OP, what is your deadline for submitting your WS? I suggest it is not submitted until very near the deadline. It has to be submitted to your local court and should be done by email, preferably. If sending by email, it cannot be more than 25 double sided A4 pages (50 single sides) and should be 25Mb or less.
You will also need to address the email to DCB Legal and CC in yourself.
Which court is the hearing scheduled to be heard at?
There is only one evidential item to exhibit... the bank statement that shows the payment made on 03/06/2021 and should be marked as XX01. Just change the "XX" to your initials. Also edit the reference to is in the WS at paragraph 51.
OK... here is my final draft suggestion for the WS. Comments and suggestions welcomed.
IN THE COUNTY COURT
Claim No: [Claim Number]
BETWEEN:
Euro Car Parks Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
WITNESS STATEMENT
1. I, [Defendant’s Full Name], am the Defendant in this claim and make this statement in support of my defence. The facts in this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Preliminary Matter
2. I submit that the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim were inadequately pleaded from the outset and failed to comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5.
3. The Claimant had an obligation to properly particularise its claim at the time of issuing proceedings but failed to:
(a) Set out the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions of the contract (or contracts) relied upon.
(b) Adequately explain how the terms of the alleged contract were incorporated or why the Defendant is said to be in breach.
(c) Clearly distinguish whether the claim is brought against the Defendant as the driver or the keeper.
4. The Claimant's Witness Statement now seeks to introduce details that were absent from the original claim. However, this does not cure the fact that the claim, as pleaded, was defective and non-compliant with CPR 16.4.
5. The court should not accept the Claimant’s attempt to roll back its liability for failing to plead the claim properly in the first instance. The court should not accept the Claimant’s attempt to roll back its liability for failing to plead the claim properly in the first instance. A Witness Statement cannot replace properly pleaded Particulars of Claim and does not remedy the Claimant’s failure to comply with the CPR.
6. The Claimant, represented by bulk litigation solicitors, is a serial litigant and should be fully aware of its obligations under the CPR. Its failure to comply with basic procedural requirements is unreasonable and amounts to an abuse of process.
7. The Particulars of Claim do not comply with CPR 16.4 because:
(a) They do not set out the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions relied upon.
(b) They do not adequately set out the reason (or reasons) why the Claimant asserts that the Defendant was in breach of contract.
(c) They fail to state what proportion of the claim is the original parking charge and what proportion is alleged damages or additional costs.
(d) They do not explain how the claim for statutory interest is calculated or from what date it is said to have accrued.
8. Even in its Witness Statement, the Claimant fails to correct these deficiencies. Despite having an opportunity to clarify its position, it provides no breakdown of its claim or explanation for additional charges beyond the original parking fee.
9. The Civil Procedure Rules exist to ensure that claims are properly pleaded so that the overriding objective is achieved. The Claimant, however, is renowned for abusing the court process, filing large volumes of vexatious claims with little regard for compliance with the CPR.
10. The Claimant should have complied with CPR 16.4 from the outset; its late Witness Statement does not excuse this failure. The Claimant’s approach to litigation is unfair, unreasonable, and an abuse of process.
11. There are also procedural irregularities with the Claimant’s Witness Statement, which has been made by Sarah Jennifer Helena Ensall, an employee of DCB Legal Limited, rather than by the Claimant or an authorised representative of the Claimant.
12. Ms. Ensall does not state that she is a solicitor or that she is acting under a solicitor’s instruction. Her title, 'Head of Bulk Litigation,' is not a legal qualification and does not confer authority to act on the Claimant’s behalf without explicit evidence of authorisation.
13. In her Witness Statement, Ms. Ensall states:
(a) "I am duly authorised to make this statement on the Claimant’s behalf."
(b) However, she provides no evidence of such authorisation, nor does the Claimant itself confirm that she is acting under its instructions.
14. The Civil Procedure Rules require that a witness statement must be based on personal knowledge unless it is made as hearsay evidence under CPR 32.2(1). Ms. Ensall does not have first-hand knowledge of the alleged parking event, the signage, or the contractual arrangements between the Claimant and the landowner.
15. Her statement relies on second-hand information and is therefore hearsay, which the court may give little or no weight to. If the Claimant intended to rely on evidence, it should have been provided by an individual with direct involvement, such as an employee of the Claimant or a representative of the landowner.
16. The Claimant’s failure to produce a proper witness statement from a relevant party further undermines the credibility of its case. The use of a bulk litigation employee to present evidence raises concerns about the accuracy and reliability of the statements made, particularly where they concern matters of fact rather than legal argument.
17. Given these fundamental procedural issues, I respectfully invite the Court to strike out the claim in its entirety. In the alternative, if the claim is not struck out, I submit that the Witness Statement of Sarah Jennifer Helena Ensall should be disregarded or given little to no weight, as it is largely hearsay and lacks first-hand knowledge of the material facts. While she states that she is "duly authorised to make this statement on the Claimant’s behalf," no evidence has been provided to demonstrate the basis or scope of this authorisation. It is unclear whether she has specific authorisation for this claim or is relying on a general contractual arrangement between her employer and the Claimant.
Further rebuttal of the claimants Witness Statement
18. At the time of filing my Defence, I was unable to respond substantively to the Claimant’s allegations due to the inadequacy of the Particulars of Claim. The claim was so poorly pleaded that it did not contain sufficient details for me to understand the precise basis of the claim, the contractual terms relied upon, or how the alleged breach was said to have occurred.
19. The Claimant has now provided further details in their Witness Statement, including evidence that was not disclosed at the time of filing the claim. Having now had the opportunity to review this material, I am able to address and rebut specific points raised.
20. The passage of time—nearly four years since the alleged contravention—means that I would not have been able to recall the precise details of the event without first seeing the evidence on which the Claimant relies. Now that the Claimant has provided their version of events, I am in a position to comment on and challenge their assertions where necessary.
21. I maintain that the Claimant’s failure to properly plead their case from the outset was unreasonable, and I do not accept that they should be permitted to retrospectively cure these defects by introducing new material at the witness statement stage. However, for the avoidance of doubt, I will now respond to the substantive points raised in the Claimant’s Witness Statement.
Systematic Misrepresentation of PCN Issue Dates
22. A Parking Charge Notice (PCN) cannot be issued twice—it is either issued on the date it is created or not at all. However, the Claimant falsely asserts in paragraph 7 of their Witness Statement that the PCN was "issued" on 03/06/2021, which is factually impossible.
23. The process of obtaining registered keeper details from the DVLA is not instantaneous. The Claimant must first process the ANPR data, prepare the request, and submit it to the DVLA, which then responds with the keeper’s details. This process typically takes at least 24 hours, and often longer, depending on weekends, bank holidays, and processing times.
24. This sequence of events makes it physically impossible for the PCN to have been issued on 03/06/2021, as the Claimant would not have known who the registered keeper was at that time. The earliest possible issue date would have been at least the following day, if not later.
25. The only scenario in which a PCN could be "issued" on the same date as the alleged contravention is if it was a Notice to Driver (NtD) affixed to the vehicle’s windscreen by a parking attendant. That did not happen in this case, and the Claimant does not suggest otherwise. The Claimant’s enforcement method—ANPR cameras—precludes the possibility of same-day issuance.
26. Despite this, paragraph 7 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement falsely repeats the misleading assertion that the PCN was "issued" on 03/06/2021. This is demonstrably untrue, as the Claimant’s own Notice to Keeper (NtK), provided in their evidence, confirms it was actually issued on 08/06/2021.
27. The Claimant’s legal representatives at DCB Legal must be fully aware of this fact, yet they continue to misstate the issue date in every claim they file. Given that the signatory of the Statement of Truth on the claim and the Witness Statement, Sarah Ensall, is also Head of Bulk Litigation at DCB Legal, she cannot claim ignorance of this issue.
28. The repeated use of incorrect issue dates in both the Particulars of Claim and the Witness Statement is misleading, creates procedural uncertainty, and undermines the credibility of the Claimant’s case. The court is invited to take particular note of this misrepresentation, as it is not an isolated error but a pattern of conduct across multiple cases issued by DCB Legal.
Non-Official Copy of the Land Registry Title
29. In paragraph 8 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement, the Claimant asserts that it was the landowner at the time of the alleged contravention and relies on Exhibit 1, a copy of the Land Registry title, to support this claim. However, the document itself explicitly states:
“This copy is not an 'Official Copy' of the register. An official copy of the register is admissible in evidence in a court to the same extent as the original.”
30. The Claimant has therefore failed to provide the highest evidential standard of proof of ownership. The authenticity of this document is open to challenge under CPR 32.19, and the Claimant should be required to produce an Official Copy of the Land Registry title, which can be obtained from HM Land Registry for a nominal fee.
31. Additionally, the document was last updated on 29 June 2018, meaning it does not confirm that the Claimant was still the landowner at the time of the alleged contravention in 2021. The Claimant has not provided a more recent update or a full transfer history of the land to bridge this gap in time.
32. The Land Registry document in Exhibit 1 states that the land is subject to rights reserved by a Transfer dated 13 January 2009, involving Ing (UK) Listed Real Estate Nominee (No. 1) Limited, Ing (UK) Listed Real Estate Nominee (No. 2) Limited, and Euro Car Parks (Management) Limited.
33. The Claimant has not disclosed the full details of these reserved rights, which may include restrictions or conditions on their authority to enforce parking charges. If the previous landowner imposed any contractual or statutory limitations, the Claimant must provide full disclosure of the transfer agreement to demonstrate that no such limitations exist.
34. Without evidence that these reserved rights do not interfere with the Claimant’s parking enforcement, the Claimant has not fully established its standing to bring this claim.
35. The Claimant has provided a redacted version of the Land Registry document in Exhibit 1, with the stated justification that the redactions were necessary to protect "privileged information between them and their Client," as stated in paragraph 8 of their Witness Statement.
36. This justification is misleading because Land Registry documents are publicly available for a small fee. Any member of the public can obtain an unredacted Official Copy. There is no legal or procedural basis for the Claimant to withhold any portion of this document, particularly as it is being relied upon in litigation.
37. Furthermore, the Claimant has asserted in paragraph 8 of their Witness Statement that they are the landowner. If this is true, then who is the “Client” they are referring to? The Claimant has not explained the involvement of any third party. If the Claimant is merely acting on behalf of another entity, they must provide full disclosure of the contractual arrangement that confers enforcement rights upon them.
38. The Claimant’s use of redactions, provision of an incomplete document, and contradictory statements about their authority create uncertainty as to whether they have the necessary standing to enforce this charge. The court is invited to require the Claimant to produce an unredacted, Official Copy of the Land Registry title, as well as any agreements that grant them enforcement rights.
No contract could be formed with the driver
39. In paragraph 9 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement, the Claimant states that they were prominently displaying signs that formed the basis of the contract. However, none of the evidential photos provided by the Claimant show any sign that contains the terms they claim were in effect. The Claimant has failed to provide any photograph of a sign that states "24 HOUR PAY & DISPLAY" or "UP TO 3 HOURS £1.50."
40. The Claimant has also not provided any signage that clearly states the £100 parking charge for breaching the terms. In a contractual claim, the alleged contractual terms must be clearly displayed and accessible to the driver at the time of parking. The absence of any such evidence raises serious doubts about whether the alleged contractual terms were ever sufficiently brought to the driver’s attention.
41. Out of the five photos provided as “evidence,” three simply show a payment machine, all of which are dated after the alleged contravention. The other two images show an entrance sign, which does not contain any terms at all, but instead states, "Terms & Conditions apply. See signage in car park for full details."
42. In paragraph 12 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement, the Claimant asserts that "The Contract provides that a Charge is payable by the driver upon breach, with payment falling due within 28 days." However, nowhere in the signage exhibited by the Claimant does this term appear. If this was a genuine term of the alleged contract, it must have been clearly displayed to the driver before they parked, yet the Claimant has failed to evidence this.
43. Furthermore, the wording on the signage shown is minuscule and barely readable, raising serious concerns about whether the terms were adequately communicated to motorists. Under contract law, for terms to be enforceable, they must be clearly brought to the attention of the party before agreement is formed.
44. Given the lack of any evidence that the alleged terms were displayed at the material time, the Defendant submits that the Claimant has failed to establish that a contract was ever formed between the driver and the Claimant. Accordingly, this claim has no contractual basis and must fail.
Failure of the Claimant to comply with PoFA 2012. No keeper liability
45. The failure in PoFA compliance is that the Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not invite me, as the keeper, to pay the charge, as required under Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). Instead, the NtK merely states that the driver is liable and instructs me to either pass the notice to the driver or provide the driver’s details.
PoFA is unequivocal in its requirements. Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) states that the notice must:
46. "State that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper—
(i) to pay the unpaid parking charges; or
(ii) if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice on to the driver."
47. This requirement is explicit, and the invitation to pay is a specific statutory obligation, not an implied one. The NtK issued by the Claimant fails to meet this requirement because it does not invite me, as the keeper, to pay the charge. Instead, it merely states that the driver is required to pay the charge and that if I was not the driver, I should provide the driver's details.
48. The law’s intention is to ensure that the keeper’s responsibilities are clear and unambiguous. The requirement for an explicit invitation to pay ensures that I, as the keeper, am given a direct choice between paying the charge and identifying the driver. The Claimant’s NtK does not contain any such invitation, meaning that it does not comply with the statutory wording requirements of PoFA.
49. The Claimant may attempt to argue that an invitation to pay is implied because the notice is addressed to me. However, this does not satisfy the strict wording requirements of PoFA. The law does not allow for implied obligations in this context; it requires full and precise compliance. By failing to provide the necessary invitation to pay, the Claimant has not met the statutory conditions required to hold me liable as the keeper.
50. Since compliance with PoFA is mandatory for the transfer of liability from the driver to the keeper, the Claimant’s failure to meet this requirement means that they cannot lawfully pursue me as the keeper. This fundamental statutory failure renders their claim against me baseless in law.
The Claimant appears to suggest that because I have not identified the driver, it is reasonable to infer that I was the driver. However, there is no legal obligation upon the keeper to identify the driver. The Claimant must prove its case on the balance of probabilities and cannot simply rely on an absence of information to shift the burden onto me.
51. If the Claimant cannot rely on PoFA to establish keeper liability, then it cannot automatically infer that the keeper was also the driver. This position is well supported by persuasive appellate case law, including VCS v Edward (2023) [H0KF6C9C], in which HHJ Gargan confirmed that the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 was enacted precisely because liability could not otherwise be established against the keeper. In paragraph 35 of the judgment, HHJ Gargan explicitly rejected the notion that the court should impose a duty on the keeper to identify the driver, holding that there is no presumption in law that the registered keeper was the driver. The full transcript of this decision is provided as Exhibit XX01.
52. The Claimant cannot sidestep its evidential burden by making unsupported assertions or seeking to imply legal obligations that do not exist. The fact remains that the burden of proof is entirely on the Claimant, and in the absence of PoFA compliance, they have failed to establish any lawful basis to pursue me as the keeper.
Rebuttal to Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement
53. In paragraph 21 of the Claimant's Witness Statement, the Claimant asserts that I have filed a "widely available templated Defence" rather than addressing substantive issues, implying that my Defence is disingenuous and a waste of the Court’s time. I respectfully submit that this assertion is both incorrect and misleading.
54. The Claimant has provided no evidence to support the claim that my Defence is "widely available," nor have they explained how they came to this conclusion. This statement is therefore speculative and should be treated as such. Given that this Witness Statement is signed under a Statement of Truth, it is inappropriate for the Claimant’s witness to make such an assertion without any supporting evidence. The Claimant cannot simply dismiss my Defence as "templated" in an attempt to undermine its validity while failing to acknowledge the numerous deficiencies in their own Particulars of Claim and evidence.
55. My Defence is a direct response to the fact that the Particulars of Claim provided by the Claimant were wholly deficient and failed to comply with the requirements of CPR 16.4. The Claimant relies on Practice Direction 7C to excuse their failure to provide detailed and compliant Particulars, yet fails to acknowledge that even within the constraints of PD 7C, the Claimant is still required to provide sufficient detail to allow a Defendant to understand the claim against them. In this case, the Claimant’s vague and generic PoC did not allow me to do so.
56. The Claimant further suggests that I could have submitted an Application to the Court regarding the inadequate Particulars. However, it is not incumbent upon a Defendant to correct a Claimant’s procedural failings at their own expense. The onus is on the Claimant to issue a properly pleaded claim in the first instance. The failure to do so has placed me at a disadvantage, as I was required to submit a Defence without any meaningful particulars of the alleged breach.
57. Furthermore, the Claimant’s reliance on CPR 1 to argue that they have acted proportionately is misplaced. The overriding objective requires both parties to act fairly and ensure that cases are dealt with justly. It is not proportionate or just for a Claimant to issue deficient Particulars and then criticise the Defendant for challenging their non-compliance.
58. The Claimant cannot now argue that their inadequate PoC is excusable simply because I have pointed out their procedural failings. The reality is that their lack of compliance with CPR 16.4 has hindered my ability to respond in any meaningful way beyond disputing the receipt of prior communication and highlighting their errors. Any suggestion that I have not suffered prejudice as a result is wholly without merit.
59. I respectfully request that the Court takes this into account when considering the Claimant’s conduct and the impact it has had on my ability to defend this claim.
Unlawful Debt Recovery Charges
60. In paragraph 27 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement, the Claimant asserts that the £70 debt recovery charge is a separate and recoverable cost. However, this contradicts the Supreme Court ruling in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, which confirmed that enforcement costs are included within the parking charge itself.
61. The Supreme Court justices made it clear that the parking charge itself was set at a level to include the costs of enforcement and debt recovery. Paragraph 98 of the Beavis judgment states:
62. "The charge is set at a level which enables the manager to recover the costs of operating the scheme. These include the costs of construction, maintenance and enforcement. They also include the costs of chasing up non-payers."
63. This passage confirms that the Supreme Court recognised that the costs of pursuing unpaid charges were already incorporated into the parking charge itself. The judges explicitly stated that these costs were considered as part of the business model of the parking operator.
64. The Claimant’s attempt to impose an additional £70 debt recovery fee is therefore an attempt at double recovery, as it seeks to reclaim enforcement costs separately when the Beavis ruling confirms that such costs were already accounted for within the PCN charge.
65. The Claimant’s misrepresentation of Beavis is particularly concerning given that Beavis is the most widely cited authority in private parking claims. The Supreme Court’s decision remains binding, and its findings on the composition of parking charges cannot be ignored or reinterpreted to suit the Claimant’s financial gain.
66. Furthermore, the Claimant has failed to provide any evidence that this additional charge was genuinely incurred, nor have they demonstrated that it represents a contractual loss. In reality, this charge is arbitrary and artificially inflated, designed to penalise motorists rather than compensate for a genuine cost.
67. This position is further supported by the Private Parking Code of Practice: Draft Impact Assessment, published by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) on 30 July 2023. This document was released alongside a call for evidence on parking charges and debt recovery fees, which ran until 8 October 2023.
68. The DLUHC report highlighted that the actual unit cost per successful debt recovery was estimated at only £8.42, meaning that the then-current cap of £70 was disproportionate to the actual costs incurred. This publication is part of the government’s ongoing effort to regulate the private parking industry under the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019, which aims to ensure fair and proportionate enforcement practices.
69. Given that even the government’s own assessment has identified the disproportionate nature of these fees, the Claimant’s attempt to recover an inflated £70 charge is wholly unreasonable and should be rejected by the court.
70. The court is invited to strike out the £70 debt recovery charge as it is not a legitimate recoverable cost under the contractual framework set out in Beavis (2015). The Claimant’s reliance on this additional charge is an abuse of process, and their attempt to mislead the court on this point should be noted when assessing the overall credibility of their case.
Conclusion
71. The Claimant has failed to properly particularise their claim from the outset, breaching CPR 16.4 and placing me at a disadvantage when drafting my Defence. Their Witness Statement attempts to retrospectively cure these defects, but this does not remedy the procedural non-compliance at the time of issuing the claim.
72. The Claimant’s representative, Sarah Ensall, is not a genuine witness to any of the facts of this case, and her statement is entirely hearsay. She is merely an employee of the Claimant’s bulk litigation firm, signing statements in support of hundreds, if not thousands, of similar claims without any personal knowledge of the matters at hand. Her evidence should therefore be given little to no weight.
73. The Claimant’s attempt to justify their £70 debt recovery charge contradicts the Supreme Court ruling in Beavis (2015), which confirmed that enforcement costs were already accounted for within the parking charge itself. Additionally, the DLUHC’s 2023 Draft Impact Assessment has highlighted that the true unit cost per successful debt recovery is around £8.42, demonstrating that the Claimant’s charge is excessive and a clear attempt at double recovery.
74. The Claimant’s request for an advocate’s fee is an abuse of process, as such costs are not recoverable in the small claims track under CPR 27.14(2) unless unreasonable conduct is found. Given the Claimant’s poorly pleaded claim, procedural non-compliance, misleading legal arguments, and excessive charges, it is the Claimant, not the Defendant, who has acted unreasonably.
75. Given the fundamental deficiencies in the Claimant’s case, their misrepresentation of legal authority, and their unreasonable conduct, I request that this claim be dismissed in its entirety.
Statement of Truth
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
