Here is a draft WS which probably needs some refinement because of some repetition. I'll let others have a look at it first and take suggestions. OP, you will have to read it and decide whether you are prepared to sign in under a statement of truth.
IN THE COUNTY COURT
Claim No: [Claim Number]
BETWEEN:
Euro Car Parks Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
WITNESS STATEMENT
I, [Defendant’s Full Name], am the Defendant in this claim and make this statement in support of my defence. The facts in this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Preliminary matter
2. The Claimant’s Particulars of Claim (PoC) and Witness Statement (WS) are both procedurally defective and should be given no weight due to their failure to comply with the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and the improper execution of their statements of truth.
3. The PoC fail to comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5. The Claimant had an obligation to fully particularise the claim at the time of issuing proceedings but failed to:
a) Set out the exact wording of the clause(s) of the terms and conditions relied upon.
(b) Adequately explain how the terms of the alleged contract were incorporated or why I am said to be in breach.
(c) Distinguish whether the claim is brought against me as the driver or the keeper.
(d) Provide a breakdown of how the total sum claimed has been calculated, including interest and alleged additional charges.
4. Despite the Claimant’s failure to adequately plead its case, the allocation judge did not order the Claimant to amend or clarify its PoC. The Claimant has since sought to introduce additional details via its Witness Statement, but this does not cure the defective PoC. A Witness Statement cannot remedy an inadequate statement of case, and this attempt to rectify procedural failings at a later stage is an abuse of process.
5. The PoC are signed by Sarah Ensall, described as the "Claimant’s legal representative", but there is no evidence that she is a solicitor or that she has the formal authorisation required under CPR 22.1 and Practice Direction 22 to sign a statement of truth on behalf of the Claimant.
6. CPR 22.1(6) and PD 22, paragraph 3.9, require that:
(a) If signed by a legal representative, they must be a solicitor or a person formally authorised by the Claimant.
(b) The signatory must be responsible for the conduct of the case.
7. Sarah Ensall is not a solicitor, and the Claimant has not provided evidence that she has explicit authorisation to sign statements of truth on behalf of Euro Car Parks. The Claimant must demonstrate that she has the required formal standing to sign the PoC. If she does not, the statement of truth is defective, and the PoC are procedurally invalid.
8. The same procedural failure applies to the Witness Statement, which is also signed by Sarah Ensall. She is not a direct witness with knowledge of the facts and has no first-hand evidence regarding the alleged parking event, the contract, or the issuance of the charge. Instead, the WS is based on hearsay, without a supporting statement from a Euro Car Parks employee who has direct knowledge of the facts.
9. The Witness Statement attempts to introduce new arguments and details that were absent from the PoC, including references to specific payment records, signage, and contract terms. However, this does not remedy the defective PoC and is an attempt to circumvent proper procedure.
10. The Claimant is a serial litigant represented by bulk litigation solicitors and should be fully aware of its obligations under the CPR. Despite this, it failed to properly plead its case at the outset and now seeks to correct its failings by introducing details at a later stage. This approach is unfair, unreasonable, and an abuse of process which puts me at a disadvantage and undermines the overriding objective.
11. In light of these procedural defects, I submit that:
(a) The PoC are inadequately pleaded, do not comply with CPR 16.4, and should be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.
(b) The statement of truth on both the PoC and WS is defective, as the Claimant has not demonstrated that Sarah Ensall was properly authorised to sign on their behalf.
(c) The Witness Statement should be given no weight, as it is based entirely on hearsay and does not correct the failings in the PoC.
(d) The court should consider whether the Claimant’s conduct in issuing vague claims and relying on late evidence constitutes unreasonable behaviour, warranting a costs order under CPR 27.14(2)(g).
12. The Claimant’s Witness Statement at paragraph 5 asserts that they are an accredited member of the British Parking Association (BPA) and operate in accordance with the BPA Code of Practice (CoP). However, this statement is demonstrably false, as the Claimant’s own evidence proves multiple breaches of the BPA CoP (Version 
, which was in effect at the time of the alleged contravention.
13. The Claimant’s witness further states that the BPA has a Code of Practice that its members are expected to adhere to, or otherwise face potential sanctions. This assertion is inherently untrue. BPA membership does not automatically mean compliance, and the BPA rarely enforces meaningful sanctions against its members, even when serious breaches occur. In this case, the evidence provided by the Claimant itself proves non-compliance with multiple sections of the BPA CoP.
14. The signage provided by the Claimant in Exhibit 2 is incapable of forming a contract with the driver. The charge for breaching the terms is buried in a wall of tiny text on the tariff board, making it impossible to be adequately noticed by a driver. No other sign shown as evidence contains the core terms of the alleged contract, meaning no contract can be said to have been properly formed.
15. BPA CoP Section 19.1 states that operators must use signs to make it easy for drivers to find out what the terms and conditions are. The signage in Exhibit 2 fails this test. The key terms are not prominent, not readable, and are buried in small print. The Claimant has failed to ensure that the terms and conditions are brought to the driver's attention from the outset, making any alleged contract unenforceable.
16. BPA CoP Section 19.2 states that a standard form of entrance sign must be placed at the entrance to the parking area. The Claimant has provided no evidence of an entrance sign in its exhibits. Entrance signs are mandatory unless the location falls within a small list of exemptions, none of which apply in this case.
17. BPA CoP Section 19.3 states that signs containing the specific parking terms must be placed throughout the site, so that drivers are given the chance to read them at the time of parking or leaving their vehicle. The signage in Exhibit 2 does not meet this requirement. The terms are not easily visible at key decision points, not clearly legible due to small print, and buried within a long block of text. This directly violates Lord Denning’s "Red Hand Rule," which requires the most onerous terms, such as a financial penalty, to be the most prominent.
18. BPA CoP Section 19.4 states that if an operator intends to use the keeper liability provisions in Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012, the signage must give adequate notice. The Claimant's evidence fails to show that the charge for an alleged breach was brought adequately to the attention of the driver. Since PoFA requires full compliance with all relevant provisions, the failure to meet this signage requirement alone invalidates any attempt to rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable.
19. BPA CoP Section 19.9 states that there must be at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking that can be viewed without needing to leave the vehicle. The Claimant’s own photographic evidence of the disabled bays confirms that no readable terms and conditions sign is visible from within a vehicle. A driver with mobility impairments would be forced to exit their vehicle to read the terms, in direct breach of this requirement.
20. The lack of compliant signage is evident from the Claimant’s own exhibits. The Claimant’s witness, Sarah Ensall, falsely claims adherence to the BPA CoP while simultaneously submitting non-compliant signage as evidence.
21 The Claimant’s own exhibits contradict their claim of compliance with the BPA CoP. This demonstrates that the witness lacks direct knowledge of the facts and that their statement is unreliable, misleading, and hearsay.
22. While there are further failures of compliance with the BPA CoP, which will be addressed later in this Witness Statement, the above breaches alone are irrefutable proof that the Claimant does not adhere to the BPA CoP, rendering paragraph 5 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement wholly unreliable and untrue.
23. The Claimant’s Witness Statement at paragraph 6 asserts that compliance with the BPA Code of Practice is essential for the Claimant to obtain Registered Keeper details from the DVLA under Regulation 27 of the Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002. The witness further claims that the Claimant "complies in all regards" with the BPA Code, thereby satisfying the requirements for accessing DVLA data.
24. This statement is demonstrably false. As already established in this Witness Statement, the Claimant does not comply with the BPA Code of Practice, as evidenced by their own signage. Since full, strict compliance with the BPA Code of Practice is a fundamental condition of the Keeper At Date Of Event (KADOE) contract between private parking operators and the DVLA, the Claimant’s access to DVLA data is unlawful.
25. The KADOE contract explicitly states that an operator must adhere to the BPA Code of Practice in its entirety as a condition of being granted access to Registered Keeper data. Any failure to meet the requirements of the Code, including but not limited to inadequate signage, misleading contractual terms, or procedural breaches, invalidates an operator’s lawful basis for requesting and processing keeper details from the DVLA.
26. The evidence provided by the Claimant itself proves that its signage does not meet the requirements of the BPA Code. As such, the Claimant has unlawfully accessed my data in contravention of the KADOE contract, which constitutes a breach of the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR, as it obtained and processed my personal data without a lawful basis.
27. The claim that the Claimant "complies in all regards" with the BPA Code is therefore untrue, and the Claimant’s entitlement to obtain, retain, and use my data is in serious doubt.
28. Further breaches of the BPA Code of Practice will be detailed later in this Witness Statement, reinforcing the fact that the Claimant has no lawful right to process or use my personal data for the purposes of issuing or pursuing this claim.
29. The Claimant’s Witness Statement at paragraph 7 falsely states that the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) was "issued" on 18/12/2021. However, the Claimant’s own evidence, shown in Exhibit 6, proves that the Notice to Keeper (NtK)—which constitutes the formal issuance of the parking charge—was in fact issued on 23/12/2021.
30. This is a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts, as the NtK is the formal notice that initiates enforcement action against the Registered Keeper. The Claimant’s assertion that the charge was "issued" on 18/12/2021 is demonstrably false, and it is unclear whether this is due to gross negligence or an intentional attempt to mislead the court.
31. This mendacious statement was also included in the Particulars of Claim, meaning that the Claimant has knowingly submitted incorrect information at multiple stages of these proceedings. This is a blatant breach of CPR 16.4, which requires the Claimant to provide a concise and accurate statement of the facts upon which they rely.
32. Given that the Claimant’s own documentary evidence contradicts their Witness Statement and Particulars of Claim, it is clear that the statements made by their witness are unreliable and untrustworthy. This further supports the contention that the Claimant’s case is based on procedural defects, misrepresentations, and abuse of process.
33. The Claimant’s Witness Statement at paragraph 8 asserts that their client has a valid contract with the landowner that authorises them to issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) at the location. However, the contract provided in Exhibit 1 is so heavily redacted that it is meaningless and constitutes a clear abuse of process.
34. The document is so extensively redacted that it fails to confirm the identity of the contracting parties, the date of the agreement, the scope of authority granted, or even the names, positions, and authority of the signatories. The absence of this key information means the Claimant has provided no admissible evidence that they have landowner authority, which is a fundamental requirement for bringing this claim.
35. This excessive redaction contravenes the principles set out in CPR 31.6, which requires disclosure of documents that are relied upon in proceedings. The Claimant has failed to provide an unredacted contract, meaning there is no verifiable evidence that they have the locus standi to pursue this claim.
36. The Claimant is required to prove that it has the necessary authority from the landowner to issue and enforce PCNs. This principle was confirmed in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1338, where the Court of Appeal made it clear that a parking operator must have clear landowner authority to enforce parking charges. The contract they have provided is so heavily redacted that it is impossible to verify whether they have such authority, making their evidence wholly unreliable.
37. The Claimant has failed to meet these basic requirements. The redacted contract does not allow myself or the court to verify that the Claimant has the right to operate at the site, issue charges, or pursue legal action in its own name. The Court of Appeal in ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1338 made it clear that a parking operator must have clear landowner authority to enforce parking charges.
38. The level of redaction in Exhibit 1 is wholly unreasonable. The security services disclose less heavily redacted documents under the Official Secrets Act than what the Claimant has submitted here. It is entirely improper for the Claimant to expect the court to accept such an incomplete and unverified document as evidence of their legal standing.
39. Given that the Claimant has failed to comply with CPR 31.6, Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5, and the principles established in case law, I submit that this claim should be dismissed in its entirety due to the Claimant’s failure to provide fundamental evidence to support their claim.
40. If the Claimant has provided the court with an unredacted version of the contract but has only disclosed a heavily redacted version to me as the Defendant, this abuse of process is even more acute. The Claimant cannot selectively disclose evidence to the court while deliberately withholding key contractual information from the Defendant. This would be a clear breach of the principles of fairness and transparency in legal proceedings, as well as a violation of CPR 31.14, which entitles a party to inspect a document that is mentioned in a statement of case.
42. The Claimant's refusal to disclose an unredacted contract to me suggests that either (a) the contract does not contain the necessary authority for them to issue PCNs and pursue legal action, or (b) they are attempting to gain an unfair procedural advantage by restricting my ability to scrutinise the alleged agreement. Either scenario is an abuse of process that should not be tolerated by the court.
42. In light of the above, I submit that the Claimant has failed to establish that it has landowner authority, has engaged in procedural misconduct, and that this claim should be dismissed in its entirety.
43. The Claimant’s Witness Statement at paragraph 9 states, "I am advised by the Claimant, that the Landowner Agreement has been extended by mutual consent of the parties." This statement is purely hearsay and provides no actual evidence that a valid contract was in force at the time of the alleged contravention.
44. The witness admits that they have been "advised" by the Claimant, rather than asserting first-hand knowledge of the contract’s validity or duration. This further demonstrates that the witness is not a direct representative of the landowner or a party to the alleged agreement and has no authority to attest to its terms.
45. The Claimant has failed to provide any documentary evidence proving that the contract was valid on the date of the alleged contravention. The heavily redacted contract in Exhibit 1 contains no visible date, term length, renewal clauses, or signatory details, meaning the Claimant has provided no proof that it was in force at the relevant time.
46. The absence of any dated, signed, and verifiable evidence showing that the contract was active at the time of the alleged contravention means the Claimant has failed to establish its legal standing to issue or enforce PCNs at this site. Without such proof, the claim cannot succeed.
47. In the claimants witness statement at paragraph 9, the Claimant’s reliance on One Parking Solution Ltd v Wilshaw [2021] is misleading. That case does not establish a general rule that landowner authority is irrelevant, nor does it override the requirement for a Claimant to prove its legal standing when challenged.
48. In Wilshaw, the operator’s landowner authority was not disputed, whereas in this case, the Claimant’s own redacted and undated contract raises serious doubts about whether they had authority to issue PCNs at the time of the alleged contravention. The Claimant cannot rely on Wilshaw to bypass the need to prove its standing where it has been actively challenged.
49. The Claimant has failed to provide clear, unredacted evidence that it had authority to operate at the site on the relevant date. Without such proof, no valid contract with the Defendant could have existed, and the claim must fail.
50. I deny the Claimant’s assertions in paragraphs 11 to 16 of their Witness Statement regarding the alleged contract. I did not knowingly agree to any contract with the Claimant, nor did I breach any stated terms.
51. I attempted to pay for parking at the site but was unable to increase the duration of stay due to what I believe was a fault with the payment machine. The machines were also positioned in a poorly lit area, and at 9 PM in December, visibility was extremely poor. I could barely see what I was pressing, which made it difficult to ensure that the correct payment had been made.
52. The fundamental basis of a contract is mutual agreement, which requires a clear offer and unambiguous acceptance. Given that the signage was already incapable of forming a contract, as previously discussed, and that the payment process was hindered by external factors beyond my control, no legally binding agreement could have been formed.
53. The Claimant has provided no evidence that the payment machine was functioning correctly at the time or that it was sufficiently illuminated for drivers to reasonably interact with it. Without proof that a valid contract was entered into, the claim cannot succeed.
54. The Claimant’s Witness Statement, under the section titled "Defendant’s Liability", covering paragraphs 17 to 20, contains further breaches of both the BPA Code of Practice (CoP) and the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012.
55. In paragraph 17, the Claimant’s witness falsely states that "Pursuant to the Contract; the Driver was liable to pay the Parking Charge within 28 days of issue." This is incorrect and contradicts both the BPA CoP and PoFA.
56. The BPA CoP, section 21.11, explicitly states that the Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not impose immediate liability on the keeper but serves three purposes:
• It invites the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charge.
• It invites the keeper to identify the driver if they were not the driver.
• It starts the 28-day period after which the keeper may become liable, but only if the operator fully complies with PoFA.
57. The BPA CoP, section 21.12, further confirms that an effective Notice to Keeper must meet the requirements of PoFA Schedule 4. The Claimant’s witness has completely misstated the legal position, as PoFA does not make the driver or keeper liable within 28 days of "issue", but instead follows the specific statutory timelines set out in Schedule 4.
58. PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 9(2)(f) states that the 28-day period begins from the day after that on which the notice is "given", not from the date of issue.
59. PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 9(6) then defines when a notice is "given." A notice sent by post is presumed to have been delivered on the second working day after it was posted, unless the contrary is proved. For these purposes, a "working day" excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays in England and Wales.
60. This position was later reinforced in the latest BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, section 8.1.2(e), which states that the recipient has 28 days to appeal from the date of "receipt", not from the date of issue.
61. The Claimant’s witness, who has already demonstrated a lack of direct knowledge of the facts, is once again making false statements that contradict the statutory framework of PoFA and the BPA CoP. These errors, whether due to negligence or an intentional attempt to misrepresent the facts, render the Claimant’s Witness Statement unreliable and untrustworthy.
62. Given that the Claimant’s witness has now provided multiple contradictory and misleading statements, their entire testimony should be treated with significant doubt, and the claim itself must be called into question.
63. The Claimant’s Witness Statement, under the sections titled "Defence" and "Amount Claimed", covering paragraphs 21 to 32, contains procedural failings, misrepresentations of case law, and an unjustified attempt to add additional charges.
64. The Claimant asserts that I was afforded a 28-day appeal period but failed to engage with it. However, my decision not to engage in a process I had no legal obligation to undertake has no bearing on my liability. The appeals process run by private parking operators is not a legal requirement and does not override my legal rights.
65. The Claimant further argues that I had the opportunity to challenge the charge after receiving debt collection letters and a Letter of Claim. This is irrelevant. The Claimant cannot rely on the Defendant’s refusal to engage with what is widely known to be an unregulated and biased appeals process as an admission of liability. The Independent Appeals Service (IAS), the appeal body associated with IPC operators, has been criticised for its lack of impartiality, and even POPLA, the BPA’s appeals service, is limited in its remit. The fact that an individual chooses to defend a claim in court rather than engaging with an unregulated, self-serving system is not an admission of liability.
66. The Claimant asserts that I breached the contract by overstaying the paid parking period. However, as previously stated, I made a reasonable attempt to comply with the alleged terms but was prevented from doing so due to a faulty payment machine and inadequate lighting at the time of payment. If a parking operator provides a system that does not function properly and prevents customers from paying the required fee, liability cannot be imposed on the motorist.
67. The Claimant relies on Exhibit 2 to prove that I entered into a contract. However, I have already demonstrated that their signage fails to meet the standards required to form a legally binding contract. The terms of the contract were not sufficiently brought to the driver’s attention, and the charge for breach was buried in a block of small, unreadable text, breaching the principles of "prominent and transparent" contract terms as established in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. Additionally, the Claimant has failed to provide evidence of a compliant entrance sign, in direct breach of BPA Code of Practice (v8) Section 19.2, which requires that clear entrance signs be in place to notify motorists that a parking contract is in effect.
68. The Claimant attempts to justify the inadequacy of their Particulars of Claim (PoC) by referring to Practice Direction 7C, Section 5.2(1) and 5.2A. However, while these rules allow for brief particulars of claim in money claims, they do not exempt the Claimant from the requirements of CPR 16.4. The Claimant had the opportunity to submit further and better particulars after the Defence was filed but chose not to do so. The burden is on the Claimant to ensure their PoC are compliant from the outset. I, as the Defendant, am not obligated to correct the Claimant’s defective pleadings, nor does a failure to make an application to strike out prevent me from relying on the PoC’s deficiencies in their Defence.
69. The Claimant asserts that the £100 parking charge is justified under Beavis as falling within an accepted range of charges. However, Beavis involved a free stay car park, where the charge was upheld as a deterrent. In a pay-and-display car park, the operator is expected to charge in proportion to actual loss or operational costs. The Claimant has provided no breakdown of their costs to justify this amount in a pay-and-display setting.
70. The Claimant then attempts to justify an additional £70 charge as a contractual cost, citing signage terms that allegedly state that extra charges will be incurred if payment is not made. However, there is no such provision in the signage evidence provided by the Claimant. The terms are buried in a block of small, unreadable text, which does not meet the "prominent and transparent" standard set out in Beavis.
71. The Claimant asserts that debt recovery costs are separate from operational costs and are therefore recoverable. However, the Supreme Court in Beavis made it clear that the parking charge itself must cover all operational costs, including debt recovery. At paragraph 98 of Beavis, Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption stated:
"The charge has to be large enough to provide an incentive to comply but not so large as to be unconscionable. It also covers the cost of running the scheme, including the cost of chasing late payments."
72. Similarly, at paragraph 193, Lord Hodge confirmed:
"The amount payable under the scheme includes the cost of operating the scheme and recovering the charges from those who refuse to pay. That is in the nature of a scheme which charges a deterrent sum, rather than a sum based exclusively on loss suffered."
73. These statements confirm that debt recovery costs are already included in the parking charge itself and should not be added separately. The Claimant’s attempt to impose an extra £70 is an abuse of process, as it seeks to recover an amount that has already been accounted for in the initial parking charge.
74. The Claimant attempts to justify the additional £70 charge by citing Chaplair Ltd v Kumari [2015] EWCA Civ 798, claiming it allows contractual indemnity costs. However, this is a misrepresentation of the case. Chaplair involved a tenancy agreement with an explicit indemnity clause, which is entirely distinct from a private parking charge.
75. Parking charge cases do not follow Chaplair, but rather Beavis, which does not permit additional charges beyond the core parking charge. This has been confirmed in Excel Parking v Wilkinson [2023] and Britannia Parking v Semark-Jullien [2020], where the courts have struck out such additional charges as an abuse of process.
76. The Claimant further attempts to reserve the right to claim additional costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g), suggesting that the Defendant has acted unreasonably. However, it is the Claimant who has acted unreasonably by:
• Failing to provide adequate Particulars of Claim in breach of CPR 16.4.
• Failing to provide an unredacted contract to prove landowner authority.
• Misrepresenting PoFA compliance regarding keeper liability.
• Falsely asserting that additional costs are recoverable despite clear Supreme Court and County Court judgments ruling otherwise.
77. If any party has acted unreasonably, it is the Claimant in bringing a claim riddled with procedural defects, misrepresentations, and excessive charges. The abuse of process in attempting to add the £70 charge alone is grounds for the court to dismiss the claim or strike out the additional sum.
78. Given that the Supreme Court in Beavis has already determined that debt recovery costs are incorporated into the parking charge, and given that lower courts have repeatedly ruled that the addition of arbitrary sums such as £70 is an abuse of process, I submit that the court should strike out the added charge as an unrecoverable sum.
79. In light of the above, I submit that:
(a) The additional £70 charge must be struck out as an abuse of process.
(b) The Claimant’s attempt to rely on Chaplair v Kumari is wholly irrelevant.
(c) The claim is procedurally and substantively flawed, and the court is invited to dismiss it in its entirety.
80. The Claimant’s Witness Statement concludes with an assertion that my Defence is "entirely without merit" and requests that it be struck out. This is a baseless and presumptive statement that disregards the multiple procedural failings, misrepresentations, and legal deficiencies in the Claimant’s case that I have demonstrated throughout this Witness Statement.
81. The Claimant’s witness, Sarah Jennifer Helena Ensall, states that she "may not be able to attend the hearing" and that an advocate will attend on her behalf under CPR 27.9. However, this is a misuse of CPR 27.9, which specifically governs hearings where neither the party nor their representative appears in person. CPR 27.9(1) states that if a party does not attend a hearing, they may rely on their written representations only if they have given notice to the court and to me no later than seven days before the hearing and have filed and served all documents on which they intend to rely.
82. The key limitation of CPR 27.9 is that the party choosing not to attend is restricted to relying on their written statement and may not introduce new arguments or evidence via an advocate. If no representative of Euro Car Parks is physically present, I submit that their advocate must not be allowed to make submissions or introduce any further arguments beyond the contents of the Witness Statement. The advocate cannot cross-examine me or argue points beyond what is already written. If an advocate attempts to introduce new material, I will object on the basis that this breaches CPR 27.9.
83. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the witness has any direct knowledge of the alleged contravention, and the Witness Statement itself consists largely of hearsay. If the Claimant does not produce a genuinely informed representative who can be cross-examined, then I submit that the court should give little to no weight to the Witness Statement and dismiss the claim.
84. The Claimant also seeks to recover the advocate’s fee for attending the hearing, which is another procedural overreach. Given that this is a small claims track case, I submit that costs are strictly limited under CPR 27.14. The attendance of an advocate is not a recoverable cost, and this request should be dismissed.
85. In light of this, if no Euro Car Parks representative is physically present, their advocate must not be permitted to introduce new arguments beyond the Witness Statement, and any attempt by the advocate to cross-examine me or make oral submissions beyond the Witness Statement should be challenged as a breach of CPR 27.9. The advocate’s fee must not be awarded, as it is not a recoverable cost under CPR 27.14. Given the serious procedural defects, misrepresentations, and abuse of process in this case, I respectfully request that the claim be dismissed in its entirety.
b]Statement of truth[/b]
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
