Author Topic: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow  (Read 7119 times)

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Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #15 on: »
My point is that the MET appeals to POPLA at Stansted are based on a very specific point that the land is not ‘relevant land’ for the purposes of PoFA 2012 and therefore it can not be used to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper.

This is not the case at Bow, where the appeal seems to be on no period of parking being specified and hence, again, PoFA 2012 has not been complied with.

Same end result, but the appeal points can not be the same.

Per Reply #4.

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #16 on: »
MET have replied to the POPLA appeal below

MET Parking Services - EW
Operator Case Summary
In the appeal to POPLA Mr Palmer raises the following grounds for appeal: • No keeper liability As we have not been provided with the name and address of the driver of the vehicle, we are pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Please see our compliant Notice to Keeper in Section B of our evidence pack. Please also see a full explanation of why we may pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012 in Section C of our evidence pack. • Minimum consideration period not evidenced While we note the appellant's comments we would point out that as stated in the Sector Single Code of Practice, a consideration period must be given where a parking operator assumes a vehicle is parked based on time alone. In this instance the charge was issued based on the action of the driver parking then exiting the vehicle without displaying a valid blue disabled badge. • No signage accessible from within the vehicle We are confident that there are sufficient signs in place in this car park, that the signs are prominently displayed and clearly state the terms and conditions, and that our signage complies with all relevant legislation and regulations. In Section E of our evidence pack we have included images of the signs in place and a site plan of the location. In addition to the full terms and conditions signs, there are additional information signs on display at the disabled bays, repeating the requirement for a disabled badge to be displayed. A motorist does not have to have read the terms and conditions of parking to enter into a parking contract, there is only the requirement that the parking operator affords them the opportunity to do so. As stated, we are confident that there is sufficient signage at the site in order to afford motorists the chance to read the terms and conditions that are in place. Upon entry to the site, it is the motorist’s obligation to seek out any terms and conditions that may be in place before choosing to park or remain on site. • No breach of the terms and conditions Whilst we note Mr Palmer believes the driver was not contractually required to display a disabled badge, the terms and conditions include that a disabled badge must be displayed face up in the front windscreen at all times, and the driver agreed to be bound by these terms and conditions when they parked in the disabled bay. A vehicle does not have to be unoccupied for this requirement to be applicable. We are not obligated to approach a vehicle and seek a disabled badge from its occupants, the driver is required to display it. In line with F.3 of the Appeals Charter, the further discount was applied and the appeal was rejected at £20. Submitting a Blue Badge during the appeal process did not entitle Mr Palmer to a cancellation of his charge, it only meant he was entitled to the further discount. • No landowner authority We have included a copy of our contract with the landowner in Section E of our evidence pack. We have redacted commercially sensitive details and highlighted relevant clauses for ease of reading. Our contract with the landowner grants us authority to form contracts with motorists and issue parking charge notices for contractual breach. We refer you to the Supreme Court ruling on ParkingEye v Beavis for the judges’ determination on whether a parking operator is acting as an agent or principal. The ruling may be found at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0280-judgment.pdf.darl The terms and conditions of use of the car park are clearly stated on the signs prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that parking is for McDonald’s customers only and that vehicles parked, stopped or waiting in marked disabled bays must display a valid disabled badge face up inside the front windscreen at all times. Please note that these terms and conditions apply to all users of the car park, which naturally includes customers of the restaurant. As the photographic evidence provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates and the appellant has acknowledged, the vehicle remained in the marked bay without a valid blue disabled badge on display. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. In light of this we believe the charge notice was issued correctly and the appeal should be refused.

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #17 on: »
Can you please format that into paragraphs. I know MET haven't, but it's nearly impossible to read when it's a block of text like that.

Any attachments provided alongside their response? They mention an evidence pack, we could do with seeing a redacted version.

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #18 on: »
Section C of their evidence pack looks critical - this is probably where they will claim that the precise wording of PoFA doesn't apply to them!

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #19 on: »
Will post it all tomorrow. Travelling right now so just cut and pasted from phone.

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #20 on: »
This is from MET's evidence pack; the rest is copies of correspondence and pictures of the site, signs etc




In the appeal to POPLA Mr Palmer raises the following grounds for appeal:
• No keeper liability As we have not been provided with the name and address of the driver of the vehicle, we are pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Please see our compliant Notice to Keeper in Section B of our evidence pack. Please also see a full explanation of why we may pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012 in Section C of our evidence pack. • Minimum consideration period not evidenced While we note the appellant's comments we would point out that as stated in the Sector Single Code of Practice, a consideration period must be given where a parking operator assumes a vehicle is parked based on time alone. In this instance the charge was issued based on the action of the driver parking then exiting the vehicle without displaying a valid blue disabled badge




No signage accessible from within the vehicle We are confident that there are sufficient signs in place in this car park, that the signs are prominently displayed and clearly state the terms and conditions, and that our signage complies with all relevant legislation and regulations. In Section E of our evidence pack we have included images of the signs in place and a site plan of the location. In addition to the full terms and conditions signs, there are additional information signs on display at the disabled bays, repeating the requirement for a disabled badge to be displayed. A motorist does not have to have read the terms and conditions of parking to enter into a parking contract, there is only the requirement that the parking operator affords them the opportunity to do so. As stated, we are confident that there is sufficient signage at the site in order to afford motorists the chance to read the terms and conditions that are in place. Upon entry to the site, it is the motorist’s obligation to seek out any terms and conditions that may be in place before choosing to park or remain on site. • No breach of the terms and conditions Whilst we note Mr Palmer believes the driver was not contractually required to display a disabled badge, the terms and conditions include that a disabled badge must be displayed face up in the front windscreen at all times, and the driver agreed to be bound by these terms and conditions when they parked in the disabled bay. A vehicle does not have to be unoccupied for this requirement to be applicable. We are not obligated to approach a vehicle and seek a disabled badge from its occupants, the driver is required to display it. In line with F.3 of the Appeals Charter, the further discount was applied and the appeal was rejected at £20. Submitting a Blue Badge during the appeal process did not entitle Mr Palmer to a cancellation of his charge, it only meant he was entitled to the further discount



No landowner authority We have included a copy of our contract with the landowner in Section E of our evidence pack. We have redacted commercially sensitive details and highlighted relevant clauses for ease of reading. Our contract with the landowner grants us authority to form contracts with motorists and issue parking charge notices for contractual breach.




We refer you to the Supreme Court ruling on ParkingEye v Beavis for the judges’ determination on whether a parking operator is acting as an agent or principal. The ruling may be found at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0280-judgment.pdf.darl The terms and conditions of use of the car park are clearly stated on the signs prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that parking is for McDonald’s customers only and that vehicles parked, stopped or waiting in marked disabled bays must display a valid disabled badge face up inside the front windscreen at all times. Please note that these terms and conditions apply to all users of the car park, which naturally includes customers of the restaurant. As the photographic evidence provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates and the appellant has acknowledged, the vehicle remained in the marked bay without a valid blue disabled badge on display. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. In light of this we believe the charge notice was issued correctly and the appeal should be refused.




SECTION C

Liability Trail
We believe we can pursue the registered keeper for payment of the charge notice as:
1. The land on which the vehicle was parked was private land and falls within the definition of relevant land under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act.
2. The driver of the vehicle is required by virtue of a relevant obligation to pay parking charges in respect of the parking of the vehicle on relevant land and the charges have not been paid in full.
3. We have the right to enforce against the driver of the vehicle the requirement to pay the unpaid charges but are unable to take steps to enforce that requirement because we do not know the name and current address for service of the driver.
4. We have given a notice to the keeper in accordance with paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act, this notice:
a.
Specifies the vehicle, the relevant land on whit it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;
b.
Informs the keeper that the driver is required to pay the charges and they have not been paid in full;
c.
Describes the charges due, the circumstances and other facts that made them payable;
d.
Specifies the amount unpaid;
e.
States that we do not know the name and address of the driver and invites the keeper to either pay the charges or advise us of the name and address of the driver;
f.
Warns the keeper that if we after the specified time the charges are not paid in full and we still do not know the name and address of the driver we may (subject
to having met all the criteria) have the right to recover the outstanding sums from the registered keeper;
g.
Informs the registered keeper of the prompt payment discount and arrangements for dispute resolution;
h.
Identifies ourselves as the creditor and specifies how to make to payment to us or correspond with us;
i.
Specifies the date of sending the notice;
j.
Specifies the Creditor.
5. The notice contains appropriate evidence by way of date stamped photographs
6. The notice was given in accordance with sub-paragraph 9(4), 11 and 12 in all relevant respects.
7. The timetable of events is listed below:
a. The parking event took place on 17/06/2025
b. The registered keeper details were received from the DVLA 19/06/2025 and the Notice to Keeper was sent on 20/06/2025.
The full details of the Notice to Keeper can be viewed in Section B above.
As the registered keeper has not provided us with the name and current address for service of the driver of the vehicle, we may pursue the registered keeper for payment of the outstanding parking charge notice.




Landowner Authority

MET Parking Services Ltd are contracted by McDonald’s to ensure adherence to the terms and conditions of the car park. Our interest in the land arises from our obligation to perform our contractual duties by ensuring provision can be made for motorists to park and facilitate motorists to use the client’s premises.
The Judges who ruled on the ParkingEye v Beavis case considered this point and held that ParkingEye had contracted with the motorist as a principal and not as agent and the contract had been formed by way of the signage displayed at the site and the motorist parking his car on the site.
We do not feel we have to provide a copy of an un-redacted contract between ourselves and our client as it contains information which is commercially sensitive and not relevant in this instance. It also extends to more than 20 pages and therefore the volume of redacted information will be significantly greater than the volume of un-redacted and relevant information.
We have however provided the letter of authority, the signature page and front sheet of the contract demonstrating it is the contract referred to in the letter of authority and the clause from the contract that demonstrates this is rolling contract and subsists until terminated.
We note POPLA are often asked to consider whether the contract existed at the date of the contravention and as you can see from the extract from the contract held with McDonald’s this agreement has a commencement date of 31 August 2010 as this was the date it was signed by the client and is agreed for an initial period of 9 months after which point it becomes an ongoing agreement with notice provisions for both parties. We can confirm that neither McDonald’s nor MET Parking have applied the notice provisions, and therefore the agreement remains in place. Consequently, we would expect POPLA to be satisfied that the contract provided adequately proves that MET Parking had sufficient authority to issue parking charges on the land, on the day of the contravention. This is also evidenced by the fact that McDonald’s permitted MET Parking’s parking enforcement signs to be prominently displayed on the site at that time and to this date.

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #21 on: »
So, they still don't really cover the key points.

They comment on a 'compliant NtK' but their wording skips over the requirement to evidence what they are saying - the NtK does not show the required 'period of parking to which the notice relates' - but it seems that they have not made this check.

Secondly, the assumption that a driver leaving a vehicle without displaying a valid blue badge constitutes contract (followed by immediate breach of contract) is not supported by the Code of Practice despite their deliberately twisted wording. For example, a driver is quite entitled to leave their vehicle in order to examine the precise contract wording especially if the signage is not entirely visible from the drivers seat of the vehicle. Their claim of contract at that point is one of necessity from their perspective rather than one of law.

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #22 on: »
Thanks. Do I need to reply to them on the POPLA appeal or is their evidence insufficient in itself?

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #23 on: »
Show us the contract they allege is valid. Also the "letter of authority".

READ THIS FIRST - Private Parking Charges Forum guide

Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #24 on: »
Link to letter of authority

https://postimg.cc/XrvXCknn

Link to McD contract

https://postimg.cc/7b7KFg88/ac2084cc



Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #25 on: »
Is that the only page of their contract they have submitted? If so, together with that LoA, the operator has not satisfied the requirements that the PPSCoP states must be evidenced in any landowner contract and pointed out as requiring evidence in the POPLA appeal.

The 25 August 2016 “Letter of Authority” does not satisfy PPSCoP 14.1 (a)–(j). It is a generic permission letter and omits most items the Code now requires.

Item-by-item check
a) Identity of landowner — Yes. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
b) Boundary map — No. None provided; merely refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract.”
c) Applicable byelaws — No. No mention.
d) Permission and duration — Partly/Yes. Confirms MET’s authority and states initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis.
e) Parking T&Cs (free period, tariffs, exemptions) — No. Says signage “must detail the terms and conditions,” but does not set them out (no free period, tariffs, or exemptions listed).
f) Means by which charges will be issued — No. Does not specify windscreen vs. postal issue, etc.
g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs) — No. Notes MET supplies/maintains signage, but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA” — Partial. Requires compliance with the BPA Code of Practice but does not state ATA membership/obligations expressly.
i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies — No. Not addressed.
j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals — No. Not addressed.

Bottom line: At best, (a) and (d) are met and (h) is only partially met. The letter fails the remaining requirements. To comply with PPSCoP 14.1, the operator would need contemporaneous, site-specific written confirmation (or the underlying contract/schedules) covering the boundary plan, any byelaws, defined T&Cs (including free time/tariffs/exemptions), method of charge issue, consent responsibilities, ATA/Code obligations, what documents may be provided to authorised bodies, and the appeals approach.

The single page of the actual contract shown does not satisfy or cure any of the defective points raised above.

This page confirms:
(a) Identity of the landowner — McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
(d) Duration of permission — initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated (paras 3.1–3.3). It evidences a signed services agreement.

It does not address the previously unsatisfied items:
(b) boundary map/Schedule of sites (only referenced, not provided);
(c) any applicable byelaws;
(e) specific parking terms (free period, tariffs, exemptions);
(f) means of issuing charges (windscreen/postal);
(g) responsibility for planning/advertising consents;
(h) operator obligations under the PPSCoP/ATA membership;
(i) documentation to be supplied to authorised bodies;
(j) approach to appeals.[/indent]

So, beyond reinforcing (a) and (d), this page does not satisfy any of the other PPSCoP 14.1 (b)–(j) requirements.

Use the following for your response to the operators evidence:

Quote
PCN AB22929772 – POPLA Comments on Operator Evidence

I am the registered keeper. No driver identity is admitted. Please address the following in order.

Landowner authority – Letter of Authority dated 25 August 2016 fails PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j):
- PPSCoP 14.1(a) Identity of landowner: Met. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
- PPSCoP 14.1(b) Boundary map: Not met. No plan or site schedule is provided; it only refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract,” which is not produced.
- PPSCoP 14.1(c) Applicable byelaws: Not met. No mention at all.
- PPSCoP 14.1(d) Permission and duration: Partly/yes on duration only. It states an initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis, but this does not remedy the missing site-specific particulars elsewhere.
- PPSCoP 14.1(e) Parking terms and conditions (free period, tariffs, exemptions): Not met. It merely says signage “must detail the terms and conditions” without setting any out. No free period, tariffs, or exemptions are listed.
- PPSCoP 14.1(f) Means by which charges will be issued: Not met. No specification of windscreen notices versus postal ANPR, etc.
- PPSCoP 14.1(g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs): Not met. It notes MET supplies/maintains signage but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
- PPSCoP 14.1(h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA”: Partial at best. It references BPA Code compliance but does not state ATA membership/obligations as required by the Single Code.
- PPSCoP 14.1(i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies: Not met. No provision.
- PPSCoP 14.1(j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals: Not met. No provision.

Bottom line on the LoA: Only (a) and (d) are evidenced, with (h) only partially. Items (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (i), and (j) are not satisfied. A generic permission letter cannot establish standing or Code compliance for this specific site and signage scheme on the material date.

Contract extract (single page) does not cure the LoA defects:
It confirms only (a) identity of landowner (McDonald’s Restaurants Limited) and (d) duration (initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated, paras 3.1–3.3). It does not address the missing PPSCoP 14.1 items: no boundary plan or site schedule (b); no statement on byelaws (c); no defined parking terms including any free period, tariffs, exemptions (e); no method of issuing charges (f); no responsibility for planning/advertising consents (g); no explicit PPSCoP/ATA obligations (h); no statement on documentation to authorised bodies (i); no appeals approach (j). Therefore, even taken together, the LoA plus this single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(b)–(j). Strict proof is required in the form of contemporaneous, site-specific written authority (or the full contract with schedules) covering all 14.1 requirements. Redacted generic paperwork is insufficient.

PoFA Schedule 4 – no keeper liability:
The Notice to Keeper does not specify any period of parking as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). The operator relies on ANPR timestamps and an assertion that the driver exited the vehicle. That is not a period of parking and cannot establish duration. Without 9(2)(a) compliance, keeper liability cannot arise, regardless of any 29-day wording.

Consideration period not evidenced; no contract formation:
The Single Code requires a consideration period on arrival before terms can bind a driver. The operator has provided no observation log or timed evidence that the vehicle remained beyond that arrival period. Their own narrative says the charge was issued because the driver exited the vehicle without a displayed badge, not due to time. That concedes no evidence of duration beyond arrival and no breach.

Signage and core term visibility:
The photos are generic and do not prove that, on the actual entry route, an entrance sign and any disabled-bay core term were clearly brought to the driver’s attention before parking. POPLA should require contemporaneous driver-sightline images (and relevant lighting/conditions) showing the core term was prominent before the decision to park. Stating motorists must “seek out” terms does not replace the requirement for clear, timely notice of the core term.

Disabled bay and Equality Act duties:
A rigid “badge must be displayed at all times” condition cannot lawfully negate the arrival/consideration period or the duty to make reasonable adjustments. On private land, the Blue Badge scheme is not determinative, and demanding the reverse side of a badge (name/photo) is excessive. The operator has not shown that reasonable adjustments were considered or that the vehicle remained beyond arrival without display.

Date inconsistencies:
The operator’s evidence references a parking event on 17/06/2025 but elsewhere the issue/event is 20/06/2025. Their DVLA/NtK timeline is predicated on 17/06/2025. These contradictions undermine reliability and any claim of PoFA timing compliance.

Beavis not determinative:
Beavis turned on unusually prominent signage and a legitimate interest in turnover. The operator has not proved equally prominent signage, any time beyond the arrival period, or Code/equality-compliant enforcement in a disabled bay context.

Conclusion:
Standing is not proved because the LoA and single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(b)–(j) and only partly meet (h). Keeper liability fails because the NtK states no period of parking as required by PoFA 9(2)(a). The operator has not proved any exceedance of the consideration period or that a contract bound the driver before any alleged breach. Signage proof is inadequate, equality duties are not addressed, and dates conflict. The appeal should be allowed.

Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #26 on: »
Thank you again

This is the link to the second pages of the contract, a site picture and a redacted list of sites managed by Met for McD

https://postimg.cc/gallery/w63X2sz


Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #27 on: »
So adjust accordingly:

Quote
The 25 August 2016 “Letter of Authority” does not satisfy PPSCoP 14.1 (a)–(j). It is a generic permission letter and omits most items the Code now requires.

Item-by-item check
a) Identity of landowner — Yes. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
b) Boundary map — No. None provided; merely refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract.”
c) Applicable byelaws — No. No mention.
d) Permission and duration — Partly/Yes. Confirms MET’s authority and states initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis.
e) Parking T&Cs (free period, tariffs, exemptions) — No. Says signage “must detail the terms and conditions,” but does not set them out (no free period, tariffs, or exemptions listed).
f) Means by which charges will be issued — No. Does not specify windscreen vs. postal issue, etc.
g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs) — No. Notes MET supplies/maintains signage, but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA” — Partial. Requires compliance with the BPA Code of Practice but does not state ATA membership/obligations expressly.
i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies — No. Not addressed.
j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals — No. Not addressed.

Bottom line: At best, (a), (b) and (d) are met and (h) is only partially met. The letter fails the remaining requirements. To comply with PPSCoP 14.1, the operator would need contemporaneous, site-specific written confirmation (or the underlying contract/schedules) covering the boundary plan, any byelaws, defined T&Cs (including free time/tariffs/exemptions), method of charge issue, consent responsibilities, ATA/Code obligations, what documents may be provided to authorised bodies, and the appeals approach.

The single page of the actual contract shown does not satisfy or cure any of the defective points raised above.

This page confirms:
(a) Identity of the landowner — McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
(d) Duration of permission — initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated (paras 3.1–3.3). It evidences a signed services agreement.

It does not address the previously unsatisfied items:
(b) boundary map/Schedule of sites (only referenced, not provided);
(c) any applicable byelaws;
(e) specific parking terms (free period, tariffs, exemptions);
(f) means of issuing charges (windscreen/postal);
(g) responsibility for planning/advertising consents;
(h) operator obligations under the PPSCoP/ATA membership;
(i) documentation to be supplied to authorised bodies;
(j) approach to appeals.[/indent]

So, beyond reinforcing (a), (b) and (d), this page does not satisfy any of the other PPSCoP 14.1 (c)–(j) requirements.

Use the following for your response to the operators evidence:

Quote
PCN AB22929772 – POPLA Comments on Operator Evidence

I am the registered keeper. No driver identity is admitted. Please address the following in order.

Landowner authority – Letter of Authority dated 25 August 2016 fails PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j):
- PPSCoP 14.1(a) Identity of landowner: Met. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
- PPSCoP 14.1(b) Boundary map: Not met. No plan or site schedule is provided; it only refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract,” which is not produced.
- PPSCoP 14.1(c) Applicable byelaws: Not met. No mention at all.
- PPSCoP 14.1(d) Permission and duration: Partly/yes on duration only. It states an initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis, but this does not remedy the missing site-specific particulars elsewhere.
- PPSCoP 14.1(e) Parking terms and conditions (free period, tariffs, exemptions): Not met. It merely says signage “must detail the terms and conditions” without setting any out. No free period, tariffs, or exemptions are listed.
- PPSCoP 14.1(f) Means by which charges will be issued: Not met. No specification of windscreen notices versus postal ANPR, etc.
- PPSCoP 14.1(g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs): Not met. It notes MET supplies/maintains signage but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
- PPSCoP 14.1(h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA”: Partial at best. It references BPA Code compliance but does not state ATA membership/obligations as required by the Single Code.
- PPSCoP 14.1(i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies: Not met. No provision.
- PPSCoP 14.1(j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals: Not met. No provision.

Bottom line on the LoA: Only (a) and (d) are evidenced, with (h) only partially. Items (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (i), and (j) are not satisfied. A generic permission letter cannot establish standing or Code compliance for this specific site and signage scheme on the material date.

Contract extract (single page) does not cure the LoA defects:
It confirms only (a) identity of landowner (McDonald’s Restaurants Limited) and (d) duration (initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated, paras 3.1–3.3). It does not address the missing PPSCoP 14.1 items: no boundary plan or site schedule (b); no statement on byelaws (c); no defined parking terms including any free period, tariffs, exemptions (e); no method of issuing charges (f); no responsibility for planning/advertising consents (g); no explicit PPSCoP/ATA obligations (h); no statement on documentation to authorised bodies (i); no appeals approach (j). Therefore, even taken together, the LoA plus this single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(c)–(j). Strict proof is required in the form of contemporaneous, site-specific written authority (or the full contract with schedules) covering all 14.1 requirements. Redacted generic paperwork is insufficient.

PoFA Schedule 4 – no keeper liability:
The Notice to Keeper does not specify any period of parking as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). The operator relies on ANPR timestamps and an assertion that the driver exited the vehicle. That is not a period of parking and cannot establish duration. Without 9(2)(a) compliance, keeper liability cannot arise, regardless of any 29-day wording.

Consideration period not evidenced; no contract formation:
The Single Code requires a consideration period on arrival before terms can bind a driver. The operator has provided no observation log or timed evidence that the vehicle remained beyond that arrival period. Their own narrative says the charge was issued because the driver exited the vehicle without a displayed badge, not due to time. That concedes no evidence of duration beyond arrival and no breach.

Signage and core term visibility:
The photos are generic and do not prove that, on the actual entry route, an entrance sign and any disabled-bay core term were clearly brought to the driver’s attention before parking. POPLA should require contemporaneous driver-sightline images (and relevant lighting/conditions) showing the core term was prominent before the decision to park. Stating motorists must “seek out” terms does not replace the requirement for clear, timely notice of the core term.

Disabled bay and Equality Act duties:
A rigid “badge must be displayed at all times” condition cannot lawfully negate the arrival/consideration period or the duty to make reasonable adjustments. On private land, the Blue Badge scheme is not determinative, and demanding the reverse side of a badge (name/photo) is excessive. The operator has not shown that reasonable adjustments were considered or that the vehicle remained beyond arrival without display.

Date inconsistencies:
The operator’s evidence references a parking event on 17/06/2025 but elsewhere the issue/event is 20/06/2025. Their DVLA/NtK timeline is predicated on 17/06/2025. These contradictions undermine reliability and any claim of PoFA timing compliance.

Beavis not determinative:
Beavis turned on unusually prominent signage and a legitimate interest in turnover. The operator has not proved equally prominent signage, any time beyond the arrival period, or Code/equality-compliant enforcement in a disabled bay context.

Conclusion:
Standing is not proved because the LoA and single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(b)–(j) and only partly meet (h). Keeper liability fails because the NtK states no period of parking as required by PoFA 9(2)(a). The operator has not proved any exceedance of the consideration period or that a contract bound the driver before any alleged breach. Signage proof is inadequate, equality duties are not addressed, and dates conflict. The appeal should be allowed.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience” - Mark Twain

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #28 on: »
Thank you again, really appreci\ted

Re: Met Parking Disabled Bay McDonalds Bow
« Reply #29 on: »
POPLA rejected appeal

See below

Decision
Unsuccessful
Assessor Name
Alexandra Roby
Assessor summary of operator case
The operator’s case is that the motorist parked or waited within a disabled bay without clearly displaying a disabled badge.

Assessor summary of your case

For the purpose of my report I have summarised the appellant’s grounds into the following points, and have checked each point before coming to my conclusion. The appellant has stated that: • the notice to keeper does not comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and therefore keeper liability cannot apply; • the operator has not provided evidence that the vehicle was observed for any measurable length of time, more than the minimum consideration period allowed; • the vehicle was occupied throughout the duration of stay; • the driver had a right to use the disabled bay; • the terms and conditions were not breached as displaying a Blue Badge was not contractually required; • there wasn’t any accessible signage from within the vehicle; and • there isn’t any evidence of the operator’s landowner authority and they put the operator to strict proof. After reviewing the operator’s evidence, the appellant has reiterated and expanded on their grounds of appeal. The appellant has also provided comments. I have addressed these within my rationale. Within their comments, the appellant has also raised additional grounds of appeal – the appellant has stated that: • the Blue Badge scheme is not determinative on private land; • the operator has not shown that reasonable adjustments were made; and • Beavis is not determinative. The motorist comments stage of our appeal process is to allow the motorist to expand upon their initial grounds of appeal in light of the evidence provided by the operator. POPLA does not allow the appellant to raise new grounds of appeal at this stage, and any new grounds of appeal raised will not be considered. Therefore, I will not be addressing this as part of my response.

Assessor supporting rational for decision

When assessing an appeal, POPLA considers whether the parking operator issued the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) correctly and if the driver complied with the terms and conditions for the use of the car park as set out on the signs. The terms and conditions of the site state that vehicles parked, stopped or waiting in marked disabled bays must display a valid disabled badge face up inside the front windscreen at all times; failure to comply with this will result in a PCN of £100. Within its evidence file, the operator has provided photographs of the appellant’s vehicle parked in a disabled bay. Having reviewed these images, I can see that a Blue Badge was not displayed. The appellant has raised a number of grounds of appeal, each of which I will address separately. • The appellant has stated that the notice to keeper does not comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and therefore keeper liability cannot apply. The Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 is a law that allows parking operators to transfer the liability to the registered keeper in the event that the driver or hirer is not identified. Within PoFA 2012, it states that the PCN must specify the period of parking. Having reviewed the PCN, I can see that it specifies both the date and time of the parking event. I am therefore satisfied that it is compliant in this respect. For the avoidance of doubt, the date of the parking event differs to the date of issue. Overall, the PCN has the necessary information and the parking operator has therefore successfully transferred the liability onto the registered keeper. • The appellant has stated that the operator has not provided evidence that the vehicle was observed for any measurable length of time, more than the minimum consideration period allowed. Section 5.1 of the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice states that parking operators must allow a consideration period of appropriate duration to allow a driver time to decide whether or not to park. Although motorists are allowed a consideration period, I must emphasise that this is to determine whether or not to park. In this case, the images demonstrated that the motorist simply parked as there was no one in the driver’s seat at the time. While the operator may not have documented how long the parking event occurred for, the evidence still demonstrates that the vehicle was parked, irrespective of how long it was there for. • The appellant has stated that the vehicle was occupied throughout the duration of stay. Although I understand that the vehicle may have been occupied by the passenger, the fact remains that it was still parked for purposes of parking management. • The appellant has stated that the driver had a right to use the disabled bay. While I do not dispute this ground of appeal, the motorist was still required to ensure that they displayed the disabled badge. If the motorist was not able to, then they would need to have parked within an alternative bay. It is important to explain that the disabled bays are managed by CCTV cameras and there isn’t a requirement that a motorist be challenged at the time of the parking event. As the vehicle was not displaying a Blue Badge, a PCN was issued as the terms weren’t complied with. The Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice sets the standards its parking operators need to comply with. Section F.3 of the Appeals Charter within the Code lists specific circumstances where a parking operator must reduce a PCN to £20, subject to appropriate evidence being provided. In terms of displaying a Blue Badge, section F.3e specifically states that the charge should be reduced to £20 for 14 days where a Blue Badge has not been displayed but the holder supplies a copy of a valid Blue Badge, which would have been valid at the time of the parking event. This section specifically states that the holder was in the vehicle at the time. Having reviewed the appellant’s appeal to the operator, I can see that they provided a photograph of the Blue Badge but redacted all of the information. In response, I can see that the operator requested that the appellant confirm whether the Blue Badge belongs to the driver or passenger. As the appellant refused to confirm, the operator was unable to respond accordingly. In terms of POPLA’s role, we can only assess whether the parking conditions were breached. • The appellant has stated that the terms and conditions were not breached as displaying a Blue Badge was not contractually required. Regarding signage, section 19 of the applicable British Parking Association Code of Practice states that parking operators needs to have signs that clearly set out the terms of parking. Within its evidence file, the operator has provided photographs of the signage on site. Having reviewed this, I can see that failing to display a Blue Badge whilst parked or waiting within a disabled bay is a breach of the terms and conditions. By choosing to do so, a motorist accepts that they will be liable for a PCN of £100. • The appellant has stated that there wasn’t any accessible signage from within the vehicle. Section 19.9 of the applicable British Parking Association Code of Practice states that there must be at least one sign that can be read without leaving the car near any disabled parking bays. While the appellant has made reference to the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice, parking operators have until December 2026 to implement any changes regarding signage. As the operator has not confirmed which code it is compliant with, I will be basing my determination on whether the operator has complied with the British Parking Association Code of Practice. Within its evidence file, the operator has provided images of the signage. Having reviewed this, I can see that there are signs placed at a lower, readable height within the disabled bays. Having compared these images with those taken of the appellant’s vehicle at the time of the parking event, I am satisfied that they parked directly in front of a sign. While I accept that the sign does not contain the full terms and conditions, the sign contains the terms and conditions relative to this parking event. I am therefore satisfied that the motorist was presented with the opportunity to comply. • The appellant has stated that there isn’t any evidence of the operator’s landowner authority and they put the operator to strict proof. Section 14.1 of the applicable Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice states that where controlled land is being managed on behalf of a landowner, written confirmation must be obtained before a parking charge can be issued. In response to this ground of appeal, the operator has provided a copy of a letter of authority signed by the landowner. Having reviewed this and taking into consideration the fact that there are many signs at the site, I am satisfied that the operator has sufficient authority to issue PCNs on the land. While the appellant has requested strict proof and specified where the operator has not complied, it is not POPLA’s role to source specific evidence on behalf of either party and we must base decisions on the evidence provided. In the absence of evidence to suggest otherwise, I am satisfied that the operator is authorised to issue PCNs for the car park. After considering the evidence from both parties, I am satisfied that the motorist parked in a disabled bay without displaying a Blue Badge and therefore did not comply with the terms and conditions of the site. As such, the parking charge has been issued correctly and I must refuse the appeal.