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PCN reference: [insert]
Vehicle registration: [insert]
Operator: UKCPS Ltd
Location: Leeds Train Station

This appeal is submitted by the registered keeper of the above vehicle. The driver has not been identified and will not be named. Nothing in this appeal is to be taken as an admission as to the identity of the driver.

1. Non-relevant land and absence of keeper liability

1.1. Leeds Train Station is railway land subject to statutory byelaws. Such land is expressly excluded from the definition of “relevant land” in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“PoFA”).

1.2. UKCPS’ own Notice to Keeper is marked “Non-PoFA”. That is a tacit admission by the operator that it is unable to invoke PoFA Schedule 4. In consequence, there is no statutory mechanism by which liability for any parking charge can be transferred from an unidentified driver to the registered keeper.

1.3. In the absence of PoFA, the only person who could possibly be contractually liable is the driver, and only if a contract was properly formed with that person on clear terms at the material time. The keeper is a different legal person. The mere fact of being the DVLA-registered keeper is, in law, nothing more than evidence that the person keeps the vehicle. It is not evidence of who was driving at any particular time.

1.4. VCS v Edward (Sheffield County Court, 2023) is a persuasive appellate authority dealing directly with this issue. The court held that there is no legal presumption that the registered keeper was the driver, and that Schedule 4 PoFA is the only route by which liability can be imposed on a keeper without proof of driver identity. The judge made clear that a parking operator cannot simply rely on the civil standard of proof to assert that a keeper was “probably” the driver. In the absence of PoFA, the claimant must produce cogent evidence that the defendant was in fact driving on the material date. No such evidence has been produced in this case.

1.5. UKCPS has produced no evidence whatsoever identifying the driver. It is relying solely on the DVLA keeper details and its own assertion. That is legally insufficient. On any proper application of contract principles and VCS v Edward, UKCPS has no cause of action against the registered keeper.

2. Central misrepresentation in the rejection letter

2.1. The operator’s rejection letter contains a stark and irreconcilable contradiction. UKCPS states:

“Without you providing the driver details, we can not transfer the liability. As the vehicle has stopped in a no stopping area, you have breached the terms and conditions and therefore the PCN has been issued correctly.”

2.2. The first sentence is correct: without driver details, and given that this is “Non-PoFA” land, UKCPS cannot transfer liability from the driver to the keeper. They expressly concede that point.

2.3. However, the second sentence then asserts that “you have breached the terms and conditions”. In context, “you” can only refer to the person to whom the letter is addressed: the registered keeper. That is a bare assertion of personal contractual breach by the keeper, without any legal or evidential basis, and in direct contradiction to the preceding sentence in which UKCPS accepts it cannot transfer liability.

2.4. UKCPS cannot logically maintain both positions. Either:
(a) liability lies only with the unidentified driver, in which case UKCPS has no lawful basis to demand payment from the keeper; or
(b) UKCPS contends that the keeper personally entered into the contract and breached it, in which case it must plead and prove facts establishing that proposition, which it has entirely failed to do.

2.5. The rejection letter therefore misstates the legal position and misrepresents the status of the keeper. It attempts to dress up a claim that UKCPS knows it cannot lawfully pursue (in the absence of PoFA and without identifying the driver) as if the keeper were personally in contractual breach. That is the single most obvious error and undermines the entirety of UKCPS’ case against the keeper.

2.6. An adjudicator cannot properly uphold a charge where the operator’s own decision letter both:
(a) concedes that no lawful transfer of liability is possible; and
(b) simultaneously asserts, without reasoning or evidence, that the addressee has “breached the terms and conditions”.

3. Failure to engage with the core ground of appeal

3.1. The keeper’s initial appeal squarely raised the determinative point: that the location is railway land, not relevant land for the purposes of PoFA, and that UKCPS’ own “Non-PoFA” designation confirms that keeper liability cannot arise. The appeal further made clear that the driver would not be identified.

3.2. UKCPS’ rejection does not engage with the legal consequences of the land being non-relevant land. Nor does it attempt to explain any lawful basis on which the keeper could be held liable notwithstanding the admitted inability to rely on PoFA.

3.3. Instead, UKCPS has issued an unreasoned, automated-style rejection, apparently drafted on the false premise that it is open to them to pursue the keeper regardless of PoFA and regardless of driver identification. That is not a mere technicality; it is a fundamental failure to articulate any cognisable cause of action against the person they are demanding payment from.

4. Nature of the signage and alleged “no stopping” contravention

4.1. UKCPS’ own wording describes the location as an area where “parking, stopping, or waiting is strictly prohibited at all times” and that the vehicle was “parked, stopped or waiting in this area”. That describes a prohibitory regime, not a contractual offer to park or stop upon payment of a charge.

4.2. Prohibitory “no stopping” signs, if that is indeed what is present, cannot sensibly be construed as making a contractual offer to motorists to stop there in return for a contractual fee. At most, they amount to a prohibition, which, if breached, would amount to trespass. Only a party with possessory rights in the land (typically the landowner) could seek damages for trespass, which would be nominal at best. A parking operator such as UKCPS, lacking sufficient proprietary interest, has no standing to pursue trespass damages in its own name.

4.3. Accordingly, even if a driver did stop momentarily in a “no stopping” area, that conduct cannot be shoehorned into a contractual “parking charge” liability owed to UKCPS. The signage, on the operator’s own description, is forbidding rather than contractual, and therefore incapable of creating the alleged contract with the driver.

5. Conclusion

5.1. Leeds Train Station is non-relevant land. UKCPS’ Notice to Keeper is expressly “Non-PoFA”. The operator therefore accepts that it cannot invoke PoFA Schedule 4 to hold the keeper liable.

5.2. The driver has not been identified and will not be named. In light of VCS v Edward, there is no permissible inference that the keeper was the driver and no legal presumption to that effect. UKCPS has provided no evidence at all of driver identity.

5.3. UKCPS’ rejection letter openly concedes that it cannot transfer liability, yet in the same breath asserts that the keeper has “breached the terms and conditions”. That is a clear and irreconcilable misrepresentation which reveals that UKCPS has no coherent legal basis for demanding payment from the keeper.

5.4. On any proper application of PoFA, basic contract principles, and the persuasive authority of VCS v Edward, UKCPS has failed to establish that the registered keeper is liable in any capacity. This appeal should therefore be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.

The denied appeal explicitly states

Quote

the driver contractually agrees to pay a parking charge. Without you providing the driver details, we can not transfer the liability.

which is exactly the point made! But then they have the cheek to go on and deny the appeal. Utter rubbish, but they know it’s the only way of extracting money from you.