Free Traffic Legal Advice

The point about making a complaint to POPLA about a flawed decision is not to get the decision reversed. POPLA will never reverse a decision, even when they admit that the decision was wrong. It is to get them to admit it and have any internal processes applied to get their assessors to re-educated.

Also, by establishing a paper trail which highlights any errors by POPLA, you then have valuable evidence that can be used in future, not just by yourself but people like us who often have to deal with this company in other cases.

The point about being pedantic about whether PoFA has Ben complied with, is that it is poorly written in certain aspects. However, there is one thing that is required, and that is full compliance with all the requirements of PoFA if the creditor wants to be able to transfer liability from the unknown driver to the known Keeper.

So, the example of implied obligation is flawed:


Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of PoFA requires that the notice must invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charge. While the Act does not require any particular wording or the use of the word "invite" itself, it does require that the keeper be clearly and directly asked to make payment. Simply stating that “you may pay or appeal” is ambiguous and does not amount to a clear invitation for the keeper to pay. That phrasing offers two generic options without clarifying that the keeper, as opposed to the driver, is being asked to settle the charge.

Likewise, stating that the driver is required to pay does not assist in fulfilling the requirement, as it refers to a different party. An implicit obligation or assumption that the keeper understands they are being asked to pay is not enough. The Act requires a positive act of communication inviting the keeper to do so. If that is missing or unclear, the notice fails to comply with paragraph 9(2)(e)(i).

Just as someone cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, a Notice cannot be partially or even mostly PoFA compliant. It is a binary matter. It either is, or it isn’t.

Whilst this point specifically has not been argued in court, and even if it were, it would not be binding anyway, I have argued it extensively with a district judge and have it on their authority that had it been argued as I have above, it would convince him that the Notice was not fully compliant with the Act.

Paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is mandatory, not merely directory.

Here’s the legal distinction and how it applies:

I, like b789, tend to read "must" as implying mandatory. But I'm not a judge.
Are there cases where judges have upheld NtKs that did not strictly meet PoFA requirements ?


That being said, 9(2)(e) (i) and (ii) go hand-in-hand because they are logically connected.

The notice (...) must (...) invite the keeper
(i)to pay the unpaid parking charges; or
(ii)if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice on to the driver

So NtK must have a (i) OR (ii) alternative to comply with 9(2)(e), not just (i) somewhere in the text and (ii) somewhere else. NtKs need to follow 9(2)(e)wording. (i) and (ii) cannot be separated because there's a logical OR between them

Further, the Boolean opposite of this proposition is (i) and (ii) (non-(i) AND non-(ii)) and this defines non-compliance with 9(2)(e) precisely as worded in 9(2)(f) which introduces the 28-day deadline:
The Notice (...) must (...) warn the keeper that if, after the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given—
(i)the amount of the unpaid parking charges specified under paragraph (d) has not been paid in full, and
(ii)the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver

So 9(2)(e) and (f) go hand-in-hand as well because they are also logically connected. That's not buy accident; legislators wanted it that way. So repeating the 9(2)(f) wording but not the 9(2)(e) wording, as Parkmaven did, makes no sense...which reinforces the mandatory must.

I hope I'm being clear.

I know judges are not mathematicians but somehow the point needs to be made
See

But is there a "warning" in ParkMaven's NtK? In this respect, the factual the notice must "warn" the Keeper, could be interpreted as directory, not mandatory. However, it falls within paragraph 9(2), which means that all those sub-points (a to i) are mandatory.

The Notice 'MUST WARN' the Keeper... but it doesn't. It simply 'advises'. Wecoiuld go on about this forever. For now, it will only be POPLA who have to be persuaded and they are usually fairly thick when it comes to analysing the nuances of PoFA, to the point of absurdity.

If it is ever litigated, the odds of it ever going as far as a hearing in front of a judge are probably less than 1%. If it ever does, then these points could be argued in the Witness Statement.

The only way this could ever be determined, once and for all, is if an appeal is made on these points and even then, it would only be persuasive, not binding unless it went to a higher court.

The phrase "must state" does not appear in Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). Instead, paragraph 9(2) opens with the phrase "The notice must—" followed by a list of specific requirements at sub-paragraphs (a) to (i).

Several of these sub-paragraphs then use the words "state that" or similar phrasing to describe what the notice must contain. This distinction matters because the legal framework of PoFA is not the same as that under the Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA).

Under the TMA, local authorities issue penalty charge notices using statutory powers, and courts have accepted substantial compliance with requirements like “must state” so long as the notice is not misleading and conveys the necessary information. However, PoFA operates in a contractual law context.

There is no automatic liability for the keeper; liability can only be transferred if the parking operator strictly complies with each of the requirements listed under paragraph 9(2). PoFA is a statutory gateway, and each condition is a mandatory precondition.

While some flexibility in language may be acceptable—such as using a synonym for “invite”—the meaning must still be clear, and ambiguity or implication is not enough. A notice that merely implies the keeper may pay, without clearly and directly inviting them to do so, does not satisfy paragraph 9(2)(e)(i).

Courts are less tolerant of ambiguity under PoFA because it governs the creation of liability where none previously existed. Therefore, comparisons to statutory law enforcement under the TMA are not applicable, and the threshold for compliance under PoFA remains strict.

Got an answer from POPLA. Pretty much as expected and carefully written ... but they don't address the 9(2)(e) non-compliance:

Your complaint about POPLA decision xxxxx

Thank you for your contact outlining the reasons why you are unhappy with the decision that has been reached by the assessor in your appeal. This was passed to me by the POPLA team as I am responsible for investigating complaints.

It is worth pointing out that before submitting an appeal, our website informs appellants that POPLA is a one-stage appeal service and we cannot reconsider your appeal if you disagree with our decision.

Clearly, the crux of your complaint is that you are unhappy with the outcome reached in the assessment of your appeal. I have noted the following points and I will address each one separately below:

You have stated that the assessor has misinterpreted the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA 2012).

I refer to section 9(2)(f) of PoFA 2012, which states that the notice to keeper must: “warn the keeper that if, at the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice to keeper is given:
(i)            The amount of the unpaid parking charges has not been paid in full, and
(ii)            The creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver,
(iii)         
the creditor will have the right to recover from the keeper so much of the amount that remains unpaid”.

The notice to keeper states:
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The assessor was therefore satisfied that it is compliant.

Although the notice to keeper requests payment within 28 days, this is assuming that the keeper is the driver. For the avoidance of doubt, the purpose of PoFA 2012 is to ensure that liability is transferred to the correct, liable party; requesting payment from the driver within 28 days is not a breach of PoFA 2012. Having reviewed the assessor’s response, I can see that this is clearly explained.

You have stated that the assessor dismissed your claim that the notice to keeper is in breach of the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice (the Code).

Within your appeal, you made reference to Section 8.1.2.e of the Code, which states: “that if the recipient appeals within 28 days of receiving the parking charge, the right to pay at the rate applicable when the appeal was made must stand for a further 14 days from the date (subject to 8.1.2d) they receive notification that their appeal has been rejected”.

This section of the Code makes reference to the amount of the charge due when an appeal response is issued. While the notice asks motorists to pay within 28 days from the date of issue, the notice is not in breach of this section. In this case, I can see that you appealed on 13 January 2025, 19 days after the date of issue. In accordance with Section 8.1.2.e of the Code, the amount due should have been £100. However, the operator held the charge at the discounted rate. Please note that this ground of appeal does not affect the validity of the parking charge notice.

You have stated the assessor has incorrectly claimed that the Code only applies to signage until 2026.

I refer to the assessor’s rationale, which explains:
“The sector Code of Practice has been jointly created by the British Parking Association (BPA) and the International Parking Community (IPC). It is largely based on the Government’s Private Parking Code of Practice, which was published in February 2022, and subsequently withdrawn in June 2022. The new Code came into force on the 1 October 2024. It is stipulated in the Code that the parking operator needs to comply with all elements relating to signage by 31 December 2026. Therefore, for any aspects of this case relating to signage, I will be referring to version 9 of the BPA Code of Practice. This is applicable for parking events that occurred from 1 February 2024.”

I refer to the Code, which states:
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The assessor therefore correctly considered the applicable British Parking Association Code of Practice when assessing the adequacy of the signage. Having reviewed the assessor’s rationale, I am satisfied that their assessment of the signage is appropriate based on the available evidence.

You have stated that the assessor failed to uphold POPLA’s own standards regarding operator rebuttals.

It is important to explain that POPLA’s role is solely to assess whether a parking charge notice was issued correctly in the first instance. While the parking operator is responsible for rebutting the appellant’s claims and demonstrating that the charge was issued correctly, it is not within POPLA’s remit to address any shortfalls in its internal appeals procedure.

You are unhappy that the assessor accepted the operator’s landowner contract as evidence of the operator’s authority to issue parking charge notices on the land.

When assessing appeals, POPLA must consider the evidence provided by both parties.

I refer to the assessor’s rationale, which explains:
“In this case the operator has provided a witness statement and an enforcement agreement and I am satisfied that the operator has the authority to issue PCN’s on this site. The operator does not need to provide a full copy of the full contract as it may contain commercially sensitive information.

While I note the appellant’s comments, from the information provided from the operator I am satisfied therefore, that the operator had sufficient authority on the date of the contravention.

Furthermore, if authority had since been removed, it is likely that the landowner would remove the signage at the same time. Not many landowners would look on quietly while someone operates on their land without their permission. The evidence provided in relation to this appeal meets the criteria POPLA requires, and therefore I am satisfied that the operator has sufficient authority at the site on the date of the parking event.”

In the absence of evidence to suggest otherwise, the assessor could only be satisfied that the operator had the relevant authority at the time.

Overall, having reviewed both the appeal and your complaint, I am satisfied the decision reached is appropriate based on the evidence presented.

In terms of POPLA’s role in the parking industry, I refer to the FAQs section of our website, which explains:
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In closing, I am sorry that your experience of using our service has not been positive. However, POPLA’s involvement in your appeal has now ended and this response concludes our complaints process. It will not be appropriate for us to correspond further on this matter and all further correspondence will be noted on your case, but not responded to.

You are of course, free to pursue this matter further through other means, such as the Courts. For independent advice, you may wish to contact Citizens Advice at: www.citizensadvice.org.uk or call 0345 404 05 06 (English) or 0345 404 0505 (Welsh).

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FYI, Parkmaven have sent a payment reminder
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As expected, here's the first debt recovery letter.
They call themselves bailiffs but there's a note at the bottom that says "this case is not subject to High Court or bailiff action"

No LOC yet.

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