It's actually a very good start. However, it does not flow properly or cover enough points. I've taken the liberty of tidying it up and adding further appeal points with references to the applicable CoP or POFA:
POPLA Verification Code: [insert]
Parking Charge Notice: [insert reference]
Vehicle Registration: [insert VRM]
Site: [insert location]
Date of Alleged Contravention: [insert date]
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I am not obliged to identify the driver and will not be doing so. I appeal this Parking Charge Notice on the following grounds:
1. No keeper liability: the Notice to Keeper fails the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) because it does not specify any “period of parking”, as confirmed in the published County Court appeal judgment of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (Plymouth County Court, HHJ Mitchell, 21 August 2023).
2. Further PoFA non-compliance: misstated statutory timescales and defective mandatory wording
3. No contract formed due to inadequate and non-prominent signage and breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) section 4.1
4. Operator’s photographic evidence is inconclusive and fails to prove any contravention
5. Failure to make reasonable adjustments for a disabled child
6. No evidence of landowner authority and non-compliance with PPSCoP section 14.1
I have provided the following evidence with this appeal:
- A video of the route from the only entrance to the car park to the bay in question, showing the signage or lack of it.
- A photograph of the vehicle’s dashboard taken from the driver’s side.
- copy of my son’s current Blue Badge.
- A photograph of the parking bay in question, showing my son’s wheelchair and the nearby UKPC sign facing away from drivers.
Ground 1 – No keeper liability: Notice to Keeper fails PoFA 9(2)(a) – no “period of parking”
UKPC is attempting to rely on PoFA Schedule 4 to transfer liability from the unidentified driver to me as registered keeper. That is only possible if the Notice to Keeper fully complies with every applicable requirement of Schedule 4. Partial or substantial compliance is not sufficient.
The most serious and fundamental defect is that the Notice to Keeper does not specify any “period of parking” at all, contrary to paragraph 9(2)(a). It merely states a time, which is a single instant, not a "period".
PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) requires that a Notice to Keeper must:
“specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates”.
A period means a span of time. A single timestamp with no expressed period is not the same thing as a specified period of parking. The distinction between a mere instant and a genuine period of parking has been analysed in detail in the published County Court appeal judgment of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions, Plymouth County Court, HHJ Mitchell, 21 August 2023.
In Brennan, His Honour Judge Mitchell considered the very same statutory language in PoFA, including the requirement in paragraphs 7(2)(a) and 8(2)(a) (which are directly analogous to 9(2)(a) where there is no windscreen ticket). The judge held, in summary:
- The regulations require a period of parking to be specified.
- The “period of parking” does not have to be the entire time the vehicle was on site, but it must be at least some recorded minimum period for which the notice relates.
- It is not enough to have a single moment or a bare time of issue; simply stating the time the notice was issued is insufficient.
- There must be a period identified between at least two times, which then constitutes a true “period of parking” to which the notice relates.
- Where no period of parking is specified, the statutory requirements are not met, so there is no valid Notice to Driver or Notice to Keeper and thus no keeper liability.
The judge made clear that the right to recover unpaid parking charges from a keeper “applies only if” the statutory conditions are met. If the notice does not specify a period of parking, the conditions are not met and the attempt to impose keeper liability fails.
Brennan is an approved circuit judge appeal judgment in a County Court appeal, specifically concerning PoFA Schedule 4 and the requirement to specify a period of parking. It is a published decision. That makes it persuasive authorityof a high level in this field, and its reasoning is directly on point. It is therefore not open to POPLA to dismiss it as some unreported, irrelevant county court decision. It is exactly the sort of authority that POPLA ought to follow when interpreting PoFA correctly.
The Notice to Keeper in this case suffers from the same defect that caused the appeal to succeed in Brennan. It does not specify any period of parking. At best, it gives no more than a date and perhaps a time of issue or a single time of observation. That is not a period of parking. There is no start and end period stated, nor any specified minimum duration forming a true “period of parking” to which this notice relates.
If UKPC believes that a timestamp or a time of issue is enough, then that is precisely the argument that was rejected in Brennan. The judge expressly held that a single point in time is not sufficient and that, had a period from first seen to time of issue been recorded, that might have been enough, but it was not, and so the notice failed PoFA.
For the same reason, this Notice to Keeper fails PoFA 9(2)(a) and cannot give rise to keeper liability. The conditions in PoFA Schedule 4 are strict and must be met in full. Without a specified period of parking, the statutory scheme does not apply, and UKPC has no right to pursue the keeper at all. Only the driver could ever be liable, and the driver has not been identified.
On this ground alone, the appeal must be allowed.
Ground 2 – Further PoFA non-compliance: misstated statutory timescales and defective wording
Even if POPLA were not persuaded by Ground 1 (which it should be), the Notice to Keeper is also defective in other respects and still fails PoFA Schedule 4.
Firstly, the dates and timescales are misstated in a way that shortens the keeper’s statutory position.
The notice was posted on 13/11/25. Under PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(6), a notice sent by post is deemed to be “given” on the second working day after posting. In this case, that is 17/11/25. Any relevant 28 day period must run from the day after the notice is given, not from the date printed on the notice.
Despite this, UKPC instructed the keeper that any appeal to POPLA had to be made “within 28 days of the date of this letter”, which would expire on 11/12/25. That mis-states the correct statutory timing and shortens the period available to the keeper. The operator therefore fails to set out the true legal position and misleads the keeper about the time they have.
Secondly, the Notice to Keeper fails to correctly reproduce all the mandatory wording required by PoFA Schedule 4, including but not limited to the warning required by paragraph 9(2)(f) about the effect of non-payment and the circumstances under which the creditor will have the right to recover the charge from the keeper. The wording used by UKPC is not identical to the statutory wording and does not accurately express that the 28 days run from the day after the notice is given, nor does it clearly and correctly set out the conditions that must be satisfied before keeper liability can arise.
Any deviation from the precise statutory requirements means the operator cannot rely on Schedule 4. PoFA is very clear that the right to claim from the keeper applies only if the conditions are met. The conditions are not met in this case, both because there is no period of parking specified at all, and because the timescales and wording are defective.
For these reasons, UKPC has no lawful basis to pursue me as keeper, and the appeal should be allowed even if POPLA did not accept Ground 1.
Ground 3 – No contract formed: inadequate signage and clear breach of PPSCoP sections 4.1 and 5.1 (consideration period)
Even if PoFA is ignored (which it should not be), no contract could possibly have been formed with the driver because the signage at this site is woefully inadequate and in clear breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), in particular sections 4.1 and 5.1.
The video evidence shows the route from the only entrance to the car park to the exact bay where the vehicle was parked when the PCN was issued. Along that entire route:
- There is only one UKPC sign visible.
- That sign is broken, insecure and turned away from the line of travel and away from the bay.
- It is not orientated towards approaching vehicles and cannot reasonably be read from inside a vehicle.
- There are no other readable UKPC signs on the approach or in front of the bay, nor within a reasonable distance on either side.
The photograph of the bay confirms this: my vehicle is parked with the boot open and my son’s wheelchair visible, and in the background the only UKPC sign can be seen facing away from the bay. A driver sitting in the vehicle cannot read that sign. It is effectively “edge on” to the bay and is useless as a means of communicating any terms.
This is a direct and obvious breach of PPSCoP section 4.1, which states:
“The parking operator must ensure that at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking can be viewed without the driver needing to leave the vehicle, in order for drivers with a disability to be able to make an informed decision on whether to park at the premises.”
That requirement is not optional and it is not vague. At least one sign with the full terms must be readable from inside the vehicle, without getting out. Here, there is not a single UKPC sign on the approach to or within the bay that can be read from the driver’s seat. The only sign is broken and turned the wrong way. That is a clear, simple, factual breach of section 4.1.
This breach is even more serious given that the vehicle was carrying a disabled child who uses a wheelchair and was parked in a disabled bay. Section 4.1 exists precisely to protect disabled users and to ensure they can make an informed decision before getting out and unloading a wheelchair. UKPC has failed completely to comply with that requirement at this site.
In addition, PPSCoP section 5.1 requires operators to allow a consideration period of appropriate duration whenever they are assuming a vehicle is “parked” based on time alone. That period must take into account:
- the time needed to locate and access an appropriate bay (for example a Blue Badge bay),
- the time needed to identify and read the signs and understand the terms,
- the time needed to decide whether to stay or leave, and, if leaving, the time needed to exit the land.
Annex B makes clear that minimum consideration periods are mandatory and that operators must register and apply those periods before issuing a parking charge at any site. In simple terms, a PCN must not be issued until the minimum consideration period has expired, unless there is clear evidence that the driver has already accepted the terms and conditions.
In this case, UKPC has provided no evidence whatsoever that the vehicle remained beyond any registered minimum consideration period for this site. They have not shown how long the vehicle was present before the PCN was issued. They have not shown that any consideration period had actually elapsed. They rely purely on the fact that the vehicle was in a bay and on poor photographs that tell POPLA nothing about elapsed time.
Given that:
- the driver was transporting a disabled child,
- they needed time to find a suitable disabled bay,
- there was no readable sign from inside the vehicle explaining the terms, and
- UKPC has not shown any parking period exceeding a minimum consideration period,
UKPC cannot demonstrate that any consideration period had expired before they issued the PCN. Issuing a PCN in those circumstances is a breach of PPSCoP section 5.1 and Annex B.
To summarise Ground 3:
- No sign containing the terms and conditions could be read from within the vehicle on the route from the entrance to the bay or when parked in the bay, in clear breach of PPSCoP section 4.1.
- UKPC has provided no evidence that the vehicle stayed longer than any mandatory minimum consideration period, and therefore issuing a PCN at all breaches PPSCoP section 5.1 and Annex B.
With no readable in-vehicle signage and no proof that a consideration period had expired, no contract can have been formed and the charge is unenforceable.
Ground 4 – Inadequate photographs: no proof of any contravention
UKPC’s case appears to rest on photographs of the vehicle’s windscreen, claiming that no Blue Badge was displayed.
These photographs are inadequate for the following reasons:
- They are taken from a distance and at poor resolution.
- They do not show a clear close-up of the dashboard area.
- They do not show the side windows where a badge might reasonably be displayed, especially given a disabled child seated there.
- The images clearly show that something is present on the driver’s side of the dashboard, but due to the angle and quality of the images, it is not possible to determine exactly what it is.
If UKPC genuinely believed there was no Blue Badge on display, a competent operative would have taken close-up photographs of the dashboard and the relevant side windows to remove any doubt. They did not. Instead, they rely on vague, long-distance images that do not prove their allegation.
By contrast, I have provided:
- A photograph of the dash taken from the driver’s side, showing an item present in the area where the badge is normally displayed.
- A copy of my son’s current Blue Badge, which was valid at the time of the alleged contravention.
The PCN was issued during the period that his previous badge was still valid before renewal, which has since been discarded.
My son is eight years old and uses a wheelchair. It is entirely implausible that the driver would park in a disabled bay with him and simply not display a valid Blue Badge. The much more likely explanation, given the poor photographs and the evidence supplied, is that the badge had been displayed but either slipped or was simply not captured clearly by the operative’s low-quality images.
The burden of proof rests with UKPC. They must show that a breach occurred. Their photographs do not do so. In the absence of clear evidence that no badge was displayed, POPLA should find that UKPC has not proved any contravention.
Ground 5 – Failure to make reasonable adjustments for a disabled child
UKPC and their client are service providers to the public. The vehicle was parked in a disabled bay for the purpose of transporting a disabled child who uses a wheelchair. The photograph shows the wheelchair at the boot of the car in the bay, confirming the purpose of the parking.
By designating disabled bays and purporting to enforce a badge-based scheme, UKPC assumes responsibilities towards disabled users. Ticketing a vehicle used to transport a wheelchair-using child in circumstances where:
- A valid Blue Badge existed at the time;
- The operator’s own evidence does not clearly show that no badge was displayed; and
- The signage is broken and non-compliant with PPSCoP 4.1;
is unreasonable and contrary to the duty to make reasonable adjustments. It penalises a disabled child and their carer for what is at worst an evidential ambiguity created by UKPC’s own inadequate photographs and poor signage.
Even if POPLA were to reject the technical PoFA and signage points (which it should not), it would still be disproportionate and unfair to uphold this charge given the disabled context and the operator’s failings.
Ground 6 – No evidence of landowner authority: PPSCoP section 14.1
Finally, UKPC has not shown that it has the required standing or authority to issue and pursue Parking Charge Notices at this location in its own name.
PPSCoP section 14.1 requires that, where controlled land is managed on behalf of a landowner, the parking operator must obtain written confirmation from the landowner covering all of the following:
a) the identity of the landowner(s)
b) a boundary map of the land to be managed
c) such byelaws as may apply to the land relating to the management of parking
d) the permission granted to the parking operator by the landowner(s) and the duration of that permission
e) the parking terms and conditions that are to be applied by the parking operator, including as appropriate the duration of free parking permitted, parking tariffs, and specific permissions and exemptions, for example for staff, residents or those stopping for short periods such as taxi and minicab drivers, delivery drivers and couriers
f) the means by which parking charges will be issued
g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents such as planning or advertising consents relating to signs
h) the obligations under which the parking operator is working, in compliance with this Code and as a member of an Accredited Trade Association
i) notification of the documentation that the parking operator may be required to supply on request to authorised bodies detailing the relationship with the landowner
j) the parking operator’s approach to the handling of appeals against parking charges.
I put UKPC to strict proof that they have such written confirmation and that it complies with all points (a) to (j) above. In particular, I require:
- Identification of the landowner or landowners.
- A clear boundary map showing exactly the land to which UKPC’s authority extends.
- The duration and scope of any written authority granted.
- The specific terms and conditions, exemptions and appeal arrangements the landowner has authorised UKPC to apply at this site.
If UKPC intends to rely on a short landowner statement or witness letter, that is not sufficient. PPSCoP section 14.1 requires detailed written confirmation covering all the listed points. If necessary, UKPC must produce the actual contract or written agreement with the landowner, redacting only information that is irrelevant to section 14.1. An absence of such evidence should lead POPLA to conclude that UKPC does not have standing to issue and enforce this charge in its own name.
Conclusion
The Notice to Keeper fails PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) because it does not specify any “period of parking”, as confirmed in the persuasive circuit judge appeal judgment in Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions. Without a valid period of parking, the strict statutory conditions for keeper liability are not met and UKPC cannot pursue me as registered keeper.
The Notice to Keeper is further defective in its misstated timescales and wording, again preventing UKPC from relying on PoFA.
Separate from PoFA, the signage is inadequate and in breach of PPSCoP section 4.1, meaning no contract could have been formed with the driver. UKPC’s photographs fail to prove any breach, and in the context of a disabled child in a wheelchair, pursuing this charge is unreasonable. UKPC has also failed to prove that it has landowner authority in accordance with PPSCoP section 14.1.
For all of these reasons, I respectfully request that POPLA allows this appeal and directs UKPC to cancel this Parking Charge Notice.
