• The signage relied on at Liverpool John Lennon Airport is incapable of forming a contract. It clearly prohibits stopping and threatens a £100 charge for doing so. This is not an invitation to treat or an offer of terms that can be accepted by conduct. There is no consideration or benefit offered to the driver, which is a fundamental requirement for a binding contract. Therefore, the signage cannot form a lawful contract, and the £100 charge is not a contractual fee but an unenforceable deterrent. A charge issued under these circumstances has no lawful basis.
• The land is under statutory control via airport byelaws, meaning it is not classified as “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). Because of this, the provisions in PoFA that allow a parking operator to pursue the registered Keeper in the absence of driver details do not apply on this site. This is a settled point in parking law, and VCS knows or ought to know that PoFA cannot be invoked in these circumstances.
• Despite PoFA not applying, VCS has deliberately copied wording from Paragraph 9(2)(f) of Schedule 4 of PoFA into the Notice to Keeper. The notice states: “
we may pursue you (the Keeper) on the assumption you were the driver.” This is a direct mimicry of PoFA’s statutory language and is used deceptively to suggest that the Keeper can be held liable even when the legal basis to do so does not exist. This is both misleading and unfair, and in direct breach of the requirement under Section 3.3 of the PPSCoP to act “professionally, fairly and transparently.”
• The conduct of VCS in relying on such language has already been criticised in court. In the persuasive County Court appeal case VCS v Ian Mark Edwards [2023] HOKF6C9C, HHJ Gargan made clear in his conclusion at paragraph 35.3 that:
“It is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
The judge offered several examples of common scenarios (e.g. company cars, shared family vehicles) to show that assuming the Keeper was also the driver is speculative and unsupported. This is directly relevant, and VCS’s continued use of that assumption—despite this ruling—shows a wilful disregard for the law and judicial guidance.
• VCS is a private company with no statutory or lawful authority to issue penalties for stopping. They are not a public authority, and cannot lawfully impose or enforce fines. The £100 demand is therefore not a penalty lawfully issued under any statutory enforcement power, but rather a speculative invoice dressed up in intimidating language. This is especially concerning given VCS’s background as a former clamping company, a practice now banned in England and Wales under the Protection of Freedoms Act. Their current business model is essentially a continuation of the same coercive tactics, but now using CCTV and misleading notices.
• This behaviour is consistent with what many consider to be vexatious conduct, designed not to recover genuine losses, but to pressure registered Keepers into payment through legally questionable means. It is also arguably in breach of the UK GDPR principles of fairness and purpose limitation, as the DVLA-supplied data is being used in a way that is not compatible with its stated purpose: namely, to pursue a lawful charge in accordance with the relevant Code of Practice.
