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1. Signage: A Masterclass in Concealment

UKPC’s signage is a textbook breach of the "Red Hand Rule", articulated by Lord Denning in Spurling v Bradshaw [1956]. He stated:

- “Some clauses which I have seen would need to be printed in red ink on the face of the document with a red hand pointing to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient.”

The £100 charge—arguably the most onerous term—is buried in small print, indistinguishable from the surrounding clutter. It is not highlighted, not bolded, not enlarged, and certainly not “adequately brought to the attention of the driver” as required by:

- Paragraph 2(2) of PoFA which states that the parking charge must be a sum “of which ADEQUATE NOTICE was given to drivers.” - Paragraph 2(3) defines “ADEQUATE NOTICE” as signage that MUST:
  - Specifiy the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking, and
  - Is ADEQUATE to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land.

UKPC’s signs fail both tests. The signage is a visual fog of generic prohibitions, privacy disclaimers, and irrelevant data protection blather. The £100 charge is not prominent—it’s camouflaged. This is not contract formation; it’s entrapment by obfuscation. The signage does not meet the statutory definition of “adequate notice,” and therefore UKPC cannot rely on PoFA to establish keeper liability.

2. PoFA Contradictions: Paragraph 9 vs Paragraph 8

UKPC’s own submission is a self-defeating contradiction. They claim compliance with Paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 (which applies when no Notice to Driver is served), then immediately cite Paragraph 8(6)—which only applies when a Notice to Driver has been served.

This is not a minor technicality. It’s a fundamental procedural error. You cannot invoke both paragraphs simultaneously. Either:

- A Notice to Driver was served -> Paragraph 8 applies.
- No Notice to Driver was served -> Paragraph 9 applies.

UKPC’s attempt to cherry-pick provisions from both paragraphs is legally incoherent. It’s akin to quoting two different statutes to justify one act—without regard for context or applicability. If POPLA accepts this contradiction, it undermines the statutory framework of PoFA entirely.

3. Jopson v Homeguard: Binding Authority on Delivery Stops

UKPC’s assertion that “any stationary vehicle is deemed parked” is not only absurd—it’s judicially discredited. In Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] B9GF0A9E, His Honour Judge Harris QC stated:

“Merely to stop a vehicle cannot be to park it; otherwise traffic jams would consist of lines of parked cars. Delivery vans… would not be accommodated on an interpretation which included vehicles stopping for a few moments for these purposes.”

He went further:

“Whether a car is parked, or simply stopped, or left for a moment while unloading... must be a question of fact or degree.”

The vehicle in question was a delivery van, stopped for 20 minutes and 26 seconds to deliver parcels to residents. This is not “parking”—it is loading/unloading, a lawful and necessary activity. UKPC’s refusal to acknowledge this distinction is not just legally flawed—it’s contemptuous of judicial authority.

If POPLA chooses to ignore Jopson, it is not merely overlooking persuasive precedent—it is disregarding binding judicial interpretation of the very concept it purports to enforce.

4. Keeper Liability: Procedural Failure

UKPC claims the Notice to Keeper was issued 4 days after the event and delivered within the statutory timeframe. But they offer no proof of posting—only a claim. Under the PPSCoP, operators MUST retain a record of the date of posting, not just the date of generation. Without this, the presumption of delivery under PoFA 8(6) fails and is rebutted.

Moreover, as already established, UKPC cannot rely on both Paragraph 8 and Paragraph 9 of PoFA. Their submission is internally contradictory and legally incoherent. Keeper liability cannot be enforced on a foundation of procedural confusion.

5. The So-Called Landowner "Witness Statement”

UKPC’s so-called witness statement is a mockery of evidential standards and a textbook example of how template-based fiction is being passed off as legal authority. It is a generic, boilerplate document that fails to meet even the most basic requirements of Section 14.1 of the PPSCoP. It contains no proof that the signatory has any authority whatsoever to bind the landowner. It is not dated in relation to the alleged contravention, and it offers no site-specific detail beyond the name of the location.

A witness statement is not a contract. It is not enforceable. It is not compliant. It is a piece of paper with vague assertions and a redacted signature offering no verifiable link to the landowner, no duration of authority, and no supporting documentation. If this is the standard of evidence POPLA accepts, then the entire concept of “landowner authority” becomes meaningless. Section 14.1 of the Code of Practice explicitly requires a valid, contemporaneous agreement showing the operator’s authority to issue PCNs and pursue legal action. UKPC has failed to provide this.

To illustrate the absurdity of accepting such a document as proof of contractual authority, anyone could parody that "witness statement" and could fabricate “evidence” of landowner authority using nothing more than imagination and a keyboard.

If POPLA accepts UKPC’s version as proof of a valid contract flowing from the landowner, despite its lack of compliance with Section 14.1 of the Code of Practice, including the redaction of signatories and absence of supporting documentation, then it will be further evidence of the inherent failures in the system.

The PPSCoP section 14.1 requires written confirmation from the landowner covering:

a) the identity of the landowner(s)
b) a boundary map of the land to be managed
c) any applicable byelaws
d) the permission granted and its duration
e) the parking terms and conditions, including exemptions
f) the method of issuing parking charges
g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents
h) obligations under the Code and ATA membership
i) documentation to be supplied to authorised bodies
j) the operator’s approach to handling appeals

None of the information listed above is commercially sensitive, nor has UKPC provided any of it. Their submission fails entirely to meet the evidentiary requirements set out in Section 14.1 of the Private Parking Code of Practice. It does not contain a signed, dated, and site-specific agreement between the landowner and the operator, nor does it establish the scope, duration, or enforceability of any purported authority. In legal terms, it is inadmissible.

A redacted, illegibly signed witness statement—unsupported by contemporaneous documentation and devoid of contractual substance—cannot be construed as proof of landowner authority under any reasonable interpretation of the statutory framework. Acceptance of such material would constitute a breach of POPLA’s duty to apply the Code of Practice with rigour and impartiality.

It would also undermine the statutory safeguards enshrined in Schedule 4 of PoFA, which require demonstrable authority to pursue keeper liability. If POPLA accepts this submission as sufficient, it will confirm the systemic failure of the current appeals process and reinforce the urgent need for reform.

The Private Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 was enacted precisely to eliminate this kind of evidential theatre and replace it with a transparent, accountable, and legally compliant framework—one that cannot be manipulated by operators relying on template fiction and procedural sleight of hand.

6. The Driver Has Not Been Identified

The driver remains unidentified. In the absence of full compliance with the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012—as detailed in the appeal—there can be no transfer of liability to the Keeper. The Keeper is under no legal obligation to name the driver, and without such identification, the operator has no lawful basis to pursue the Keeper.

The persuasive authority of VCS v Edward (2023) confirms that operators cannot rely on assumption or inference to establish that the Keeper was the driver. Liability cannot be imposed without clear, unequivocal evidence. No such evidence has been presented, and therefore, the charge must fail.

Summary

UKPC’s signage fails the Red Hand Rule and breaches PoFA 2(2) and 2(3). Their reliance on both Paragraphs 8 and 9 of PoFA is legally contradictory. Their definition of “parking” is judicially discredited by Jopson v Homeguard. Their evidence is riddled with procedural errors, unsupported assertions, and irrelevant boilerplate. Their landowner witness statement is a joke.

If POPLA upholds this charge, it will be doing so in defiance of statute, precedent, and basic contractual principles. That outcome would speak volumes—not about the merits of the case, but about the credibility of the appeals process itself.