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This is my response to the evidence submitted by Private Parking Solutions Ltd. They have failed to properly address multiple key points raised in my appeal and their claims contain numerous legal and factual errors. I request that POPLA consider all of the following.

First, the location is not properly specified. The Notice to Keeper states the location as “Uxbridge Ind Est, Wallingford Rd, Salisbury Rd, Arundel Rd, UB8 2RZ.” This covers a wide area and several roads. It is not a specific identifiable location, which is required under paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The operator has not rebutted this point. In fact, they confirm the area covers multiple roads, which supports my argument that the location is vague and non-compliant. They also confirm the incident occurred at UB8 2RP, not UB8 2RZ, which shows the NtK was inaccurate.

Second, the operator relies on a claimed observation of 44 seconds to justify the charge. This is completely inadequate and fails both the legal and contractual standards. The operator has completely ignored the minimum consideration period that must be allowed under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, section 5.1. That section states that operators must allow a reasonable consideration period for the driver to find the terms, read them, and either decide to accept and park or leave. This period is defined as a minimum of five minutes.

If the operator is claiming that the vehicle was on site for just 44 seconds, then by their own evidence, there is no possibility that the driver had sufficient time to read the terms, understand them, and make an informed decision. This means no contract could have been formed. Without a contract, there can be no breach and no charge.

The operator is trying to have it both ways. They want to rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable, which requires evidence of a parking period. At the same time, they are claiming that 44 seconds is enough to establish that a contract was entered into and breached. That is legally and logically absurd. No contract can be formed in less than the five-minute consideration period.

This is not about whether the car was observed on site. It is about whether any evidence shows that the driver had time to read and accept the terms, which is essential for contract formation. Forty-four seconds proves the opposite — that there was no parking period at all, just a fleeting presence.

Therefore, even if every other element of the operator’s case were correct (which it is not), their failure to show that the vehicle was present for more than five minutes fatally undermines any claim that a contract existed or that the PoFA requirements have been met.

Third, the signage is prohibitory. The sign clearly states “No parking, waiting, loading or unloading on the roads and footpaths at any time.” This is not an invitation to park under certain conditions. It is a clear prohibition. A contract cannot be formed from prohibitive terms. As I explained in the original appeal, PCM v Bull (2016) confirmed that a prohibitory notice cannot form the basis of a contractual agreement. The operator claims a contract was formed, but this contradicts the content of the signage and applicable case law.

Fourth, the operator claims to have identified the creditor, but this is not accurate. The Notice to Keeper states “we, the creditor” without naming any specific legal entity within that sentence. This is not compliant with paragraph 9(2)(h) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which requires that the notice “identify the creditor.” The term “we” is ambiguous and legally meaningless in this context.

The identity of the creditor is a fundamental requirement under PoFA. It is essential that the registered keeper knows exactly who is pursuing the charge. This is not a mere technicality. A notice demanding payment must make it explicitly clear who the money is being claimed by and who it is allegedly owed to. Simply placing the operator’s name somewhere else on the page or letterhead is not good enough. The legal requirement is to identify the creditor within the body of the notice itself, and to do so clearly and unambiguously.

In this case, the Notice to Keeper does not make it clear whether the creditor is the operator, the landowner, or some third party. It is especially unclear because the contract provided by the operator names “Trade Sales” as the party authorising enforcement. But “Trade Sales” could be the landowner, a leaseholder, or just a managing agent. There is no proof of who owns the land or who holds the legal right to enforce charges. Therefore, it is impossible to tell from the Notice to Keeper or the evidence whether the creditor is Private Parking Solutions Ltd, Trade Sales, or another unnamed entity altogether.

The operator has not provided any clarification in their evidence or addressed this point in their response. They simply assume that the recipient of the notice will know who the creditor is. That assumption is not sufficient to meet the statutory requirement. If the operator cannot or will not clearly state who the creditor is, then the Notice to Keeper is invalid under PoFA and they cannot transfer liability to the keeper.

This appeal point stands and must be upheld.

Fifth, the operator has submitted a supposed landowner agreement, but this document is deeply flawed. It names a company called Trade Sales as the party authorising PPS to manage the site, but there is no evidence that Trade Sales is the landowner or leaseholder. No land registry details are provided and no document is included proving Trade Sales has the right to grant enforcement authority. There is no site map included even though the agreement itself says one must be attached. The section asking for patrol areas to be defined is left blank. There is no way to determine whether the alleged contravention occurred on land covered by this agreement.

The person signing on behalf of Trade Sales is not named in print, and their signature is unreadable. No job title is given and no evidence is provided showing that they have any authority to sign such an agreement. This makes it impossible to verify whether this is a valid contract.

Additionally, the contract start date is shown as 7 February 2024. If the alleged incident occurred on or before this date, the contract was not yet in force. If the incident occurred after this date, the contract still fails to establish that the signatory was authorised to bind the landowner or that PPS has the right to issue charges and take legal action in its own name.

Worse still, the contract references a non-existent organisation. It claims to be issued in accordance with sections 7.1 to 7.3 of the “British Association Code of Practice.” This is not a real entity. There is no such organisation as the British Association in this context. This appears to be a botched reference to the British Parking Association. A contract that gets the name of the governing code wrong cannot be relied upon. This seriously undermines the credibility and legal effect of the document.

Sixth, the operator claims that because I did not name the driver, I have assumed liability. This is incorrect. The burden is on the operator to comply with all of the conditions in Schedule 4 of PoFA in order to transfer liability to the keeper. As shown above, they have failed to do so. There is no presumption that the keeper is the driver. VCS v Edward (2023) confirmed that a keeper cannot be held liable simply because they were not able to name the driver.

In conclusion, the operator has failed to rebut my core appeal points. The Notice to Keeper is non-compliant with PoFA. The operator has not established that a contract was formed. Their claim of a 44-second observation is not only insufficient but confirms that no contract could have been formed due to the failure to allow the required five-minute consideration period. Their signage is prohibitory and cannot support a claim based on contract law. Their evidence of landowner authority is legally and factually defective. For all of these reasons, the appeal must be allowed and the charge cancelled.

Subject: Response to ICA Query – PPS Case / DVLA Step 2 Complaint

Dear [ICA Officer's Name],

Thank you for your acknowledgement of my complaint and for outlining the scope of your review.

You asked what my main outstanding concerns are and what I hope to achieve. I fully understand that the ICA cannot investigate the validity of private parking charges or alter DVLA policy. My complaint is not about whether the original release of data was lawful, but rather the DVLA’s failure to handle my complaint properly once evidence of a serious breach came to light.

My key concerns are as follows:

1. The DVLA accepted false information without scrutiny.

Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd falsely claimed to the DVLA that no appeal had been received. This statement was used as the basis to dismiss my Step 1 complaint. I later provided a copy of the operator’s own appeal rejection letter dated 6 May 2025, which proves beyond doubt that an appeal had been received, processed, and responded to. Despite this, the Step 2 response from the DVLA failed to acknowledge or correct this contradiction.

2. The DVLA failed to exercise oversight under the KADOE contract.

Once evidence was submitted showing that the operator had both misled the DVLA and breached the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (by ignoring my appeal until prompted), the DVLA took no action and closed the case. No enforcement step was taken under the KADOE contract, no warning issued, and no recognition made of the seriousness of the operator’s misconduct. This reflects a failure to meet the DVLA’s duty as Data Controller under UK GDPR and the DPA 2018.

3. The DVLA's response shows a lack of impartiality.

I note from your own letter that over 41,000 private PCNs are issued each day. This scale of data use by private operators appears to have created a culture in which the DVLA is reluctant to challenge parking companies for fear of disrupting this revenue-generating scheme. The refusal to act against an operator who provided false information to a government agency undermines public trust and calls into question whether the DVLA’s complaints process is being applied fairly or merely as a procedural formality.

While I understand that the ICA cannot investigate financial motives or policy outcomes, I believe this context is relevant to understanding why the DVLA failed to investigate the matter properly and why enforcement mechanisms were not triggered.

I am not seeking to reverse the data release, nor to challenge KADOE policy. What I seek is an independent finding that:

• The DVLA failed to investigate the complaint properly;
• The DVLA accepted and relied on factually incorrect information provided by a KADOE user;
• The complaint was closed without addressing the proven misrepresentation;
• There was no meaningful enforcement of the KADOE contract obligations despite clear evidence of misuse;

These failures amount to poor administration and a breach of the DVLA’s duty to fairly manage complaints and uphold data protection principles.

Thank you for your time and for reviewing this matter. I am happy to provide further supporting material if needed.

Yours sincerely,

[Your Full Name]

Subject: Formal Complaint – POPLA Decision by Assessor Lisa Lea (Ref: [Insert POPLA Ref])

To the Lead Adjudicator,

I am submitting a formal complaint regarding the decision issued by Assessor Lisa Lea in my appeal against Private Parking Solutions Ltd. The decision is legally defective and procedurally flawed. I understand POPLA operates a single-stage process and does not reverse decisions, but I require a written response to this complaint for the record, as I intend to rely on it in future proceedings.

The following errors are clear and unacceptable:

1. The assessor wrongly accepted a vague multi-road location and postcode (UB8 2RZ) as compliant with PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 9(2)(a), even though the operator’s own evidence stated the incident occurred at UB8 2RP. This is a factual discrepancy and a breach of the requirement to specify a particular location.

2. The operator claimed the vehicle was present for just 44 seconds. The Code of Practice requires a minimum five-minute consideration period. The assessor ignored this completely and assumed a contract was formed simply because a PCN was issued. That is circular reasoning and shows a failure to understand basic contract law.

3. The signage was prohibitory, stating “No parking, waiting, loading or unloading.” This is not an offer to park under terms. The assessor failed to apply the relevant case law (PCM v Bull 2016), which confirms that prohibitory signs cannot form a contract.

4. The Notice to Keeper used the term “we” without naming a legal entity as the creditor. The assessor wrongly concluded that branding or payment instructions elsewhere on the notice satisfied PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 9(2)(h). This is legally incorrect. The creditor must be clearly named in the body of the notice.

5. The landowner agreement provided by the operator was defective. It referenced a non-existent organisation (“British Association”), lacked a site map, failed to identify the signatory, and gave no proof that Trade Sales had authority to grant enforcement rights. The assessor ignored all of this and accepted the document without scrutiny.

6. The assessor claimed keeper liability transferred because the NtK warned the keeper. This ignores the requirement for full compliance with all PoFA conditions. Multiple breaches were evident, yet the assessor cherry-picked one clause and disregarded the rest.

7. The assessor repeatedly referred to the location as a “car park.” This is factually wrong. The alleged contravention occurred on a public-access road within an industrial estate, not in a car park. Roads are not car parks. The only time a road could be considered a car park is during a traffic jam, and even then not legally. This mischaracterisation shows a complete failure to understand the nature of the site and undermines the entire basis of the decision.

This decision is legally incoherent and procedurally negligent. It fails to apply statutory requirements, ignores binding case law, and accepts flawed evidence without scrutiny. I request that the Lead Adjudicator reviews this complaint and confirms whether these issues have been acknowledged and whether any internal action will be taken to address the assessor’s conduct.

I do not expect the decision to be reversed, but I do expect a formal written response for the record.