Free Traffic Legal Advice

1. Non-compliance with PoFA 2012, Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(f)
The operator asserts compliance with Schedule 4 because its Notice to Keeper (NtK) states: “If after 29 days we have not received full payment or driver details...” This is defective in both timing and substance and fails to satisfy paragraph 9(2)(f).

Timing
The Act requires the warning to be framed by reference to “the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given” (paragraph 9(2)(f)), and paragraph 9(6) defines “given” as deemed two working days after posting. The operator’s formulation—“after 29 days”—is not equivalent and is likely to mislead. It is detached from the statutory “given” date and produces inconsistent deadlines depending on posting day and intervening weekends or bank holidays. The statute fixes a single 28-day period; the operator’s wording does not.

Substance
The same paragraph requires the NtK to warn that if, after that 28-day period, the charge remains unpaid and the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver, the creditor will have the right to recover the unpaid sum from the keeper.

The operator’s wording—“payment or driver details”—misstates the statutory test. It implies the keeper must identify the driver or pay, whereas PoFA imposes no such obligation; it merely sets conditions on the creditor’s right to transfer liability.

Because the NtK fails to express the warning by reference to the correct 28-day period and misstates the statutory pre-conditions, it does not comply with paragraph 9(2)(f). Keeper liability therefore cannot arise.

2. Prohibitory signage—no contract capable of arising
The signage reads: “NO PARKING AT ANY TIME… UNAUTHORISED PARKING WILL RESULT IN A PARKING CHARGE NOTICE OF £100.” This wording is a prohibition, not an offer.

Contract formation requires (i) an offer granting permission to park on stated terms, (ii) acceptance of that offer, and (iii) consideration moving from the driver. Where parking is expressly forbidden, no permission is offered, and thus no consideration can arise. Any vehicle stopping contrary to such a prohibition is, at most, a trespasser—a matter only the landowner may pursue, generally for nominal damages. A parking agent cannot re-characterise a prohibition as a contractual offer.

This is the opposite of the ParkingEye v Beavis model, where a time-limited licence to park was clearly offered, and the charge was a conspicuous core term of that licence. Here, there is no offer at all, merely a warning against trespass. Accordingly, no contract could have formed, and neither driver nor keeper can be held liable in contract.

3. Absence of a “period of parking”
The NtK provides only a single timestamp (e.g. “13:36”) and does not specify any duration of stay. Paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 requires that the NtK “specify the period of parking to which the notice relates”. A single moment in time is not a “period”. The County Court confirmed this defect as fatal in the persuasive appellate decision in Brennan v Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd [2023, H6DP632H]. Without a defined period of parking, the NtK is non-compliant and incapable of transferring liability to the keeper.

4. Consideration period not evidenced
Section 5.1 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice requires a minimum five-minute consideration period to allow a motorist to read the terms and decide whether to accept them. The operator has provided no evidence that the vehicle was parked beyond this mandatory period. The limited photographs are insufficient to prove that any contract was formed.

5. No evidence of standing to operate or litigate
The operator is put to strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous agreement flowing from the landowner that authorises it to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue payment or legal action in its own name.

Section 14 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (“Relationship with Landowner”) sets out mandatory requirements which must be satisfied and evidenced before any operator may issue PCNs. In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires written confirmation from the landowner identifying:

• the landowner’s name and address
• a boundary plan of the land to be managed
• any applicable byelaws
• the scope and duration of the operator’s authority
• the detailed parking terms and conditions, including any exemptions
• the means of issuing PCNs
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents
• and the operator’s obligations and appeals procedure under the Code

These provisions are not optional; they are a condition precedent to lawful operation. The operator must therefore produce an unredacted, dated, and signed agreement identifying the contracting parties and signatories, confirming authority for this specific site. Any document with redacted or obscured details will not satisfy this requirement.

Conclusion
PPS’s NtK is defective under PoFA 2012 and cannot transfer liability to the keeper. The signage is purely prohibitory and incapable of creating a contract. No period of parking or evidence of compliance with the mandatory consideration period has been shown. Finally, the operator has produced no proof of its legal standing to issue PCNs or pursue claims at this location.

For all these reasons, the appellant respectfully requests that POPLA allow this appeal.