Here's a draft. There's no rush to submit so await any additional comments, always good to have a 2nd pair of eyes. In the interests of not re-inventing the wheel, I've directly re-used most of what b789 wrote, amending it to refer to the hirer in the correct places, and adding a point about the failure to issue a PoFA compliant NtH.
POPLA Appeal
[NAME] (Hirer) (Appellant)
-Vs-
MET Parking Services Limited (Operator)
Vehicle Registration Mark:[VRM]
POPLA Reference Code: [POPLA REFERENCE]
Parking Charge Notice Number: [PCN REFERENCE]
Case Overview:
I, the hirer (“I”/“the Appellant”) of the above vehicle (VRM: _______), received a parking charge notice via post from MET Parking Services Limited (“the Operator”/"MET"), which purported to be a Notice to Hirer. I appealed to the Operator, who acknowledged and subsequently rejected my appeal, without addressing the points raised. It is my position that as the hirer of the vehicle I have no liability for the parking charge, and that my appeal should therefore be upheld. My appeal is on the following grounds:
- The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
- The Operator has failed to meet the requirements of Paragraph 14 of PoFA
- Failure to Address Appeal Points
- Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage
- No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity
Grounds for Appeal:
1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
MET do not know the identity of the driver, and are pursuing me as the hirer of the vehicle.The alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which is located within the boundary of Stansted Airport. This boundary is confirmed by a Stansted Airport-issued map provided with this appeal. Stansted Airport is governed by airport byelaws, which constitute statutory control over the land. Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA explicitly states that "relevant land" excludes any land that is "subject to statutory control," such as land covered by byelaws. Therefore, Southgate Park is not relevant land for the purposes of PoFA.
While the land may be private and MET Parking Services may have been contracted by the landowner’s agents to manage the car park, this does not negate the fact that it is within the airport boundary and subject to byelaws. The existence of byelaws over the land places it under statutory control, as established by law. MET Parking Services’ argument that the land is not covered by byelaws is incorrect and does not override the statutory framework. As a result, MET Parking Services cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the hirer. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed. As the hirer, I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and there can be no hirer liability in this case.
2. The Operator has failed to meet the requirements of Paragraph 14 of PoFA
As previously stated, MET do not know the identity of the driver, and are pursuing me as the hirer of the vehicle.
Even if Southgate Park is relevant land (which is denied), MET are still unable to hold me liable as the hirer of the vehicle, as they have failed to comply with the requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act in order to do so. PoFA sets out the conditions that must be met for the Operator to recover the charges from me as the hirer of the vehicle.
Paragraphs 14 (1) and (2) of PoFA Schedule 4 state that:
(1) If—
(a) the creditor is by virtue of paragraph 13(2) unable to exercise the right to recover from the keeper any unpaid parking charges mentioned in the notice to keeper, and(b) the conditions mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) below are met, the creditor may recover those charges (so far as they remain unpaid) from the hirer.
(2) The conditions are that—
(a)the creditor has within the relevant period given the hirer a notice in accordance with sub-paragraph (5) (a “notice to hirer”), together with a copy of the documents mentioned in paragraph 13(2) and the notice to keeper;
(b)a period of 21 days beginning with the day on which the notice to hirer was given has elapsed; and
(c)the vehicle was not a stolen vehicle at the beginning of the period of parking to which the unpaid parking charges relate.
As clearly stated in paragraph 14(2)(a), alongside the ‘Notice to Hirer’, the operator must give the hirer a copy of the notice to keeper, as well as the documents mentioned in paragraph 13(2). As per 13(2), these documents are:
(a) a statement signed by or on behalf of the vehicle-hire firm to the effect that at the material time the vehicle was hired to a named person under a hire agreement;
(b)a copy of the hire agreement; and
(c) a copy of a statement of liability signed by the hirer under that hire agreement.
Contrary to these requirements, MET failed to provide me with a copy of the Notice to Keeper, as required by 14(2)(a) of PoFA. They also failed to provide me with a copy of any of the documents listed in 13(2) of PoFA.
PoFA makes clear that all these requirements must be met in order for the Operator to be able to recover any unpaid charges from the hirer. As the Operator has failed to meet these conditions, they are unable to recover the unpaid charge from me, the hirer of the vehicle.
3. Failure to Address Appeal Points
In my initial appeal to MET Parking Services, I specifically raised the issues of the site being under statutory control and therefore not relevant land under PoFA, and their failure to comply with the other requirements of PoFA to hold me liable as the hirer. Despite this, MET Parking Services failed to address these critical legal arguments in their rejection. Instead, they dismissed the appeal without engaging with the evidence or addressing the legal basis of my argument. This omission suggests their decision to reject my appeal was not based on a proper consideration of the facts or the applicable legal framework.
4. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage
MET Parking Services has not provided sufficient evidence that the terms and conditions were clearly displayed and visible to motorists. For a driver to have agreed to any contractual terms, the signage must have been legible, prominently positioned, and capable of being read before entering into a contract. Without evidence of the signage’s visibility and clarity at the time of the alleged contravention, the claim is unsubstantiated.
5. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity
As the hirer of the vehicle, I am not legally obligated to identify the driver. MET Parking Services has provided no evidence to identify the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. Since liability cannot be transferred to the hirer under PoFA due to the site’s statutory control, and MET's failure to comply with the requirements of PoFA, MET Parking Services must pursue the driver—if they can identify them. Without such identification, their claim against the hirer is baseless.
Furthermore, the POPLA assessor must not assume or infer that the hirer was also the driver. There is extensive persuasive case law on this matter. In VCS v Edward H0KF6C9C [2023], HHJ Mark Gargan in his conclusion, stated in paragraph 35.3:
“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell. For example, there will be companies who are registered keepers of vehicles where many drivers have the use of the vehicle from time to time. There will be individual employers who are the registered keeper but who allow a number of people to drive their vehicles. There may be situations where husband and wife are each registered keepers of their respective vehicles but for some reason drive the other. These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
Although this case relates to registered keepers rather than hirers, I contend that the same argument would apply to the hirer of a vehicle. The appellant is explaining this point in detail because some assessors have in the past erroneously allowed MET Parking Services to claim that the Keeper/hirer was likely the driver without any evidence. MET attempts to mislead assessors by relying on a misleading and erroneous note in Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which states:
“Liability It is the driver that is liable for the parking charge.
NOTE: The driver is often the same person as the keeper and/or the hirer. Where a keeper or hirer fails or refuses to provide the name and serviceable address of the driver when requested to, it may be assumed they are the driver, based on that failure or refusal.”
This statement is contrary to the law, as explained in VCS v Edward. The hirer's refusal to identify the driver does not permit any assumption of driver identity. Any such inference would be legally baseless and improper. POPLA assessors must adhere to established legal principles and not be misled by incorrect interpretations provided by parking operators.
Conclusion:
Southgate Park’s location within Stansted Airport places it under statutory control and excludes it from being considered relevant land under PoFA. The wording of Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA is clear: land subject to statutory control, such as land covered by byelaws, is not relevant land. The official map of the airport boundary provided with this appeal confirms this fact beyond any doubt. Even if the site were relevant land, MET are still unable to hold me liable as the hirer as they have failed to comply with the requirements of PoFA in relation to hirer liability. Additionally, the hirer cannot be assumed to be the driver, as supported by persuasive case law. MET Parking Services cannot hold the hirer liable for the alleged parking charge. Their failure to address these fundamental points in their rejection of my initial appeal further demonstrates the inadequacy of their claim. I therefore request POPLA to uphold this appeal and instruct MET Parking Services to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.
