Free Traffic Legal Advice

Re: Parking Charge Notice [ref] – Vehicle [reg]

Dear G24 “Team”,

I acknowledge your latest piece of waffle about Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). You appear to labour under the delusion that simply parroting paragraphs 9(2)(b) and 9(2)(f) somehow conjures up keeper liability. It does not.

For the avoidance of doubt:

• Your Notice to Keeper does not comply with all of the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a)–(i) (and associated provisions).
• Partial, selective or “near enough” compliance is legally meaningless.
• In particular, your document fails the requirements of paragraph 9(2)(e)(i), amongst others.

The legal position is simple: you have failed to meet the statutory conditions for transferring liability from the unknown driver to the registered keeper. Consequently, you have no lawful basis whatsoever to pursue me as keeper. That is the end of the matter.

You now have the sheer nerve to ask me to assist you by identifying the driver, as if I am under some obligation to help you repair your own PoFA car crash. I am not.

So, for the avoidance of doubt:

1. I am the registered keeper.
2. The registered keeper declines to identify the driver.
3. You have no lawful basis to assume, infer or otherwise pretend you know who was driving.
4. You have chosen to rely on PoFA while failing to comply with PoFA. That is your mess, not mine.

Your muddled reliance on a couple of cherry-picked sub-paragraphs of PoFA (2) while ignoring the rest only serves to underline the level of intellectual malnourishment at play here. If your staff are incapable of understanding that ALL applicable PoFA conditions must be satisfied before keeper liability can arise, that is your problem, not mine. I am not about to give you a free tutorial.

If you genuinely believe your defective NtK somehow creates keeper liability despite its non-compliance, you are welcome to waste your own time and money at IAS or in court. Any independent review will simply be invited to note:

1. Your admitted reliance on PoFA;
2. Your failure to comply with all mandatory provisions of 9(2); and
3. Your complete lack of evidence as to the identity of the driver.

In the meantime, this is my final word on the subject. Do not contact me again about this speculative invoice unless it is to:

• Confirm that the charge has been cancelled; or
• Serve a properly compliant Letter of Claim or court papers.

Any debt collector drivel will be ignored.

As to your invitation that I should assist you by naming the driver, I can only refer you to the response given in Arkell v Pressdram (1971).

Yours faithfully,

[Name]
Registered Keeper

Appellant: [Full name]
PCN reference: [xxxxxxxx]
Vehicle registration: [xxxxxxx]
Operator: G24 Limited
Site: Ventura Retail Park, Tamworth, Phase 1 car park
Status: Registered keeper – no admission as to driver identity

I am the registered keeper of the vehicle identified in this matter. I appeal against this Parking Charge Notice in full. I deny any liability, whether as driver or as keeper. For the avoidance of doubt, there is no admission as to the identity of the driver and I decline to identify the driver. No adverse inference can properly be drawn from that lawful choice.

G24 has chosen to rely on Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“PoFA”) and has expressly threatened me with keeper liability in its correspondence, repeatedly citing paragraph 9(2)(b) and 9(2)(f). However, G24’s Notice to Keeper does not comply with the mandatory conditions imposed by Schedule 4 and therefore cannot create keeper liability. In those circumstances, G24 can only pursue the unknown driver, who has not been identified.

GROUND 1 – NO KEEPER LIABILITY UNDER SCHEDULE 4 POFA 2012

Liability may only be transferred from the driver to the registered keeper if, and only if, the operator strictly complies with all of the applicable provisions of Schedule 4 to PoFA. Paragraph 4(1) and 4(2) set out that keeper liability arises only “if all the applicable conditions under this Schedule are met.”

Where an operator seeks to rely on paragraph 9 (Notice to keeper: no notice to driver), paragraph 9(2) sets out a list of mandatory information that “the notice must” contain. These requirements are not optional; they are strict preconditions. The wording of paragraph 9(2) is clear. It enumerates requirements (a) through (i). Each is couched in mandatory language (“must”), and failure to comply with any of them prevents keeper liability from arising.

In this case, G24’s Notice to Keeper fails to comply with paragraph 9(2)(e)(i). That provision requires the notice to:

   “state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper—
   (i) to pay the unpaid parking charges; or
   (ii) if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver…”

The Notice to Keeper issued by G24 does not contain a compliant statement in the terms required by paragraph 9(2)(e)(i). In particular, it does not set out, in the statutory form, that the creditor does not know both the name and address for service of the driver and it does not contain a correct and complete invitation to the keeper in the prescribed form. G24 have instead substituted their own wording, which does not mirror the statutory requirement and fails to discharge paragraph 9(2)(e)(i).

This is not merely a matter of “substantial compliance” or “close enough”. The statute does not permit a “near miss” approach. The operator either complies with the prescribed wording and structure, or it does not. In this case, it does not. On that basis alone, the Notice to Keeper is non-compliant and incapable of creating any keeper liability.

Further, and in any event, the Notice to Keeper fails to comply with paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires the notice to “specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.” G24 rely upon ANPR entry and exit timestamps. ANPR technology records only times when a vehicle passes cameras; it does not and cannot record the actual “period of parking”. The law explicitly requires specification of “the period of parking”. Entry and exit times are not the same thing, nor do they prove the duration of any stationary parking event. They do not account for time spent queuing, driving slowly around the car park, or waiting for a space, nor for mandatory consideration and grace periods.

The Notice to Keeper in this case merely reproduces ANPR entry/exit times and then asserts that a “maximum stay” was exceeded. That is not compliant with paragraph 9(2)(a). The required “period of parking” is absent; it is not for an operator to gloss the statutory wording by asserting that ANPR times are good enough. They are not. Again, this defect is fatal to keeper liability.

There are additional omissions and defects within the Notice to Keeper when one compares it line by line to the requirements of paragraph 9(2)(a)–(i) and the other applicable conditions in Schedule 4. However, it is sufficient for present purposes that the IAS should note the above specific breaches of paragraphs 9(2)(e)(i) and 9(2)(a). A failure of any one applicable condition is sufficient to prevent any transfer of liability from the unknown driver to the keeper.

The legal consequence is straightforward. G24 cannot rely on PoFA to pursue the registered keeper. The only potentially liable party would be the driver, whose identity is not admitted and has not been disclosed. G24 cannot lawfully treat the keeper as if he or she were the driver, nor can they reverse the burden of proof or invite the IAS to indulge any presumption to that effect. There is no such presumption in PoFA or in general law.

GROUND 2 – MISREPRESENTATION OF KEEPER LIABILITY AND MISUSE OF DATA

Notwithstanding their non-compliance with PoFA, G24’s rejection letter continues to assert that they “have the right to recover any unpaid part of the parking charge from you, the registered keeper” under paragraph 9(2)(f). This is a serious misstatement of the law. Paragraph 9(2)(f) does not grant any such right; it merely prescribes wording which must be contained in a notice in order for keeper liability to arise if all other statutory conditions are also satisfied.

Where an operator fails to comply with the mandatory conditions of Schedule 4 but nevertheless represents to a data subject (the keeper) that they have a statutory right to recover a parking charge from that person as keeper, this is a misuse of DVLA data and a misrepresentation of legal authority. It is also contrary to the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), in particular clause 8.1.1(d), which prohibits operators from misrepresenting the legal position regarding keeper liability under PoFA.

The IAS will be aware that the entire justification for access to keeper data via the DVLA KADOE contract is that the data must be used fairly, lawfully and transparently. An operator that fails to meet PoFA’s conditions yet continues to press the keeper as if those conditions had been satisfied is plainly not acting fairly or lawfully. This is highly relevant to the credibility and weight that should be attached to their evidence and assertions in this appeal.

GROUND 3 – NO EVIDENCE OF A BINDING CONTRACT WITH THE LANDOWNER

G24 is put to strict proof that it had, at the material time, a valid and enforceable written agreement with the landowner (or a party with sufficient title to sue) conferring authority upon G24 to: (a) manage and control parking at Ventura Retail Park, Tamworth, Phase 1; and (b) issue Parking Charge Notices and pursue them through to court proceedings in its own name. The burden rests squarely on G24 to demonstrate that it is not a mere contractor or agent with no independent right of action.

The IAS will appreciate that a bare “site agreement”, a short-form “authority letter”, or a self-serving witness statement falls far short of what is required. Any such document must be a properly executed agreement and must not be so heavily redacted that key information is concealed. The document must clearly identify, as a minimum, the contracting landholder, the precise land and car park areas subject to the scheme, the duration of the agreement, the nature and limits of G24’s authority, the level of charges, and whether G24 has the right to take legal action in its own name.

In this regard, any contract or letter of authority relied upon must comply in full with Section 14.1(a–j) of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice. That provision sets out the mandatory minimum content that must be present in any agreement or written authority between a landholder and a parking operator. It is not sufficient for an operator to produce a document with those 14.1(a–j elements missing or obscured. If any of the mandatory 14.1(a–j particulars are absent, or if they are concealed behind redactions (for example in relation to the identity of the landholder, the land covered, the duration, the financial arrangements, or the operator’s litigation rights), then the document is non-compliant with the Code and cannot safely be treated as proof of standing.

The Appellant therefore invites the IAS to require strict proof of a fully unredacted contract or letter of authority that demonstrably satisfies Section 14.1(a–j of the PPSCoP and shows that G24 was expressly authorised, at the material time, to issue Parking Charge Notices and to recover them by litigation in its own name. If G24 fails to produce such evidence, or produces only a redacted or generic document, the IAS is asked to find that G24 has failed to establish locus standi and that the charge cannot be enforced.

GROUND 4 – INADEQUATE AND NON-COMPLIANT SIGNAGE

The alleged parking contract is said to be formed by means of signage at the site. The operator bears the burden of proving that clear, legible, and sufficiently prominent terms were effectively communicated to the driver before any parking event commenced. In circumstances where PoFA is not engaged (because of operator non-compliance), the alleged debt can only arise, if at all, from a contract said to have been formed between operator and driver. The standard of proof and clarity required is correspondingly high.

G24 has provided no contemporaneous evidence of the actual signage layout, positioning, or content as it appeared on the material date. A few stock photographs or small images of template signs do not suffice. The IAS should require:

   a) A contemporaneous site plan indicating all signage positions, heights, and angles; and
   b) Legible, close-up photographs of the signs, showing all text, including any small print relating to maximum stay, charges, and key terms; and
   c) Wider photographs demonstrating how those signs would have appeared to a driver entering and circulating the site, including at eye level from a driver’s viewpoint.

The appellant’s position is that the signage fails to meet the requirements for contractual incorporation. It is not admitted that the alleged terms were sufficiently prominent, legible, or transparent to be binding on a reasonable driver. Any terms that are alleged to impose a disproportionate penalty, or that purport to bind a motorist to a significant financial charge for a trivial overstay, must be particularly prominent and brought fairly to the driver’s attention. The operator has not discharged that burden.

Further, if the operator wishes to rely upon ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, it is incumbent on them to demonstrate that the factual matrix in this car park is analogous to the Beavis case, including signage design, prominence, commercial justification, and context. Absent evidence of such similarity, Beavis does not assist G24. It is not a blanket blessing of all private parking charges in all circumstances.

GROUND 5 – FAILURE TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION AND GRACE PERIODS

The Private Parking Single Code of Practice requires that operators allow motorists a reasonable “consideration period” on arrival, in order to read the signs and decide whether to stay, and a minimum grace period at the end of any permitted parking before issuing a charge. This reflects basic consumer fairness. G24’s blanket assertion that “the maximum stay time allowed was exceeded” does not demonstrate that the operator has observed these requirements.

The operator has produced no evidence of how it has allowed for mandatory consideration and grace periods in its ANPR calculations, nor how the alleged “overstay” has been calculated after those periods. As already noted, ANPR entry and exit times are not equivalent to a proved period of parking and do not demonstrate breach of contract when allowance is made for the required buffer periods. The burden remains on G24 to prove an actionable breach of clearly communicated terms, not merely to assert that “our records confirm” a breach.

GROUND 6 – UNFAIR AND DISPROPORTIONATE CHARGE

The Parking Charge demanded bears no relation to any genuine pre-estimate of loss and is purely penal in nature. While Beavis accepted that in certain tightly defined circumstances a charge could be commercially justifiable and not a penalty, those circumstances involved a specific, prominent, and carefully controlled system in a town centre retail park with very clear signage and an obvious legitimate interest in deterrence.

In contrast, G24 has produced no evidence of any comparable legitimate interest, nor of the clarity and prominence of its signs. In the absence of such evidence, this charge represents an unfair and disproportionate term under the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Terms which require a consumer to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation when compared with the operator’s legitimate interest and actual loss are liable to be assessed as unfair and are not binding.

CONCLUSION

In summary:

a) G24’s Notice to Keeper is non-compliant with PoFA Schedule 4, in particular paragraphs 9(2)(e)(i) and 9(2)(a), and does not meet all mandatory conditions of paragraph 9(2)(a)–(i) and the wider Schedule. Keeper liability therefore does not arise.
b) The operator has misrepresented its right to recover the charge from the keeper despite that non-compliance, undermining its credibility and its lawful use of DVLA data.
c) G24 has not proved that it holds sufficient landowner authority to create and enforce parking contracts in its own name.
d) G24 has not proved that clear, prominent, and legally effective signage was in place and properly incorporated into any alleged contract.
e) G24 has not proved any properly calculated period of parking or any allowance for mandatory consideration and grace periods.
f) The charge is, in the circumstances of this site and on the limited evidence provided, an unfair and disproportionate penalty, and is not binding.

For all of the above reasons, this appeal should be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled in full.

Should the IAS nonetheless be minded to dismiss this appeal, the appellant respectfully requires that the assessor sets out, with reference to the actual wording of Schedule 4 PoFA and to the specific content of G24’s Notice to Keeper, how each limb of paragraph 9(2)(a)–(i) is said to have been satisfied, and on what legal basis the keeper can be held liable in the face of the clear statutory requirements and the absence of any admission as to driver identity.

Appellant’s comments on operator’s evidence

1. The operator has uploaded only a signage pack and a “Site Evaluation Sheet”. There is no copy of the Notice to Keeper, no attempt to deal with any of the PoFA points raised, and no evidence at all of landowner authority. None of the substantive legal grounds in the appeal have been addressed or rebutted. The IAS is therefore invited to treat those unrebutted points as conceded or, at the very least, as unchallenged.

GROUND 1 – CONTINUING ABSENCE OF ANY PROOF OF KEEPER LIABILITY

2. The operator’s evidence contains no Notice to Keeper, no PoFA analysis and no attempt to show compliance with Schedule 4. My original appeal set out that the NtK fails PoFA 2012 Schedule 4, in particular paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) and 9(2)(a), and that not all limbs of 9(2)(a)–(i) are satisfied.

3. Since the operator has chosen not to produce the NtK at all, they have failed, as a matter of simple evidential burden, to demonstrate any compliance with PoFA. It is impossible for the IAS to conclude that “all applicable conditions” in Schedule 4 are met when the operator has not even placed the NtK before you.

4. The legal position therefore remains unchanged: there is no evidence before the IAS that keeper liability has arisen. The only potentially liable party is the unidentified driver, and there has been no admission of driver identity. The operator cannot invite any presumption that the keeper was the driver, as there is no such presumption in PoFA or in general law.

GROUND 2 – NO EVIDENCE OF LANDOWNER AUTHORITY AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PPSCoP 14.1(a–j)

5. My appeal put the operator to strict proof of a valid, written agreement with the landholder, conferring authority to manage parking, issue PCNs and bring proceedings in G24’s own name. The operator has not produced any such agreement or even a letter of authority.

6. Instead, they have produced only an internal “Site Evaluation Sheet” showing a survey by one of their employees on 07/02/2024, together with a plan and some photographs. This is not a contract, and it does not even purport to show any grant of authority from the landowner. It is nothing more than an internal document prepared by the operator for its own purposes.

7. Section 14.1(a–j) of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice prescribes the mandatory minimum contents of any agreement or written authority between a landholder and a private parking operator. Among other things, such an agreement must clearly show: the identity of the landholder, the land covered, the duration of the agreement, the scope of the operator’s authority, and whether the operator may litigate in its own name. None of that appears in the operator’s evidence.

8. The operator has therefore failed to show any compliant agreement at all, let alone one that satisfies PPSCoP 14.1(a–j). In the absence of a fully compliant, unredacted contract or authority letter, G24 has not proved locus standi to enforce any alleged parking contract or to pursue charges in its own name. On that ground alone, the appeal should be allowed.

GROUND 3 – SIGNAGE: OPERATOR’S OWN EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE APPEAL

9. The only substantive material the operator has produced is signage imagery. Far from rebutting the appeal, it confirms that the alleged contractual terms were not clearly brought to the attention of drivers.

Entrance signage

10. The “600 x 800 Cust Ent NEW” entrance sign states “Customer Parking Only – See notices in car park for Terms and Conditions – Private Land”. It does not display the maximum stay, does not state the charge, and does not mention any three hour limit or £100 sum. It merely instructs motorists to look elsewhere.

11. Under basic principles of contract law and under the PPSCoP, core terms such as any time limit and any financial charge must be clearly communicated at or before the point of contract formation, particularly where they are onerous. An entrance sign that simply tells motorists to look for other notices, without disclosing the key terms itself, is insufficient to bind a driver to a £100 charge.

12. The “Driver’s View – Entrance” photograph confirms that even this limited entrance sign is small and set back from the carriageway. From a moving vehicle at the stated approach speed of 20 mph, it would be impossible to read any wording beyond perhaps “Customer Parking Only”. The operator’s own evidence therefore shows that no clear contractual offer, including the alleged maximum stay and £100 charge, is made at the point of entry.

Main terms signage

13. The main sign (“Private Land – Customer Parking Only – Maximum stay 3 hours”) is dominated by branding and large “Customer Parking Only” text. The supposed contractual charge and detailed terms are buried in dense small print at the bottom of the sign. The phrase “Breach of ANY of the terms and conditions will result in the driver being liable for a parking charge of £100” appears only within that small print.

14. The “Driver’s View” photographs demonstrate that, from a typical parking position, the small print is not legible to a driver seated in the vehicle. The operator has provided no close-up images showing that the small print can be read from a normal standing position adjacent to the vehicle, nor that such signs are positioned so a driver would inevitably notice and read them before or while parking.

15. It follows that the alleged £100 charge is an onerous term, not sufficiently brought to the attention of the consumer. The operator’s own photographs show it is presented as small-print “legalese”, contrary to the transparency and prominence requirements of the PPSCoP and the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

Nature of the alleged contract

16. The sign is also drafted on a “breach” footing: “Breach of ANY of the terms and conditions will result in the driver being liable for a parking charge of £100.” That is classic damages/penalty wording rather than a clear offer to park in return for a £100 contractual fee. In those circumstances, the operator has an even higher burden to show that the term is transparent, prominent and fair. Their evidence does not begin to discharge that burden.

Consideration and grace periods

17. The operator still shows only ANPR entry and exit imaging; they have provided no breakdown of how any “overstay” is calculated once mandatory consideration and grace periods are allowed for. Section 5.1 of the PPSCoP requires a reasonable consideration period on arrival to allow the driver to read the signs and decide whether to stay. A further grace period is required at the end of parking.

18. The operator’s site plan shows a large, busy retail car park with 462 spaces and multiple access routes. It is obvious that a driver might spend several minutes circulating and queuing before parking, and the same again when leaving. None of this is “parking” for the purposes of PoFA, and none of it may properly be counted as chargeable overstay. Yet the operator has produced no evidence that these mandatory periods were allowed for or deducted.

19. As already stated in the original appeal, ANPR entry and exit timestamps do not equate to a proved “period of parking” under PoFA 9(2)(a). The operator’s evidence does nothing to alter that conclusion.

GROUND 4 – FAILURE TO ANSWER THE SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

20. The operator has chosen not to respond at all to the core legal grounds advanced: PoFA non-compliance (particularly 9(2)(e)(i) and 9(2)(a)), misrepresentation of keeper liability, the absence of any PoFA-based right to pursue the keeper, and the lack of any evidence of landowner authority. Instead, they have simply uploaded generic signage materials.

21. An operator that genuinely believed it had complied with PoFA and held proper authority would be expected to provide the NtK, a PoFA compliance analysis, and a landowner contract or letter of authority in full compliance with PPSCoP 14.1(a–j). G24 has done none of these things. The inference is obvious.

CONCLUSION

22. In light of the operator’s limited evidence and its complete failure to rebut the detailed legal grounds already raised, the appellant respectfully invites the IAS to allow the appeal on one or more of the following bases:

(a) The operator has produced no NtK and no proof of compliance with PoFA Schedule 4. Keeper liability has not arisen and the appellant, as keeper, is not liable.

(b) The operator has produced no contract or authority letter that complies with PPSCoP 14.1(a–j). It has not proved any right to issue or enforce PCNs in its own name.

(c) The operator’s own evidence shows that key terms, including the three-hour maximum stay and £100 charge, are not clearly or prominently communicated at the point of entry or at the point of parking, and that the alleged contractual term is not fairly incorporated.

(d) The operator has not shown any proper calculation of a “period of parking” nor any deduction for mandatory consideration and grace periods.

23. For all of these reasons, the appeal should be upheld and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.