MET has supplied its evidence to POPLA, and I now have 7 days to comment.
For reference, my POPLA appeal, as submitted:
"Appeal Against Parking Charge Notice ("PCN") Issued by MET Parking Services Ltd ("MET" or the "operator") PCN Reference: [NUMBER] Vehicle Registration: [NUMBER] Date of Alleged Contravention: 12/03/25 This is an appeal by the Keeper of the vehicle and I raise the following points for POPLA to consider:
1. No breach of terms
2. No standing
Grounds for Appeal:
1.Ground of Appeal: No breach of terms — signage clearly stated 90-minutes free parking period at the time of parking The appellant is the registered keeper of the vehicle and disputes the validity of the charge on the basis that no breach of the stated parking terms occurred. The operator claims the vehicle remained on site for 82 minutes. The signage visible at the site clearly stated that 90 minutes of free parking was permitted. Therefore, there was no contravention, and the charge has been issued without foundation.
The appellant holds photographic evidence of the signage in situ clearly stating “90 minutes maximum stay.” This photo is timestamped and geotagged, evidencing the location, date and time. The signage at the site was plainly visible, bears a date of "16/05/24", the same wording is repeated on several other signs within the site and no contradictory "60-minute limit" was displayed elsewhere within the site.
In response to the initial appeal, the operator claimed that the signage had been changed to 90 minutes "days after" the date of the alleged contravention. However, they have failed to provide any contemporaneous photographic evidence of the signage in place on the material date, nor have they shown that the alleged 60-minute limit was clearly and unambiguously displayed at the time.
If the operator now wishes to claim that the maximum permitted stay was 60 minutes, they are put to strict proof of:
• a full set of photographs showing the signage in situ on the exact date of the alleged contravention;
• the wording of all terms and conditions allegedly visible to the driver; and
• evidence showing that the signage was sufficient to form a binding contract.
2. Ground of Appeal: No standing — Operator must prove landowner authority, actual parking terms and the date of contractual amendment In accordance with Section 14.1 of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), no parking charge can be issued unless the operator holds written confirmation from the landowner which explicitly includes the actual parking terms and conditions in force at the time, including (per 14.1(e)):
“the parking terms and conditions that are to be applied by the parking operator, including as appropriate the duration of free parking permitted...”
MET Parking Services has made the extraordinary claim that the maximum stay on the site was 60 minutes on the date of the alleged contravention, and that this was changed to 90 minutes 'days later'. However, they have:
• not provided any photographic evidence of signage on the site dated at or near the time of the alleged contravention showing a 60-minute restriction; and
• offered no documentary evidence supporting the existence or date of any amendment to the parking terms.
This is a critical failure. The operator’s claim is not only unsupported—it is directly contradicted by contemporaneous evidence. If MET had any signage displaying a 60-minute restriction on the date in question, they would have included photographic evidence from that period. They haven’t, because they can’t.
The operator is now put to strict proof of the following, per PPSCoP Section 14:
• a contemporaneous, unredacted copy of their landowner agreement showing that MET was authorised to manage parking at the site;
• that this agreement includes a clause (per 14.1(e) of the PPSCoP) confirming a 60-minute maximum stay was contractually agreed and permitted by the landowner on the date of the alleged event;
• written evidence from the landowner confirming the subsequent change to a 90-minute free parking period; and
• the date that this change to the terms was formally agreed, documented and implemented, and the signage changed accordingly.
Any failure to provide this material is fatal to their claim. A parking operator cannot simply invent past restrictions or rely on undisclosed internal records. The landowner contract must show the actual parking terms in effect at the time, not what MET retrospectively asserts. If they cannot produce it, then they had no authority to issue this charge, and the appeal must be upheld.
Conclusion: The driver of the vehicle was aware of the parking restrictions in effect on the site at the time of the alleged contravention and took pains to comply with all such terms and conditions——including the 90-minute free parking allowance clearly and unambiguously offered to the driver as an inducement to enter into the contract of parking. Despite this, MET has inexplicably sent a PCN to the Keeper of the vehicle, alleging that the actual terms of the parking contract were contrary to all the available evidence, and that the driver had therefore breached such terms by remaining on site for 82minutes. However, there is no evidence that the free parking limit was indeed 60 minutes, nor that MET had been authorised by the landowner to offer parking services with a 60-minute limit, at the time of the alleged contravention. I therefore request POPLA to uphold this appeal and instruct MET Parking Services Ltd to cancel the related PCN."
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In response to my first ground for appeal, MET elaborated upon its original claim that the terms and conditions had been changed "days earlier" to specify that the terms and the signs were changed on 12 March 2025 (four days after the alleged contravention), but they have failed to provide any of the requested evidence showing what the terms and conditions (or the signs) stated on the actual date of the alleged contravention. Instead, they have made the same evidence-free claim and then "reiterated" the same claim again for emphasis:
"We note [REGISTERED KEEPER]’s comments, however, the signage that was in place on 08/03/2025 advised that the time limit was 60 minutes. A new time limit of 90 minutes was implemented at a later date, but not until 12/03/2025 when the signage was replaced. Please see below an image taken on the date of the installation when our attendant conducted an updated survey":
[Fuzzy, but time-stamped (12/03/2025) photo showing "1-1/2 Hours Max Stay" on 12 March 2025]
"We reiterate that the time limit in place on 08/03/2025 was 60 minutes.
The fact of the matter is that the maximum stay period is a contractual term between the motorist and parking operator. The terms of that contract are what are stated on the signs and the signs weren’t updated until 12/03/2025. Therefore, the effective date for the purpose of the updated contract between a motorist and ourselves is 12/03/2025 onwards. Any correspondence between us and our client would not alter the effective date of the new terms and conditions.
We are confident that there were sufficient signs in place in this car park and that the signs were prominently displayed and clearly stated the terms and conditions. In Section E of our evidence pack we have included images of the signs that were in place at the time and a site plan of the location. We are confident that our signage complies with all relevant legislation and regulations.
A motorist does not have to have read the terms and conditions of parking to enter into a parking contract, there is only the requirement that the parking operator affords them the opportunity to do so. As stated, we are confident that there was sufficient signage at the site in order to afford motorists the chance to read the terms and conditions that were in place. Upon entry to the site, it is the motorist’s obligation to seek out any terms and conditions that may be in place before choosing to park or remain on site."
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In response to my second ground for appeal, MET has largely ignored the actual grounds for appeal and provided only a redacted version of the landowner contract, which does not include any provision that its agreement with the landowner includes a clause (per 14.1(e) of the PPSCoP) confirming a 60-minute maximum stay was contractually agreed and permitted by the landowner on the date of the alleged event; nor has MET provided "written evidence from the landowner confirming the subsequent change to a 90-minute free parking period":
"We have included a copy of our contract with the landowner in Section E of our evidence pack. We have redacted commercially sensitive details and highlighted relevant clauses for ease of reading. Our contract with the landowner grants us authority to form contracts with motorists and issue parking charge notices for contractual breach.
We refer you to the Supreme Court ruling on ParkingEye v Beavis for the judges’ determination on whether a parking operator is acting as an agent or principal. The ruling may be found at
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0280-judgment.pdf.darlThe terms and conditions of use of the car park are clearly stated on the signs prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that parking is for McDonald’s customers only and there is a maximum permitted stay of 60 minutes. Please note that these terms and conditions apply to all users of the car park, which naturally includes customers of the restaurant. As the photographic evidence provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates, the vehicle remained in the car park for longer than the maximum permitted stay. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. In light of this we believe the charge notice was issued correctly and the appeal should be refused."
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Within Section E of their evidence pack, MET again leans into ParkingEye v Beavis (which has nothing to do with this claim), and offers POPLA some additional, irrelevant advice:
"MET Parking Services Ltd are contracted by McDonald’s to ensure adherence to the terms and conditions of the car park. Our interest in the land arises from our obligation to perform our contractual duties by ensuring provision can be made for motorists to park and facilitate motorists to use the client’s premises.
The Judges who ruled on the ParkingEye v Beavis case considered this point and held that ParkingEye had contracted with the motorist as a principal and not as agent and the contract had been formed by way of the signage displayed at the site and the motorist parking his car on the site.
We do not feel we have to provide a copy of an un-redacted contract between ourselves and our client as it contains information which is commercially sensitive and not relevant in this instance. It also extends to more than 20 pages and therefore the volume of redacted information will be significantly greater than the volume of un-redacted and relevant information.
We have however provided the letter of authority, the signature page and front sheet of the contract demonstrating it is the contract referred to in the letter of authority and the clause from the contract that demonstrates this is rolling contract and subsists until terminated.
We note POPLA are often asked to consider whether the contract existed at the date of the contravention and as you can see from the extract from the contract held with McDonald’s this agreement has a commencement date of 31 August 2010 as this was the date it was signed by the client and is agreed for an initial period of 9 months after which point it becomes an ongoing agreement with notice provisions for both parties. We can confirm that neither McDonald’s nor MET Parking have applied the notice provisions, and therefore the agreement remains in place. Consequently, we would expect POPLA to be satisfied that the contract provided adequately proves that MET Parking had sufficient authority to issue parking charges on the land, on the day of the contravention. This is also evidenced by the fact that McDonald’s permitted MET Parking’s parking enforcement signs to be prominently displayed on the site at that time and to this date."
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In summary, MET ignored my demands for particular evidence relating to the date in question and provided a lot of meaningless additional information which only serves to illustrate that they have changed their terms and conditions at different times in the past.
What's to best way to follow up? I would probably just hammer home exactly how MET has failed to address the two grounds for appeal, and that they have now lost their opportunity to prove any breach has occurred on the only relevant date. Is POPLA likely to "fill in the blanks" in MET's favour?
For example, MET included in its evidence pack numerous pictures timestamped 3 December 2020, which show that the signs in the car park indeed indicated a 60-minute free parking period at that time, but the only evidence they provided relating to the date they claim to have changed the terms and conditions (12 March 2025) is a single photo from a "site survey" allegedly done on that date, which shows the same 90-minute free period which I photographed on 5 April 2025. (Coincidentally, 12 March 2025 is the same date MET requested registered keeper details from the DVLA and sent the Notice to Keeper.) MET provided no evidence of (a) what the signs showed on 8 March 2025, or (b) that any signs were indeed changed on 12 March 2025. In any case, what the signs showed on 12 March 2025 is irrelevant for the purpose of demonstrating a breach of contract on 8 March 2025.
However, I'm worried that from the evidence MET did provide, POPLA might simply assume the facts MET has failed to prove, such as the implication that the terms and conditions had remained "60 minutes" from 3 December 2020 until the date MET allegedly changed them to "90 minutes" on the same date they requested my DVLA information (four days after the vehicle was parked there), and that MET's unredacted (and un-provided) contract with McDonald's contains the apparently critical "free parking period" terms (and each change thereto was similarly authorised by McDonald's). A legitimate finder of fact in an "appeal" should not simply assume critical facts, of course...
Thanks in advance for any further input and advice!
--Outahere