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POPLA comments on operator evidence – MET Parking Services
PCN [ref]
Vehicle: [reg]
Appellant: Registered Keeper
Site: McDonald’s, Southgate Park, Stansted Airport

These comments respond to MET Parking Services’ POPLA evidence. They should be read alongside my original appeal.

1. Land is not “relevant land” under PoFA – airport byelaws apply

This car park is within the Stansted Airport boundary and is subject to airport byelaws. As a matter of law, such land is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

Paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 expressly excludes land where parking is subject to statutory control, including byelaws. Where land is not “relevant land”, PoFA keeper liability simply does not exist at all, regardless of the wording of the Notice to Keeper.

Despite this, MET’s evidence repeatedly states that they are “pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012” and asserts that their Notice to Keeper is “compliant”. That is a misstatement of the law because PoFA cannot apply on non-relevant land.

The driver has not been identified. On non-relevant land, MET may only ever pursue the driver, not the keeper. As the appellant is the registered keeper only, the appeal must be upheld for this reason alone.

2. Breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice – section 8.1.1(d)

Because this is not relevant land, MET are in clear breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) version 1.1, section 8.1.1(d), which states that:

“The parking operator must not serve a notice or include material on its website which in its design and/or language: state the keeper is liable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 where they cannot be held liable.”

MET’s Notice to Keeper and their POPLA evidence both assert that they are relying on PoFA to pursue the registered keeper at this airport-controlled site. This is exactly the type of misleading use of PoFA that section 8.1.1(d) prohibits.

POPLA is operated for the British Parking Association and must apply the PPSCoP. An operator who misleads keepers by claiming PoFA liability in circumstances where it is legally impossible should not be rewarded. This serious breach of the Code is an independent reason to allow the appeal.

3. Even if PoFA applied (it does not), the NTK is not compliant

For the avoidance of doubt, even if POPLA were to wrongly treat this as “relevant land”, MET’s Notice to Keeper still does not comply with all mandatory requirements of Schedule 4.

One key example is paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires the Notice to Keeper to “specify the period of parking” to which the notice relates. MET’s notice does not specify any period of parking; they only provide a single point in time. A moment in time is not a “period of parking” within the meaning of PoFA.

PoFA is strict. Partial or substantial compliance is not enough. Without full compliance with every mandatory paragraph, there can be no transfer of liability from driver to keeper. MET have not identified the driver and cannot rely on PoFA, whether because the land is not relevant land or because the notice is defective, or both.

4. Disabled driver and Equality Act – failure to make reasonable adjustments

MET claim they are “confident” they have complied with “all current regulations” and that the disabled driver should have gone inside, located a member of staff, and requested help displaying the badge or asked for a discretionary exemption.

That position ignores their anticipatory duty under the Equality Act 2010. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is owed in advance to disabled people as a group. It is not enough to say “you should have come and complained at the time”. Policies and systems must be designed so that disabled motorists are not placed at a substantial disadvantage.

For many disabled drivers, lifting a Blue Badge up to the dashboard may be difficult or impractical. In this case the disabled badge holder, who also has medical equipment to contend with, placed the valid Blue Badge flat on the front passenger seat. That is a reasonable adjustment to accommodate their disability.

MET’s model uses elevated remote cameras that cannot reliably see a badge on the front seat and they make no enquiry of the occupants. Their process is essentially:

– If the camera cannot see a badge on the dashboard, issue a PCN, even in a disabled bay.

That is not an Equality Act-compliant system. It is a computerised “no badge on dashboard = ticket” approach that fails to anticipate the needs of disabled motorists.

5. MET’s speculation about the badge is irrelevant and unreasonable

MET attempt to cast doubt on the Blue Badge by suggesting it “may not belong to the driver” because I have not named the driver and only provided the front of the badge.

This is irrelevant and unreasonable for several reasons:

– The Blue Badge scheme benefits the disabled person whether they are the driver or passenger; there is no requirement that the badge holder must personally be the driver.

– Providing the front of the badge is a reasonable way to evidence its validity without disclosing unnecessary personal data from the reverse side.

– The driver’s disability and use of a Blue Badge are now clearly evidenced to POPLA. MET have offered no evidence to contradict this, only speculation.

6. Camera evidence cannot prove the badge was not displayed

MET rely on photographs taken from a fixed, elevated, front-facing camera. By design, such a camera angle cannot properly see a flat object on the front passenger seat. The fact that MET’s camera could not see the badge does not prove that the badge was not displayed.

The appellant has confirmed that a valid Blue Badge was displayed and has produced evidence of it. The limitation of MET’s chosen technology is not a breach by a disabled motorist; it is a flaw in MET’s enforcement process.

7. Appeals Charter is not a defence to discrimination or misusing PoFA

MET rely heavily on their “Appeals Charter” and argue that because certain facts were not stated at the first appeal, they were entitled to ignore them. That is not correct.

A private “charter” written by the operator cannot override:

– Statutory duties under the Equality Act 2010; or
– The legal restrictions on using PoFA on non-relevant land; or
– The PPSCoP prohibition on misrepresenting keeper liability.

The salient facts are now fully before POPLA: airport-controlled land, non-relevant under PoFA; a disabled Blue Badge holder using a disabled bay; a badge reasonably displayed given their disability; and an operator misrepresenting keeper liability in breach of the Code of Practice.

8. Conclusion

To summarise:

1. This site is within the Stansted Airport boundary and subject to byelaws. It is not “relevant land” under PoFA, so keeper liability cannot arise in law.
2. MET’s NtK and evidence wrongly state that they are pursuing the registered keeper under PoFA, in clear breach of PPSCoP section 8.1.1(d).
3. Even if PoFA applied (it does not), the NtK fails mandatory requirements such as specifying a period of parking, so no keeper liability could arise in any event.
4. A disabled Blue Badge holder used a disabled bay, and the badge was displayed in a way that was reasonable and necessary given their disability. MET’s system and practices fail to make reasonable adjustments and rely on limited camera angles rather than proper checks.

For all these reasons, I submit that this Parking Charge Notice is unenforceable against the registered keeper and invite POPLA to allow the appeal.

POPLA comments on operator evidence – MET Parking Services
PCN: [reference]
Vehicle: [registration]
Appellant: Registered Keeper
Site: McDonald’s [location]

These comments respond to MET Parking Services’ POPLA evidence. They should be read alongside my original appeal.

1. No keeper liability – Notice to Keeper is not PoFA-compliant

MET say they are “pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012” and describe their Notice to Keeper (NtK) as “compliant”. It is not.

Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to “specify the period of parking” to which the notice relates. MET’s NtK does not specify any period of parking. It shows only still images with single timestamps, taken within a very short interval. A series of moments in time is not a “period of parking”.

The NtK does not state when any alleged parking event began, when it ended, or how long the vehicle was parked. Without a specified period of parking, MET have failed to comply with a mandatory condition of Schedule 4. PoFA is strict; partial or substantial compliance is not enough.

Because the NtK is not fully compliant, MET cannot transfer liability from the unknown driver to the registered keeper. The driver has not been identified. In law, only the driver could be liable. For this reason alone, the appeal must be allowed.

2. Misuse of PoFA – breach of PPSCoP section 8.1.1(d)

The Private Parking Single Code of Practice (version 1.1) at section 8.1.1(d) states that an operator must not:

“state the keeper is liable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 where they cannot be held liable.”

Here, MET cannot hold the keeper liable because their NtK does not satisfy PoFA. Nevertheless, both the NtK and their POPLA evidence repeatedly assert that they are pursuing the keeper under Schedule 4 and that their NtK is “compliant”.

That is exactly the kind of misrepresentation that section 8.1.1(d) prohibits. POPLA is operated for the BPA and should not endorse operators who mislead keepers about their legal liability. This breach of the Code is an independent ground to allow the appeal.

3. Equality Act 2010 – failure to make reasonable adjustments

MET argue that because the disabled driver did not speak to staff at the time, no “reasonable adjustments” were requested and therefore none were required. That is a misunderstanding of the Equality Act.

The duty to make reasonable adjustments for disabled people is anticipatory. It applies to policies and systems in advance, for disabled people as a group. Service providers must design their procedures so that disabled users are not placed at a substantial disadvantage. It is not enough to say, after issuing a charge, that “you should have asked for help”.

In this case:

– The driver is a disabled Blue Badge holder.
– The driver has mobility restrictions and uses a steering aid and medical equipment.
– The badge was placed flat on the front passenger seat so that the driver did not need to twist, reach or lift it to dashboard height.

For some disabled drivers, lifting and positioning a badge on the dashboard is not realistic or safe. Placing the badge flat on the front seat was a reasonable way to display it in light of the driver’s disability. That method would be easily visible from normal ground-level inspection at the vehicle.

MET’s model uses elevated, remote cameras and no human check at ground level. Their effective policy appears to be:

– “If our overhead camera cannot see a badge on the dashboard, we will issue a PCN, even in a disabled bay.”

This is not an Equality Act-compliant system. It fails to anticipate that some disabled drivers cannot safely follow a rigid “on the dashboard only” requirement, and it offers no built-in flexibility or reasonable adjustment before issuing a charge.

4. MET’s suggestion that the driver should have hunted for a manager is unrealistic

MET say the driver should have gone inside, located a staff member or manager and either:

– asked for help lifting the badge to the dashboard, or
– requested a discretionary exemption.

This is not a reasonable expectation to impose on a disabled person who has parked in a marked disabled bay for a short visit to a restaurant.

It would require the disabled driver to:

– Walk or manoeuvre into the restaurant while already struggling with mobility and medical equipment.
– Find a suitable staff member or manager, explain their disability and personal circumstances in public, and then rely on that individual’s ad-hoc discretion.

The Equality Act does not require disabled people to negotiate bespoke exemptions every time they visit a premises. It requires the service provider to structure its policies so that disabled people can use the service in the first place without being placed at a substantial disadvantage.

The fact that MET say “an exemption is not guaranteed and is at the discretion of the manager on duty” simply underlines that their system is discretionary and ad hoc, not anticipatory or embedded as the law requires.

5. Blue Badge evidence – MET’s speculation is irrelevant

MET say it is “entirely possible” that the badge “does not belong to the driver” because the keeper has not named the driver and only the front of the badge has been provided.

This is irrelevant and unreasonable:

– The Blue Badge scheme benefits the disabled person, whether they are the driver or the passenger. There is no requirement that the badge holder must personally be the driver.
– Providing only the front of the badge is a proportionate way to evidence its validity while avoiding unnecessary disclosure of personal data on the reverse.
– MET have provided no evidence at all that the badge is invalid or misused; they merely speculate.

POPLA should attach no weight to MET’s speculation. The reasonable inference from the evidence is that a genuine disabled person was using a disabled bay with a valid badge.

6. Camera evidence does not prove the badge was not displayed or that a contract was formed

MET rely on a handful of photos taken from a fixed, elevated, front-facing camera over a very short time period (around a minute). That tells POPLA only that at those moments, from that particular angle, their camera could not see something lying flat on the passenger seat.

It does not prove that:

– The badge was not displayed at other times during the stay; or
– The badge could not be seen from a normal human viewpoint at the vehicle; or
– The vehicle was parked for any defined “period of parking” beyond the minimum consideration time required to read the signs and settle.

The appellant has explained that the badge was displayed on the seat and has provided a copy of the badge. The limitation lies in MET’s chosen technology and enforcement method, not in the conduct of a disabled motorist.

7. “Appeals Charter” cannot override statute or the Code

MET rely heavily on their own “Appeals Charter” and say the case does not fall under categories F.3(e) or F.3(g). That internal document is not law and cannot override:

– The statutory requirements of Schedule 4 PoFA;
– The Equality Act duty to make reasonable adjustments; or
– The PPSCoP prohibition on misusing PoFA.

The salient facts now before POPLA are:

– The NtK is non-compliant with PoFA and cannot create keeper liability.
– MET nevertheless assert keeper liability under PoFA, contrary to PPSCoP 8.1.1(d).
– A disabled Blue Badge holder used a disabled bay and displayed a valid badge in a way that was necessary and reasonable given their disability.
– MET’s enforcement model fails to anticipate and reasonably accommodate disabled users.

8. Conclusion

In summary:

1. MET’s NtK does not specify any period of parking and therefore fails a mandatory requirement of Schedule 4 PoFA. The appellant, as registered keeper, cannot be held liable.
2. Despite this, MET assert keeper liability under PoFA, in breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice section 8.1.1(d).
3. A disabled Blue Badge holder used a disabled bay. The badge was displayed on the front passenger seat because of the driver’s mobility and medical needs. That was a reasonable adjustment in practice.
4. MET’s rigid insistence on dashboard-only display, enforced solely by remote elevated cameras and discretionary “exemptions” on request, does not meet their anticipatory duty under the Equality Act 2010.
5. MET’s speculation about the badge and reliance on an internal “Appeals Charter” do nothing to cure these legal defects.

For all of these reasons, I submit that this Parking Charge Notice is unenforceable against the registered keeper and invite POPLA to allow the appeal.