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The operator’s response that “the IAS has sight of our landowner contract” is not strict proof and fails to address the specific points raised in the appeal. The request was for strict proof of compliance with Section 14 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), which sets out mandatory requirements for landowner authority. These include the identity of the landowner, the scope and duration of the contract, boundaries of the land, enforcement rights, signage responsibilities, and the appeals process, among others.

By withholding the contract from the appellant, the operator prevents any independent verification that the agreement even exists, that it covers this site, that it is still in force, or that it was signed by authorised individuals. The IAS cannot expect an appellant to accept at face value an unverified claim that a private contract meets all requirements, especially when there is no opportunity to test or challenge the evidence.

If the IAS assessor is indeed a qualified solicitor or barrister, which I seriously doubt, they will understand that the request for strict proof exists to ensure the operator is acting within proper legal authority. Without disclosure, the appellant is left with no way of assessing whether the PCN has been lawfully issued.

In addition, it is understood that the land at the former May & Baker Club is owned by the local council. If the operator’s authority to issue PCNs derives from a contract with May & Baker, who were merely a tenant and have since been dissolved, then such authority has lapsed.

Without evidencing a copy of the current contract or agreement authorising enforcement on this land or confirmation of whether the agreement was granted directly by the council, as the landowner, then if no such contract exists with the landowner or their authorised agent, then the enforcement activity is ultra vires and the PCN must be cancelled.

The operator may not be legally required to disclose their contract unless proceedings are issued in court, and the appellant would be more than willing to oblige them with that route. However, if the IAS wishes to maintain any credibility as a fair and impartial appeal body, again, which is doubted, it must recognise that unverified assertions are not evidence and should not be accepted in place of clear, examinable proof.

Rebuttal to Operator’s Prima Facie Response:

1. No Obligation to Provide Evidence for Independent Verification: This is a legally baseless claim. The burden of proof lies entirely with the operator. Assertions do not equate to evidence. The operator is not exempt from substantiating their standing, especially when challenged. It is not “non-sensical” to demand proof that the party issuing charges has the requisite legal authority to do so. In fact, this is a foundational legal requirement—as confirmed by VCS v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 186.

2. “Evidence of Authority Provided to IAS”: The operator admits to withholding this from the appellant. This deprives me of any opportunity to scrutinise or challenge the alleged landowner contract—a clear breach of procedural fairness. A redacted or boilerplate template agreement, filed secretly with the IAS, fails to meet the standard of strict proof required by Section 14 of the IPC Code of Practice. If the IAS assessor is legally qualified, they will know that evidence is not deemed proven simply by being asserted or handed in behind closed doors.

3. “Non-Compliance with Terms and Conditions”: This allegation presumes contract formation, yet the operator has provided no site map, no images of signage, and no proof that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the IPC Code of Practice on the date in question. Without that, there is no proof that any contract was capable of being formed—let alone breached.

4. Presumed Agreement to Charges: The operator contends that use of the site equates to contractual agreement. But if the signage is inadequate or the operator lacks authority, then no valid contract can arise. This is basic contract law. One cannot enforce terms the other party was neither adequately informed of nor capable of accepting.

Conclusion:

The operator’s assertion that signage inherently proves authority is absurd and would be laughed out of court. The notion that enforcement can occur without strict proof of landowner authority—documented, unredacted, and contemporaneous—is legally unsustainable. If such flimsy reasoning were put before a district judge, it would be promptly dismissed for failing to meet basic evidential standards.

The IAS insists its assessors are legally qualified, yet this cannot be verified. Their determinations are unsigned, anonymised, and offer no indication of legal reasoning. Yes, decisions are published—but the anonymity and opacity of those involved does little to inspire confidence in either their legal standing or procedural integrity. If they truly were solicitors or barristers, there would be no professional reason to conceal their identities. Transparency is the hallmark of genuine legal process—not secrecy.

The IAS has acquired a reputation as a kangaroo court precisely because it routinely upholds parking charges without requiring operators to meet evidential thresholds that would be compulsory in litigation. If the assessor in this case chooses to rely on unsubstantiated claims and ignore the strict legal requirements I’ve set out, I can only conclude—based on the reasoning and the concealment—that they are not legally qualified.

Should the operator rely on any IAS outcome to pursue court action, I will be more than ready to defend the matter robustly. In a real court, with a real judge, procedural shortcuts and speculative assertions won’t pass muster.

The operator’s response again evades the core issue and misrepresents the purpose of this appeal. The request was not for disclosure under legal compulsion but for strict proof in line with the requirements of Section 14 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP). This Code sets out mandatory prerequisites for a valid parking charge, and operators seeking to rely on their contractual authority must provide clear, examinable evidence to support it.

The operator has failed to do so.

No one has demanded the disclosure of confidential financial terms. However, the mandatory elements set out in Section 14.1(a) to (j) are not commercially sensitive and must be open to scrutiny in any fair appeal process. This includes identifying the landowner, defining the area of enforcement, confirming the duration and scope of the contract, and showing who signed it and on what authority.

The operator claims that such documents can be provided “if the charge progresses to court,” yet still asks the IAS to uphold a charge based on a contract they refuse to disclose. This is procedurally unfair. It prevents the appellant from verifying whether the operator is acting with the landowner’s authority—especially relevant in this case, where the land is understood to be owned by the local council and the former tenant (May & Baker) is now dissolved.

Unless the operator is willing to confirm that its agreement is directly with the landowner or their authorised managing agent, and supply a copy of that agreement (redacted only for financial terms), the IAS cannot reasonably conclude that the charge was lawfully issued.

The operator’s continued refusal to provide evidence calls into question whether any valid authority exists at all. If the IAS wishes to uphold standards of fairness and transparency, the appeal must be allowed.

However, given the IAS’s reputation and my own view that it is not an impartial or independent body, should this appeal be rejected, I look forward to challenging the matter in court—where the operator will no longer be able to hide behind the opaque and one-sided process that the IAS continues to endorse.