Free Traffic Legal Advice

Send the following email to the court and Cc in Moorside Legal and yourself with the following:

Subject: UKCPS Ltd v [Defendant] — Non-compliance with Order of 03/10/2025; automatic strike-out (para 3)

Dear Sir or Madam,

I refer to District Judge [judges name which you redacted]’s Order dated 03/10/2025.

Paragraphs 1–2 struck out the original particulars and required the Claimant by 4:00pm on 20/10/2025 to file and serve Particulars of Claim that:

(i) state whether the claim is brought under Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) and, if so, identify the relevant obligation; or, if not brought under PoFA, identify the cause of action; and
(ii) if contract is relied upon, identify the contracting parties, the consideration and the alleged breach; or, if tort is relied upon, identify the tort.

At 15:47 on 20/10/2025 the Claimant served “Further Particulars of Claim”, signed under a Statement of Truth by “John Moody, Litigation Paralegal”. Those particulars do not comply with the Order. They do not elect a single cause of action. They do not identify any PoFA “relevant obligation” or any period of parking. If contract is alleged, they do not identify the parties, the specific term allegedly breached, or any site-specific consideration. No trespass or other tort is pleaded.

Further, the Statement of Truth and service appear to have been effected by a non-authorised individual. In Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) the High Court reiterated that an unauthorised employee cannot conduct litigation or sign a statement of truth on behalf of a party.

The Claimant has therefore failed to comply with paragraphs 1–2 of the Order. Under paragraph 3, the claim stands struck out automatically and without further order. I respectfully invite the Court to record the strike-out on the file and to vacate any listed dates.

I also seek my costs of and occasioned by this issue. I seek costs for unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g). Alternatively, I seek a summary assessment under CPR 44.2 in the Court’s general case-management discretion.

In view of paragraph 3 above, I also invite the Court to direct that a copy of its order and the offending documents are referred to the Solicitors Regulation Authority for investigation.

Exhibits:

A1: Order of 03/10/2025.
A2: Claimant’s service email timed 15:47 on 20/10/2025.
A3: “Further Particulars of Claim” (showing lack of particulars).
A4: Statement of Truth page signed “John Moody, Litigation Paralegal”.

Yours faithfully,

[Name]
[Address]
[Email]
[Claim number]

If you get no confirmation before the defence deadline, make sure you give me a couple of days notice to prepare the amended defence. Keep the exhibits lean (A1–A4 above) for this request; the PoFA and signage evidence belongs in the defence if the court does not accept automatic strike-out.

DO NOT send anything as your amended defence until the very last minute. If you have not heard anting back from either the court or Moorside Legal by 3:30pm on Monday 3rd November, you can send the following as your "holding" amended defence. It is sent as a PDF attachment in an email to the court and CC'd to help@moorsidelegal.co.uk and yourself.

I repeat, do not send anything before the deadline and then, only if you have had no response from either the court or Moorside.

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT [County Court name]

Claim No: [Claim Number]

BETWEEN:

UKCPS Ltd
Claimant

- and -

[Defendant's Full Name]

Defendant

---

DEFENCE

1. This Amended Defence is filed without prejudice to the Defendant’s position that the claim stood struck out automatically under paragraph 3 of the Court’s Order dated 3 October 2025 owing to the Claimant’s non-compliance with paragraphs 1–2. It is filed protectively and in the alternative only.

2. The Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to the relief claimed, or at all.

A. Non-compliance with the Court’s Order / CPR

3. By Order dated 03/10/2025 the court struck out the original Particulars of Claim (PoC) for breach of CPR 16.4(1)(a) and directed the Claimant, by 4:00pm on 20/10/2025, to file and serve PoC which (i) state whether the claim is brought under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) and, if so, identify the “relevant obligation”; or (ii) if not under PoFA, identify the cause of action; and, where contract is alleged, to set out the contracting parties, the consideration and the alleged breach.

3. The “Further Particulars of Claim” served by email at 15:47 on 20/10/2025 still fail to comply. They equivocate between PoFA, contract and a vague “licence not granted”, never elect a single cause of action, do not identify any “relevant obligation”, fail to plead any period of parking, do not identify the contractual parties, consideration or the specific term allegedly breached, and plead no coherent tort. They are generic, not fact-specific.

4. In consequence, the Claimant has not complied with paragraphs 1–2 of the Order. Under paragraph 3, the claim stands struck out automatically. The Defendant invites the Court to record strike-out and deal with costs. If, however, the Court treats the Further PoC as compliant, the Defendant pleads to the merits as follows.

B. No contract formed: prohibitive signage / no offer

5. The signage relied upon (Claimant’s exhibit “Controlled Land – Terms and Conditions”) is prohibitive, as held in the persuasive appellate decision in PCM(UK) Ltd v Bull & Others (Southampton CC, 2016, DJ Glen), prohibitive signage cannot give rise to a contractual licence and is incapable of creating liability in contract.:

(a) “Parking is only permitted for residents … in possession of a valid virtual permit.”
(b) “No parking is permitted for any other vehicles for any length of time.”

6. Such wording makes no contractual offer to non-permit holders; it is a prohibition. With no offer, there can be no acceptance or consideration by a non-permit motorist. At most, the facts alleged could amount to trespass—actionable only by the landholder and sounding in nominal damages. The Claimant pleads neither landowner title nor a tort, and has no locus to claim in trespass.

C. PoFA not engaged and keeper not liable

7. If (contrary to §5–6) the Claimant relies on PoFA keeper liability, it has not met the strict requirements of Schedule 4:

(i) Paragraph 9(2)(a): the NtK (dated 17/10/2024) does not specify any period of parking. The CCTV stills span only ~86 seconds and some frames are not timestamped. Instantaneous images are not a “period of parking” and cannot evidence that the vehicle was parked at all (as opposed to momentary presence, manoeuvring or stopping to read terms).

(ii) Paragraph 9(2)(e): the NtK’s wording focuses on the driver being liable and merely “invites” the keeper to pay or name the driver, rather than clearly inviting the keeper to pay the parking charges as PoFA requires.

(iii) Paragraph 9(2)(f)–(i): strict proof is required that all mandatory information and warnings were given in the prescribed form and within the statutory deadlines.

8. PoFA is a statutory gateway. Non-compliance is fatal to any attempt to hold the registered keeper liable. The Claimant has not pleaded, still less proved, full compliance as held in the persuasive appellate decision in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v Edward (Leeds CC, 2023), where no evidence of a period of parking exists, PoFA liability cannot arise.

D. No standing and non-disclosed landowner authority

9. The Claimant is put to strict proof of a contemporaneous, unredacted contract with the landholder that: (a) identifies the site and signage in force at the material time; (b) confers authority to form contracts with motorists and to litigate in the Claimant’s own name; and (c) sets the £100 sum as liquidated damages (not a penalty or disguised damages). A bare assertion of authority is insufficient.

E. Inadequate particulars and lack of evidence

10. The Further PoC rely on a facsimile sign, not proof of the actual terms posted at the material time and entrance(s). The Defendant requires strict proof of:

(a) full-site signage plans and photographs contemporaneous with the material date;
(b) the visibility/legibility of any purported terms from a driver’s position;
(c) the route taken and whether any contractual terms could be read before the alleged breach.

11. The CCTV stills do not evidence parking or any breach of a clear term. An 86-second window is equally consistent with a driver stopping briefly and/or reading the signs and leaving—conduct that cannot fairly be penalised. The industry's own Code of Practice  confirms that a mere instant (or seconds) does not constitute a “period of parking” capable of proving breach and requires a minimum of 5 minutes is a "consideration period" before any charge can be issued.

F. Unrecoverable additional sums (“debt recovery”)

12. The claim includes an added £60 “recovery/administration” sum. The persuasive appellate decision in Excel Parking Services Ltd v Wilkinson (2020, Sheffield CC, HHJ Jackson) confirmed that “debt recovery” add-ons are not recoverable. This is double recovery and not recoverable in small claims for private parking charges.

13. The Supreme Court in ParkingEye v Beavis allowed a single sum (there, £85) as a deterrent where clear, prominent signage existed; it did not endorse bolt-ons. Numerous circuit-wide decisions have disallowed such add-ons, and the Government’s Private Parking(Code of Practice) Act 2019 has banned them. The court is invited to strike out the add-on as an abuse of process.

G. Signature / conduct of litigation

14. The Further PoC are verified by a statement of truth signed “John Moody, Litigation Paralegal”. Only an authorised litigator may conduct litigation or sign statements of truth on behalf of a represented party. Absent evidence that Mr Moody is an authorised person, conducting litigation, including filing or serving pleadings and signing statements of truth, is a reserved legal activity under sections 12 and 14 of the Legal Services Act 2007, as reaffirmed in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB). The SoT is defective. The court may disregard a defective statement of truth and/or exercise its case-management powers as to sanctions.

H. Beavis distinguished

15. If the Claimant seeks reliance on ParkingEye v Beavis, the facts are far removed: (i) signage here is prohibitive, not an offer to all users on clear, prominent terms; (ii) no commercial justification is pleaded; (iii) the alleged parking is not evidenced as a meaningful duration; and (iv) the claim includes unlawful bolt-ons. Beavis does not assist the Claimant.

I. Conclusion

16. Accordingly, the Defendant invites the Court to confirm the automatic strike-out under paragraph 3 of the Order dated 3 October 2025. In the alternative, if the claim is treated as subsisting, the Defendant asks that it be dismissed in its entirety with costs pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) for the Claimant’s unreasonable conduct.

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:


Date:

You can sign the defence by simply typing your full name as the signature.

Hi,

Trust you are keeping well.

I have received an Order dated 6 November 2025 from the court today which states the following (I have removed the name of the Judge and the Court:


"Before District Judge ?? sitting at the County Court at ?.

Upon the Court considering the Claimant's amended particulars of claim dated 20 October 2025

And upon the Court noting that the statement of truth to the same has been signed by John Moody in their capacity as a "litigation paralegal"

And upon the Court being mindful of Mazur && anr v. Charles Russell Speechlys LLP (2025)] EWHC 2341 and
noting that a "litigation paralegal" is not a person that is authorised to "conduct litigation" as defined by Section 12(1) and 13(2) of the Legal Services Act 2007.

And upon the Court giving careful consideration to Civil Procedure Rule 3.3 and 3.4, being mindful of the
overriding objective and further being mindful that this is not the first time in these proceedings that the Claimant has been in breach of the CPR and/or a fundamental principle of litigation.

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. The claim is struck out.
2. No order for costs.

Dated 5 November 2025"


I am correct to assume this is the end of the matter?  If so, all thanks to you (and your team).

Thank you again.

I think I'll let "sleeping dogs lie" so to say unless they do anything.

The Court was Huddersfield County Court and the Judge was District Judge Akers for your information.

              

You can still pursue costs despite the “no order for costs” wording. That direction only means the court didn’t award costs automatically at strike-out. It doesn’t block a later application.

Because the claim was on the small claims track, you must base any request only on CPR 27.14(2)(g). That rule lets the court order one party to pay the other’s costs if they have behaved unreasonably. No other CPR provision about costs applies after allocation.

Act quickly. File an N244 within about 14 days of the strike-out order or as soon as possible. Ask for:

Support it with a short witness statement showing the claimant’s unreasonable behaviour (failure to comply with the October order, defective particulars, use of an unauthorised paralegal). Attach the October and November orders and the offending pleadings.

List only reasonable post-issue costs: time preparing the defence and correspondence, time spent on the strike-out issue, and this application. Use the litigant-in-person rate of £24 per hour (PD 46 para 3.4) and include any court fees or minor out-of-pocket expenses.

Excellent news. The order you have quoted is simply the court listing a hearing for your costs application. The parking claim itself is already struck out and remains dead. The only live issue is whether the claimant should now be ordered to pay your costs and, if so, how much. You must attend that hearing; if you do not, the judge can just refuse the application or make no order.

Between now and 16 January 2026, you should get three things in order.

First, assemble a small, focused bundle of documents. You should have at least:

Take at least two copies of this bundle to court: one for you and a spare that can be handed up if the judge wants it.

Second, prepare a clear costs schedule. This is a simple one-page breakdown of what you are asking for. You base it on the Litigant-in-Person (LiP) rate of £24 per hour. List, in plain language and with realistic hours, the time you spent on necessary work caused by the claim and by their unreasonable conduct.

For example, time spent reading the Letter of Claim and claim form, researching and drafting the defence, dealing with allocation, reading and analysing the Further PoC and the Mazur issue, and preparing the N244 and this costs application. Add up the hours, multiply by £24, and then add any actual out-of-pocket expenses such as the N244 court fee, postage/printing, and your travel (public transport or mileage at 45/mile return plus parking) to attend the costs hearing. Put a single total at the bottom. Make sure the hours are honest and not obviously inflated.

Third, have a short note of what you will say to the judge. You do not need to file it formally; it is mainly for you. In that note, set out briefly:


Then list, in simple terms, what you say was unreasonable:


Finish your note with a simple line along the lines of: “I respectfully invite the court to find the claimant has behaved unreasonably under CPR 27.14(2)(g) and to order them to pay my costs as per the attached schedule, within 14 days.”

On the day of the hearing, the judge will usually start by confirming that this is your application for costs and then ask why you say you are entitled to them. Use your note to anchor yourself.

Explain that you are the successful party, that you are only claiming the fixed litigant-in-person rate and reasonable expenses, and that in your submission the claimant’s conduct has gone beyond ordinary mistakes and clearly crossed the CPR 27.14(2)(g) “unreasonable behaviour” threshold. Hand up your costs schedule if the judge does not already have it.

If someone attends for Moorside (highly unlikely) and tries to dismiss the situation as minor “errors”, calmly bring the judge back to the realities:


You can say that for an SRA-regulated firm this pattern is not just unreasonable but frankly embarrassing and falls well below the standards expected of competent solicitors; it should not be for a consumer defendant to absorb the time and cost of dealing with that level of procedural incompetence. You can add, without overdoing it, that such conduct is of a kind that may merit separate consideration by the SRA, but that for present purposes you simply ask the court to mark it appropriately by exercising its discretion under CPR 27.14(2)(g) and ordering the claimant to pay your costs as set out in your schedule.

As for contacting Moorside beforehand, you are entitled to try. You can send a “without prejudice save as to costs” email offering to settle your costs application if they pay an agreed sum. Keep it short and factual: refer to the fact the claim has been struck out, that a costs hearing is listed, that you consider their conduct unreasonable, and that you will be seeking an order under CPR 27.14(2)(g) for the amount in your schedule. Then state the sum you would accept in full and final settlement of your costs, on condition it is paid by a specific date, and that if they do not agree you will proceed to the hearing and may show the judge that you made a reasonable settlement proposal. You can pitch the offer either at the full figure in your schedule or slightly discounted; that is up to you.

In short: the claim itself is finished, you have a discrete hearing on your costs, you should turn up with a tidy bundle, a sensible costs schedule, and a clear explanation of why their conduct was unreasonable and why the judge should now exercise the 27.14(2)(g) discretion in your favour.

Here is a draft email you can send to Moorside Legal at help@moorsidelegal.co.uk (or any other email address they may have used to send you correspondence. You CC yourself also:

Subject: UKCPS Ltd v [Your Name] – Costs Application Listed 16 January 2026

WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAVE AS TO COSTS

Dear Sirs,

I write regarding the above matter.

As you are aware, by order dated 5 November 2025 the court struck out your client’s claim of its own initiative under CPR 3.3 and 3.4, expressly referring to repeated breaches of the CPR and to Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB). I am therefore the wholly successful party. The only issue now outstanding is my application for costs, which has been listed for hearing at 3:00 pm on 16 January 2026.

In my submission, the conduct of this litigation by a supposedly professional, SRA-regulated firm of solicitors has gone well beyond ordinary procedural mistakes. Issuing and pursuing a vague and non-compliant claim, failing properly to comply with the court’s October order, and using an unqualified “litigation paralegal” to conduct litigation and sign statements of truth after Mazur is not just unreasonable; it is embarrassing for a firm in your position and falls materially below the standard expected of competent solicitors. It should not be left to a consumer defendant to absorb the time and cost of dealing with that level of procedural incompetence.

At the costs hearing I will be inviting the court to find that your and your client’s behaviour amounts to “unreasonable behaviour” within the meaning of CPR 27.14(2)(g) and to order that you pay my costs of and occasioned by the proceedings, at the litigant-in-person rate of £24 per hour together with my out-of-pocket expenses, as set out in my schedule.

However, in order to avoid the need for a further hearing and the associated time and expense for all concerned, I am prepared to compromise. If you agree to pay the sum of £[insert figure you are willing to accept] in full and final settlement of my costs, such payment to be made within 14 days of acceptance, I will notify the court that my costs application is withdrawn and that no further order is required.

If you do not accept this proposal, or if I receive no response, I will proceed with the application on 16 January 2026 and may place this letter before the court on the issue of costs.

Yours faithfully,

[Your Name]