Author Topic: PCN x5 – Private Land, No Permit. UKCPS – The Bar, St James Gate  (Read 459 times)

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Re: PCN x5 – Private Land, No Permit. UKCPS – The Bar, St James Gate
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This is still largely a template, but it is a “better” template in the sense that it tries to answer your headings. The problem for them is that almost everything they say is either (a) a bare assertion with no proof, or (b) a misstatement of how contract law and PoFA actually work.

This is my take on each section, and what it gives you for the IAS appeal and later if they escalate.

Permit requirement and contractual terms

“The absence of a permit entitlement within a tenancy agreement does not exempt a driver from compliance with on-site parking controls.”

That is an assertion, not a legal analysis. It also dodges the real point: the tenancy does not “exempt” anyone; it is the occupier’s pre-existing contract which defines what obligations the occupier has accepted. A third-party sign cannot unilaterally create new contractual obligations against a resident/tenant unless there is a route in the tenancy (or properly notified building regulations) that permits it.

They also keep sliding back to “driver” to avoid addressing keeper liability. That is useful because it shows they are not actually engaging with who they are pursuing and on what basis.

Signage and enforcement

“Parking is for authorised permit holders only... unauthorised vehicles may be issued with a PCN... By parking without displaying a valid permit, the driver accepted the risk...”

This is the same circular reasoning as before: “we put up a sign, therefore contract, therefore charge”. It still fails to answer the prohibitive sign point. A sign that says parking is for permit holders only is, on its face, forbidding. It is not an offer of parking to non-permit holders for £100. Their own wording (“authorised permit holders only”, “unauthorised vehicles”) actually supports the argument that this is about alleged trespass/unauthorised presence rather than a contractual offer to everyone.

“Accepted the risk” is also telling language: risk is not acceptance of contractual terms. Contract formation requires an offer capable of acceptance. If the sign forbids parking by non-permit holders, there is no offer to accept.

Access gate condition

This is mostly irrelevant either way, but note what they have done: they have turned your “open access due to broken gate” point into a pure “doesn’t matter” statement, without addressing the fairness/management angle or the practical reality that the site was not being controlled as a permit-only facility.

Resident information

“UKCPS is contracted... in accordance with the site rules as provided by the landholder.”

Again: assertion with no proof. They still have not produced the landholder contract or any evidence of the landholder’s rules, nor any evidence that those rules were properly notified to residents/tenants, nor that UKCPS has the necessary authority to contract with motorists and litigate in their own name.

Keeper liability

“We are satisfied that... issued in accordance with relevant legislation... Where applicable, liability may be transferred...”

This is the classic IPC operator move: a vague statement that sounds like compliance but cites nothing and proves nothing. “We are satisfied” is meaningless. “Where applicable” is also an escape hatch. Either they are relying on PoFA to pursue the keeper, or they are not. If they are, they must show strict compliance with the statutory wording and service requirements. If they are not, they can only pursue the driver, who has not been identified.

For IAS purposes, for what it's worth, you press them to strict proof:

• identify which PoFA paragraph they rely on (NtK following NtD vs ANPR, para 8 vs para 9)
• show where the notice specifies the period of parking (not a single time)
• show the mandatory wording (including the invitation to pay, warning of keeper liability, etc., in the required form)
• show dates of issue and deemed service and how it meets the statutory deadlines

If their NTK is non-compliant in any respect, “may be transferred” becomes “cannot be transferred”.

Duration and nature of parking

“The reason for parking and the duration of stay do not negate the requirement...”

That is simply a restatement of their business model. Legally it still doesn’t fix: (a) no contract/prohibitive signage, (b) no keeper liability, (c) lack of standing, (d) primacy of the tenancy and lack of notified regulations.

Also note: they do not state any actual duration, and they have provided no new evidence beyond the same photos. If their documentation only shows an “observed time” rather than a period, that continues to feed your PoFA “period of parking” point.

What this changes for your IAS appeal

It gives you extra material to attack because they have now committed in writing to several propositions that are either unproven or internally inconsistent:

1. They say it is “permit holders only” and “unauthorised vehicles” (helps your prohibitive/no offer argument).
2. They claim PoFA compliance but provide no particulars (press strict proof).
3. They assert landholder rules/authority but disclose none (press strict proof of standing and the contract).
4. They keep relying on “driver responsibility” language while hinting at keeper liability (shows they are trying to have it both ways).

Appeal each PCN separately to the IAS with the following:

Quote
I am the registered keeper of vehicle [VRM]. I appeal to the Independent Appeals Service against UKCPS Ltd (“the Operator”) in respect of Parking Charge Notice [PCN NUMBER], issued in relation to an alleged contravention on [ALLEGED DATE] at approximately [ALLEGED TIME] at The Bar, St James Gate, NE1 4BB (basement car park). Liability is denied in full.

This is a dispute of substance concerning contract formation, the legal character of the signage relied upon, evidential sufficiency, landholder authority and standing, the primacy of the occupier’s existing contract and residential rights, and the Operator’s compliance with mandatory statutory requirements.

The Operator is put to strict proof of every element of its claim and strict proof of any rebuttal of the points raised in this appeal. In particular, the Operator must strictly prove:

(i) the precise location and circumstances of the alleged event;
(ii) the exact wording of the alleged contractual terms relied upon;
(iii) that those terms were lawfully capable of forming a contract with this class of motorist;
(iv) that any alleged contract was actually formed;
(v) that the sum demanded is recoverable in law;
(vi) that the Operator has standing and landholder authority to offer contracts and pursue charges in its own name; and
(vii) if the Operator seeks to pursue the registered keeper, strict compliance with every applicable requirement of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“PoFA”).

Bare assertion is not proof.

The Operator’s handling of the initial keeper appeals is relevant to credibility and procedural fairness. The rejection letter is largely boilerplate and repeatedly defaults to “driver responsibility” and conclusory statements that the charge was “issued correctly”, while failing to engage with determinative issues raised: the absence of any PoFA “period of parking”, the prohibitive nature of the signage, the absence of any contractual offer to non-permit holders, the requirement for strict proof of standing, and the primacy of the occupier’s pre-existing contractual framework. An ADR determination that relies on repetition of such assertions rather than evidence and legal analysis cannot amount to a fair resolution of a legal dispute.

Procedural fairness and the asserted legal competence of the IAS assessor are directly relevant because this dispute is not about mitigation. It turns on statutory interpretation (PoFA Schedule 4), orthodox principles of contract formation, the distinction between prohibition and contractual offer, locus and landholder authority, and the interaction between a residential occupier’s existing contract and a third-party enforcement scheme. The IAS publicly indicates that appeals are determined by legally qualified assessors, typically solicitors or barristers. Decisions are anonymous and unsigned and provide no verifiable indication of the assessor’s qualification, practising status, or independence. Where an ADR scheme relies on claimed legal expertise as a marker of credibility, it is reasonable to expect decisions to demonstrate that expertise through structured legal analysis rather than assertion.

I therefore invite the IAS to confirm in its decision, without disclosing personal data, whether the assessor determining this appeal is a practising solicitor of England and Wales, a barrister holding a practising certificate, or another legally qualified person, and to confirm that no conflict of interest exists. If the IAS declines to provide even this minimal confirmation, I request that it explains how that position is compatible with transparency and consumer confidence in ADR. This request is directly relevant because a legally trained decision-maker will recognise that the determinative questions below must be decided by reasoned application of statute and contract law, not by phrases such as “signage was present” or that the charge was “issued correctly”.

1. No keeper liability: failure to specify any period of parking as required by PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a)

The Operator’s Notice to Keeper is explicitly headed “Notice to Keeper (Postal – PoFA) Issued on private land”. The Operator asserts in its rejection letters that the PCN and Notice to Keeper were issued in accordance with “relevant legislation” and that liability “may be transferred” to the registered keeper.

This is a postal Notice to Keeper. The applicable statutory route is PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9. Paragraph 9(2)(a) is mandatory. It requires the Notice to Keeper to specify the vehicle, the relevant land, and the period of parking to which the notice relates.

The Notice to Keeper does not specify any period of parking. It provides only an alleged event date and a single “time of issue” or observation time. A single instant is not a period. A period requires duration. The Notice attempts to cure this defect by asserting that the charge relates to “the period of parking specified above”, but no such period is specified. This is a failure to comply with a mandatory statutory condition.

Where PoFA conditions are not met, liability cannot be transferred to the registered keeper. The Operator may pursue only the driver. The keeper does not admit the identity of the driver and will not identify the driver. The keeper is under no legal obligation to do so. This ground alone requires that the appeal be allowed.

2. Prohibitive signage: no contractual offer to non-permit holders, therefore no contract and no contractual charge

The signage relied upon states, in substance and in terms, that parking is permitted only for permit holders when parking wholly in allocated bays and displaying a valid permit. That wording is prohibitive. It grants permission solely to permit holders. It does not offer parking to non-permit holders on any terms.

A contractual charge can only arise from a contract. A contract requires an offer capable of acceptance. A prohibition cannot be accepted. A sign that excludes an entire class of motorists does not make a contractual offer to that class. The Operator’s own language reinforces this analysis, repeatedly describing vehicles as “unauthorised” and parking as restricted to “authorised permit holders only”.

If the Operator’s case is that the vehicle was unauthorised, the proper legal characterisation is trespass. Only a landholder with proprietary interest can pursue trespass, and then only for nominal damages absent proof of loss. A parking contractor cannot convert an alleged trespass into a contractual charge by assertion or by characterising a prohibited act as acceptance of terms.

Accordingly, no contract was formed and no contractual parking charge can arise.

3. Primacy and supremacy of the existing occupation contract; derogation from grant and quiet enjoyment

This is a residential development. The keeper is a residential tenant under an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement contains no clause imposing any obligation to comply with UKCPS, no permit requirement, and no agreement to pay private parking charges. The keeper has never been provided with, nor notified in writing of, any estate regulations or “site rules” said to bind tenants in relation to the basement area.

The managing agent has expressly stated that its legal relationship is with the leaseholder and has refused to provide or discuss the lease or any estate regulations with a sub-tenant. It is therefore impermissible for the Operator to rely on undisclosed lease terms or undisclosed “site rules” as the basis for enforcement against a tenant.

The doctrine of primacy of contract is straightforward. Where an occupier’s rights and obligations arise from an existing tenancy, a third-party contractor’s signage cannot unilaterally add new terms, extract additional consideration, or override the occupier’s contractual framework unless those terms are validly incorporated into the tenancy or properly notified as binding regulations. Any attempt to impose such a scheme after the grant of the tenancy, particularly where it penalises ordinary residential use of the premises, is inconsistent with quiet enjoyment and amounts to a derogation from grant.

The Operator is put to strict proof of the contractual route by which it contends a residential tenant has agreed to be bound by UKCPS terms and to pay £100 for an alleged breach. In the absence of such proof, the Operator is attempting to create obligations by signage alone which do not bind the tenant and are unenforceable.

4. No standing and no proof of landholder authority

The Operator asserts that it is contracted to manage and enforce parking in accordance with “site rules” provided by the landholder. That is not proof. The Operator must strictly prove that it has contemporaneous written authority from the landholder defining the land, defining the scope of enforcement, and expressly authorising UKCPS to enter contracts with motorists and pursue charges in its own name.

No landholder contract, no boundary map, no site plan, and no written authorisation have been produced. Photographs of a vehicle and a sign do not establish standing. Without strict proof of authority, the Operator has no locus to pursue this charge.

5. Evidential insufficiency: no proof of parking as opposed to momentary presence

The Operator relies on still photographs taken at a single point in time. That evidence does not establish any period of parking and does not distinguish parking from momentary presence. This evidential failure is fatal both to any PoFA reliance and to any assertion that a contractual term relating to “parking” was breached.

The Operator is put to strict proof of duration and of the vehicle’s exact position relative to the alleged contractual scheme, including bays, markings, and the specific signage relied upon. Close-up images without context do not discharge that burden.

6. Failure to engage with the substance of the appeal

The Operator’s rejection asserts that tenancy silence does not matter, that the gate condition does not matter, and that liability “may” be transferred under PoFA. These are assertions, not proof. They do not rebut the determinative issues: statutory non-compliance, absence of contract formation, lack of standing, and the supremacy of the tenant’s existing contractual rights.

Remedy sought

For the reasons above, the appeal must be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled. The Operator has failed to establish keeper liability, failed to establish contract formation, failed to prove standing and landholder authority, and cannot override a residential tenant’s pre-existing contractual framework by signage alone.

In the alternative, if the IAS is minded not to allow the appeal, I request that it first requires strict proof of:

(i) full unredacted landholder authority including boundary maps and sign location plans;
(ii) the specific mechanism by which any “site rules” are said to bind tenants and evidence that such rules were provided or notified in writing prior to the alleged event;
(iii) PoFA compliance including identification of where the Notice to Keeper specifies a period of parking; and
(iv) evidence demonstrating more than momentary presence and showing the vehicle’s position relative to the alleged contractual scheme.

In the absence of such proof, the appeal must be allowed.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain
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