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IN THE COUNTY COURT AT EXETER

Claim No: [Claim Number]

BETWEEN:

Euro Car Parks Ltd
Claimant

- and -

[Defendant's Full Name]

Defendant

---

AMENDED DEFENCE
Filed pursuant to the Order of District Judge Priddis, dated 4 May 2025

1. In accordance with the court order dated 4 May 2025 requiring the Claimant to file further and better Particulars of Claim, and permitting the Defendant to file a response by 18 June 2025, the Defendant now submits this amended defence in place of the previous version. The Defendant maintains that the claim is without merit, lacks a properly pleaded cause of action, and should be struck out.

2. The Amended Particulars of Claim remain riddled with legal and factual inaccuracies, unsupported assertions, and entirely false representations of statutory provisions. Despite having been prompted by a court order to clarify the claim, the Claimant has instead submitted a revised set of particulars that are legally incoherent, procedurally defective, and signed under a Statement of Truth by a representative who appears either wholly unqualified or recklessly indifferent to the law.

3. The Claimant’s bare assertion that it "operates in accordance with the Code" is denied. The applicable code at the material time was the British Parking Association Code of Practice, version 8 (effective from January 2020). The Defendant asserts that the Claimant failed to comply with key provisions of that Code, particularly those relating to clear and prominent signage, grace periods, and proper functioning of ANPR systems. The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof of full compliance with all relevant sections of the 2020 BPA Code of Practice.

4. The Defendant accepts being the Registered Keeper of the vehicle at the time of the alleged incident but does not accept any liability for the charge. While the Notice to Keeper may appear superficially compliant, it fails to meet the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In particular, it does not include the invitation required by paragraph 9(2)(e)(i), namely that the Keeper is invited to pay the unpaid parking charge. As compliance with PoFA is a binary issue, this failure alone renders the notice non-compliant. The Claimant is therefore unable to pursue the Defendant as Keeper. The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof that the notice was served in accordance with PoFA and that all mandatory requirements were met in full.

5. The Claimant has provided no evidence of landowner authority. The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof of a contemporaneous and valid contract with the landowner that expressly authorised the Claimant to issue parking charges and to pursue legal action in its own name. A bare assertion of authority is not evidence and is not sufficient.

6. The Defendant submits that the signage wording “MAXIMUM STAY 30 MINUTES” is prohibitive in nature and does not constitute a contractual offer. The accompanying warning about a parking charge for breach is vague, lacks clarity, and does not specify the full terms. In the absence of a clear contractual framework, the signage amounts to a regulatory notice rather than an offer of contract. The Claimant is put to strict proof of how and where the signage was displayed, what full terms it contained, and how it was capable of forming a binding agreement.

7. The signage term quoted — “FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS WILL RESULT IN THE ISSUE OF A PARKING CHARGE NOTICE: (£100 IF PAID WITHIN 14 DAYS OF ISSUE)” — is unsupported by any evidence. The Claimant has not produced any photograph or facsimile of the signage allegedly displaying this wording. The Defendant denies seeing or accepting any such term. In any event, the wording does not amount to a contractual offer. It simply states a consequence for breach, with no clear statement of terms, no defined contractual consideration, and no explanation of how a motorist’s actions would amount to acceptance. As such, it functions as a prohibitive or regulatory notice, not a contractual agreement capable of binding the Defendant.

8. The Claimant alleges the vehicle remained on site for 1 hour and 10 minutes but provides no ANPR images, timestamps, or data to support this claim. The Defendant does not accept the accuracy of the alleged timings. Furthermore, no contract existed to breach, and even if it had, no grace period was applied, and no consideration was given to the medical emergency that delayed the driver’s return. The BPA Code of Practice requires reasonable allowances for such circumstances, which the Claimant has ignored.

9. The Defendant notes that the Amended Particulars of Claim are signed under a statement of truth by a person who either does not understand the law or has deliberately misrepresented it. The content is legally incoherent, riddled with errors, and in parts, plainly dishonest.

10. Paragraph 9 of the Claimant's amended PoC falsely claims that the Notice to Keeper invited the Defendant to pay the charge. That is outright mendacious. The Notice did not contain any invitation for the keeper to pay the charge, as required by paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. This is a basic statutory requirement. The individual who signed the amended PoC clearly hasn't read PoFA or hasn't understood it — or worse, has read it and decided to fabricate what it says.

11. Paragraph 10 of the amended PoC states that because the Defendant did not nominate the driver, the Claimant now pursues the Defendant on the basis that they must be the driver. This is a legally illiterate argument. The law does not allow a Claimant to shift the burden of proof onto a Defendant merely because they haven’t named someone else. VCS Limited v Ian Mark Edward (2023) [H0KF6C9C] confirmed that such reasoning is fundamentally flawed. This kind of argument would embarrass a first-year law student.

12. Paragraph 11 states that “paragraph 1 of PoFA clarifies that the Registered Keeper is presumed to be the Keeper unless proven otherwise”. This is total fiction. No such wording exists anywhere in PoFA. Paragraph 1 merely contains definitions. Whoever wrote that paragraph either made it up or copied it from another amateur without checking the law. The court should note that this blatant falsehood was signed off under a statement of truth.

13. The Claimant’s representative appears to have no understanding of the statutory framework they are attempting to rely on. The content of the amended PoC is not just defective — it is legally nonsensical, factually wrong, and in breach of the obligation to tell the truth to the court. Signing such falsehoods under a statement of truth is a serious matter and calls into question the competence, integrity, and honesty of whoever wrote and signed these documents.

14. The Defendant invites the court to treat these pleadings with the contempt they deserve. The Claimant’s representative is either completely untrained in law or is wilfully misleading the court. Either way, this is not acceptable, and the Defendant asks the court to strike out the claim.

15. The Defendant notes the Claimant's reference to debt collection activity. The use of a third-party debt collection agency such as Direct Collections Bailiffs Limited is irrelevant to this claim, as such entities have no authority to enforce or assess liability. The Claimant has provided no evidence that any Letter of Claim issued under the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims complied with the required format, content, or enclosures. The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof that its pre-action correspondence met the standards required under the protocol.

16. The Defendant denies that issuing proceedings was a reasonable or proportionate step. The Claimant has failed to provide a properly compliant Letter of Claim or sufficient evidence to support the claim. As such, the litigation appears premature and unjustified. The Defendant reserves the right to challenge the Claimant’s conduct under the Overriding Objective and CPR 1.1, and to seek costs if the court agrees that the claim should not have been issued in the first place.

17. The Defendant asserts that the claimed amount is grossly inflated. The £70 “costs” figure is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and constitutes a disallowed element of double recovery. The £23.48 interest is unexplained and unsupported by any working. The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof of the legal basis for each element of the claimed sum and reserves the right to challenge the claim as an abuse of process.

18. The Claimant purports to claim interest under section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 but states that the interest rate is “8% above base rate”, which is legally incoherent. Section 69 allows for a flat statutory rate, not a rate “above base rate”. No base rate is defined or explained. The Particulars of Claim fail to comply with CPR 16.4 and PD16(7.5). The Claimant has not stated the date from which interest is claimed, the sum to which it applies, or the daily accrual rate. As drafted, the interest claim is vague, legally incorrect, and incapable of assessment. It must be struck out or disregarded in its entirety.

19. The Amended Particulars of Claim are signed under a Statement of Truth by a legal representative of the Claimant, Ms Annalise Cogley of DCB Legal Ltd. The Defendant draws the court’s attention to multiple false and misleading statements of both law and fact within the document, including but not limited to:

(a) The false assertion that the Notice to Keeper invited the Keeper to pay the charge, in breach of PoFA 2012 paragraph 9(2)(e)(i);

(b) The invented claim that paragraph 1 of PoFA 2012 creates a presumption that the Registered Keeper is also the Keeper;

(c) The incorrect and legally baseless suggestion that failure to nominate another driver amounts to proof that the Defendant was the driver; and

(d) The legally incoherent statement that interest is claimed under section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 at “8% above base rate,” which is entirely false and unsupported by statute.

20. These errors go beyond mere technicality. They suggest that the Claimant's representative either lacks a basic understanding of the statutory framework or has acted with reckless disregard for the truth. This conduct is especially serious given that the Amended Particulars were filed following a court order made due to deficiencies in the original claim.

21. The Statement of Truth confirms that contempt proceedings may be brought against any person who signs a document containing false statements without an honest belief in their truth. The Defendant submits that the Claimant’s representative cannot credibly claim an honest belief in statements that so plainly misrepresent black-letter law. This conduct is therefore a potential breach of CPR 22.1(1)(b) and CPR PD 22 para 2.2, and raises serious concerns about compliance with professional obligations under the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) Code of Conduct, including:

• Principle 1: Upholding the rule of law and the proper administration of justice;

• Principle 2: Acting with integrity; and

• Principle 6: Acting in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the legal profession.

22. The Defendant invites the Court to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2) or dismiss it in its entirety on the basis that it discloses no reasonable grounds, is an abuse of process, and is supported by particulars that are legally incoherent and factually incorrect. In the alternative, the Defendant requests that the matter proceed to a hearing where the Claimant is put to strict proof of each element of its case. The Defendant further invites the Court to consider the conduct of the Claimant and its legal representative under CPR 27.14(2)(g) and CPR 1.1, and to award costs on the basis that the Claimant has acted unreasonably throughout.

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:


Date: