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Response to Operator’s Submission

It is striking how little of the operator's response actually addresses the points raised in the appeal. Instead of tackling the substantive issues, the operator has opted for the “copy-paste and hope for the best” approach, regurgitating generic statements about signage and Beavis. This is disappointing, albeit unsurprising, given the lack of substance in their claim.

1. Signage is Prohibitory, Not Contractual

The operator claims that their signage forms a contractual agreement with the driver, but this assertion falls flat upon even the most basic scrutiny. The signs on-site are entirely prohibitory, stating only:

(a) “No parking, waiting, loading or unloading on the roads at any time.”
(b) “No parking, waiting, loading or unloading on the footpaths at any time.”
(c) “No causing obstructions at any time.”

These statements are not terms and conditions—they are outright prohibitions. A prohibitory sign cannot form the basis of a contract, as it does not offer anything to the driver. For a contract by conduct to be formed, there must be an offer that the driver can choose to accept by their actions. Here, no such offer exists. Instead, the signs impose blanket bans on certain activities, making it clear that parking is not permitted under any circumstances. How can a driver breach a contract that was never on offer in the first place?

If the landowner truly wished to enforce such prohibitory restrictions, the appropriate course of action would be to pursue trespass claims under common law, which only the landowner—not the operator—has the standing to prosecute. The operator cannot stretch the limits of contract law to enforce prohibitions that fall outside its remit.

The operator’s own “evidence” further undermines their case. Their signage does not communicate any of the terms listed in their supposed landowner contract (See section 4). There is no mention of the requirement to display a permit, park within marked bays, or avoid yellow lines—restrictions they claim are central to their enforcement. Instead, the signs prohibit all parking, waiting, loading, or unloading, and offer no alternative under which parking might be allowed.

The operator has attempted to sidestep this issue by simply stating, without explanation, that “the signage forms a contract.” But how does a blanket prohibition magically transform into a contractual offer? The operator has failed to address this fundamental flaw in their argument, choosing instead to rely on vague, unsupported assertions. Are we supposed to just take their word for it? Perhaps they’re hoping POPLA will.

POPLA must recognise that prohibitory signage does not create a contract. The operator cannot rely on signs that categorically ban parking to claim that a driver agreed to pay a charge for doing so. If there is no offer, there is no contract. If there is no contract, there can be no breach. This is not a minor technicality—it is the foundation of contract law. The operator’s case fails at the first hurdle, and this appeal must therefore succeed.

2. Misplaced Reliance on ParkingEye v Beavis

It’s almost amusing how the operator clings to ParkingEye v Beavis as if it’s a magic wand to justify every parking charge ever issued. However, the Beavis case involved signage that clearly offered terms—free parking for two hours, with charges for overstaying. Here, the signage does no such thing. Instead, it prohibits parking altogether. How can a driver agree to terms when the sign explicitly forbids the very act required to accept those terms?

Of course, the operator doesn’t bother to explain this glaring inconsistency. They just drop the Beavis name and hope no one notices it doesn’t apply.

3. Ambiguity of Location

The appeal pointed out that the Notice to Keeper (NtK) fails to identify the location of the alleged contravention with sufficient clarity, as required by Paragraph 7(2)(a) of PoFA. Listing an entire industrial estate and three different roads is not specific enough to identify where the vehicle was supposedly parked.

The operator’s response? They casually brush this off, claiming the “post code” is sufficient. Really? A post code that covers multiple roads and areas is supposed to pinpoint the exact location of a parking contravention? This lack of precision violates PoFA, and the operator’s dismissal of this point is, frankly, an insult to anyone with an ounce of intelligence.

4. Landowner Authority

The operator relies on a supposed “landowner contract” to justify their authority to enforce Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) at this location. However, this document is riddled with flaws, inconsistencies, and missing information that seriously undermine its credibility.

Firstly, the document lacks clarity about who actually authorised it. It contains what appear to be two different signatures purportedly acting on behalf of the landowner or their agent, but no evidence has been provided to demonstrate that either individual has the legal authority to represent the landowner. The names of the signatories are illegible, no job titles are provided, and there is no supporting documentation (e.g., a power of attorney, agency agreement, or other authorisation). Without proof of their authority, these signatures are meaningless.

Secondly, the contract identifies the client as “Trade Sales”, but provides no further information to confirm who or what this entity is. There is no company registration number, no address, and no evidence that “Trade Sales” is a legitimate entity, let alone one authorised to act on behalf of the landowner. This raises significant doubts about whether the operator has any valid agreement with the actual landowner of the site.

The contract also fails to provide a clear and complete map of the premises, which is a requirement under the BPA Code of Practice. The document vaguely refers to site boundaries but does not include any specific details or supporting evidence to define where the operator’s authority applies. This is particularly problematic for a large industrial estate spanning multiple roads, as it is impossible to determine which areas are covered under the supposed agreement.

Finally, while the “Restrictions” section of the contract outlines specific terms (e.g., the requirement to display a valid permit, park within marked bays, and not park on yellow lines), there is no evidence that these restrictions are communicated on-site. In fact, as discussed in Section 1, the signage on-site contains entirely different wording that is prohibitory in nature and does not reflect the terms in the landowner contract. This discrepancy raises serious concerns about whether the operator is complying with the landowner’s instructions—or if the operator is simply enforcing arbitrary rules.

Under Section 7 of the BPA Code of Practice, operators must provide clear, written evidence of their authority from the landowner, and this evidence must withstand scrutiny. In this case, the contract fails to demonstrate:

(a) That the signatories are authorised to act on behalf of the landowner.
(b) That “Trade Sales” is a valid and authorised entity.
(c) That the landowner consented to the specific terms the operator claims to enforce.
(d) That the contract was valid at the time of the alleged parking contravention.

Without these critical elements, the contract cannot be relied upon as evidence of landowner authority. POPLA must demand robust proof that the operator has the authority they claim. If the operator cannot provide clear, unredacted evidence of a valid and current landowner agreement, this appeal must succeed.

Summary

The operator’s response fails to address the points raised in the appeal. Instead, they rely on generic statements, irrelevant case law, and a complete lack of evidence. Their inability to engage with the appeal’s key arguments is telling... they don’t have a case.

The appeal must succeed for the following reasons:

(a) The signage is prohibitory and incapable of forming a contract.
(b) The NtK fails to comply with PoFA requirements, particularly regarding location and keeper liability.
(c) The operator has not provided proof of landowner authority.
(d) The charge is punitive and lacks justification under Beavis.
(e) The operator’s response is, at best, inadequate and, at worst, an insult to the intelligence of everyone involved. POPLA should uphold the appeal.

As there is a limit of 10,000 characters for the POPLA response webform

POPLA say they aim to respond in 2-4 weeks, but a recent poster reported getting a result after around 7 weeks, so it might take a while.

     Dear <tango33>,

 We are writing to update you about your appeal.

 Your appeal is now ready to be assessed and is currently in a queue
waiting to be allocated. We expect to make a decision on your appeal 6-8
weeks from the point that the appeal was first submitted. The next
communication that you will receive from us will be the decision on your
appeal.

 Kind regards

 POPLA Team

Unsuccessful

The appellant has raised the following points from their grounds of appeal. • The prohibitions do not suggest an offer to allow parking, instead they explicitly state what actions are not permitted which does not form an offer than can be accepted by conduct. • The charge is presented as a penalty. • Wording implies that the £100 charge is a consequence of breaching the prohibitions but does not indicate that the driver is entering into a contract by parking. • The signage as worded are incapable of forming a valid contract. • Under PoFA, Paragraph 7(2)(a) requires that the relevant land where the vehicle was parked is described with enough detail to ensure the keeper is aware of the specific location. The exact location is not listed on the PCN. • They put the operator to strict proof that the operator has the authority to issue parking charges on this land. After reviewing the operator’s evidence, the appellant expands on their grounds of appeal. The appellant has provided 1. Photo of the signage. The above evidence has been considered in making my determination.

The appellant is appealing as the registered keeper. I have received the PCN, and I am satisfied this meets the requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. I am satisfied as stated by the operator that the site name is 'Uxbridge Industrial Estate'. The roads that fall within the Uxbridge Industrial Estate site are Wallingford Road, Salisbury Road and Arundel Road. Which make up ‘Uxbridge Industrial Estate’. As such, I am considering the registered keeper’s liability for the PCN. When assessing an appeal POPLA considers if the operator has issued the parking charge notice correctly and if the driver has complied with the terms and conditions for the use of the car park. The appellant says the prohibitions do not suggest an offer to allow parking, instead they explicitly state what actions are not permitted which does not form an offer than can be accepted by conduct. When parking on private land it is the operators responsibility to display the terms and conditions on the signage. It is then the motorists responsibility to comply with them. In this case the site does no allow motorists to park. As such it is clear that by parking on site a parking charge notice will be issued. As the driver choose to park in a no parking area, they have accepted the consequences of breaching the terms and as such a parking charge notice was issued in response to this. The appellant says the charge is presented as a penalty. The say the wording implies that the £100 charge is a consequence of breaching the prohibitions but does not indicate that the driver is entering into a contract by parking. The appellant has told us in their response that they consider the charge is a contractual penalty and therefore it is unenforceable. The appeal reasons raised have led me to consider the relevant case law of ParkingEye v Beavis. The Supreme Court considered private parking charges in a high-profile case, ParkingEye v Beavis. The Court recognised that parking charges have all the characteristics of a contractual penalty, but nevertheless were enforceable because there were legitimate interests in the charging of overstaying motorists. It concluded that a charge in the region of £85 was proportionate, and it attached importance to the fact that the charge was prominently displayed in large lettering on the signage itself. While the specific facts of the case concerned a free-stay car park where the motorist had overstayed, I consider the principles that lie behind the decision remain the same. Taking these principles into account, I am not going to consider whether the loss is a genuine pre-estimate of loss or whether it reflects a correct loss to the landowner. Rather, I am going to consider the charge amount in the appellant’s case, as well as the legibility of the signage. After reviewing the signage provided by the operator, I am satisfied that the signage is legible, and the charge amount is in the region of £85 and therefore allowable. The Court’s full judgement in the case is available online should the appellant want to read it. The appellant explains that the operators evidence to show they have the authority to operate on this land is not sufficient. The British Parking Association Code of Practice sets the standards by which its members must abide by. Section 7.1 of the code confirms that if an operator does not own the land on which it is carrying out parking management, it must have the written authorisation of the landowner or their appointed agent. This must confirm the operator has the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that it is responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner or agent requires the operator to keep to the Code of Practice, the details of the land and that it has the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges. In response to this ground of appeal, the operator has provided a copy of the contract, and on reviewing this, I am satisfied that the operator has sufficient authority to pursue charges on the land. Having review both the appellants grounds of appeal and the comments raised, I conclude that the terms and conditions of the car park have not been met and the operator has issued the PCN correctly, as such the appeal is refused.