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Private parking tickets / Re: UK Car Park Management (CPM) PCN - 'No Parking Outside Of A Marked Bay' - Queens Road, Nottingham.
« on: February 20, 2026, 09:34:17 am »You can submit the following as your IAS appeal, for what it's worth. It prompts the IAS assessor to perjure themself if the fail to answer the relevant pint about their claimed legal status as an ADR adjudicator, which will be fun to see in their response and can be used as general evidence to various authorities, if necessary:Quote1. I am the registered keeper of vehicle [VRM]. I appeal to the IAS against UK Car Park Management Ltd (“the Operator”) in respect of Parking Charge Notice [PCN NUMBER], issued in relation to an alleged contravention on 04/11/2025 at approximately 20:48. Liability is denied in full. This is a dispute of substance about contract formation, evidential sufficiency, landowner authority, and the Operator’s compliance with mandatory requirements of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (“PPSCoP”) and the law of contract.
2. The Operator bears the burden of proof. It must prove on the balance of probabilities (i) the precise location and circumstances of the alleged contravention; (ii) that the driver was offered clear contractual terms capable of acceptance; (iii) that the driver accepted those terms; (iv) that the charge is recoverable as a contractual charge rather than an unenforceable penalty or damages dressed up as a contractual sum; and (v) that the Operator has proper standing and landowner authority to contract with motorists and to pursue charges in its own name. A bare assertion is not evidence.
3. The Operator’s handling of the initial appeal is relevant background to credibility and fairness. The Operator initially refused to process the appeal unless the driver’s full name and serviceable address were provided. That position was improper. There is no general legal obligation upon a registered keeper to name the driver in a private parking matter. That the Operator sought to impose this as a condition of considering a keeper appeal demonstrates a procedural approach geared to coercion rather than genuine dispute resolution. Whilst the Operator has now issued a template rejection, it still fails to engage with the substance of the issues raised and remains evidentially deficient.
4. Procedural fairness and the asserted legal competence of the IAS assessor. The IAS states that appeals are determined by legally qualified assessors, typically solicitors or barristers. Decisions are anonymous, unsigned, and provide no verifiable indication of the assessor’s qualification, practising status, or independence. Where an ADR scheme relies on claimed legal expertise as a marker of credibility, it is reasonable to expect decisions to demonstrate that expertise through structured legal analysis rather than assertion.
5. I therefore invite the IAS to confirm in its decision, without disclosing personal data, whether the assessor determining this appeal is a practising solicitor of England and Wales, a barrister holding a practising certificate, or another legally qualified person, and to confirm that no conflict of interest exists. If the IAS declines to provide even this minimal confirmation, I request that it explains how that position is compatible with transparency and consumer confidence in ADR.
6. This request is directly relevant. The present dispute involves core legal issues: contract formation, the distinction between prohibition and contractual offer, evidential proof of parking as opposed to momentary presence, locus and landowner authority, and compliance with mandatory Code requirements. A legally trained decision-maker will recognise that these are determinative questions and will address them by reasoned analysis. If the IAS intends to dismiss the appeal, I request that it does so by engaging with those legal elements rather than by conclusory statements such as “signage was present” or that the charge was “issued correctly”.
7. The rejection letter asserts that “there is no parking outside of a marked bay” and that the vehicle was “parked in contravention of the terms and conditions as advertised on the signage displayed on site.” That is an unparticularised conclusion. It does not identify (a) the exact boundary of the land the Operator contends is “the site”; (b) the exact position of the vehicle; (c) the wording of the alleged contractual term; (d) the specific sign relied upon and its location relative to the vehicle; (e) how the sign could have been read, understood and accepted at the material time, at night; or (f) evidence of duration showing “parking” as opposed to a brief stop.
8. Failure to prove “parking” as opposed to a momentary stop. The Operator has not proven that the vehicle was parked at all. The circumstances were consistent with a brief stop for passenger collection, in a turning area or junction environment, after manoeuvring. A short stop while a passenger enters a vehicle is not necessarily “parking” in the ordinary meaning of the word and is materially different from leaving a vehicle parked as contemplated by typical private parking terms. The Operator’s evidence must show a meaningful period of parking. If the Operator relies on timestamped photographs, it is put to strict proof that those timestamps evidence a period of presence that is more than momentary and that they show the vehicle stationary in a manner that meets any alleged definition of “parking”. A single instant in time does not prove a contravention of a “no parking” term.
9. Failure to prove the exact location and that it is controlled land within the Operator’s remit. The Operator has not provided a boundary map or a clear site plan showing where the controlled land begins and ends, what parts are said to be roadway, access road, car park or marked bays, or that the alleged location falls within land over which it has authority. This is not a technicality. If the vehicle was on or adjacent to highway land, or on land outside the Operator’s remit, there is no cause of action. The Operator’s rejection ignores this entirely.
10. Failure to prove adequate signage and therefore failure of contract formation. A parking charge can only be recovered as a contractual term if the terms were clearly brought to the driver’s attention before any alleged acceptance. This requires prominent, legible signage positioned so that a driver can read it in time to decide whether to enter or stop. The material time was after 20:48 in early November, in darkness. The Operator has produced no evidence of illumination, reflective material, sign orientation, font size, or readability from a driver’s perspective, nor photographs showing what the driver would have seen on approach or at the stopping position. A generic assertion that “signage is displayed on site” is not evidence of communication of terms.
11. In particular, the Operator must prove the charge term was prominent. The Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye v Beavis turned on unusually prominent signage and a specific commercial justification. It does not permit operators to impose £100 charges on the basis of obscure, unreadable, or unseen terms. Absent strict proof that the charge itself was prominently displayed and legible at the material time, the appeal must be allowed.
12. Forbidding or prohibitory signage and absence of contractual offer. UKCPM commonly uses signage stating “No parking”, “No stopping” or “No parking outside marked bays” on roadways or access roads. Such wording is prohibitory and incapable of forming a contractual offer to park for a fee. A prohibition cannot be accepted; at most it alleges trespass, which only a landholder may pursue and only for nominal damages. The Operator must therefore prove that the signage relied upon constituted a contractual offer capable of acceptance rather than a bare prohibition. If the case is “you must not park here”, no contract exists and the charge is unrecoverable.
13. Failure to evidence landowner authority. The Operator was expressly put to strict proof of landowner authority and compliance with PPSCoP Section 14. The rejection letter does not engage with this point at all. The Operator must produce contemporaneous written authorisation defining the land, the scope of enforcement, any permissions or exemptions, and authority to issue charges and pursue recovery in its own name, together with a boundary map. Without this, the Operator lacks standing and the appeal must be allowed.
14. Failure to engage with the substance of the appeal. The rejection is boilerplate. It does not answer the questions posed about signage adequacy, boundary definition, landowner authority, night-time visibility, the distinction between parking and a brief stop, or the legal nature of the signage. A statement that a PCN was “issued correctly” is not a reasoned determination.
15. Evidence quality and reliability. The Operator is put to strict proof that its evidence is accurate, contemporaneous, correctly timestamped, and contextual. Any photographs must show the vehicle’s position relative to bays or markings, the presence and location of signage, the route of approach, and that signage was readable at night. Close-ups without context do not discharge the burden of proof.
16. Keeper liability under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. If the Operator seeks to rely on keeper liability, it must demonstrate strict compliance with Schedule 4 of PoFA. If it does not, then it has no lawful route to pursue the keeper. The Operator’s earlier attempt to compel driver identification strongly indicates it cannot or will not rely on PoFA, a point the IAS is invited to consider.
17. PPSCoP consideration and grace periods. The PPSCoP treats consideration and grace as distinct concepts. Where an alleged contravention involves a very brief presence, the Operator must show it considered whether the event fell within a permitted consideration period. The Operator has produced no evidence of such consideration and has merely asserted a prohibition.
18. Consumer fairness and transparency. The Operator’s references to additional charges and credit impact are noted. Any credit impact can only arise following a court judgment that remains unpaid beyond the statutory period. Template wording implying otherwise is misleading and relevant to credibility.
19. Remedy sought. The Operator has failed to prove contract formation, failed to prove standing or landowner authority, failed to prove that the vehicle was parked rather than briefly stopped, and failed to rebut the substantive points raised. The IAS is invited to allow the appeal and direct cancellation of the PCN. In the alternative, the IAS is invited to require production of the landowner contract and boundary map, a full site plan with sign locations, contemporaneous legible photographs of the signage relied upon, and contextual photographs showing the vehicle’s position in night-time conditions. In the absence of that evidence, the appeal must be allowed.
Hey 👋, I submitted the above and this morning I have had a response from the IAS accepting the grounds of my appeal and dismissing the ticket 😁 Thank you so much for your time and your assistance. The IAS provided the following comment:
"This PCN was issued on the basis that the Appellant's vehicle was parked outside of a marked bay. One of the first issues I must consider when determining an appeal such as this is whether the signage was sufficient to have brought to the attention of the Appellant the terms and conditions that apply to parking on this site. Indeed this is one of the Appellant's numerous grounds of appeal. The Appellant argues that the signage was not prominent and legible and was also not suitably illuminated in the hours of darkness. The Operator provides a site map, signage proof and site photographs. However, notwithstanding this evidence, I am unable to see any of the signs in the photographs of the Appellant's vehicle. Although the site photographs show the existence of the signage (albeit in 2022), I am unable to tell from the photographs where those signs are located relative to where the Appellant was parked. I am not necessarily persuaded by the Appellant's argument about lighting because the photographs of the Appellant's vehicle do appear to show the site as having some lighting, but in the absence of knowing where the signs are located I cannot be satisfied that they would have been clear and visible to the Appellant, particularly when driving in the hours of darkness. As to the argument that a vehicle headlights would illuminate the signs, that would depend on the position of the signage, including whether the signs face the vehicle or are located on a wall or other area not facing towards the vehicle. Whilst the Appellant has not provided any evidence in support of the insufficient signage, in the absence of clarity as to the location of the signs in the site photographs relative to the Appellant's vehicle, or being able to see the signage in the photographs of the vehicle, I cannot be satisfied that the signage on the site is sufficient. Accordingly, I will allow the appeal on that basis.
The Appellant should be aware that I am allowing the appeal on the basis of insufficient signage evidence only; not on the basis of his other grounds of appeal.
I have considered all the issues raised by both parties in this Appeal and I am not satisfied that the Operator has established that the Parking Charge Notice was properly issued and therefore this Appeal is allowed".
Thanks in advance?