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Good Morning All,

I have duly appealled to POPLA and submitted the evidence given in this forum. I have not had a reply from POPLA stating that MET Parking have provided evidence and for me to reply (within 7 Days):

Below is the reply from MET and attached is the evidence pack - it is a little lenghtly so I do apologise.

Evidence Pack is here: https://1drv.ms/b/c/b4c4dc171574f6e5/EUQ1g0zDr5hJgVI5Sx_mjs8BtBOu_8QpnA2g5akPIcyY0A?e=3MdGPU

Reply from MET Parking:

"Operator Name
MET Parking Services - EW
Operator Case Summary
In the appeal to POPLA Mr XXXX raises the following grounds for appeal: • No keeper liability As we have not been provided with the name and address of the driver of the vehicle, we are pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Please see our compliant Notice to Keeper in Section B of our evidence pack. Please also see a full explanation of why we may pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012 in Section C of our evidence pack. As stated in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Relevant Land is any land that is not a) a highway maintainable at the public expense, b) a parking place which is provided or controlled by a traffic authority, or c) any land excepting the aforementioned on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control. Paragraph 3 subsection 3 states that parking is subject to statutory control if any statutory provision imposes a liability in respect of the parking of vehicles on that land. The Stansted Airport byelaws do not impose a penalty for vehicles parking within Southgate Park. We have included in section E of this evidence pack excerpts from the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and also the Airport byelaws. The full airport byelaws may be viewed online at: https://assets.live.dxp.maginfrastructure.com/f/73114/x/46195467c9/stansted-byelaws.pdf In light of this, the site is not excluded by the definitions laid out in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and as such is considered Relevant Land. For the sake of clarity: Southgate Park is a pay-by-phone car park, by definition a place in which to park vehicles. The Stansted Airport byelaws do not impose a liability in respect of parking vehicles within the Southgate Park car park. In light of this we believe the site is not excluded by the definitions laid out in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and as such is considered Relevant Land. We would point out that this was addressed during the initial appeal process. Whilst Mr XXXX may have responded to advise he disagreed with our statement, this does not mean we failed to address his appeal points. • Inadequate evidence of clear and prominent signage We are confident that there are sufficient signs in place in this car park and that the signs are prominently displayed and clearly state the terms and conditions. In Section E of our evidence pack we have included images of the signs in place and a site plan of the location. We are confident that our signage complies with all relevant legislation and regulations. A motorist does not have to have read the terms and conditions of parking to enter into a parking contract, there is only the requirement that the parking operator affords them the opportunity to do so. As stated, we are confident that there is sufficient signage at the site in order to afford motorists the chance to read the terms and conditions that are in place. Upon entry to the site, it is the motorist’s obligation to seek out any terms and conditions that may be in place before choosing to park or remain on site. • Landowner authority We have included a copy of our contract with the landowner in Section E of our evidence pack. We have redacted commercially sensitive details and highlighted relevant clauses for ease of reading. Our contract with the landowner grants us authority to form contracts with motorists and issue parking charge notices for contractual breach. We refer you to the Supreme Court ruling on ParkingEye v Beavis for the judges’ determination on whether a parking operator is acting as an agent or principal. The ruling may be found at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0280-judgment.pdf.darl   Turning to the charge itself: In this instance, the driver had not registered the vehicle for the free parking period. As advised on the signs, only customers are entitled to the free parking period, and they must register their vehicle on arrival. The driver did not make payment for their stay as an alternative and as such the parking charge was issued. In line with F.3(g) of the Appeals Charter, we requested evidence of custom during the initial appeal process (as only customers are entitled to park for free). We received no response to this request and as such the appellant was not entitled to the further discount when the appeal was rejected. PLEASE NOTE: regarding the further reduction of a charge under Annex F, the Sector Single Code of Practice specifically states that ‘in all cases the Appeals Charter would require the motorist to provide the evidence.’. As such, without the appellant providing supporting evidence then there is no requirement for an operator to allow a further reduction. The terms and conditions of parking are clearly stated on the signs that are prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that the car park is for the use of Southgate Park customers only and that to receive the 60-minute maximum free stay for customers, drivers must enter their vehicle registration on arrival. Visitors may extend their stay up to 3 hours by using the pay by phone service. As the evidence we have provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates, the vehicle remained in the car park without being registered for the free parking period and no payment was made as an alternative. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. Therefore, we believe that the charge notice was issued correctly, and the appeal should be refused."

If you could  please let me know how I should reply it would be very much appreciated.

Thanks - Jack

There are plenty of MET Southgate Park POPLA appeals on the forum with advised responses to the rubbish that MET put in their evidence. Just find one of those and copy it. In fact, I just read another successful POPLA appeal for the same location earlier today on here.

The basic fact is that irrespective of what MET say, it is an irrefutable fact that the location is within the Stansted Airport boundary and is therefore land under statutory control. As such, there can be no PoFA liability. Just point that out to the assessor. They've had so many of these that they know it and regularly cancel the PCNs issued at this location as long as the driver is not identified.

There are plenty of MET Southgate Park POPLA appeals on the forum with advised responses to the rubbish that MET put in their evidence. Just find one of those and copy it. In fact, I just read another successful POPLA appeal for the same location earlier today on here.

The basic fact is that irrespective of what MET say, it is an irrefutable fact that the location is within the Stansted Airport boundary and is therefore land under statutory control. As such, there can be no PoFA liability. Just point that out to the assessor. They've had so many of these that they know it and regularly cancel the PCNs issued at this location as long as the driver is not identified.

Hello b789 - Would the following be the post you was refering to, and am I able to use this?

This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.

1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA

The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.

MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.

MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.

Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

2. The location is under statutory control

MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land if the parking of a vehicle on that land is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The Stansted Airport byelaws contain a provision that regulates where vehicles may be parked within the airport boundary. Since the byelaws impose statutory control over parking, this means the location is not relevant land under PoFA.

The airport byelaws do contain a provision stating:

“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”

This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA

MET Parking Services has failed to acknowledge or rebut the official airport boundary map provided in this appeal, which confirms that Southgate Park is within the airport boundary and thus subject to these byelaws. They have also failed to explain why they believe that parking at this location is not subject to statutory control, despite the clear wording of the byelaws.

The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.

MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.

MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’

Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument

The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.

MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.

4. No Keeper liability under PoFA

MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.

MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.

5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice

MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This assumption has no basis in law and contradicts established legal precedent.

The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.

6. Inadequate signage evidence

MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.

The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:

- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance

MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.

7. No obligation to prove customer status

MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.

MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.

Conclusion

- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- They have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- MET has ignored the case law referenced in the appeal, failing to address binding legal principles that refute their position.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.

Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled

Thank You - I have submitted that to POPLA and will update you in due course.

You've got to love MET’s self-defeating moronic argument... they claim airport byelaws don’t apply where Road Traffic Enactments do — but either way, the land is under statutory control and therefore not 'relevant land' for the purposes of PoFA.