Free Traffic Legal Advice

no it's not leased or hired, I guess I quoted an incorrect section. which bit shall I remove?

Here is a slightly more coherent version that you should send to POPLA:

I, the registered keeper of vehicle [VRM], received a "Parking Charge Notice" (PCN) titled "Notice to Keeper" via post from MET Parking Services (hereinafter referred to as MET). I appealed this notice to MET, which acknowledged and subsequently rejected my appeal without addressing the points I raised. It remains my position that, as the registered keeper of the vehicle, I have no liability for the parking charge. My appeal should therefore be upheld on the following grounds:

1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)

2. MET Cannot Transfer Liability to the Keeper and Cannot Assume Keeper Liability for the Charge

3. MET’s Notice to Keeper Breaches the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) and their KADOE Contract with the DVLA

4. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage

1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)

MET does not know the identity of the driver and is pursuing me as the vehicle’s registered keeper. The alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which falls within the boundary of Stansted Airport. A Stansted Airport-issued map, provided with this appeal, confirms this fact. As Stansted Airport is subject to byelaws, it falls under statutory control.



Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA explicitly states that "relevant land" excludes any land that is "subject to statutory control," such as land governed by byelaws. Therefore, Southgate Park does not qualify as relevant land under PoFA. While the land may be privately owned and MET may have been contracted to manage the car park, this does not override the fact that it falls under statutory control.

Since Southgate Park is not relevant land, MET cannot invoke PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper. The only party they may legally pursue is the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed. As the keeper, I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and thus, there is no keeper liability in this case.

Furthermore, MET continues to mendaciously claim that because the location is "private land" or "not at the airport," then it must be relevant land. However, the POPLA assessor cannot deny the obvious fact that an official Stansted Airport map, with the airport boundary clearly marked in blue and the location of Southgate Park marked in red, shows that it is within the airport boundary and therefore is land under statutory control (airport byelaws). I put MET to strict proof that this is not the case.

2. MET Cannot Transfer Liability to the Keeper and Cannot Assume Keeper Liability for the Charge

Even if Southgate Park were considered relevant land (which is denied), MET would still be unable to hold me liable as the registered keeper due to non-compliance with PoFA’s strict statutory conditions. PoFA sets out clear requirements that an operator must meet in order to transfer liability from the driver to the keeper. MET has failed to meet these requirements, meaning I cannot be held liable.

Additionally, as the keeper of the vehicle, I am not legally required to identify the driver. MET has provided no evidence to establish the identity of the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. Since PoFA does not apply to Southgate Park and MET has failed to meet PoFA’s conditions for keeper liability, MET must pursue the driver—if they can identify them. Without such identification, their claim against the keeper is baseless.

Furthermore, POPLA must not assume or infer that the keeper was the driver. Established case law supports this position. In VCS v Edward [2023] (H0KF6C9C), HHJ Mark Gargan stated in paragraph 35.3:

"Simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell... These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion."

This legal principle confirms that MET cannot assume keeper liability unless they provide direct evidence that the keeper was the driver. POPLA must not be misled by any attempt to suggest otherwise.

3. MET’s Notice to Keeper Breaches the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) and their KADOE Contract with the DVLA

Section 8.1.1(d) of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) clearly states:

"The parking operator must not serve a notice which in its design and/or language states the keeper is liable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 where they cannot be held liable."

Since Southgate Park is not relevant land under PoFA, MET is in clear breach of this section by continuing to issue Notices to Keeper (NtKs) that falsely imply or directly state that the registered keeper can be held liable. This is a serious breach of the Code of Practice.

By knowingly issuing such unlawful notices, MET is also in breach of their Keeper at Date of Event (KADOE) contract with the DVLA, which only permits them to obtain registered keeper details for lawful and Code-compliant purposes. Handling and processing keeper data in this manner is therefore unlawful, and MET has no legitimate grounds to retain or use my personal data.

As a result, MET’s entire basis for issuing this PCN is fundamentally flawed. Their breach of both the PPSCoP and the KADOE contract means that the PCN is invalid on that ground alone. The assessor must acknowledge that MET has no legal right to issue or enforce this charge. The PCN must be cancelled immediately.

I will be reporting MET’s conduct to the DVLA separately, but the key point for POPLA to consider is that MET’s non-compliance invalidates this charge entirely.

4. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage

MET has not provided sufficient evidence that the terms and conditions of parking were clearly displayed and visible to motorists. For a driver to be bound by a contract, signage must be legible, prominently positioned, and capable of being read before a contract is formed. MET has failed to provide satisfactory evidence that:

• The signage was adequately positioned and illuminated;
• The terms and conditions were clearly legible from a driver's perspective;
• The alleged contravention occurred in an area where sufficient and visible signage was present.

Without such evidence, MET’s claim is unsubstantiated.

Conclusion

Southgate Park is within Stansted Airport’s boundary and is therefore subject to statutory control, excluding it from being classified as relevant land under PoFA. The explicit wording of Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA confirms that land governed by byelaws does not meet the definition of relevant land. The official airport boundary map provided with this appeal removes any doubt about this fact.

Even if the site were relevant land, MET has still failed to comply with PoFA’s keeper liability requirements. Furthermore, MET’s Notice to Keeper breaches the PPSCoP and their KADOE contract with the DVLA, meaning they have no lawful basis to handle or retain keeper data. This renders the PCN invalid on this ground alone.

MET has also failed to provide evidence of adequate signage. Given these fundamental flaws, POPLA must uphold my appeal and instruct MET Parking Services to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.

Unfortunately, the appellant in that case didn't provide the assessors name or the POPLA reference number. It can be referenced but without those two details, it will hold little weight for the assessor of this appeal.

I think that there should be enough in this appeal to persuade the POPLA assessor but, as always with POPLA, you don't know who is doing the assessment and they have some truly moronic assessors on staff at the moment, who have shown incredible lack of understanding of the law and the PPSCoP.

Anyway, if POPLA don't accept the appeal, it would be very easily defended in court if MET are going to play silly buggers and try and escalate it that far.

Other. Let your POPLA appeal PDF do the talking for you.

So MET have uploaded their evidence and a case summary PDF to POPLA now. I have about 3 days left to respond with my comments.

The comments are this:




The PDF is over 30 pages of stuff, the original PCN, appeals, signs, maps and site photos.

Never mind... just copy and paste the following into the POPLA response webform. It is under the 10,000 character limit:

This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.

1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA

The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.

MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.

MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.

Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

2. The location is under statutory control

MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land if the parking of a vehicle on that land is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The Stansted Airport byelaws contain a provision that regulates where vehicles may be parked within the airport boundary. Since the byelaws impose statutory control over parking, this means the location is not relevant land under PoFA.

The airport byelaws do contain a provision stating:

“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”

This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA

MET Parking Services has failed to acknowledge or rebut the official airport boundary map provided in this appeal, which confirms that Southgate Park is within the airport boundary and thus subject to these byelaws. They have also failed to explain why they believe that parking at this location is not subject to statutory control, despite the clear wording of the byelaws.

The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.

MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.

MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’

Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument

The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.

MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.

4. No Keeper liability under PoFA

MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.

MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.

5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice

MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This assumption has no basis in law and contradicts established legal precedent.

The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.

6. Inadequate signage evidence

MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.

The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:

- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance

MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.

7. No obligation to prove customer status

MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.

MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.

Conclusion

- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- They have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- MET has ignored the case law referenced in the appeal, failing to address binding legal principles that refute their position.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.

Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.

Appeal successful - "The operator has not persuaded me that the byelaws are not relevant to general parking at the stanstead site. I am not satisfied that the operator can use POFA to pursue the keeper of the vehicle"