Free Traffic Legal Advice

Thank you very much. This is what I'm getting at.

Bristol Airport cannot have bylaws in place governing things like stopping and parking but choose not to enforce them through the criminal courts, allowing instead a private contractor to issue demands for payment in the wake of alleged contractual breaches relating to the very behaviour that the bylaws cover. There cannot be two parallel regimes, one statutory and the other contractual, covering the same acts on the same land. 

To be clear again, VCS has made no comment whatsoever about the bylaws. They said nothing to me (in spite of the fact that I challenged them on this very issue) and clearly wanted to contribute nothing to The Guardian on the topic. If the land was not covered by the bylaws, why would VCS be shy about saying so? The same goes for Bristol Airport itself. If the bylaws don't apply, then roads directly adjacent to the airport, which it clearly owns, do not fall within the scope of the 'the Airport', as referenced on page 4 of those bylaws. No plan is attached to that document; however, page 11 of this document shows the boundaries of the airport in 2006. The area at issue in my case is very much inside this boundary, even if the footprint has changed slightly in the years since.

Are you looking for meaningful advice on your situation? or just expressing your opinion as you seem to be fixated on the argument you've gained from the Gary Rycroft article.

as I said before b789 has given you excellent advice. up to you if you don't want to use it.

I know what you said before. I'm clearly looking for meaningful advice on my situation. b789 has now provided me with extra information around the bylaws question, which very much looks like the information contained in the article I'm 'fixated on'.

Many thanks. My appeal to the IAS has just been dismissed.

I have been doing a bit more research into this issue of mixing enforcement of statutory and civil laws on land controlled by byelaws. Part of the issue is differences between the areas under control and differentiating between the roads and the car parks.

VCS operate at several airports besides Bristol, including Liverpool John Lennon Airport (LJLA) and Leeds Bradford Airport (LBA) where these issues crop up all the time.

Regulation 6.7 of the Liverpool John Lennon Airport (LJLA) Byelaws is an interesting focal point because it explicitly allows the airport operator to impose charges and conditions for parking. The interpretation of this regulation determines whether the terms and conditions established by a contracted parking operator like Vehicle Control Services (VCS) are statutory (under the byelaws) or civil (under contract law).

Key Considerations for Regulation 6.7

1. Statutory Nature of Regulation 6.7

Scope of the Byelaws: Regulation 6.7 forms part of the statutory byelaws approved under the Airports Act 1986. This means that any charges or conditions imposed by the airport operator under this regulation derive their authority from statutory law. 

Statutory Enforcement Mechanism: Breaches of Regulation 6.7 are enforceable through the byelaws’ statutory framework, typically involving prosecution in a magistrates’ court. This would classify such terms and conditions as statutory in nature, not civil.

2. Private Contracts and Delegated Authority

Role of the Contracted Operator: If the airport operator contracts VCS to manage car parks and authorises them to install signs with terms and conditions, the operator is effectively delegating their authority under Regulation 6.7 to VCS.
 
Civil Contracts: Despite the delegation, the relationship between the driver and VCS is still governed by the terms on the signage, which constitute a civil contract. This is because the authority to impose terms and conditions has been transferred to VCS through a private contract, and the enforcement mechanism is the civil court system, not the statutory byelaws. 

3. Statutory vs. Civil Enforcement

The distinction lies in how breaches are enforced:

Statutory Enforcement: If a driver breaches a condition that flows directly from the byelaws (e.g., parking outside designated areas or obstructing traffic), enforcement would typically occur through prosecution in a magistrates’ court under the byelaws. 

Civil Enforcement: If the driver breaches a term set out on VCS’s signage (e.g., overstaying a time limit or failing to pay a parking fee), enforcement occurs through the private operator’s civil contract claim, using the civil court system. 

This dual framework creates a situation where certain aspects of parking may overlap:

The byelaws may set general rules for parking (e.g., designated areas, time limits).

VCS’s terms and conditions (authorised by the airport operator under Regulation 6.7) create additional rules, such as charges for overstaying or failing to display a ticket, enforced through civil claims.

Legal and Practical Implications

Flowing Authority: Terms and conditions established by VCS ultimately derive their authority from the airport operator under Regulation 6.7. However, their enforcement mechanism (civil vs. statutory) determines whether they are statutory or civil. 

Blurring Lines: While the terms are indirectly linked to the byelaws, they remain civil in nature because the airport operator has chosen to enforce them through private contracts rather than the byelaws’ statutory framework. 

Potential Challenges: Drivers might argue that since the conditions flow from Regulation 6.7, breaches should be enforced through statutory mechanisms rather than civil claims. This could undermine the operator's ability to rely on private enforcement.

Conclusion

The terms and conditions on VCS’s signs are civil, not statutory, despite originating from the airport operator’s authority under Regulation 6.7. This is because the enforcement mechanism for these terms is through the civil court system as private contractual claims, rather than prosecution under the byelaws. The airport operator’s decision to delegate authority to a private company effectively shifts enforcement into the realm of contract law, even though the underlying authority comes from statutory byelaws.

This distinction between statutory and civil enforcement is crucial in understanding the legitimacy of private parking operators' actions and the legal framework governing parking on byelaw-regulated land.

However, you may be thinking that section 3 above contradicts the argument. You are absolutely right to note the tension in Section 3 regarding enforcement mechanisms. For example, not parking in a marked bay within a car park presents a situation where the conduct breaches both the statutory byelaws (e.g., "parking outside of a designated area") and the contractual terms displayed on the VCS signage. This overlap creates ambiguity as to whether the breach should be enforced statutorily or civilly.

The enforcement of parking outside a designated area within car parks is handled civilly through VCS’s contractual terms, even though the same behaviour could constitute a statutory breach of byelaws. This practice is facilitated by the airport operator’s delegation of enforcement authority under Regulation 6.7 and reflects a preference for civil enforcement over statutory prosecution due to its practicality and efficiency.

However, this dual regulatory framework raises legitimate questions about the boundaries between statutory and civil enforcement. While the current approach is widely used, it remains vulnerable to legal challenges that question the compatibility of contractual enforcement with statutory byelaws. For drivers, this ambiguity underscores the importance of understanding their rights and the legal basis for any enforcement action.

Food for thought on how to handle the breaches of byelaws on the roads.

I have now received a letter from DCBL.

I note that DBCL and DCB Legal are two sides of the same coin. I'm seeing in another post on this forum that the distinction is important.

Anyway, have a read of the correspondence pictured. I’d be grateful for your thoughts.

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That's fine.

I appreciate that you don't need to read debt recovery letters. However, I thought I would ask about this correspondence just to be sure.

Thanks for the clarity and ongoing advice.

Probably. But they may try and resurrect it one day. Not that they can do much about it though.