HI,
i had a pcn from MET parking at southgate park, stanstead airport. Followed the usual advice, did not disclose driver details and submitted an appeal to popla. this is METs response, and looking for advice on an appropriate response. many thanks
In the appeal to POPLA Mr Knowles raises the following grounds for appeal:
• No keeper liability As we have not been provided with the name and address of the driver of the vehicle, we are pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Please see our compliant Notice to Keeper in Section B of our evidence pack. Please also see a full explanation of why we may pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012 in Section C of our evidence pack. As stated in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Relevant Land is any land that is not a) a highway maintainable at the public expense, b) a parking place which is provided or controlled by a traffic authority, or c) any land excepting the aforementioned on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control. Paragraph 3 subsection 3 states that parking is subject to statutory control if any statutory provision imposes a liability in respect of the parking of vehicles on that land. The Stansted Airport byelaws do not impose a penalty for vehicles parking within Southgate Park. We have included in section E of this evidence pack excerpts from the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and also the Airport byelaws. The full airport byelaws may be viewed online at:
https://assets.live.dxp.maginfrastructure.com/f/73114/x/46195467c9/stansted-byelaws.pdf In light of this, the site is not excluded by the definitions laid out in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and as such is considered Relevant Land. For the sake of clarity: Southgate Park is a pay-by-phone car park, by definition a place in which to park vehicles. The Stansted Airport byelaws do not impose a liability in respect of parking vehicles within the Southgate Park car park. In light of this we believe the site is not excluded by the definitions laid out in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and as such is considered Relevant Land.
• Breach of KADOE As stated above, we have complied with all aspects of PoFA 2012 and therefore there has been no such breach. We believe we may continue to process Mr Knowles’ data under the following legal bases: Contract – The processing is necessary for the parking contract that has been entered into when vehicles enter and remain in the location. Legitimate Interests – Processing is required to protect and enable pursuit of legitimate interests in ensuring the car park is effectively managed, pursuing unpaid parking tariffs and charges due and promoting the safety and security of the location.
• Unclear signage We are confident that there are sufficient signs in place in this car park and that the signs are prominently displayed and clearly state the terms and conditions. In Section E of our evidence pack we have included images of the signs in place and a site plan of the location. We are confident that our signage complies with all relevant legislation and regulations. A motorist does not have to have read the terms and conditions of parking to enter into a parking contract, there is only the requirement that the parking operator affords them the opportunity to do so. As stated, we are confident that there is sufficient signage at the site in order to afford motorists the chance to read the terms and conditions that are in place. Upon entry to the site, it is the motorist’s obligation to seek out any terms and conditions that may be in place before choosing to park or remain on site.
• No evidence of landowner authority We have included a copy of our contract with the landowner in Section E of our evidence pack. We have redacted commercially sensitive details and highlighted relevant clauses for ease of reading. Our contract with the landowner grants us authority to form contracts with motorists and issue parking charge notices for contractual breach. We refer you to the Supreme Court ruling on ParkingEye v Beavis for the judges’ determination on whether a parking operator is acting as an agent or principal. The ruling may be found at
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2013-0280-judgment.pdf.darl Turning to the charge itself: In this instance, the driver had not registered the vehicle for the free parking period. As advised on the signs, only customers are entitled to the free parking period, and they must register their vehicle on arrival. The driver did not make payment for their stay as an alternative and as such the parking charge was issued. In line with F.3(g) of the Appeals Charter, we requested evidence of custom during the initial appeal process (as only customers are entitled to park for free). We did not receive this and as such the appellant was not entitled to the further discount when the appeal was rejected.
PLEASE NOTE: regarding the further reduction of a charge under Annex F, the Sector Single Code of Practice specifically states that ‘in all cases the Appeals Charter would require the motorist to provide the evidence.’. As such, without the appellant providing supporting evidence then there is no requirement for an operator to allow a further reduction. The terms and conditions of parking are clearly stated on the signs that are prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that the car park is for the use of Southgate Park customers only and that to receive the 60-minute maximum free stay for customers, drivers must enter their vehicle registration on arrival. Visitors may extend their stay up to 3 hours by using the pay by phone service. As the evidence we have provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates, the vehicle remained in the car park without being registered for the free parking period and no payment was made as an alternative. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. Therefore, we believe that the charge notice was issued correctly, and the appeal should be refused.
