Author Topic: Split Hijacked thread: MET Parking Services - Southgate Park - Stansted Airport Starbucks/McDonalds - Notice To Keeper  (Read 3562 times)

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I have heard back from POPLA with MET's comments which are as follows:


In the appeal to POPLA Mrs X. raises the following grounds for appeal: • No keeper liability As we have not been provided with the name and address of the driver of the vehicle, we are pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Please see our compliant Notice to Keeper in Section B of our evidence pack. Please also see a full explanation of why we may pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012 in Section C of our evidence pack. We note Mrs X’s comments, however, the Byelaws apply to areas where the road traffic enactments do not apply. Specifically in relation to parking they state ‘no person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.’ These byelaws can be read at: https://assets.live.dxp.maginfrastructure.com/f/73114/x/46195467c9/stansted-byelaws.pdf We are confident that there are no applicable airport Byelaws relating to parking in effect at this location, and would point out that only statutory control relating to the parking of a vehicle is relevant in relation to PoFA. Byelaws that do not relate to parking are not relevant under schedule 4 of PoFA 2012. An area being part of a parcel of land surrounding an airport does not automatically mean that statutory control is in place for that particular area. • Failure to address appeal points There was no such point made in her initial appeal and as such we were not able to address it. • No evidence of clear/prominent signs We are confident that there are sufficient signs in place in this car park and that the signs are prominently displayed and clearly state the terms and conditions. In Section E of our evidence pack we have included images of the signs in place and a site plan of the location. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. We are confident that our signage complies with all relevant legislation and regulations. At no point has Mrs X claimed that the driver of the vehicle was a customer of the restaurant, nor has she provided any evidence to prove that they were. As such, this would not qualify under Section F.3(g) of the Appeals Charter. The terms and conditions of parking are clearly stated on the signs that are prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that the car park is for the use of Southgate Park customers only and that to receive the 60-minute maximum free stay for customers, drivers must enter their vehicle registration on arrival. Visitors that are not Starbucks customers may pay to park for up to 3 hours by using the pay by phone service. As the evidence we have provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates, the vehicle remained in the car park without being registered for the free parking period and no payment was made as an alternative. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. Therefore, we believe that the charge notice was issued correctly, and the appeal should be refused. 

Please can you advise me of my next steps?  Many thanks

Any chance you can scan and show us the contents of their "evidence pack"?
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

Actually, never mind about the contents of their evidence pack. Simply copy and paste the following into the POPLA response webform. It is below the max character limit of 10,000 and is unformatted:

Quote
This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.

1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA

The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.

MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.

MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.

Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

2. The location is under statutory control

MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land that is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.

MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.

MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’

Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument

The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.

MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.

4. No Keeper liability under PoFA

MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.

MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.

5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Code of Practice

MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This is legally incorrect and has no basis in law.

The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.

6. Inadequate signage evidence

MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.

The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:

- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance

MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.

7. No obligation to prove customer status

MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.

MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.

Conclusion

- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- hey have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- They have completely ignored the case law referenced in the appeal.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.

Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’
Does it? It says that any land "on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control" is not 'relevant land'. That's potentially slightly different to a blanket statement that any statutory control over the land renders it not 'relevant land'.

I think the argument should still be made (because why not), but I think this is a distinction worth making.

Fab, thank you so much for your help. I'll keep you updated

Meh! The precise wording of PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) states that land is not relevant land if it is land “on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control.” (my emphasis)

This means that it is not enough for the land simply to be within an area subject to statutory control (such as an airport). Instead, there must be statutory control specifically over parking on that land.

MET argues that PoFA applies because they believe the Stansted Airport byelaws do not explicitly regulate parking at Southgate Park. Their reasoning suggests that unless the byelaws directly control parking enforcement on that specific site, the land is not excluded from PoFA.

However, the byelaws do contain a provision stating:

“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”

This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA.

I will advise on any amendment to the suggested response to the operators evidence shortly.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

Here is the slightly revised version of what you should copy and paste into the POPLA response webform:

Quote
This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.

1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA

The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.

MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.

MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.

Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

2. The location is under statutory control

MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land if the parking of a vehicle on that land is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The Stansted Airport byelaws contain a provision that regulates where vehicles may be parked within the airport boundary. Since the byelaws impose statutory control over parking, this means the location is not relevant land under PoFA.

The airport byelaws do contain a provision stating:

“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”

This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA

MET Parking Services has failed to acknowledge or rebut the official airport boundary map provided in this appeal, which confirms that Southgate Park is within the airport boundary and thus subject to these byelaws. They have also failed to explain why they believe that parking at this location is not subject to statutory control, despite the clear wording of the byelaws.

The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.

MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.

MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’

Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument

The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.

MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.

4. No Keeper liability under PoFA

MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.

MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.

5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Code of Practice

MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This is legally incorrect and has no basis in law.

The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.

6. Inadequate signage evidence

MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.

The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:

- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance

MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.

7. No obligation to prove customer status

MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.

MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.

Conclusion

- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- hey have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- They have completely ignored the case law referenced in the appeal.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.

Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.
« Last Edit: February 17, 2025, 05:15:09 pm by b789 »
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

Hello, as I have a similar situation, I wondered if there was nay update with your appeal to POPLA?

POPLA often take over 8 weeks to adjudicate on appeals, the OP won't have a response for some time.

I would like to start by saying a Massive Thank You for hosting the template and the map, and all the valuable advice and encouragement,

My car stopped in Starbucks carpark for 13 minuites at 12.30am, it was dark and dank,
Starbucks was closed and the carpark was not lit, and as you guessed it received a fine,

I lodged an appeal using your template: Reply #11 on: January 23, 2025, 04:37:48 pm and also included the Map.

It was a bit of a faff having to go thru it, bit it was worth it in the end, it`s outrageous to be fined
for parking in a non-lit carpark when the shop was closed and past midnight.

I finally received the outcome of my appleal today 09-05-2025 that started 25-02-2025.

Your appeal was successful.

As your appeal was successful, your parking charge is not effective and you do not need to take any further action  ;D.

Assessor summary below of my case:

There is no legal obligation to identify the driver or assumption of driver identity. There is case law on this matter, VCS v Edward H0KF6C9C [2023]. This says it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion. As explained in VCS v Edward, the keeper’s refusal to identify the driver does not permit any assumption of driver identity. • The location is not 'relevant land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (POFA). The alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which is located within the boundary of Stansted Airport. Stansted Airport is governed by airport byelaws, which constitute statutory control over the land. Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of POFA explicitly states that "relevant land" excludes any land that is "subject to statutory control," such as land covered by byelaws. Therefore, Southgate Park is not relevant land for the purposes of POFA. While the land may be private and MET Parking Services may have been contracted by the landowner’s agents to manage the car park, this does not negate the fact that it is within the airport boundary and subject to byelaws. As a result, MET Parking Services cannot rely on POFA to transfer liability to the registered keeper. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed. • The operator has failed to address their grounds of appeal. This suggests their decision to reject their appeal was not based on a proper consideration of the facts or the applicable legal framework. • For a driver to have agreed to any contractual terms, the signage must have been legible, prominently positioned, and capable of being read before entering into a contract. Without evidence of the signage’s visibility and clarity at the time of the alleged contravention, the claim is unsubstantiated. The appellant has provided a map of the airport showing the boundary within which airport byelaws apply and they have indicated the location of Southgate Park, and this is within this boundary. This has been considered in my determination.

Assessor supporting rational for decision

I am allowing this appeal, with my reasoning outlined below: It is the responsibility of the operator to provide POPLA with sufficient, clear evidence in order to rebut the appellant’s claims and prove that it issued the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) correctly. This PCN has been issued for remaining on site without authorisation. When parking on private land, the parking contract is between the motorist and the operator through the terms on its signs. The signage at this site states charges apply for parking and there is a 60-minute free stay for Southgate Park customers only, and the vehicle registration must be registered on arrival. The operator has said in their case file that at the time the appellants vehicle was on site, there was no free stay and the kiosk for registering vehicles was inaccessible. The parking operator has provided details from its system to show the appellants vehicle was on site for 13 minutes and the driver did not pay for their stay. In their appeal, the appellant has said they will not identify the driver at the time in question. From the evidence provided I am not satisfied the driver has been identified. Therefore the operator is pursuing the registered keeper of the vehicle in this instance. For the operator to transfer liability for unpaid parking charges from the driver of the vehicle to the registered keeper of the vehicle, the regulations laid out in the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 must be adhered to. POFA 2012 allows parking operators to transfer the liability to the registered keeper if the driver or hirer is not identified when a PCN has been issued on relevant land. In this case, the appellant has said the alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which it not relevant land. They have said it is located within the boundary of Stansted Airport, and Stansted Airport is governed by airport byelaws, which constitute statutory control over the land. The appellant has provided a map of the airport showing the boundary within which airport byelaws apply and they have indicated the location of Southgate Park, and this is within this boundary. Relevant land under POFA excludes land subject to statutory control. Airport Authority and Highways Authority fall under statutory control. In this case, we would expect the parking operator to demonstrate or explain why the land in question is relevant land as defined in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Within their case file, the parking operator claims the Byelaws don’t apply in areas where Road Traffic Enactments apply. However, they haven’t been clear on boundaries relating to where Road Traffic Enactments do and don’t apply. In any case, in places where Road Traffic Enactments apply, the land is under the statutory control of the Road Traffic Enactments. I note the operator also claims that the only relevant part of the Byelaws is the part labelled parking – and that this is in relation to cargo and baggage. However, there are other areas that seek to restrict more general parking activities. For example, the Byelaws include: “5(3) Obstruction Except in an emergency, no person shall leave or park a Vehicle or cause it to wait for a period in excess of the permitted time in an area where the period of waiting is restricted by a Sign.” In this case the operator’s own terms and conditions are about parking in an area restricted for a permitted time, and they also include not obstructing others. Therefore I am not satisfied that the operator has demonstrated or sufficiently explained that the Byelaws are not relevant to general parking at this site, and so they have not sufficiently rebutted the appellants grounds of appeal. As POFA 2012 cannot be used in this case to transfer the liability of the charge from the driver to the registered keeper, I must allow the appeal on the basis that the operator has failed to demonstrate that the appellant is the driver and therefore liable for the charge. I note the appellant has raised other issues as grounds for appeal, however, as I have decided to allow the appeal for this reason, I did not feel they required further consideration.

I hope my outcome encourages others to appeal this unfair and outrageous fine.
« Last Edit: May 09, 2025, 07:34:46 pm by johnr64 »
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Well done... Can you share the POPLA case number? Although one POPLA assessor is not bound by another, this is an unusually detailed assessment that would be useful to refer others to.