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I refer to my decision on Mr. Opayemi’s appeal. I also refer to my decision in agreeing to hear Mr. Opayemi's application for costs, communicated to the enforcement authority (EA) on my instruction on 25 April 2025, in which I said:


“I expect the attendance as a witness of, or a detailed witness statement from, U. Ithsham, the author of the enforcement authority (EA)'s notice of rejection of Mr. Opayemi's representations, as to the factual circumstances in which those representations were rejected, leading to Mr. Opayemi's appeal. In the absence of the attendance as a witness of, or a detailed witness statement from, U. Ithsham, I am likely to draw an adverse inference as to how those representations were dealt with, and as to the honesty of U. Ithsham's belief in the truth of the assertions of fact made by U. Ithsham in the notice of rejection.”


The EA has had the opportunity of making representations in respect of this costs application and has done so. It did not provide a representative for the costs hearing, or seek an adjournment so that one could attend.


I do not know the sex of U. Ithsham and so, in those circumstances, I will refer to the person where necessary, intending no disrespect, as ‘they’.


Regulation 6(1) of the Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (London) Regulations 1993, which governs the procedure for the adjudication by this tribunal of appeals against PCNs for moving traffic contraventions, reads as follows, with my underlining:


“6.- Power to require attendance of witnesses

(1) The adjudicator may require the attendance of any person (including a party to the proceedings) as a witness, at a time and place specified by him, at the hearing of an appeal and require him to answer any questions or produce any documents in his custody or control which relate to any matter in the proceedings…”


I took the view that Regulation 6(1) did not permit me to require the attendance of U. Ithsham at the hearing of this application for costs because, it seemed to me, that paragraph applied only to the hearing of “an appeal”. I had of course determined Mr. Opayemi’s appeal at an earlier hearing.


Regulation 5(2) is, however, more broadly drafted. It reads, as far as is relevant, and with my underlining:


“5.- Further representations

…(2) The adjudicator may invite a party to deliver to the proper officer representations dealing with any matter relating to an appeal within such time and in such a manner as may be specified.”


I consider that representations concerning a costs application fall within Reg. 5(2) because they deal with “a matter relating to an appeal”. My invitation - indeed it was expressly rather more strongly as an expectation - for representations in the manner of oral evidence or a witness statement from U. Ithsham fell within Reg. 5(2).


The adverse inference to the possibility of which I had expressly drawn the EA’s attention is in Reg. 5(3) and reads:


“(3) Where a party fails to respond to an invitation under paragraph (2), the adjudicator may (without prejudice to any other powers he may have) draw such inferences as appear to him proper.”


The EA clearly received my decision agreeing to hear Mr. Opayemi’s costs application. It responded to it on 28 April 2025. The EA did not state that U. Ithsham would be attending the hearing of the costs application today and that did not in fact transpire. No witness statement from U. Ithsham has been provided by the EA. Nor did the EA seek an adjournment of the costs hearing in order that U. Ithsham could attend, or in order that a witness statement could be provided.


Instead, the EA responded as follows (which response I reproduce in full):


“The PCN was issued because the vehicle in question failed to comply with a prohibition on certain types of vehicle (motor vehicles).

The 'No Motor Vehicles' sign at the entrance to Royal Albert Way complies with the vehicle prohibition sign diagram 619, as specified in the Traffic Signs Regulation and General Directions 2016 (Schedule 3, Part 2, Item 12). This sign indicates a complete ban on motor vehicles and does not need to display operational times.


This sign is an illuminated electronic LED sign, which activates during the specified hours of 22:00 to 03:00, as per the Traffic Management Order. The illumination ensures high visibility at night, even without street lighting. Evidence of the location and signage was provided in the evidence pack.


Due to the recent time change, which moved the clock forward by an hour, the signage failed to illuminate as expected. This oversight should have been identified by the issuing officer and later addressed by Officer U Ithsham.

Officer U Ithsham has acknowledged their error in judgment and will undergo training to prevent such occurrences in the future. We sincerely regret the inconvenience caused to the Appellant.


The Appellant is requesting compensation of £250.00 for the time spent capturing evidence to contest the case. While we understand the effort required, we believe this could have been undertaken en route to the Appellant's work, as their trade involves driving a taxi.


We apologise for the error, recognise the inconvenience caused, and propose a compensation of £50.00, which we believe to be fair under the circumstances. We respectfully request the Adjudicator to consider this proposal.”


Although the EA’s acknowledgment of an error and offer of compensation is to be welcomed, in my opinion the EA considerably understates the gravity of what actually occurred here.


In his representations to the EA Mr. Opayemi said (as far as is relevant and with my underlining):


"At the time that this PCN was issued and studying from the video/photo evidence taken by your camera, there was no sign been displayed that meets the code 52m [no motor vehicles]. The sign displayed was only showing speed limit of 40mph only.”


Mr. Opayemi was indeed correct. The EA’s own evidence clearly, obviously and undeniably showed that the speed limit sign was showing and that the ‘no motor vehicles’ sign was not. Even the most fleeting view of the CCTV footage, or the stills taken from it which were embedded in the PCN, demonstrate that to be the case. It follows, and I find on the balance of probabilities, that anyone who considered Mr. Opayemi’s representations and looked at the footage or the still images could not conceivably, genuinely have believed that ‘no motor vehicles’ signage was present and that an enforceable contravention had occurred. Conversely, the logical corollary of that is that no-one who (for whatever reason) believed that that signage was present, that a contravention had occurred and that Mr. Opayemi was liable for the PCN, could conceivably have considered his representations or looked at the EA’s own footage or still images.


Yet, in the notice of rejection of those representations, U. Ithsham, of the EA’s Customer Relations Team, made the following assertions of fact that I consider to be relevant:


“Your comments and the evidence have been reviewed in accordance with Schedule 1 of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003”


“… the signs at the location are clear. You would have driven past warning signs informing you of the restricted route ahead.”


“…we have investigated your case and have not found any grounds for cancellation.”


“having taken all aspects of this matter… into consideration, no justification for cancelling the penalty charge has been found”


Each and every one of those assertions of fact was untrue. It is inconceivable that the consideration, review and investigation referred to in the notice of rejection actually took place.


It would have been open to the EA to cause U. Ithsham to attend the costs hearing or otherwise provide evidence, if it was in fact the case, that they did not themselves carry out the consideration, investigation and review to which the notice of rejection refers but that another employee of the EA purported to have carried out those tasks and then informed U. Ithsham of the results. In those circumstances, in which the other employee would of course have misled U. Ithsham, it might be the case that U. Ithsham nonetheless had a genuine belief that the assertions of fact made in the notice of rejection were true. It is also logically possible that U. Ithsham might have been thinking of another set of representations when saying that the consideration, investigation and review took place.


But there is no evidence to either effect. Those scenarios are pure speculation. They are also inherently unlikely.


In the correspondence of 25 April 2025 I expressly referred to the adverse inference that might be drawn from an absence of evidence from U. Ithsham. I said that in the absence of such evidence, “I am likely to draw an adverse inference as … to the honesty of U. Ithsham's belief in the truth of the assertions of fact made by U. Ithsham in the notice of rejection.


I do draw that inference. I find on the balance of probabilities that the reason there is no evidence from U. Ithsham to the effect that they genuinely believed in the truth of the assertions of fact made in the notice of rejection is because that was not the case.


I find on the balance of probabilities, on the basis of all the evidence and the inherent likelihoods, that U. Ithsham made the assertions of fact in the notice of rejection without a genuine belief in their truth. That is to say, the assertions of fact were not merely untrue, they were knowingly or recklessly false statements which the law would treat as dishonest and deceptive (Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337) and which might, not unfairly, be called lies.


It is unlikely that U. Ithsham lied because they knew that there were no ‘no motor vehicles’ signs present and that that the contravention could not have occurred. It is more likely that they lied about having considered Mr. Opayemi’s representations and having reviewed and investigated the evidence because they could not be bothered to carry out those tasks. It is the less egregious of the two alternative untruths, but it is serious nonetheless. It is particularly serious because the lie occurred in the context of an attempt by U. Ithsham’s employer, this EA, to extract a £130 penalty from a member of the public who was not in fact liable for it, because the requisite signage was not present. I am afraid that trying to deceive a member of the public, who is entitled to rely on the good faith of the EA as a public authority, is more than a mere “error of judgment”. I do not understand what “training” is necessary; one does not require “training” to tell the truth in formal documents issued by an EA as part of the statutory enforcement process for PCNs.


The EA document of 28 April 2025 also reveals that there is a further guilty party here, albeit unnamed. The “issuing officer” was clearly seriously negligent in thinking that the vehicle’s owner was liable for a PCN in the absence of the requisite ‘no motor vehicles’ sign.


In light of my findings above, which form the factual basis for the question whether to award costs, it is quite obvious that the decisions to issue the PCN, to reject Mr. Opayemi’s representations and to resist his (inevitable) appeal were each wholly unreasonable. It is plain that I should exercise my discretion to award costs. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer case for the award of costs against an EA.


I have, throughout, been impressed with the clarity and moderation with which Mr. Opayemi made his representations and presented his appeal to this tribunal, both in writing and orally. Part of the reason he made his appeal was to act in the public interest so that other unsuspecting members of the public were not ‘caught out’ as he – but for his tenacity – would have been.


Mr. Opayemi initially sought the sum of £250 in costs but, when we went through his costs carefully in the hearing, I think Mr. Opayemi accepted that they were in fact somewhat lower than that. Mr. Opayemi works as a professional driver of an ‘executive’ car, which means that whilst his vehicle costs are a little higher, his earnings are greater than a ‘typical’ professional driver. He will often get bookings for higher value fares, to airports, for example. Driving to the location and taking photographs of the scene took 40 minutes during which time, he told me, he lost out on likely around £60 of net earnings, taking into account the costs of running the car. I do not accept the EA’s argument that Mr. Opayemi could somehow have stopped and taken pictures whilst also earning a fare. Actually making the appeal and uploading the photographs took around 30 minutes. Applying the same yardstick, that incurred lost earnings of around £45. I consider those times entirely reasonable. I accept Mr. Opayemi's evidence.


In assessing the costs incurred I have disapplied the starting point in the Civil Procedure Rules r.46.5(4)(b) and corresponding Practice Direction of £19 per hour. That is because Mr. Opayemi has, on the balance of probabilities, proved financial loss. Rather, I have applied the principles concerning the recovery of litigant-in-person costs that are to be found in the decision of the Senior Courts Costs Office (Master James) in Spencer v. Paul Jones Financial Services Limited (Case HC-2013-000044, 6 January 2017) and, in particular, paragraph [66] of that decision.


Every so often an appeal has the effect of properly holding an EA to account. Mr. Opayemi is one such appellant. In this case, very poor practice was exposed because of a fortuitous combination of the changing of the clocks and Mr. Opayemi’s sense of justice. I trust that this EA (and others) will never again falsely claim that representations have been considered when they have not been.


I have no hesitation in awarding Mr. Opayemi the very modest costs of his appeal, namely £105.