Free Traffic Legal Advice

The operator’s evidence pack is a classic example of irrelevance and obfuscation, spectacularly failing to address the single most important legal requirement: compliance with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). The third page of their own evidence confirms that the date of the alleged contravention was 21/12/2024, and the Notice to Keeper (NtK) was issued on 02/01/2025. Being a Thursday, the earliest this could be “given” is Monday 06/01/2025 – 16 days after the event. Under PoFA Schedule 4, paragraph 9(4)(b), a NtK must be delivered within 14 days of the date of the alleged contravention to create keeper liability. The operator has missed this statutory deadline and cannot rely on PoFA. The rest of their submission is therefore irrelevant, because they have not established any liability on the part of the keeper.

Despite this being fatal to their claim, they try to bluff their way through the appeal by falsely asserting that the NtK was issued “within the required timeframe.” This is either basic ignorance of statutory requirements or a wilful attempt to mislead. Either way, POPLA must not allow operators to proceed on the basis of such blatant disregard for the law.

Even if PoFA had been complied with (it wasn’t), the signage at the site is wholly incapable of forming a contract with the driver. The signs simply state: “NO PARKING AT ALL TIMES”. This is not an offer to park under terms; it is a clear prohibition. Contract law requires that an offer is made, which can then be accepted by conduct (parking). Where parking is forbidden entirely, there can be no offer and thus no contract.

This legal principle is supported by PCM UK v Bull (Wimbledon County Court, 2016), where the judge held that prohibitory signs cannot form a contractual agreement because they do not offer terms that can be accepted. The same view was expressed in Horizon Parking v Mr J. C (2016), where the judge found that a sign stating "no parking" cannot constitute an offer capable of acceptance and no contract was formed.

The operator’s evidence shows that the signage in question contains prohibitory language only. The signage does not specify terms for permitted parking or any charge for authorised use – because none is permitted. If parking is not permitted at all, then no contract can arise and any driver parking there cannot be said to have “accepted terms.” The operator’s assertion that a contract was formed is legally unsustainable.

In addition, the operator has provided no valid evidence of landowner authority. A single page labelled “site agreement” is presented with no start date, no term, and no indication that it flows from the landowner. This fails to meet the evidential burden established in ParkingEye v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1338, which requires proof of the operator’s legal standing to offer contracts and pursue charges in their own name. CUP’s one-page document does not come close to meeting this standard and would not be accepted in court.

For the benefit of the POPLA assessor, I repeat the requirements of a valid landowner contract according to section 14 of the PPSCoP and if you compare what has been provided by the operator, it is not difficult to see where their evidence fails miserably to prove any contractual right flowing from the landowner:

Relationship with landowner

14.1. Where controlled land is being managed on behalf of a landowner(s), before a parking charge can be issued written confirmation must be obtained by the parking operator from the landowner(s) covering:

a) the identity of the landowner(s)
b) a boundary map of the land to be managed;
c) such byelaws as may apply to the land relating to the management of parking;
d) the permission granted to the parking operator by the landowner(s) and the duration of that permission
e) the parking terms and conditions that are to be applied by the parking operator, including as appropriate the duration of free parking permitted, parking tariffs, and specific permissions and exemptions, e.g. for staff, residents or those stopping for short periods such as taxi and minicab drivers, delivery drivers and couriers;
f) the means by which parking charges will be issued;
NOTE 1: For example, to the windscreen or through the post.
g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents e.g. planning or advertising consents relating to signs h) the obligations under which the parking operator is working, in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA;
i) notification of the documentation that the parking operator may be required to supply on request to authorised bodies detailing the relationship with the landowner; and
j) the parking operator’s approach to the handling of appeals against parking charges.
NOTE 2: Where byelaws have been made, which prohibit the issuance of a parking charge, unless specific legal provision has been made to suspend them, they take precedence and therefore careful consideration must be given to ensuring that the parking management arrangements are consistent with them.
NOTE 3: Particular care is needed to establish appropriate contractual terms, including the application of parking terms and conditions, in respect of controlled land where leaseholders may have rights that cannot be qualified or overruled e.g. by imposing a requirement on the resident of an apartment block to display a permit to park in contravention of their rights under their lease, or to ensure that free parking periods do not breach planning consents.

To summarise:

- The operator has failed to comply with PoFA paragraph 9(4)(b) and cannot pursue the keeper.
- The signage is prohibitory and incapable of forming a contract under basic contract law.
- No contract was formed with the unidentified driver.
- The operator has failed to demonstrate landowner authority or legal standing.

POPLA is invited to allow this appeal without delay. If this appeal is refused despite these fatal defects, it would confirm that POPLA is not applying basic legal principles and is merely enabling BPA members to misuse data and mislead the public.