Free Traffic Legal Advice

Nothing special in there. The court has set a date for a hearing on 30th October. The Claimant must pay the trial fee of £27 no later than 4pm on 2nd October. The Claimant must submit their 'bundle' no earlier than 7 days and not later than 3 days before the hearing.

At some point, they will submit a copy of their WS to you. Do not prepare your own WS before seeing theirs. If you have not received anything from the claimant by 2nd October, call the court and check to see if the trial fee has been paid. If it hasn't, then the claim is struck out.

Hi There,
I received the claimant's witness statement located below:
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/6cvjkv37swwpq77on2v4t/AEWqgLgZkoH8YIz4tDM1pJc?rlkey=66iealapwjqbd8b7blbse5rms&st=w93di3s4&dl=0

 Two things I would like to highlight:
1. The claimant is not attending the hearing. Does its have any implication on the case?
2. Clause 33 on page 7 states that I parked from 11:39 to 12:04 or 25 minutes. I was maneuvering in the parking from 9:11:39 am to 9:12:04 or 25 seconds. Does it change anything?

I have few questions:
1. Do I need to file a defendant witness statement? Any templates I can use. Page 15 of the claimant's statement shows that the parking lot is quite busy. I would like to provide a video of my own to that effect. In addition, the internet is full of many horror stories on the parking company being quite aggressive in issuing PCNs. I am happy to avoid filing this information is deemed redundant.

2. The Notice of Allocation Small Court Track (provided earlier) states that claimant has to pay trial fee by 02-oct-2025. Further, it thats that " Each party must deliver to the other party and to the court office copies of all documents on which that party intends to rely at the hearing no later than fourteen days before the hearing." The hearing date is 30th October-2025. Can I wait until 3rd October to file witness statement so that efforts are not wasted.

As always, would appreciate relevant pointers and support.

I’ll make a full response when I get back the the UK in a few days. However, a quick read of their WS shows that it is not a WS at all but a repeat of the amended PoC they were ordered to submit.

A WS written by an emoloyee of their Legsl representative is only hearsay and the court should give little to no weight to it all. A WS must be written I. The first person. If it is not, then it is not a “Witness Statement”.

Also, the paralegal has the audacity to tell the court that the defence is from the internet and then goes on to imply that the defendant is incapable of understanding it or the relevant law and CPRs. That is a sanctionable commentary and definitely not within her knowledge, even though she has signed it under an SoT.

This wil need further scrutiny and most of i5 can be rebutted. Whilst the “witness” will not be attending, they will likely send a “gun for hire” advocate.

You will have to remember that the judge on the day will most likely not have had any ti me to review the case and will only be skim reading it. Therefore, any WS needs to be concise and highlight the errors and false claims made by the claimant and the fact that the PoC were still defective, photos tsk en over the span of a few seconds do not establish that a contract was formed, their photo  the terms sign for blue badge holders does not bear any relation to their evidential photos of the location the vehicle was photographed in. There is no requirement on the defendant to prove anything. The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove their claim.

The list will go on.

If the trial fee is paid, I suggest you keep your WS short and succinct. I know that most district judges like a quiet life and having to trawl through reams of legal argument in a claim of this type and size makes them unhappy. You do not want an unhappy judge.

The judge, on the day, will have only had maybe 10 minutes or so to go through the 'bundle'. The main things they will read first are the PoC and the defence. If necessary, they will then have to refer to the WS. As the claimants WS is nothing but a rehash of the further PoC and also include fresh assertions that were not made in the PoC, include case law as 'evidence' and ad hominem commentary on the defence, it should alert the judge that they are dealing with a firm of incompetents and the case is not worth dealing with and should be thrown out.

So, I suggest the following as your fairly brief WS, that hopefully, the judge will feel happy about. Do not submit anything until it is clear that the trial fee has been paid.

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT WATFORD

Claim No: [Claim Number]

BETWEEN:

Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd
Claimant

- and -

[Defendant's Full Name]

Defendant

---

WITNESS STATEMENT

1. I am the Defendant and a litigant in person. I rely on my Amended Defence. I deliberately adduce no evidence of my own. What follows is drawn entirely from the Claimant’s Further Particulars of Claim, the paralegal’s witness statement, and the Claimant’s exhibits (including the Notice to Keeper).

2. The original Particulars of Claim did not disclose a proper cause of action. The court afforded the Claimant a lifeline and ordered Further Particulars. Despite that indulgence, the Further Particulars still fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) because they do not set out a concise statement of material facts establishing liability.

3. As a litigant in person I have been put to disproportionate and avoidable time and effort by a professionally represented serial litigant. Even after being given a second chance, the Claimant has served a pleading that remains defective and a witness statement that largely rehashes the same shortcomings.

4. The Claimant has given notice under CPR 27.9 that it will not attend. No witness of fact is available for questioning. The paralegal’s statement is hearsay and contains advocacy and commentary. I ask the Court to place little weight on assertions that are not proved by the exhibits.

5. The Claimant elected to pursue keeper liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Strict compliance is required. The Notice to Keeper states only a single timestamp and no period of parking, so it does not satisfy PoFA Sch 4 para 9(2)(a). This point was confirmed in Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) at paras 27–28; I rely on that authority as set out in my Skeleton Argument.

6. The paralegal’s statement then asserts a different timeline, alleging a 25-minute duration with different times. That contradicts the Notice to Keeper. The Claimant’s own materials are inconsistent on time and duration and cannot establish a breach.

7. The photographs relied upon do not prove a period of parking. At most they show a brief stationary interval consistent with manoeuvring. They do not evidence parking for any duration. See Jopson v Homeguard (2016) (stopping briefly for a legitimate purpose ≠ parking); full reference in my Skeleton.

8. The allegation of failing to display a Blue Badge is not proved. There is no clear, probative image of the windscreen showing that no badge was displayed. The burden rests on the Claimant; it has not been discharged on its own exhibits.

9. The Claimant seeks to add £70 to the £100 charge. The signage wording quoted by the Claimant refers only to a £100 charge for failure to display a badge. The Notice to Keeper also makes no mention of any £70. The first reference to £170 appears only in later correspondence. A later reminder cannot retrospectively enlarge the contract. The extra £70 is not part of the contract and is irrecoverable; see ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 at [98], per my Skeleton.

10. The Claimant’s reliance on trade body codes to justify the £70 is muddled and misdated. Its own Notice to Keeper names one trade body, while later documents invoke another and refer to a code dated after the 2023 event. A later or different code cannot create a term that did not exist at the time.

11. Interest is not properly particularised. The Further Particulars do not identify the start date or show the calculation to the pleaded figure. That remains defective.

12. Standing is not proved. The contract produced is redacted so that the identity and authority of the signatory and the status of the counterparty are concealed. The Court cannot verify any grant of authority to issue charges or to sue in the operator’s own name on the version served.

13. The Notice to Keeper’s keeper-warning wording does not mirror the statutory invitation and warning required by paragraph 9(2)(f). It conflates payment and driver-naming and does not satisfy PoFA. Having elected to rely on PoFA, the Claimant must strictly comply. It has not.

14. The Claimant has not identified the driver and has not complied with PoFA; I rely on Excel v Smith (2017) and VCS v Edward (2023) as set out in my Skeleton.

15. The paralegal’s statement adds legal submissions and gratuitous, ad hominem aspersions about my understanding. The deponent does not know me. Such speculation under a Statement of Truth is improper and should be disregarded. A professionally represented claimant should narrow the issues; instead, its materials have expanded them and wasted court and party time.

16. On the Claimant’s own materials there is no proved breach, no compliant route to keeper liability, no contractual basis for the £70, no properly pleaded interest, and no proved standing. The claim discloses no reasonable grounds and should be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a). In the alternative, it should be dismissed.

17. Given the Claimant’s decision not to attend and the manner in which its case has been advanced—defective pleadings despite a second chance, inconsistent timelines, hearsay presented as “witness” evidence, and reliance on documents that do not prove the alleged breach—I invite the Court to consider a modest costs order for unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g).

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:


Date:

If the trial fee is pad by the deadline, let us know and I will provide the skeleton to go with your WS which can be submitted 14 days before the hearing.

Change para #4 to:

4. 4. The Claimant will not attend (CPR 27.9) and no witness of fact is available. The statement is signed by a ‘Legal Assistant’ claiming conduct of the action ‘subject to supervision’. Conduct of litigation is a reserved activity (LSA 2007 ss.12, 14; Sch.2) and supervision does not cure unauthorised conduct: Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB). I invite the Court to give little weight to hearsay/advocacy not proved by exhibits, require confirmation that the signatory is authorised or exempt, and note the apparent breach when addressing costs (CPR 27.14(2)(g)).

Submit the WS 7 days before the hearing (if that is what the directions order states, because it is normally 14 days) by email to the court and CC the claimant (or their legal representative if they are represented) and also CC yourself. Each page of the WS must be numbered. You sing it by typing your full name.

You can submit the skeleton (below) 2-3 working days before the hearing date. Again, sent to the court and CC'd to the claimant. You will need to also attach the transcripts listed below for the 'unreported' cases and only need the relevant page of the transcript with para highlighted for the Beavis references.

This is a list of the transcripts you will need to attach to the skeleton:

Authorities List (Defendant) — to accompany Skeleton Argument

• Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (County Court appeal, 2023)
Proposition relied on: PoFA Sch 4 para 9(2)(a) requires a period of parking; a single timestamp is insufficient.
Pinpoint: paras 27–28.
Transcript: Attached (unreported) — relevant paragraphs highlighted.

• Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (County Court appeal, Oxford, 29 June 2016, case no. B9GF0A9E)
Proposition relied on: Brief stopping/manoeuvring is not “parking”.
Pinpoint: the passage defining “parking” versus brief stop (commonly cited section).
Transcript: Attached (unreported) — relevant paragraph(s) highlighted.

• Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Edward (County Court appeal, 2023)
Proposition relied on: Where PoFA is not met, the claimant must prove the defendant was the driver; no inference from keeper status.
Pinpoint: the holding on driver proof (core passage).
Transcript: Attached (unreported) — relevant passage highlighted.

• ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67
Proposition relied on: The parking charge includes the costs of enforcement; bolted-on “debt recovery” sums are double recovery.
Pinpoint: [98].
Transcript: Not attached (reported). A copy of [98] will be available at the hearing if required.

• Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan (2023) (E7GM9W44)
Proposition relied on: Strike-out where particulars are vague/defective and disclose no proper cause of action.
Pinpoint: judgment rationale.
Transcript: Attached (unreported) — relevant passage highlighted.

• CPMS v Akande (2024) (K0DP5J30)
Proposition relied on: Requirement for further/better particulars; strike-out where PoC remain non-compliant after opportunity to cure.
Pinpoint: judgment rationale.
Transcript: Attached (unreported) — relevant passage highlighted.

Notes:
• Only the unreported authorities are appended, with the exact paragraphs relied upon clearly highlighted.
• This list is served with the Skeleton Argument. Copies for the court and the claimant will be provided in hard copy at the hearing.

Here is the Skeleton that the transcripts go with:

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT WATFORD
CLAIM NO: [claim number]
Private Parking Solutions Ltd (Claimant) v [your full name] (Defendant)

SKELETON ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

A. INTRODUCTION AND ISSUES

1. This Skeleton supports my Amended Defence and invites the Court to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) as disclosing no reasonable grounds, or alternatively to dismiss it. I rely solely on the Claimant’s own materials: its Further Particulars of Claim (“F-PoC”), its paralegal/“Legal Assistant” witness statement (“WS”), and the exhibits (including the Notice to Keeper, “NtK”).

2. The issues are:

(1) Keeper liability under PoFA Sch 4 is unavailable: the NtK fails mandatory requirements (no “period of parking” under para 9(2)(a); defective keeper warning under para 9(2)(f)).
(2) In the absence of PoFA compliance, the Claimant must prove I was the driver; it does not.
(3) Breach is not proved on the exhibits (contradictory timings; photos do not evidence “parking”).
(4) The additional £70 is not contractual and is irrecoverable (double recovery).
(5) Interest is not properly particularised (PD 16).
(6) Standing is not proved: the contract is redacted in the very respects needed to show authority.
(7) Weight and conduct: the WS is largely hearsay/advocacy; the Claimant will not attend (CPR 27.9); there is an additional concern about unauthorised conduct of litigation.

B. STRIKE-OUT: PLEADINGS DEFECTIVE EVEN AFTER A “SECOND CHANCE”

3. The original PoC did not disclose a cause of action. The Court afforded the Claimant a lifeline by directing F-PoC. Despite that indulgence, the F-PoC remains non-compliant with CPR 16.4(1)(a): it still does not set out a concise statement of material facts establishing liability (including a coherent PoFA route, a pleaded driver case if PoFA fails, or a contractual basis for the £70).

4. Persuasive authorities support strike-out where particulars remain inadequate despite an opportunity to cure (e.g. Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan (2023); CPMS v Akande (2024)).

C. POfA NON-COMPLIANCE: KEEPER LIABILITY FAILS

5. The Claimant elects to pursue me as keeper under PoFA. Strict compliance is required. The NtK states only a single timestamp and no “period of parking”, contrary to para 9(2)(a). Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) confirms that a single instant does not suffice; there must be a period of parking.

6. The NtK’s keeper warning departs from para 9(2)(f) by conflating payment and driver-naming and not mirroring the prescribed invitation/warning. Having elected PoFA, the Claimant must bring itself strictly within it; it has not.

7. Result: keeper liability is unavailable. The claim can only succeed by proving I was the driver; it does not attempt to do so.

D. DRIVER NOT PROVED

8. Where PoFA is not met, the Claimant must prove the defendant was the driver. The persuasive appellate decisions in Excel Parking Services Ltd v Smith (2017) and VCS v Edward (2023) confirm there is no presumption that keeper = driver. The Claimant adduces no such proof.

E. BREACH NOT PROVED ON THE CLAIMANT’S OWN EXHIBITS

9. The Claimant’s materials are internally inconsistent on time. The NtK fixes a single “incident” time, whereas the WS asserts a different 25-minute window. That contradiction undermines any alleged period of parking and the allegation of breach.

10. The photographs do not evidence “parking” as opposed to a brief stop/manoeuvre. Jopson v Homeguard (2016) (CC appeal) explains that brief stopping is not “parking”.

11. The allegation of “no Blue Badge displayed” is unsupported by a clear, probative windscreen image. The burden of proof lies with the Claimant; it has not discharged it.

F. THE £70 ADD-ON: NOT CONTRACTUAL; DOUBLE RECOVERY

12. The signage wording quoted by the Claimant states a £100 charge for failure to display a Blue Badge; the NtK likewise contains no £70 term. The first reference to £170 appears only in later correspondence. A post-event reminder cannot retrospectively enlarge the contract.

13. The £70 is an impermissible add-on. ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 at [98] explains that the charge includes the costs of enforcement and debt recovery; adding a fixed “debt recovery” sum is double recovery.

14. The Claimant’s reliance on trade-body codes to justify the £70 is muddled and misdated (including reference to a code adopted after the 2023 event and a different ATA than named on the NtK). A code cannot invent a term that was not part of the contract.

G. INTEREST NOT PARTICULARISED

15. The F-PoC pleads a figure and daily rate but gives no start date or calculation basis, contrary to PD 16. The pleading remains defective.

H. STANDING NOT PROVED

16. The contract exhibit is redacted such that the identity/role of the signatory and the status of the counter-party are concealed. The Court cannot verify a grant of authority to issue PCNs and to litigate in the operator’s own name. The Claimant is put to strict proof; little weight should attach to a document that hides the very matters it is tendered to prove.

I. WEIGHT, NON-ATTENDANCE, AND UNAUTHORISED CONDUCT

17. The Claimant will not attend (CPR 27.9). Its WS is signed by a “Legal Assistant” who claims “conduct of the action subject to supervision”. Conduct of litigation is a reserved activity (Legal Services Act 2007, ss.12, 14; Sch.2). Supervision does not cure unauthorised conduct: Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB). I invite the Court to: (i) give little weight to hearsay/advocacy not proved by exhibits (Civil Evidence Act 1995, s.4; CPR 32.1 powers apply on small claims); (ii) require confirmation that the signatory is authorised or exempt; and (iii) note the apparent breach when addressing costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g).

J. RELIEF SOUGHT

18. On the Claimant’s own materials: (i) PoFA is not complied with; (ii) the driver is not proved; (iii) breach is not proved; (iv) the £70 add-on is not contractual; (v) interest is not particularised; and (vi) standing is not proved. The Court is invited to:

(1) Strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a); or
(2) Dismiss the claim; and
(3) Make a modest costs order for unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g) given the defective pleadings despite a second chance, contradictory materials, non-attendance of any witness of fact, and the concerns under the LSA 2007 highlighted above.

Authorities

• ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [98]
• Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (CC appeal, Oxford, 2016, B9GF0A9E)
• Excel Parking Services Ltd v Smith (CC appeal, 2017)
• Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Edward (CC appeal, 2023)
• Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (CC appeal, 2023), [27]–[28]
• Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan (2023) (E7GM9W44)
• CPMS v Akande (2024) (K0DP5J30)

Statute/Rules: PoFA 2012 Sch 4 (esp. 9(2)(a), 9(2)(f)); CPR 3.4(2)(a), 16.4(1)(a), 27.9, 27.14(2)(g); PD 16 (interest particulars); Civil Evidence Act 1995 s.4; Legal Services Act 2007 ss.12, 14 and Sch.2; Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).

I guess I just attach the whole documents to the email. In that case it should be easy, or do I put somehow put it in one doc (skeleton + all transcripts)?

Not to worry. Here is an updated Skeleton that you should submit the week before the hiring. You should also take two copies of it with you on the day:

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT WATFORD
CLAIM NO: [claim number]
Private Parking Solutions Ltd (Claimant) v [your full name] (Defendant)

SKELETON ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

A. INTRODUCTION AND ISSUES

1. This Skeleton supports my Amended Defence and invites strike-out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) (no reasonable grounds) or dismissal. The Claimant’s case has been advanced first by a Legal Assistant who expressly claimed “conduct of the action subject to supervision”, and then—at the eleventh hour—by a different deponent (a solicitor) who simply re-signed the same witness statement. That late substitution is prejudicial and unreasonable.

2. The issues are:

(1) Keeper liability under PoFA Sch 4 is unavailable: the NtK fails mandatory requirements (no “period of parking” under para 9(2)(a); defective keeper warning under para 9(2)(f)).
(2) In the absence of PoFA compliance, the Claimant must prove I was the driver; it does not.
(3) Breach is not proved on the exhibits (contradictory timings; photos do not evidence “parking”).
(4) The additional £70 is not contractual and is irrecoverable (double recovery).
(5) Interest is not properly particularised (PD 16).
(6) Standing is not proved: the contract is redacted in the very respects needed to show authority.
(7) Weight and conduct: the WS is largely hearsay/advocacy; the Claimant will not attend (CPR 27.9); there is an additional concern about unauthorised conduct of litigation.
( Late substitution/ambush: the Claimant has replaced the paralegal deponent with a solicitor at the last minute, without permission, to “cure” an unauthorised conduct point; this is an abuse that should be excluded or attract costs.

B. STRIKE-OUT: PLEADINGS DEFECTIVE EVEN AFTER A “SECOND CHANCE”

3. The original PoC did not disclose a cause of action. The Court afforded the Claimant a lifeline by directing F-PoC. Despite that indulgence, the F-PoC remains non-compliant with CPR 16.4(1)(a): it still does not set out a concise statement of material facts establishing liability (including a coherent PoFA route, a pleaded driver case if PoFA fails, or a contractual basis for the £70).

4. Persuasive authorities support strike-out where particulars remain inadequate despite an opportunity to cure (e.g. Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan (2023); CPMS v Akande (2024)).

C. LATE SUBSTITUTION OF WITNESS: AMBUSH AND ABUSE

5. The Claimant first served a witness statement signed by a Legal Assistant who stated she had “conduct of this action, subject to the supervision of [her] principal.” Conduct of litigation is a reserved activity (Legal Services Act 2007, ss.12 & 14; Sch.2). Supervision does not authorise an otherwise unauthorised person to conduct litigation: Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).

6. At the eleventh hour, the Claimant served a second witness statement (“WS2”) in the same terms but now signed by a solicitor who asserts she “is a Solicitor… [and has] conduct of this matter” and re-signs a fresh Statement of Truth dated 14 October 2025.

7. This is not a correction of a slip; it is a late substitution of the witness. On Denton, the breach is serious and significant; no good reason is given; and all the circumstances—especially trial by ambush—favour refusal of relief. The Defendant prepared to meet a paralegal deponent; the evidential foundation has been switched to a solicitor with no first-hand knowledge.

8. Orders sought (sequenced):

(i) Exclusion: refuse WS2; confine the Claimant to the first statement; or
(ii) Adjournment with costs (if WS2 is admitted): vacate and relist with the Claimant paying the Defendant’s costs thrown away; and
(iii) Attendance: if the Court proceeds, require WS2’s deponent to attend for cross-examination; otherwise WS2 should attract little or no weight (CPR 32.1; CEA 1995, s.4).

D. WEIGHT, NON-ATTENDANCE, AND UNAUTHORISED CONDUCT

9. The Claimant chose to advance its case initially via a Legal Assistant who admitted “conduct of the action subject to supervision.” Conduct of litigation is a reserved activity (LSA 2007, ss.12, 14; Sch.2). Supervision does not confer authorisation: Mazur (above). The later switch to a solicitor deponent—re-signing the same narrative—confirms the attempt to “cure” this defect, but does so out of time and without permission. The Court should: (i) give minimal weight to lawyer-authored advocacy and hearsay; (ii) exclude WS2 or require attendance for cross-examination; and (iii) mark the unreasonable conduct in costs.

E. POfA NON-COMPLIANCE: KEEPER LIABILITY FAILS

10. The Claimant elects to pursue me as keeper under PoFA. Strict compliance is required. The NtK states only a single timestamp and no “period of parking”, contrary to para 9(2)(a). Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) confirms that a single instant does not suffice; there must be a period of parking.

11. The NtK’s keeper warning departs from para 9(2)(f) by conflating payment and driver-naming and not mirroring the prescribed invitation/warning. Having elected PoFA, the Claimant must bring itself strictly within it; it has not.

12 Result: keeper liability is unavailable. The claim can only succeed by proving I was the driver; it does not attempt to do so.

F. DRIVER NOT PROVED

13. Where PoFA is not met, the Claimant must prove the defendant was the driver. The persuasive appellate decisions in Excel Parking Services Ltd v Smith (2017) and VCS v Edward (2023) confirm there is no presumption that keeper = driver. The Claimant adduces no such proof.

G. BREACH NOT PROVED ON THE CLAIMANT’S OWN EXHIBITS

14. The Claimant’s materials are internally inconsistent on time. The NtK fixes a single “incident” time, whereas the WS asserts a different 25-minute window. That contradiction undermines any alleged period of parking and the allegation of breach.

15. The photographs do not evidence “parking” as opposed to a brief stop/manoeuvre. Jopson v Homeguard (2016) (CC appeal) explains that brief stopping is not “parking”.

16. The allegation of “no Blue Badge displayed” is unsupported by a clear, probative windscreen image. The burden of proof lies with the Claimant; it has not discharged it.

H. THE £70 ADD-ON: NOT CONTRACTUAL; DOUBLE RECOVERY

17. The signage wording quoted by the Claimant states a £100 charge for failure to display a Blue Badge; the NtK likewise contains no £70 term. The first reference to £170 appears only in later correspondence. A post-event reminder cannot retrospectively enlarge the contract.

18. The £70 is an impermissible add-on. ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 at [98] explains that the charge includes the costs of enforcement and debt recovery; adding a fixed “debt recovery” sum is double recovery.

19. The Claimant’s reliance on trade-body codes to justify the £70 is muddled and misdated (including reference to a code adopted after the 2023 event and a different ATA than named on the NtK). A code cannot invent a term that was not part of the contract.

I. INTEREST NOT PARTICULARISED

20. The F-PoC pleads a figure and daily rate but gives no start date or calculation basis, contrary to PD 16. The pleading remains defective.

J. STANDING NOT PROVED

21. The contract exhibit is redacted such that the identity/role of the signatory and the status of the counter-party are concealed. The Court cannot verify a grant of authority to issue PCNs and to litigate in the operator’s own name. The Claimant is put to strict proof; little weight should attach to a document that hides the very matters it is tendered to prove.

K. RELIEF SOUGHT

22. On the Claimant’s own materials: (i) PoFA is not complied with; (ii) the driver is not proved; (iii) breach is not proved; (iv) the £70 add-on is not contractual; (v) interest is not particularised; and (vi) standing is not proved. The Court is invited to:

(1) Strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a); or
(2) Dismiss the claim; and
(3) Costs for unreasonable conduct (CPR 27.14(2)(g)): The Claimant’s conduct includes (a) persistently defective pleadings despite a second chance; (b) contradictory materials; (c) advancing its case through an unauthorised person; and (d) an eleventh-hour witness substitution to “cure” that defect, causing prejudice. If WS2 is admitted, the Defendant seeks an adjournment with the Claimant to pay costs thrown away; if excluded, the Defendant seeks costs of and caused by the application.

Authorities

• ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [98]
• Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd (CC appeal, Oxford, 2016, B9GF0A9E)
• Excel Parking Services Ltd v Smith (CC appeal, 2017)
• Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Edward (CC appeal, 2023)
• Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (CC appeal, 2023), [27]–[28]
• Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan (2023) (E7GM9W44)
• CPMS v Akande (2024) (K0DP5J30)

Statute/Rules: PoFA 2012 Sch 4 (esp. 9(2)(a), 9(2)(f)); CPR 3.4(2)(a), 16.4(1)(a), 27.9, 27.14(2)(g); PD 16 (interest particulars); Civil Evidence Act 1995 s.4; Legal Services Act 2007 ss.12, 14 and Sch.2; Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB).