1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
2. Failure to Address Appeal Points
3. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage
4. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity
1.
The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA):
The alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which is located within the boundary of Stansted Airport. This boundary is confirmed by a Stansted Airport-issued map provided with this appeal. Stansted Airport is governed by airport byelaws, which constitute statutory control over the land. Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA explicitly states that "relevant land" excludes any land that is "subject to statutory control," such as land covered by byelaws. Therefore, Southgate Park is not relevant land for the purposes of PoFA.
While the land may be private and MET Parking Services may have been contracted by the landowner’s agents to manage the car park, this does not negate the fact that it is within the airport boundary and subject to byelaws. The existence of byelaws over the land places it under statutory control, as established by law. MET Parking Services’ argument that the land is not covered by byelaws is incorrect and does not override the statutory framework. As a result, MET Parking Services cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the registered Keeper. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed. As the Keeper, I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and there can be no Keeper liability in this case.
2. Failure to Address Appeal Points:
In my initial appeal to MET Parking Services, I specifically raised the issue of the site being under statutory control and therefore not relevant land under PoFA. Despite this, MET Parking Services failed to address this critical legal argument in their rejection. Instead, they dismissed the appeal without engaging with the evidence or addressing the legal basis of my argument. This omission suggests their decision to reject my appeal was not based on a proper consideration of the facts or the applicable legal framework.
3. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage:
MET Parking Services has not provided sufficient evidence that the terms and conditions were clearly displayed and visible to motorists. For a driver to have agreed to any contractual terms, the signage must have been legible, prominently positioned, and capable of being read before entering into a contract. Without evidence of the signage’s visibility and clarity at the time of the alleged contravention, the claim is unsubstantiated.
4. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity:
As the registered Keeper of the vehicle, I am not legally obligated to identify the driver. MET Parking Services has provided no evidence to identify the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. Since liability cannot be transferred to the Keeper under PoFA due to the site’s statutory control, MET Parking Services must pursue the driver—if they can identify them. Without such identification, their claim against the Keeper is baseless.
Furthermore, the POPLA assessor must not assume or infer that the Keeper was also the driver. There is extensive persuasive case law on this matter. In
VCS v Edward H0KF6C9C [2023], HHJ Mark Gargan in his conclusion, stated in paragraph 35.3:
“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell. For example, there will be companies who are registered keepers of vehicles where many drivers have the use of the vehicle from time to time. There will be individual employers who are the registered keeper but who allow a number of people to drive their vehicles. There may be situations where husband and wife are each registered keepers of their respective vehicles but for some reason drive the other. These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
The appellant is explaining this point in detail because some assessors have in the past erroneously allowed MET Parking Services to claim that the Keeper was likely the driver without any evidence. MET attempts to mislead assessors by relying on a misleading and erroneous note in Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which states:
“Liability
It is the driver that is liable for the parking charge.
NOTE: The driver is often the same person as the keeper and/or the hirer. Where a keeper or hirer fails or refuses to provide the name and serviceable address of the driver when requested to, it may be assumed they are the driver, based on that failure or refusal.”
This statement is contrary to the law, as explained in
VCS v Edward. The Keeper’s refusal to identify the driver does not permit any assumption of driver identity. Any such inference would be legally baseless and improper. POPLA assessors must adhere to established legal principles and not be misled by incorrect interpretations provided by rogue parking operators.
