Free Traffic Legal Advice

Given the administrative venue error and the transfer to St Helens rather than your local court — a short response would serve a useful tactical purpose. It confirms that you are still engaged, shows awareness of process, and may deter BW Legal from taking liberties during the allocation stage or ahead of any possible discontinuance.

A brief reply that reiterates that the matter is defended, confirms the position is unchanged and gives notice that costs may be sought under CPR 27.14(2)(g) if unreasonable conduct continues.

Dear Eden Moore,

Re: Claim No. [XXXXXXXX] – Norwich Traffic Control Limited v [Defendant Name]

Thank you for your email of [insert date].

The Defendant’s position remains as clearly set out in the fully pleaded defence. There is no basis for further negotiation. If your client continues to pursue this claim unreasonably, the Defendant will seek costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g).

Please also note that the Civil National Business Centre (CNCB) has transferred this case to St Helens County Court, which is not the Defendant’s local court as specified in the Directions Questionnaire. This appears to be an administrative error. A formal request has been submitted to the CNCB for the matter to be re-transferred to the correct venue.

Accordingly, the Defendant does not accept that St Helens County Court is the appropriate hearing centre for this claim, and any further conduct premised on the suitability of that venue will be challenged.

Yours faithfully,

[Defendant Name]

You do not "file" your defence with the court. your defence has already been pleaded and is based on the claimants flawed PoC. You will deal with anything if and when the claimant pays the trial fee.

As this is a telephone hearing, unless you are prepared to ay a fee to have it transferred to a local court for a hearing in person, you will have to rely on the claimant going all the way or not.

The deadline for the parties to submit their Witness Statements (WS) is 11th June. Let's see if they submit their WS by that date. If they have not submitted anything a few days before that date, remind us.

OK. As this is going to be a telephone hearing, it is not strategically worthwhile to continue seeking a transfer to your local court for an in-person hearing when:


Unless you have specific reasons (e.g. hearing impairment, poor phone coverage, or caring responsibilities making a phone hearing unworkable), HMCTS will very likely reject any further request to change the venue.

So you need work with what you have. So far:


You now need to prepare your witness statement and supporting exhibits to be filed and served no later than 4pm on 11 June 2025. Even if the Claimant fails to serve theirs, do not miss your own deadline. If they don’t comply, you can object to their evidence later.

Here is a suggested WS but you should not send anything until just before 4pm on Wednesday 11th June:

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT ST HELENS

Claim No: [Claim Number]

BETWEEN:

Norwich Traffic Control Ltd
Claimant

- and -

[Defendant's Full Name]

Defendant

---

WITNESS STATEMENT

1. I make this statement in support of my defence to the claim brought by Norwich Traffic Control Limited. I confirm that the facts set out here are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

No Contract Formed

2. The claim fails from the outset due to the Claimant’s total failure to show that a parking contract was ever formed. The Notice to Driver (NtD) and Notice to Keeper (NtK) merely record a single timestamp. There is no actual “period of parking” specified, and no evidence whatsoever of how long the vehicle was present. This is a fundamental omission. A contract by conduct cannot be formed without a consideration period. There must be sufficient time for the driver to seek out, read the signage, consider the terms, and make a decision to accept or reject them. Without showing how long the vehicle remained on site, the Claimant has not established that any contract was formed.

3. The IPC Code of Practice, Version 9, which applied at the time, confirms this. Section 13 requires that a consideration period of appropriate duration be allowed before a parking contract is formed. This is consistent with basic contract law: no contract can arise by conduct unless there has been sufficient time to seek out, read and consider the terms. The Claimant has provided no evidence that this requirement was met. The Claimant has provided no evidence that the vehicle remained on site beyond this undefined but necessary consideration period. Without this, the court cannot conclude that a contract was even capable of being created, let alone breached. As such, the entire basis for the claim collapses.

No Compliance with PoFA 2012

4. This same deficiency also renders the Claimant’s notices non-compliant with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("PoFA"). In order to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is mandatory. Paragraph 7(2)(a) (in respect of a Notice to Driver) and paragraph 8(2)(a) (for a Notice to Keeper following a NtD) both require that the notice must "specify the period of parking to which the notice relates." A single timestamp, as provided by the Claimant, is not a “period” of parking and therefore fails this requirement.

5. This issue was considered in the persuasive appellate decision Scott Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H]. Relevant excerpts are exhibited at Exhibit XX-01.

6. At paragraphs 27 to 30, HHJ Mitchell confirmed that PoFA requires the notice to specify a period of parking, even if it is a short one, and not merely a moment in time. He explained that:

“The period of parking does not refer to the whole period a vehicle is in situ. It could be less than that... it could be any minimum period; that is the period to which the Notice relates. That is what the Regulations are getting to... Where it went wrong... is that the second of those [times] was put in as ‘NA’. If the time had been put in, that would have cured the problem and that simply had to be repeated in the Notice to keeper.” (paras. 28–29)

7. The judgment makes it clear that where the notice fails to specify a minimum identifiable period, as is the case here, PoFA conditions are not met and keeper liability cannot arise.

No Evidence of Driver Identity

8. The Claimant has also failed to establish the identity of the driver. The registered keeper is under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and I have not done so. In the persuasive appellate case of VCS v Ian Mark Edward (2023) [HOKF6C9C], HHJ Gargan made it clear that it is not appropriate for a court to infer that the registered keeper was the driver, even on the balance of probabilities, where there is no supporting evidence. A copy of the relevant section of the judgment is exhibited at Exhibit XX-02.

9. At paragraph 35.3, the judge stated:

“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell… These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”

10. As the Claimant’s notices are non-compliant with PoFA, they cannot rely on keeper liability, and in the absence of any admissible evidence identifying the driver, the claim must fail.

Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4

11. The Particulars of Claim are vague, inadequately pleaded, and fail to comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5. The Claimant does not identify the precise terms of the alleged contract, nor the clause(s) said to have been breached. There is no statement of when or for how long the alleged parking occurred, nor any identification of the signage or the specific terms displayed. The pleading fails to set out the facts necessary to establish either breach or the basis of any contractual entitlement to the sum claimed.

12. The Claimant has also failed to specify whether I am being pursued as the driver or the keeper. The pleading is impermissibly ambiguous, failing to disclose which legal basis is relied upon or to plead alternative causes of action with the required particularity. This is contrary to the basic principles of civil pleading and has caused significant prejudice to the Defendant.

13. The Defendant submitted a proposed draft order with the Defence, inviting the Court to strike out the claim or, in the alternative, to order further and better particulars. The Court failed to address that request and instead allocated the matter to a final hearing without requiring the Claimant to remedy the procedural defects. The Defendant respectfully submits that this oversight has resulted in procedural unfairness, and now invites the Court to exercise its case management powers to strike out the claim in its entirety pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 16.4 for failure to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.

14. In a similar claim heard before another County Court, a District Judge struck out the case on the court’s own initiative due to the Claimant’s failure to comply with CPR 16.4. I submitted a copy of that draft order with my defence. The judge held that requiring further case management steps in such a poorly pleaded claim would be disproportionate, given the modest value of the claim. The same reasoning applies here.

No Evidence of a Valid Contract with the Landowner

15. The Claimant has failed to provide any evidence of a valid and binding contract with the landowner conferring authority to manage the land, issue parking charges, and pursue legal action in its own name. This is a serious omission that undermines the foundation of the claim.

16. The mere presence of signage is not sufficient to establish that the Claimant has the necessary legal rights to form parking contracts or enforce them. As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 186 at [22], a party must demonstrate that it has a sufficient interest in the land or specific authorisation from the landowner to offer contracts to park and to enforce any resulting charges. Without this, the operator cannot be a contracting party, and any alleged contract would be void for want of locus standi.

17. In this case, the Claimant has not produced any document showing:

(i) the identity of the landowner;
(ii) the dates and duration of any agreement;
(iii) the geographic extent of the authority granted;
(iv) whether the Claimant was authorised to form contracts and/or bring legal proceedings in its own name;
(v) the terms under which any consideration flows between the landowner and the Claimant.

18. The existence of such a contract is not a mere formality. It is a mandatory requirement to establish standing. As stated by District Judge McLean in Excel Parking Services v Wilkinson (Stockport County Court, 2017, unreported but widely cited), “a person who puts up a sign cannot automatically claim that they are authorised to do so by the landowner... the burden of proof is on the Claimant to show that they had the necessary rights.”

19. Accordingly, without this foundational evidence, the Claimant cannot demonstrate a cause of action and the claim ought to be struck out.

Failure to Comply with the PAP

20. I responded to the Claimant’s Letter of Claim raising detailed objections and requesting key evidence. The Claimant failed to meaningfully engage with my response. Specifically, they did not provide timestamped photographs of the signage in situ at the material time, nor did they address my argument that the £60 “debt recovery” charge was not transparently included in the original terms.

21. I also challenged the Claimant’s reliance on ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, as the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In Beavis, the signage was prominent, clear, and unambiguous, and the Supreme Court held that the charge was justified by a legitimate commercial interest. By contrast, in this case, the Claimant has presented no evidence of comparable signage, no evidence of a legitimate interest justifying the charge, and no basis for the application of the Beavis ruling.

22. Had the Claimant dealt with the concerns raised pre-action, this matter could likely have been resolved or discontinued without burdening the court. The Claimant’s failure to do so has resulted in unnecessary litigation and wasted time, for which I submit that a costs order is justified.

Conclusion

23. In conclusion, the Claimant has failed to demonstrate that any contract was formed, that a valid parking charge was incurred, or that the statutory requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have been met. They have not provided evidence of the alleged period of parking, nor established keeper liability under PoFA. No admissible evidence has been produced to identify the driver, and the Particulars of Claim remain vague, non-compliant with CPR 16.4, and lacking in legal clarity.

24. The Claimant has pursued this claim despite repeated pre-action warnings of these fundamental defects and has failed to address them both before and after proceedings were issued. Their conduct has been unreasonable throughout.

25. I respectfully request that the claim be dismissed, and that the Court consider making a costs order pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) due to the Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour.

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:


Date:

You will need to include the two transcripts referred to. In the WS you need to replace the XX in "XX-01" with your initials. You then need to create a cover sheet for those items of evidence with the court headers as they are in your WS and just put "Supporting Evidence" and mark each one with the corresponding reference as in the WS.

Here are links to the two transcripts:

Brennan v PPS

VCS v Edward

When you send it, you must email it as a PDF attachment in an email with the claim number in the email subject field. You email it to civil.sthelens.countycourt@justice.gov.uk and also CC BW Legal and also yourself in the same email.

Quick update - BW Legal's bundle has just landed on my doormat.  I am currently in the process of scanning and uploading it - I'll update this post with a copy once I'm done.

Thanks b789 - bundle can be found here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aw8fnbPf6wX2P00eE_cCCkcw5D7ATv7K/view?usp=sharing

I note that they have included a copy of their contract with Orbit Homes, which I assume will necessitate an amendment to the WC. 

I also see that they have provided a schedule of signs and photographic evidence of their presence, but that these photographs are without a time stamp. On this basis, I assume that they cannot use them to prove that any signs other than the one sign shown in the contemporaneous time-stamped photos were present at the time of the alleged infraction?

You need to make the file public so I can access it

Sorry! Should be accessible now.

Here is a suggested amended WS but you should not send anything until just before 4pm on Wednesday 11th June:

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT ST HELENS

Claim No: [Claim Number]

BETWEEN:

Norwich Traffic Control Ltd
Claimant

- and -

[Defendant's Full Name]

Defendant

---

WITNESS STATEMENT

1. I am the Defendant in this claim and a litigant-in-person with no formal legal training. I have prepared this witness statement and my Defence to the best of my ability, having carried out detailed research into the relevant law and procedure. In doing so, I have received informal guidance from publicly accessible legal resources, including the forum www.ftla.uk (Free Traffic Legal Advice), which provides voluntary assistance on private parking and contractual matters. I respectfully ask the Court to take into account that this case has been presented in good faith by a lay person and is not a generic or template response, as inaccurately alleged by the Claimant’s representative. I confirm that the facts stated in this witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Claimants 'Witness' is third-hand hearsay

2. The Claimant’s witness statement is authored by a paralegal employed by BW Legal who confirms they are acting under the instruction of a senior. This makes the content of the statement, at best, third-hand hearsay. The witness has no personal knowledge of the facts, the site, the signage, or of me as the Defendant.

3. The statement is written predominantly in the third person and contains speculative, disparaging, and inadmissible commentary that strays far beyond the factual scope permitted by CPR Practice Direction 32. It includes an unfounded accusation—also repeated in the Skeleton Argument—that my Defence was copied from a generic internet forum, specifically moneysavingexpert.com. This is categorically false.

4. My Defence was compiled independently with tailored support from the consumer legal forum www.ftla.uk, which specialises in assisting members of the public in private parking contractual matters. As a litigant-in-person, I am entitled to seek legitimate advice and assistance. Even if the Defence had been influenced by online resources, that would not render it improper. In contrast, the Claimant’s own submissions appear to be generic templates containing boilerplate assertions and legal inaccuracies.

5. The witness, not being present at the hearing and not having personal knowledge, cannot be cross-examined. In accordance with the Civil Evidence Act 1995 and CPR 33, I respectfully submit that the Court should attach little or no weight to this untested, third-hand hearsay evidence, which fails to assist the Court on any material or disputed fact.

6. Moreover, the Claimant’s late attempt to plead their case through the witness statement further highlights that they could have—and should have—served proper Particulars of Claim within 14 days of issuing the claim online via MCOL, pursuant to PD 7C.5.2. Their decision not to do so has deprived the Court and the Defendant of a fair and timely understanding of the claim. This omission was avoidable and strategic, not inadvertent or constrained by MCOL limitations.

7. The focus of my Defence was on this very inadequacy—namely, that the Particulars of Claim failed to adequately comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16. The Claimant has not addressed those defects in any meaningful or procedurally compliant way. Instead, they attempt to deflect attention from the deficiencies of their claim by attacking the format and supposed origin of my Defence, which entirely misses the point.

The Claimant failed to adequately plead their claim pursuant to CPR 16.4

8. The Particulars of Claim are vague, inadequately pleaded, and fail to adequately comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5. The Claimant does not identify the precise terms of the alleged contract, nor the clause(s) said to have been breached. There is no statement of when or for how long the alleged parking occurred, nor any identification of the signage or the specific terms displayed. The pleading fails to set out the facts necessary to establish either breach or the basis of any contractual entitlement to the sum claimed.

9. The Claimant has also failed to specify whether I am being pursued as the driver or the keeper. The pleading is impermissibly ambiguous, failing to disclose which legal basis is relied upon or to plead alternative causes of action with the required particularity. This is contrary to the basic principles of civil pleading and has caused significant prejudice to the myself.

10. I submitted a proposed draft order with the Defence, inviting the Court to strike out the claim or, in the alternative, to order further and better particulars. The Court failed to address that request and instead allocated the matter to a final hearing without requiring the Claimant to remedy the procedural defects. I respectfully submit that this oversight has resulted in procedural unfairness, and now invite the Court to exercise its case management powers to strike out the claim in its entirety pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 16.4 for failure to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.

11. There was nothing to prevent the Claimant from filing further and better particulars under PD 7C.5.2A within 14 days of the MCOL claim, which they chose not to do. That decision is not my responsibility. A failure to remedy defective pleadings cannot be excused by the 1080-character limit of the MCOL interface. Where a claim is factually or legally complex—as this one purports to be—the Claimant should have served separate, detailed particulars as expressly permitted by the Practice Direction. The option existed but was not exercised.

12. The Claimant’s Skeleton also states that “the hearing can focus on the facts of the case”, and that its solicitors will “respond to the Defendant’s facts” at the hearing. This confirms the Claimant’s strategic decision to rely on minimal pleadings and belatedly expand upon them at trial. That is procedurally inappropriate. The purpose of pleadings is to inform the other party of the case they must meet, not to be supplemented piecemeal via a witness statement or skeleton.

13. Furthermore, the Claimant’s assertion that the PoC must be deemed compliant because the case was allocated to the small claims track is misconceived. Allocation is an administrative process and does not imply judicial approval of pleadings. No judge has ruled on compliance with CPR 16.4 in this case, and silence cannot be taken as endorsement.

14. Additionally, the Claimant’s witness is a paralegal who has no first-hand knowledge of the facts and makes several speculative and disparaging comments that are inadmissible under CPR PD 32. These include opinions about the Defence’s origin and format, which are wholly irrelevant to the issues before the Court and serve only to undermine the integrity of these proceedings

No evidence of a contract being formed with the driver

15. The claim fails from the outset due to the Claimant’s total failure to show that a parking contract was ever formed. The Notice to Driver (NtD) and Notice to Keeper (NtK) merely record a single timestamp. There is no actual “period of parking” specified, and no evidence whatsoever of how long the vehicle was present. The option on the NtD to record and observation 'period' is shown as: "First seen at: N/A".

16. This is a fundamental omission. A contract by conduct cannot be formed without a consideration period. There must be sufficient time for the driver to seek out, read the signage, consider the terms, and make a decision to accept or reject them. Without showing how long the vehicle remained on site, the Claimant has not established that any contract was formed.

17. The IPC Code of Practice, Version 9, which applied at the time, confirms this. Section 13 requires that a consideration period of appropriate duration be allowed before a parking contract is formed. IN the latest version of their Code of Practice, this has now been confirmed to a period of no less than 5 minutes.

18. This is consistent with basic contract law: no contract can arise by conduct unless there has been sufficient time to seek out, read and consider the terms. The Claimant has provided no evidence that this requirement was met. The Claimant has provided no evidence that the vehicle remained on site beyond this undefined but necessary consideration period. Without this, the court cannot conclude that a contract was even capable of being created, let alone breached. As such, the entire basis for the claim collapses.

Failure to fully comply with all the requirements of PoFA 2012

19. This same deficiency also renders the Claimant’s notices non-compliant with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("PoFA"). In order to transfer liability from the unknown driver to the registered keeper, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is mandatory. Paragraph 7(2)(a) (in respect of a Notice to Driver) and paragraph 8(2)(a) (for a Notice to Keeper following a NtD) both require that the notice 'must' "specify the period of parking to which the notice relates". A single timestamp, as provided by the Claimant, is not a “period” of parking and therefore fails this requirement, especially when their own paperwork provides a box precisely for this purpose.

20. This issue was considered in the persuasive appellate decision Scott Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H]. Relevant excerpts are exhibited at Exhibit XX-01.

21. At paragraphs 27 to 30, HHJ Mitchell confirmed that PoFA requires the notice to specify a period of parking, even if it is a short one, and not merely a moment in time. He explained that:

“The period of parking does not refer to the whole period a vehicle is in situ. It could be less than that... it could be any minimum period; that is the period to which the Notice relates. That is what the Regulations are getting to... Where it went wrong... is that the second of those [times] was put in as ‘NA’. If the time had been put in, that would have cured the problem and that simply had to be repeated in the Notice to keeper.”

22. The judgment makes it clear that where the notice fails to specify a minimum identifiable period, as is the case here, PoFA conditions are not met and keeper liability cannot arise.

Failure to fully comply with PoFA means no Keeper liability

23. The Claimant has also failed to establish the identity of the driver. The registered keeper is under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and I have not done so. In the persuasive appellate case of Vehicle Control Services v Ian Mark Edward (2023) [HOKF6C9C], HHJ Gargan made it clear that it is not appropriate for a court to infer that the registered keeper was the driver, even on the balance of probabilities, where there is no supporting evidence. A copy of the relevant section of the judgment is exhibited at Exhibit XX-02.

24. At paragraph 35.3, the judge stated:

“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell… These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”

25. I respectfully submit that in order for the claimant to be able to rely on the provisions of PoFA, all the requirements of the act must be met. Partial or even substantial compliance is not sufficient. To use an analogy, just like pregnancy, one either is or is not. It is a binary issue and the same applies to PoFA compliance. In this case, their notices are not fully compliant.

26. As the Claimant’s notices are not fully compliant with all the requirements of PoFA, they cannot rely on keeper liability, and in the absence of any admissible evidence identifying the driver, the claim must fail.

Failure to evidence a valid contract flowing from the landowner

27. The Claimant relies on a one-page document as its contract with the landholder, yet this purported agreement is fraught with deficiencies. It is signed only by a representative of Orbit Homes, with no counter-signature from the Claimant, raising doubts about whether it constitutes a valid and binding agreement.

28. The contract includes a self-declaration that the signatory is either the landowner or a duly authorised agent but provides no independent proof of landowner authority. This falls short of the requirements under CPR Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5, which require the source of the Claimant’s authority to be clearly set out.

29. The handwritten addition “Richard Dean, Future Build” appears without explanation or context. There is no indication of who Richard Dean is, what “Future Build” represents, or what legal interest—if any—this entity holds in the land. It is unclear whether this was added contemporaneously or afterwards. This unexplained annotation introduces serious uncertainty into the authenticity and authority behind the agreement.

30. Crucially, the agreement makes no express grant of authority for the Claimant to issue legal proceedings in its own name. The vague reference to a right to “pursue by any means lawful” does not amount to an assignment or clear authorisation, and is insufficient to confer locus standi.

31. The contract also contains a retrospective enforcement clause, purporting to legitimise charges issued before the agreement was signed. Such a clause is legally ineffective and cannot confer retrospective authority.

32. The version of the purported contract disclosed to me by the Claimant is redacted. If the Claimant has provided an unredacted version to the Court but failed to serve the same upon me, this would constitute a breach of CPR 32.12 and CPR 1.3, which require mutual disclosure and cooperation in the interests of a fair hearing. It would also amount to procedural unfairness and a denial of my right as a litigant-in-person to properly examine the material relied upon. I respectfully request that the Court disregard any version of the contract which has not been disclosed in full and in equal terms to both parties.

33. The agreement refers to a site plan, which is said to form part of the contract and purportedly marks the signage locations. However, I visited the site upon receiving the Notice to Keeper and recorded a video capturing the actual signage conditions. Still images from this video are provided as evidence to demonstrate that crucial signage marked on the plan was either missing, obscured, illegible, or not in the locations indicated. As such, the site plan is materially inaccurate and does not reflect the actual conditions at the location.

34. This discrepancy is not a minor oversight—it goes to the heart of the alleged contractual framework. If the signage relied upon by the Claimant to form a contract was not in place as shown on the plan, then the plan cannot serve as reliable evidence of either the existence or adequacy of notice given to drivers.

35. Moreover, it casts serious doubt on the validity of the agreement itself, given that the purported basis of enforcement (i.e. effective signage) was not actually implemented as described in the contract documentation. The Court is therefore invited to find that this inconsistency further undermines the enforceability of the contract and the credibility of the Claimant's case.

36. For example, the key left hand entrance sign marked on the site plan is missing entirely and the other entrance sign is hidden round the corner of the building on the right as you approach the car park and mounted high on a wall and cannot be seen by a driver entering the car park . It is severely faded. Another supposed terms sign on the building opposite the entrance is absent. This undermines any suggestion that clear and visible contractual terms were communicated to the driver. A copy of the site plan showing the obvious anomalies is attached as evidence at XX-04.

37. The Claimants witness has shown multiple photo of signs that are not dated but were clearly taken prior to the date of the alleged contravention an dhow that the site has changed materially since they were taken, as the site is no longer the same shape and the boundary walls have been changed and are also now covered in graffiti.

38. Taken together, the contract is vague, inadequately executed, and factually contradicted by contemporaneous site conditions. The Court is invited to find that the Claimant has failed to prove either contractual standing or the existence of clear, accessible signage capable of forming a binding agreement with any motorist.

Failure of the Claimant to properly engage in the Pre Action Protocol

39. Following receipt of the Claimant’s Letter of Claim, I engaged in detailed correspondence raising fundamental concerns. These included: the validity of the signage, the alleged contractual authority of the Claimant, the calculation and legal basis of the £60 add-on charge, and the inapplicability of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 to this case. Despite being given ample opportunity to clarify or substantiate their position, the Claimant failed to answer these questions. No documents were provided, and no serious attempt was made to justify their claim.

40. Instead, the Claimant proceeded to issue a County Court claim via the MCOL interface, choosing to rely on vague and wholly inadequate Particulars of Claim. These did not specify the terms of the alleged contract, the signage relied upon, the period of parking, the nature of the breach, or even whether the claim was pursued against me as keeper or driver. This lack of detail falls well short of CPR 16.4 and PD16 paragraph 7.5, and left me in a position where I had no option but to plead my Defence on the basis of the Claimant’s inadequately pleaded case.

41. The Claimant is professionally represented and had the procedural right under PD7C 5.2A to serve full Particulars of Claim within 14 days of issuing the claim. Given the complexity of the issues raised in pre-action correspondence—including my challenge to their misapplication of Beavis, which clearly concerned a free car park at a retail site with prominent signage and a compelling commercial justification—they had every reason to exercise that right. Yet they chose not to.

42. The Claimant’s later reliance on Beavis—a Supreme Court judgment with highly specific facts and strict qualifying criteria—is not only inappropriate, but further reveals their unwillingness to properly engage with the material differences in this case. The site in question here does not present the same signage clarity, free parking rationale, or legitimate interest. I expressly raised this distinction in my pre-action replies, which the Claimant ignored.

43. Now, on the eve of witness statement submission deadline, the Claimant seeks to introduce extensive new arguments and factual assertions via a witness statement written by a paralegal acting under instruction. This third-hand, untested statement attempts to backfill the serious deficiencies in their case by addressing points they refused to clarify during the PAP process or in the claim particulars. This tactic of last-minute ambush—relying on arguments withheld pre-claim and absent from the PoC—is procedurally unfair and contrary to the Overriding Objective.

44. The Court is invited to give little or no weight to this strategy. The Claimant’s failure to engage with legitimate pre-action queries, their failure to plead a coherent claim, and their subsequent reliance on inadmissible hearsay to ‘plug the gaps’ at the final hour, demonstrates conduct which is inconsistent with fair litigation.

Conclusion

45. In conclusion, the Claimant has failed to demonstrate that any contract was formed, that a valid parking charge was incurred, or that the statutory requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have been met. They have not provided evidence of the alleged period of parking, nor established keeper liability under PoFA. No admissible evidence has been produced to identify the driver, and the Particulars of Claim remain vague, non-compliant with CPR 16.4, and lacking in legal clarity.

46. The Claimant has pursued this claim despite repeated pre-action warnings of these fundamental defects and has failed to address them both before and after proceedings were issued. Their conduct has been unreasonable throughout.

47. I respectfully request that the claim be dismissed, and that the Court consider making a costs order pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) due to the Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour.

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed:


Date:

You will need to include the two transcripts referred to and also the photo (stills from your video) showing the absence of signs and also the phot you provided of the faded entrance sign on the right, both the close up and the one show how insignificant it is general view.

In the WS you need to replace the 'XX' in "XX-01" etc. with your initials. You then need to create a cover sheet for those items of evidence with the court headers as they are in your WS and just put "Supporting Evidence" and mark each one with the corresponding reference as in the WS.

Here are links to the two transcripts:

Brennan v PPS

VCS v Edward

When you send it, you must email it as a PDF attachment in an email with the claim number in the email subject field. You email it to civil.sthelens.countycourt@justice.gov.uk and also CC BW Legal and also yourself in the same email.
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