Subject to seeing the "contract", here is the amended and expanded WS which also rebuts the claimant's WS:
IN THE COUNTY COURT
Claim No.: xxxxxx
Between
Hounslow Enforcement Limited
(Claimant)
- and -
Defendant’s name from N1 claim
(Defendant)
WITNESS STATEMENT
1. My name is [Your Full Name], and I reside at [Address]. I am the Defendant in these proceedings and this Witness Statement is made from my own knowledge and research, and I confirm that the facts stated within it are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
PRELIMINARY MATTER - The Claim should be struck out
2. I respectfully submit that before proceeding with the hearing, the Court should consider a Preliminary Matter: striking out the claim due to the Claimant's and/or their solicitor’s failure to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a), which requires a concise statement of the facts. It is embarrassing that the Claimant’s solicitor, a firm widely recognised for its bulk litigation process of issuing thousands of poorly pleaded claims each month, has once again provided inadequate Particulars of Claim (PoC). In this case, the PoC are so deficient that I, as the Defendant, was expected to prepare a defence without a proper understanding of the facts and allegations against me.
3. Dismissing the claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators (legal firms like the notorious Gladstones with their well-documented connections to the IPC Trade Body) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, they should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authorities:
4. In Car Park Management Services Ltd v Akande 2024 [K0DP5J30] heard on 10th May 2024, HHJ Evans, sitting at Manchester County Court, held that
"It cannot be right that the fundamental basic rule that Particulars of Claim must set out the case which a defendant has to meet can somehow be swept away by the character limit imposed by the MCOL system. It does not take many characters to say 'did not buy a ticket' or 'did not display permit' but if the Claimant really cannot fit that into the 1080 character limit then the remedy is to serve detailed Particulars of Claim."
The same is true in this case. (See exhibit XX-01 CPMS v Akande judgment)
5. In Civil Enforcement Ltd v Chan 2023 [E7GM9W44] heard on 15th August 2023, HHJ Murch, sitting at Luton County Court, held that
"the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract".
The same is true in this case. (See exhibit XX-02 CEL v Chan judgment)
6. There are many other examples of similarly poorly pleaded claims that have been struck out, both at allocation stage and at hearings. (See exhibit XX-03 Other CPR 16.4 judgments)
The basis of the defence
7. These are the woefully inadequate PoC as provided to me by the Claimant through their solicitor utilising MCOL:
"THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE WITH REGISTRATION [ENTER THE VEHICLE REG](THE 'VEHICLE') PARKED IN BREACH OF THE TERMS OF PARKING STIPULATED ON THE SIGNAGE (THE 'CONTRACT) AT NORTH HYDE HOUSE HAYES, ON 19/04/2023, 18/04/2023, THUS INCURRING THE PARKING CHARGES (THE 'PCN'S'). THE PCN'S WERE NOT PAID WITHIN 28 DAYS OF ISSUE. THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS THE UNPAID PCN'S FROM THE DEFENDANT AS THE DRIVER/KEEPER OF THE VEHICLE. DESPITE DEMANDS BEING MADE, THE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SETTLE THEIR OUTSTANDING LIABILITY. THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS £100 PER PCN, £70.00 PER PCN CONTRACTUAL COSTS PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT AND PCN TERMS AND CONDITIONS, TOGETHER WITH STATUTORY INTEREST OF £15.14 PURSUANT TO S69 OF THE COUNTY COURTS ACT 1984 AT 8.00% PER ANNUM, CONTINUING AT £0.07 PER DAY."
8. As evidenced, there is a lack of precise detail in the PoC in respect of the factual and legal allegations made against me such that the particulars of claim do not comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a). There is no precise or even concise factual allegation made against me. There is no factual or legal basis for the claim. It is not shown how the claim has been calculated.
9. Should the court not agree that the claim should be struck out, I respectfully request that the Claimant be ordered to provide further particulars that, for the avoidance of doubt, must:
(a) refer to and have attached to them (clearly marked "A") a copy of the contract (or contracts) between the claimant and defendant relied on.
(b) set out the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions of the contract (or contracts) which is (or are) relied on.
(c) have attached to them a copy of each of the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) which forms the basis of this claim.
(d) must state by what method each of the PCNs was first brought to the attention of the defendant. For example, attaching it to the defendant's vehicle or sending by post.
(e) in respect of each alleged breach of contract, set out the reason (or reasons) why the claimant asserts that the defendant was in breach of contract.
(f) in respect of each alleged breach of contract, set out (i) the full postal address of where the breach took place and (ii) the precise date and time of the alleged breach and (iii) exactly how long it is alleged that the vehicle was parked before the parking charge was incurred.
(g) state, in respect of each PCN sued on, whether the claim is (or is not) brought under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(h) in respect of each alleged breach of contract, must state whether the defendant is sued as the driver of the vehicle or the keeper of the vehicle.
(i) not state that the defendant is sued in the alternative as the driver of the vehicle or as the keeper of the vehicle.
(j) state what amount of the claim is the claim for non-payment of the PCNs and what amount of the claim is not for non-payment of the PCNs.
(k) must explain the factual or legal (or both) basis of the claim for any amount claimed which is not for non-payment of the PCNs.
(l) set out a precise calculation of the claim for statutory interest up to the date of issue to include the date interest started running.
Should the Claimant fully comply with the order and the claim is not struck out, I should be allowed to provide an amended defence based on all the facts provided by the order.
Hearsay evidence
10. The Claimants 'witness' is a legal assistant employed by the claimant’s solicitors and has no direct knowledge of the actual events that form the basis of the claim. Any evidence provided by this individual is second-hand, supposedly relying entirely on information supplied by the claimant, and thus cannot carry the same weight as testimony from someone who witnessed or was directly involved in the incident.
11. The claimant's Witness Statement (WS) fails to comply with CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2, as it does not clearly distinguish between what the witness knows firsthand and what has been provided to them by others. It is evident that the individual providing the statement, being a legal assistant with no direct involvement in the events, relies on information provided by their client and lacks personal knowledge of the facts. As a result, this statement amounts to hearsay, which weakens its credibility. Further, the claimant's witness has failed to indicate the source of any information and belief, as required under PD 32.18.2.
12. The paralegal 'witness' does not work for the Claimants company and therefore has no role in the operations, policies, or specific events regarding the parking charge or this case. This distance from the Claimants company further undermines their ability to give a credible account of the facts.
13. The claimant's WS is written in the third person, which is inappropriate for a witness statement. A WS should represent the personal account of the witness and should be written in the first person, as per CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.1, which requires a witness to state their evidence clearly, in their own words.
No Offer of Parking and No Contract Formed
14. In paragraph 11 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, the claimant lists the "terms and conditions" displayed at the site, which are all prohibitory terms such as "No Stopping," "No Waiting," and "No Pick Up/No Drop Off." I submit that these prohibitions cannot possibly form a contractual offer because they do not offer any service or benefit to the motorist but rather prohibit actions altogether.
15. For a contract to exist, there must be an offer, consideration, and acceptance. The claimant’s signs, by their own wording, prohibit any action (such as stopping or waiting) rather than offering parking or any other service. This means there is no contractual offer made to motorists, as no positive action is proposed in exchange for any consideration (payment).
16. In legal terms, a prohibitory notice merely tells the motorist what they cannot do, and therefore, it does not give rise to any enforceable agreement or parking contract. It is impossible for a motorist to "accept" a contract that does not exist, as they are not given the option to do anything other than leave. If the terms are simply prohibitions, there can be no offer capable of acceptance, and thus no contract has been formed.
17. As there is no valid offer or contract, no liability can arise from any alleged breach of such "terms and conditions" and the Claimant’s parking charge is unenforceable on this basis.
Unenforceable Additional Costs
18. In paragraph 13 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, it is stated that the signage provides for a "Parking Charge in the sum of £100, plus additional costs if the same remains unpaid." However, I submit that these "additional costs" are not defined anywhere in the signage or contract terms allegedly relied upon by the claimant, rendering them vague and unenforceable under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), which requires that contract terms be both fair and transparent.
19. In the Particulars of Claim, the claimant has added £70 per Parking Charge Notice (PCN), claiming this as "contractual costs as per the contract terms and conditions." However, these additional costs are not referred to or specified on the signage at the site. The claimant cannot impose additional costs that are not clearly stated in the contract (assuming a contract even existed, which is disputed). This lack of transparency violates Schedule 2, Paragraph 10 of the CRA, which prohibits unfair terms 'that have the object or effect of irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which the consumer has had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.'
No Contract Formed Due to Prohibitory Signage
20. Additionally, as already argued, the prohibitory signage at the site (e.g., "No Stopping," "No Waiting") cannot form the basis of a contract. As there is no offer, no consideration, and no acceptance of terms, no valid contract exists between the claimant and the defendant. If no contract exists, the claimant has no lawful basis to impose any parking charge, let alone any additional costs. The purported £70 contractual costs are therefore not only unjustified but also unenforceable.
Penalty Charge, Not Genuine Pre-Estimate of Loss
21. Furthermore, these additional costs appear to be arbitrary and penal in nature. Under established contract law principles, such as ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015], parking charges must either be a genuine pre-estimate of loss or commercially justified. In this case, the additional £70 is neither justified nor explained. The claimant has provided no breakdown or explanation of how this amount was calculated or why it is appropriate. It can only be viewed as a punitive charge designed to penalise the defendant, which is contrary to established legal principles that prohibit excessive and unfair contractual penalties.
22. The claimant’s demand for additional costs of £70 per PCN is entirely baseless. It is not supported by any clear contractual term, it violates the CRA's requirements for fairness and transparency, and it constitutes an unlawful penalty charge. The court should strike out this portion of the claim as unenforceable.
No Evidence of Service of PCNs, Reminder Notices or PAP
23. In paragraphs 20 and 23 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, the claimant asserts that the details of the alleged contraventions were sent to me as the registered keeper of the vehicle, and that I failed to make any payment or response. However, the claimant has provided no evidence that these notices were actually sent or that they were properly served.
24. I submit that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that they not only prepared these notices but also sent them in accordance with the relevant rules of service, as per Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 6.26. Merely producing copies of the notices does not prove they were properly delivered or received.
25. The claimant has not provided any evidence, such as proof of postage or a certificate of service, to confirm that the notices were actually posted. Simply producing copies of the notices does not prove they were ever sent. Without evidence of proper posting, the claimant cannot rely on CPR 6.26 to claim that these notices were deemed served.
26. Furthermore, I had not received any correspondence whatsoever from the claimant until the County Court claim form, despite my address being unchanged for the last 10 years. I have always received other PCNs and promptly dealt with them, which demonstrates that there is no issue with my address being on record with the DVLA.
27. The claimant’s assertion that, because the claim form was received, the PCNs and reminders must also have been received is speculative and not supported by any evidence. It is entirely possible that these documents were not sent, were misaddressed, or were otherwise not delivered. The claimant must provide proof of proper service, such as proof of postage or delivery, for these notices. Without this, their claim cannot stand as the basic pre-requisites for holding the registered keeper liable under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) have not been satisfied.
28. Additionally, the claimant seeks to recover legal fees and other charges beyond the PCNs, yet there is no evidence that any pre-action protocol (PAP), including a formal Letter of Claim, was ever served. This lack of compliance with pre-action procedures further undermines the claimant’s claim and the additional costs they seek to recover.
29. I invite the court to strike out the claim on the basis that the claimant has failed to prove proper service of the PCNs, the reminders, and any pre-action correspondence. Simply showing copies of these documents is not sufficient to meet the burden of proof.
Offensive and Baseless Allegation Regarding My Ability to Understand CPR and Legal Issues
30. In paragraph 23 of the claimant's Witness Statement, the claimant’s legal representative — who, as already noted, has no direct involvement in the events surrounding the alleged claim — makes a wholly inappropriate and offensive assertion about my ability to understand the complexities of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The witness claims, without any basis, that I have relied on a "generic defence" found on the internet and implies that I do not understand the references I have made to the law and CPR requirements.
31. This is a baseless and entirely unfounded personal attack. The claimant's witness has no knowledge whatsoever of my level of education, professional background, or capacity to understand legal matters. It is deeply unprofessional and, quite frankly, embarrassing that a firm of supposed legal professionals would resort to such unfounded insults in an official court document.
32. As a litigant in person, I am not expected to have the same legal expertise as the claimant’s solicitors. However, I have every right to research legal matters and use any available resources to present my defence, just as the claimant’s solicitors have evidently relied on templates for both their Particulars of Claim and Witness Statement. My defence is fully supported by relevant case law and legal principles, regardless of the method by which I prepared it.
33. Moreover, this unwarranted and disparaging comment about my ability as a litigant in person amounts to unreasonable behavior on the part of the claimant's solicitors. Such conduct is clearly designed to intimidate and belittle me, rather than address the actual legal issues in the case. I believe this behavior violates the spirit of fair litigation and may amount to a breach of the Overriding Objective under CPR 1.1, which requires the parties to act justly and fairly.
34. I respectfully request that the court take note of this unprofessional conduct when making any assessment of costs. The claimant’s solicitors' reliance on personal attacks, rather than focusing on the substance of the legal matters, reflects poorly on their conduct and should be considered when determining whether the claimant has behaved unreasonably in the proceedings. Under CPR 44.3, the court has the discretion to consider the unreasonable behavior of a party when making a costs assessment. The claimant’s failure to adhere to the Civil Procedure Rules and reliance on unwarranted personal attacks amounts to unreasonable conduct and should be considered when making any decision on costs.
35. In paragraph 25 of the claimant's Witness Statement, the claimant asserts that I have been able to produce a "substantive defence" and implies that I have not suffered any prejudice as a result of the claimant's failure to provide detailed and compliant Particulars of Claim (PoC). I respectfully submit that this assertion is inaccurate and fails to appreciate the nature of my defence.
36. My defence primarily relies on the fact that the Particulars of Claim provided by the claimant were woefully deficient and did not comply with the requirements of CPR 16.4, as they failed to provide sufficient detail about the basis of the claim. As a result, I was unable to understand the case against me or adequately prepare a response to any specific allegations.
37. The only substantive element of my defence, aside from pointing out the deficiencies in the claimant's PoC and their failure to comply with CPR 16.4, was to state:
"I have no recollection of the reasons I would have been at the location as this claim is the first communication I have ever received on this matter."
38. This is far from a detailed or "substantive" defence, and it reflects my inability to provide a fuller response due to the claimant's failure to communicate the alleged contravention to me prior to initiating this claim. I have never received any prior communication about this matter, either in the form of a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) or reminder letters, as stated in my defence. The claimant’s failure to serve any prior notice means I could not reasonably provide a detailed account or explanation of the circumstances of the alleged incident.
39. It is important to highlight that my defence is not "substantive" in the sense that the claimant implies, but is rather a reflection of the claimant's procedural failures and their failure to provide me with any prior information about the alleged breach. This has placed me at a significant disadvantage, and the suggestion that I have not suffered any prejudice as a result is clearly without merit.
40. The claimant cannot now seek to argue that their inadequate PoC is excusable simply because I have pointed out their legal and procedural failings. Their lack of compliance with CPR 16.4 has severely hindered my ability to respond to this claim in any meaningful way beyond disputing the receipt of prior communication and highlighting their procedural errors.
41. I respectfully request that the court takes this into account when considering the claimant's conduct and the impact it has had on my ability to defend this claim.
Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4
42. In paragraph 26 of the claimant’s Witness Statement, the claimant attempts to excuse their failure to fully comply with CPR 16.4 by asserting that the information provided in their Particulars of Claim (PoC) was sufficient to make me aware of the nature of the claim. This is a feeble and unconvincing attempt to justify their non-compliance, and I have already provided evidence of recent persuasive cases where similar failures led to claims being struck out.
43. As I have referenced earlier in this Witness Statement, in CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023], the court found that vague and inadequate PoCs that failed to provide essential details were grounds for striking out the claim. The claimant’s PoC in this case suffers from the same deficiencies — lacking crucial information such as the specifics of the alleged contravention, the terms supposedly breached, or any supporting evidence. In my case, the claimant's PoC contains similarly vague and non-specific language, which prevented me from understanding the basis of the claim and defending myself appropriately.
44. I respectfully submit that the claimant’s continued reliance on these deficient PoCs should result in the court giving no weight to their justification, and I once again refer the court to the persuasive appeal cases I have cited, CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023], which I have included as evidence.
Conclusion: Claimant's Failure to Satisfy the Burden of Proof
45. The claimant, in their Witness Statement, has failed to satisfy the fundamental burden of proof in this matter. Despite making various assertions about the alleged contraventions and my supposed liability, the claimant has not provided adequate evidence to support their claim. Specifically:
Lack of Evidence of Service: The claimant has not demonstrated that the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs), reminder notices, or any pre-action correspondence were properly served, as per the requirements of CPR 6.26. Simply producing copies of these documents is insufficient without proof of postage or delivery, and their failure to provide such proof severely undermines their claim.
Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4: As detailed earlier, the claimant’s Particulars of Claim (PoC) are woefully deficient and do not comply with the requirements of CPR 16.4. The PoC fails to provide sufficient detail about the alleged contravention, preventing me from fully understanding the case against me. Recent persuasive cases, such as CPMS v Akande [2024] and CEL v Chan [2023], demonstrate that such failures warrant the striking out of the claim.
Inadequate and Speculative Witness Testimony: The claimant’s Witness Statement was provided by a legal assistant who has no personal knowledge of the events surrounding the claim. Much of the testimony provided is hearsay and fails to comply with CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2, which requires the witness to clearly indicate which statements are based on their own knowledge and which are based on information provided by others. This undermines the credibility of their evidence.
46. Despite these significant procedural and evidentiary failings, the claimant has unreasonably asserted that my defence is "without merit." I strongly reject this assertion. My defence has highlighted the claimant's failures to provide sufficient evidence and comply with legal procedures. Furthermore, as a litigant in person, I have made every effort to research and present a defence that addresses the key issues in this case, despite the claimant’s refusal to provide me with clear and adequate information from the outset.
47. The claimant has failed to meet the basic procedural requirements outlined in the Civil Procedure Rules, including CPR 16.4 for providing adequate particulars and CPR 6.26 regarding service of documents. Their continued reliance on vague, hearsay-based arguments demonstrates a clear lack of credibility and adherence to proper legal standards. In light of these procedural deficiencies and the claimant’s unreasonable conduct, I respectfully request that the court dismiss the claim in its entirety and consider costs under CPR 44.3.
48. In the matter of costs, I ask:
(a) standard witness costs for attendance at Court, pursuant to CPR 27.14, and
(b) for a finding of unreasonable conduct by this Claimant, seeking costs pursuant to CPR 46.5.
49. Attention is drawn specifically to the (often-seen from this industry) possibility of an unreasonably late Notice of Discontinuance. Whilst CPR r.38.6 states that the Claimant is liable for the Defendant's costs after discontinuance (r.38.6(1)) this does not normally apply to claims allocated to the small claims track (r.38.6(3)). However, the White Book states (annotation 38.6.1): "Note that the normal rule as to costs does not apply if a claimant in a case allocated to the small claims track serves a notice of discontinuance although it might be contended that costs should be awarded if a party has behaved unreasonably (r.27.14(2)(dg))."
Statement of truth
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
