This appeal is submitted by the registered keeper in respect of a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) issued by Smart Parking Ltd. The PCN is disputed in its entirety on the following grounds:
1. Failure to Comply with Paragraph 9(4) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) – Late Delivery of the Notice to Keeper
2. No Evidence That the Person Being Pursued Was the Driver – No Keeper Liability Can Arise
3. Inadequate and Unclear Signage – No Contract Can Be Formed
4. No Evidence of Landowner Authority – Operator Is Put to Strict Proof
Each of these grounds is a valid and independent basis for cancellation of the charge.
1. Failure to Comply with Paragraph 9(4) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) – Late Delivery of the Notice to Keeper
The alleged parking event occurred on 11/02/2025. According to Paragraph 9(4) of Schedule 4 of PoFA, a Notice to Keeper (NtK) must be delivered to the registered keeper within 14 days of the alleged contravention — in this case, by 25/02/2025.
The NtK issued by Smart Parking is dated 21/02/2025 (day 10). This means that unless Smart Parking can prove it was posted on or before that date by a method that ensures delivery within two working days, it is not compliant with PoFA.
The only type of postal service that legally and practically supports delivery within two working days is first class post. This is not a mere preference — it is a legal requirement if the operator wishes to rely on the presumption of delivery under:
• Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978, which states that service is deemed effective when an item is “properly addressed, prepaid, and posted”, and
• The accepted legal interpretation in the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 6.26), which confirms that first class post (or equivalent) is presumed delivered two business days after posting.
To be absolutely clear for the avoidance of any doubt:
• First class post is a 1–2 working day service.
• Second class post is a 2–3 working day service.
• Hybrid mail typically applies second class or economy mail services, and often confirms “2–3 working day” delivery timeframes on its receipts.
Here is a step by step explanation, in case there is any confusion:
• Only first class post is officially recognised as a 1–2 working day service and therefore supports the two working day delivery presumption under PoFA.
• If a letter is sent using a 2–3 working day delivery method (such as second class or hybrid/economy post), it is not first class, and therefore no two-day presumption applies.
• In such cases, the earliest presumed delivery date is three working days after posting, unless the operator proves otherwise with hard evidence.
• Smart Parking must therefore prove, not simply claim, that the NtK:
• Was actually entered into the postal system (not just generated or passed to a print vendor) on 21/02/2025 or earlier; and
• Was sent by first class post (not a slower 2–3 day delivery method).
If they cannot prove both of these elements, then the notice is presumed delivered no earlier than 26/02/2025 — which is after the 14-day legal limit under PoFA.
The BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice v1.1 (17 February 2025), Section 8.1.2, Note 2 also confirms this:
“A notice sent by post is to be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been delivered on the second working day after the day on which it is posted […] Therefore, parking operators must retain a record of the date of posting of a notice, not simply of that notice having been generated (e.g. the date that any third-party Mail Consolidator actually put it in the postal system.)”
Thus, Smart Parking is put to strict proof on both key points:
• That the NtK was posted (not just generated) on or before 21/02/2025, and
• That it was sent using first class post, which is the only postal method that supports the statutory presumption of two working day delivery.
Unless Smart Parking can meet both evidential thresholds, the NtK must be deemed delivered after the statutory 14-day period, in breach of PoFA Paragraph 9(4). As such, no keeper liability can arise and the appeal must be upheld.
2. No Evidence That the Person Being Pursued Was the Driver – No Keeper Liability Can Arise
Smart Parking has not provided any evidence as to the identity of the driver, and the registered keeper is under no legal obligation to name them.
Since the operator is attempting to rely on keeper liability under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), they must demonstrate full compliance with every requirement in that Schedule, including but not limited to Paragraphs 9(2)(e), 9(2)(f), and 9(4). As established in point #1, the NtK was not delivered within the required 14-day timeframe, rendering it non-compliant with Paragraph 9(4).
It is important to emphasise that PoFA compliance is a binary matter. Just as someone cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, an NtK cannot be partially or even mostly PoFA compliant. It either is or it isn't PoFA compliant, and as shown in point #1, it isn't.
Accordingly, as Smart Parking has failed to meet the statutory conditions for keeper liability, and no driver admission has been made, the charge cannot be enforced against the registered keeper.
3. Inadequate and Unclear Signage – No Contract Can Be Formed
The signage at the location is inadequate, poorly positioned, unlit, and extremely difficult to read. The signs are mounted high up on posts, contain dense blocks of small-font text, and are not easily readable either from within a stationary vehicle or while approaching.
For a contract to be formed, the terms must be clearly brought to the attention of the driver before or at the point of parking. If the terms and charges are not prominent, unambiguous, and legible, then no contract can be said to have been offered, let alone accepted.
This signage fails to meet the standards set by the Supreme Court in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, where the signage was described as:
“large, prominent, and with the charge in the largest font.”
Smart Parking’s signage is the opposite: small, cluttered, high up, and entirely unlit at night — failing both in form and function.
It also fails to meet the requirements of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, specifically:
Paragraph 2(3)(b)(ii), which requires:
“the display of one or more notices which—are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land.”
The signage at this location is not adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers. It is not readable without leaving the vehicle, is positioned at height, and is wholly ineffective in darkness.
Furthermore, the signage does not comply with the mandatory standards set out in the Private Parking Single Code of Practice:
• Section 3.1.3(b):
“Signs must be sufficiently large to be visible from a distance and legible on approach.”
• Section 3.1.6:
“Signs must be designed and installed so as to be conspicuous and legible in all lighting conditions during which the controlled land may legitimately be accessed…”
• Section 3.1.7:
The operator is therefore put to strict proof that:
• The signs at the location were visible and legible to drivers at the time of parking;
• The signs were either illuminated or sufficiently visible in low-light conditions;
• The signage complied in full with the PPSCoP Section 3 and with PoFA Paragraph 2(3)(b)(ii);
• The parking charge and core contractual terms were clearly conveyed at the time the alleged contract was said to have been formed.
Absent such proof, no contract could have been formed, and the operator has no lawful basis to issue or enforce a parking charge.
4. No Evidence of Landowner Authority
Smart Parking is not the landowner at this site and has no automatic right to issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) or to pursue payment from motorists. In order to lawfully operate on this land, they must hold a valid written agreement with the landowner which grants them the authority to enforce parking terms and to issue PCNs in their own name.
The BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice (Version 1.1, February 2025) makes this requirement explicit. Section 14.1 states that:
“Where controlled land is being managed on behalf of a landowner(s), before a parking charge can be issued written confirmation must be obtained by the parking operator from the landowner(s) covering:
[...]
the permission granted to the parking operator by the landowner(s) and the duration of that permission
[...]
the parking terms and conditions that are to be applied by the parking operator [...]
[...]
the documentation that the parking operator may be required to supply on request to authorised bodies detailing the relationship with the landowner.”
The Code also requires this documentation to be supplied on request, which includes to POPLA as an authorised appeals body.
Accordingly, the operator is formally put to strict proof that they hold an unredacted, up-to-date, and fully executed contract or written agreement that:
• Was in force on the date of the alleged contravention;
• Clearly shows that Smart Parking is authorised by the landowner (not a managing agent) to:
• Issue PCNs in their own name; and
• Pursue unpaid charges and take legal action in their own name;
• Covers the specific location of the alleged incident;
• Confirms that none of the relevant terms and permissions have materially changed since the contract was signed.
The operator must not rely on:
• A summary of terms;
• A witness statement or letter from their own staff or a managing agent;
• A redacted, unsigned, or undated agreement;
• Or a contract missing any of the above required details.
Unless Smart Parking provides proper documentary evidence that satisfies all the criteria under PPSCoP Section 14.1, they have no legal authority to issue or enforce this charge, and the appeal must be allowed in full.
Conclusion
In light of the issues raised above, this charge is entirely without merit. The operator has failed to comply with fundamental legal and procedural requirements necessary to establish either a lawful contract with a driver or to transfer liability to the keeper.
Unless the operator can now provide strict proof to rebut each of these grounds, this PCN must be cancelled. The evidence and reasoning presented in this appeal are compelling and based on the operator's own regulatory framework and statutory obligations. Accordingly, the appellant respectfully requests that the appeal be allowed in full.
