https://youtube.com/shorts/NUU8f_LL1o4Even the JCIO do not know that he is a judicial office holder. This is going further.
ETA Register of Appeals
Register kept under Regulation 20 of the Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (London) Regulations 1993, as amended and Regulation 17 of the Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (Representations and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2022.
Case Details
Case reference 2250050555
Appellant Mohammed Miah
Authority London Borough of Bromley
VRM LD19VLO
PCN Details
PCN BY97170086
Contravention date 06 Dec 2024
Contravention time 18:50:00
Contravention location Croydon Road /Eden Road
Penalty amount GBP 130.00
Contravention Entering and stopping in a box junction
Referral date -
Decision Date 30 Apr 2025
Adjudicator Andrew Harman
Appeal decision Appeal refused
Direction Full penalty charge notice amount stated to be paid within 28 days.
Reasons
The appellant's authorised representative, Mr Morgan, attended the video hearing of this appeal on 8 April 2025. The council did not attend the hearing, it not being expected to do so. The hearing was adjourned to give the council an opportunity to respond to the submissions made by Mr Morgan on behalf of the appellant, supported by previous decisions of the adjudicator, which had only very recently been uploaded to the case. Mr Morgan confirmed that he would also be uploading to the case further submissions, on a different point, which I suggested the council may wish to respond to.
The appeal has been listed before me today for determination.
The council has not responded to the adjournment notice.
This is a box junction case.
Mr Morgan argues that this incident amounts to no more than a de minimus breach of the prohibition the council seeks to enforce.
My having viewed the council's video footage of the incident, I am unpersuaded by that submission.
Mr Morgan further submits that the PCN is not compliant, the 28 day day period for the making of representations being misstated therein.
He also submits, by way of collateral challenge, that the statutory grounds as given on the council's website are confusing.
Neither of these submissions raise or fall within a statutory ground of appeal in a box junction case.
That being so, I am not satisfied that I have the power to find in Mr Morgan's favour in respect of either.
I find this contravention proved.
The appeal is refused.
Decision Date 16 Sep 2025
Adjudicator Anthony Chan
Previous decision Appeal refused
Appeal decision Appeal refused
Direction Full penalty charge notice amount stated to be paid within 28 days.
Reasons
This is an application by the Appellant for a review of the adjudicator’s decision. The application was heard over a video link. The Appellant attended as did Mr Morgan who represents the Appellant. The Authority was not represented.
The Notice of Appeal was admirably succinct. The Appellant argued that the stopping in the box junction was de minimus. The Appellant also argued that the PCN was invalid because it stated that:
“Any representations received by the authority outside the 28-day period mentioned above may be disregarded.”
Mr Morgan said, and I accept, that the 28-day period referred to a period commencing with the date of the Notice.
Mr Morgan submits that Schedule 1, para. 1(3) of the 2003 Act provides that the 28-day period commences from the date of service. Therefore, the statement flies in the face of the law.
The appeal was heard on 8 April 2025. Mr Morgan added at the hearing a third point which was that the Authority’s website advised two lists of grounds at least one of which may be incorrect and confusing. Mr Morgan had not provided a screenshot of the page at the appeal or at this application.
The adjudicator adjourned the matter to invite submissions from the Authority. The Authority had not responded.
At the resumed hearing, the adjudicator rejected the submission regarding de minimus, and this was not pursued at the review application. The adjudicator found that neither of the other submissions raised or fall within a statutory ground of appeal in a box junction case. The adjudicator did not think that he had the power to find in Mr Morgan's favour in respect of either. The appeal was refused.
Mr Morgan seeks a review on the basis that the adjudicator “appears to dismiss a collateral challenge from the outset and without making any finding as to the merits of either of his two submissions.
Mr Morgan supplemented his application by further correspondence dated 28 August 2025. He said:
“I was ambushed by his taking a point not raised by Bromley re collateral challenges not being a ground of appeal and he didn't hear me out. He just said he had changed his mind re collateral challenges to the best of my recollection. He then adjourned the case for the council to respond. Clearly, they failed to do so. And he has changed his mind on that issue too viz the website failings.”
On 1 September 2025, Mr Morgan asked that I recluse myself because he has made a complaint about my conduct in another matter and it is currently before the appropriate body. I am aware of a complaint made about me by Mr Morgan to London Councils. He has withdrawn that complaint before the 1 September. I am not aware of any other outstanding complaint by Mr Morgan about me and Mr Morgan has not identified which other body is in receipt of such a complaint. I do not think that I must recluse myself.
Before I deal with the merits of the application, I need to comment on Mr Morgan’s approach to the case. Mr Morgan complains that he was ambushed by the adjudicator. I wonder why Mr Morgan did not consider that raising a fresh point at an appeal where the other party was not present was not an ambush. Furthermore, it is Mr Morgan who seeks to make a collateral challenge. It was therefore up to Mr Morgan to set out why his challenge amounted to a collateral challenge and to establish the legitimacy of a collateral challenge in these proceedings. It is not an ambush. If a party seeks to engage on detailed legal points, they cannot complain that they are required by the adjudicator to engage in a detailed legal discussion. It is what Mr Morgan was obliged to do and so should have been prepared for.
A similar point, always advanced by Mr Morgan in this and other cases, is that if a point is not challenged by the authority, the adjudicator may not take it upon himself or herself to take issue with the point.
I do not accept this argument. Proceedings before the adjudicator are informal in nature. There are no pleadings. In most cases, parties are not legally represented. They do not even have to attend. The Regulations say: “… the adjudicator shall conduct the hearing of an appeal in such manner as he considers most suitable to the clarification of the issues before him and generally to the just handling of the proceedings; he shall so far as appears to him appropriate seek to avoid formality in the proceedings.”
So, an adjudicator may, and often does, intervene when they see an expired Traffic Management Order, or if a body of case law against a point being made, even if the Appellant does not raise the point. It will of course be necessary for the adjudicator to make it clear that he or she is concerned about a point is under consideration and to allow both parties to make submissions thereon.
Appellants often complain that the Authority and or the adjudicator has not “played by the rules.” They need to be mindful that the same rules apply to them. One cannot exploit the informality of the adjudicator’s proceedings but seek to impose strict compliance to rules on the other party or the adjudicator.
Collateral challenge
I asked Mr Morgan to explain why a collateral challenge should be entertained. Mr Morgan’s answer, as I understood it, was that because the two issues (non-compliant PCN, confusing website) did not amount to a ground of appeal under the 2003 Act. Mr Morgan submits that a consideration of a collateral challenge does not involve prejudice.
I can understand what lies behind the submission. The adjudicator’s power to allow an appeal has been considered in Walmsley v TfL and others [2005] EWCA Civ 1540and R (on application of Lord Mayor and the Citizens of Westminster) v the Parking Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 1007 (admin). Both cases established that the adjudicator’s power to allow an appeal is limited to one or more statutory grounds having been established.
At page 55 of the Walmsley decision, Chadwick LJ said:
“I am conscious that I have left open the question whether an adjudicator has power to entertain a challenge to TfL’s decision to pursue payment on grounds which would found an application for judicial review – as Mr Justice Scott Baker suggested in the Bexley case. We were taken to the decision of Mr Gary Higginbottom, sitting as a parking adjudicator, in Davis v The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (PAS Case No 1970198981, 30 March 1998) which provides a helpful analysis of the arguments. We were shown decisions made by adjudicators since the decision of Mr Justice Stanley Burnton in this case in which they have, in terms, treated themselves as having that power: the adjudicator’s reasons for his decision in Chess v Transport for London (Case No 9050067211, 9 July 2005) provides a good example. For the reasons that I have given I do not think that we can or should address that question on this appeal. It can be expected that, sooner or later, there will be an appeal to this Court in which that question will arise and will need to be decided. But it may be that the rule maker will think it sensible to consider the question as a matter of policy and put it beyond doubt by an appropriate provision to the Enforcement and Adjudication Regulations.”
Then came the decision in R (on application of the London Borough of Camden) v the Parking Adjudicator [2011] EWHC 295 (admin) in which the Court held that: “ the policy maker has heeded the suggestion of Chadwick LJ and made clear the nature and extent of collateral challenges that may be considered by Parking Adjudicators whilst adhering to the principle found in the judgment of Elias J in the Westminster case, that the four corners of their powers are contained within the Appeals Regulations.”
The Court had in mind the changes brought about by the Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (Representations and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2022 so that procedural defects can amount to a ground of appeal, and the adjudicator can make recommendations to cancel a PCN when there are compelling reasons.
The 2002 Regulations only cover parking (in London) so Chadwick J’s question in Walmsley remains unanswered in the 2003 Act jurisdiction. It can give rise to an argument that in the 2003 Act jurisdiction, adjudicators can entertain arguments that one or more statutory grounds apply as well as a collateral challenge.
I do not think that collateral challenges are or are intended to be a tool to sweep up all arguments not pertaining to a ground of appeal. While the 2003 Act does not have procedural impropriety as a ground of appeal, it cannot mean that all challenges based on alleged procedural defects are collateral challenges.
The classical collateral challenge is to challenge a prior unlawful act or decision. The basis of the challenge is that the unlawful act or decision impedes a proper argument in the case.
So, in the leading case of Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] UKHL, the House of Lords approved a collateral challenge by Boddington against the lawfulness of a byelaw under which Boddington was charge with a criminal offence. Similarly, the Court approved a collateral challenge in R (on the application of Bexley) v the parking adjudicator 29 July 1997) by the motorist against the lawfulness of a Traffic Management Order which he is alleged to have contravened.
It seems to me therefore that the basis of a collateral challenge must be that there was a previous unlawful decision or act (in the public law sense) which impedes the mounting of a defence that the allegation has no lawful basis.
In the instant case, the alleged unlawfulness is the wording in the PCN. It does not impede the argument that the PCN is non-compliant. It creates the argument. The impediment is the series of cases culminating in the Camden case. To challenge the impediment, one would and could challenge or distinguish the case law.
Accordingly, I reject the submissions that the adjudicator erred in not hearing the collateral challenges.
Unfairness
I am aware that there is an appreciable number of appeals in which the Appellant has sought to argue that the adjudicator has a right to ensure general fairness, and this includes any perceived unfairness before the appeal is made. I do not agree that such wide powers exist. To hold otherwise would mean that the adjudicator does have an independent roving commission to identify public law failings with consequent power to allow appeals outside the relevant Regulations. Camden made it clear that no such powers exist.
Challenges based on procedural requirements in the 2003 Act
Despite the above, I am not satisfied that Camden can be interpreted that procedural defects cannot be challenged in an appeal concerning a 2003 Act PCN. The Camden case is substantially based on the availability of a procedural impropriety in the 2002 Regulations. If and when the 2002 Regulations do not apply, is the motorist completely unprotected against any act or omission by the enforcing authority? For example, if an Authority enforces a 2003 Act PCN which was issued out of time, or mis-states the date and time of the alleged contravention, or fail to issue a Notice of Rejection, must the motorist:
· Apply for a judicial review at the High Court?
· Persuade the adjudicator to extend the boundary of a collateral challenge?
· Seek an order from the adjudicator that the PCN cannot be enforced so that the appeal has to be allowed?
I do not think that one has to seek judicial reviews on all perceived procedural defects. I also do not see, for reasons that I have given above, that the adjudicator should seek to extend the ambit of a public law argument when the alleged defect does not affect a person’s rights against a public authority.
I am satisfied that the third course of action is available, on a narrow ground that upholding the PCN would mean that appellant would not receive a fair hearing, and an adjudicator is obliged to ensure a fair hearing.
I am not advocating that all procedural defects come within the fair hearing argument. The point is that if a procedural defect deprives an Appellant of a fair hearing, the adjudicator may intervene. For example, if an authority issues a Charge Certificate before it is allowed by legislation so that the Appellant is pressed into paying the penalty before the appeal takes place, it is difficult to argue that the adjudicator cannot intervene.
Was the PCN defective?
The point has been argued on numerous occasions. Section 4 (8 ) of the 2003 Act provides that the PCN must:
(a)state-
(i)the grounds on which the council or, as the case may be, Transport for London believe that the penalty charge is payable with respect to the vehicle;
(ii)the amount of the penalty charge which is payable;
(iii)that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice;
(iv)that if the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by the specified proportion;
(v)that, if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of the 28 day period, an increased charge may be payable;
(vi)the amount of the increased charge;
(vii)the address to which payment of the penalty charge must be sent; and
(viii)that the person on whom the notice is served may be entitled to make representations under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to this Act; and
(b)specify the form in which any such representations are to be made.
Paragraph 1 (3) of Schedule 1 to the Act provides that the enforcing authority may disregard any such representations which are received by them after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the penalty charge notice in question was served. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 to the Act goes on to provide, inter alia, that the enforcing authority may serve a charge certificate if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of a 28-day period beginning with the date of service.
Mr Morgan submits that the PCN was invalid because it had stated that the period of 28 days in which to make representations starts from the date of the PCN.
I accept that the start of the 28-day period is mis-described but there is no specific provision that the start of the 28-day period be stated in the PCN. I accept however that a purposive interpretation of Section 4 (8 ) (a)(viii) and Section 4 (8 )(b) read together must be that the correct start of the 28-day period must be stated to avoid the motorist running out of time. The PCN is, to this extent, defective.
Is there a need for prejudice?
Mr Morgan had submitted that when challenging the contents of a PCN by way of collateral challenge, he did not need to establish prejudice. I do not agree.
As I have stated above, the classical collateral challenge is aimed at a finding that an infringement has not occurred because the creation of the infringement was unlawful. A successful challenge in Donnington led to the striking down of the byelaw or the relevant provision so that Mr Donnington has not committed a criminal act. Prejudice is irrelevant. Similarly, the striking down of the requirement to display a tax disc in Bexley means that the motorist has complied with the remaining terms and conditions of the car park and so was allowed to park. Prejudice does not come into it.
The challenge that Mr Morgan has in mind is not aimed at, nor could it lead to, the argument that the instrument which created the alleged contravention should be struck down. It is based on an argument that something has gone wrong in the enforcement process. If I am correct in my analysis that it is not a collateral challenge but a challenge to the fairness of the proceedings, which is permissible, then prejudice is relevant.
In the parking jurisdiction (and other matters considered under the Traffic Management Act 2004), the legislation has defined a procedural impropriety, and this does not include prejudice. An allegation of procedural impropriety if accepted will lead to the PCN being cancelled.
Procedural impropriety is not a ground of appeal in the 2003 Act jurisdiction, and it cannot be argued. Mr Morgan is seeking to label his argument a collateral challenge to enable a “procedural impropriety argument” to take place in the 2003 Act jurisdiction while also seeking to enjoy the benefit of not having to establish prejudice. I do not think that it works.
I asked for Mr Morgan’s submission regarding R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340 and on the Court of Session’s decision in Glasgow City Council against a decision of the Upper Tribunal for Scotland [2025] CSIH 2. Mr Morgan does not say that the cases are not relevant save to make a rather uninformed comment that the latter is a Scottish case.
Mr Morgan complains again that these cases had not been mentioned before in this and other cases. Here again, Mr Morgan is raising the argument that a PCN should not be enforceable because of a procedural defect, it is therefore he (and the respondent authority) who must set out the argument and identify authoritative decisions for and against this submission. As far as I can see in the cases cited by Mr Morgan in which the adjudicator found a defective PCN must result in the appeal being allowed, there was no reference to Soneji and/or Glasgow even when these cases appear to say the contrary. It is rather astounding that Mr Morgan having failed to discharge his obligation, sought to argue that I should ignore a Court of Appeal decision, a Court of Session decision, and a Supreme Court decision.
Soneji posed the question as to whether a confiscation order must be quashed on the ground that there was a defect or omission in the procedure connected with a confiscation application. In Glasgow, the question was whether the Tribunal should have allowed an appeal by a motorist because the Council had not served a PCN by recorded or registered post as required under the relevant Scottish legislation.
My understandingof the Soneji and Glasgow decisions is that where Parliament had not prescribed a consequence for a failure to comply with the requirements prescribed by legislation, a court or a Tribunal needs to consider whether Parliament had intended that total invalidity must result.
The Glasgow case included a helpful review of English cases, which rather weakened Mr Morgan’s submission to me that I should not rely on a Scottish case. In particular, the Court in the Glasgow case referred (at paragraph 43) to A1 Properties (Sunderland) Ltd v Tudor Studios RTM Company Ltd [2024] 3 WLR 601 at the Supreme Court and said:
“The Supreme Court ruled that the starting point for analysis was the guidance given in Soneji. Lord Briggs and Lord Sales (with whom Lord Hamblen, Lord Leggatt and Lord Stephens agreed) explained that the point of adoption of the revised analytical framework in Soneji was to move away from a rigid category-based approach to evaluating the consequences of a failure to comply with a statutory procedural requirement and to focus instead on (a) the purpose served by the requirement as assessed in the light of a detailed analysis of the particular statute and (b) the specific facts of the case, having regard to whether any (and what) prejudice might be caused or whether any injustice might arise if the validity of the statutory process is affirmed notwithstanding the breach of the procedural requirement.”
The Court held that the first question is whether examination of the purpose of the procedural rule, which has admittedly been breached shows that Parliament intended that the rule should operate strictly, as a bright-line rule. If that question falls to be answered in the affirmative, other issues such as whether there has, in any event, been substantial compliance with the rule and whether non-compliance has given rise to any concrete prejudice do not arise for consideration.
In seeking to answer the question, the Court of Session agreed that the PCN has to contain important information and guidance for the person to whom it is sent. It requires to include all the information set out in the legislation. Without such information there is no guarantee that the recipient will have been made aware of his alleged liability to pay a penalty, its amount, by when it is due and how and within what timescales he is entitled to challenge it. However, the Court concluded, at paragraph 55,
“But again, all this says and implies nothing about the method of service of the PCN and whether it must be served in a particular way in order to be effective. In addressing the first question one must look more deeply into whether the purpose served by the procedural rule indicates that Parliament intended the rule to work strictly in every case, whatever the factual position might be. The question then comes to be whether the statutory scheme yields the inference that Parliament must have intended the PCN to be unenforceable on account of its having been invalidly served, even in circumstances where there is no doubt that a properly framed PCN has in fact been timeously received by the person to whom it was issued. This seems an inherently unlikely interpretation of Parliamentary intention. It would mean that Parliament intended in every case to put the procedural cart before the substantive horse to such an extent that an inconsequential lapse in procedure would inevitably defeat the substantive purpose of the legislation; form would be allowed always to triumph over substance.
In cases where it is undisputed that the purpose of serving the PCN has in fact been fulfilled, there seems no reason to suppose that Parliament would nonetheless have intended the PCN to be unenforceable, essentially on the basis of a technicality.''
I would add that in the instant case, the 2003 Act does not say that the 28-day period is an absolute bar to making representations. All it does is to give the authority a discretionary power to disregard the representations. It is not a bright line rule as envisaged in A1 Properties.
The Court of Session went on to consider the second question. It noted that the recipient of the PCN was made fully aware of what he needed to know about the contravention. He was also made aware of his rights under the enforcement process and duly did so in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The purpose of the rule’s governing service has accordingly been fulfilled. The motorist’s interests have not been adversely affected to any extent. So, on any realistic view, the procedural protections inherent in the scheme have been entirely satisfied. That being the case, the Court did not consider that Parliament had intended that the PCN should nonetheless be treated as a legal nullity.
I am posing questions similar to the ones considered by the Court of Session. I would respectfully answer them in the same way. The Appellant had made his representations in time, had received a Notice of Rejection, exercised his right to appeal to the adjudicator, and his appeal was heard.
I am of course aware of the decision in R (on the application of the London Borough of Barnet Council) v the Parking Adjudicator [2006] EWHC 2357 (admin). It is unfortunate that this case was, as far as I know, not considered in Soneji or Glasgow and a reconciliation of the decisionsis not easily achievable. In so far as they conflict, I prefer the approach in Soneji and Glasgow.
The website inaccuracies
There is a clear distinction between a defective PCN and inaccuracies on a website. There is no legal requirement to publish any information on the web. There is no requirement any information must spell out in verbatim requirements for a PCN, it seems to me that not only must the two questions proposed in Glasgow must be asked, but the answers examined in vigour to understand why any confusion invalidates the PCN.
There is no evidence that the Appellant relied on anything said on the website. There is no evidence that he had even seen the information. The Appellant made his representations on 26 December. The Appellant made only one point which was that his rear wheel slightly touched the markings, so he was not causing an obstruction. The confusing website point was not made until 8 April at the hearing.
Furthermore, Authorities are often reminded that it has a public law duty to consider cancelling a PCN even though a ground of appeal is not established. The webform on which the representations are made encouraged and allowed the Appellant to “explain in as much details as possible why you think your PCN be cancelled.” How are they to indicate this to motorists if they can say nothing more than the statutory grounds?
Given that there was no breach of a rule and there was nothing which could suggest that the Appellant was prejudiced, I am not satisfied that there is any lawful basis to find that the PCN is not enforceable because of what is said on the website.
I am not satisfied that the interest of justice requires a review. The application is refused.