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PBP?

NtK is still not compliant with PoFA 9(2)(e)(i) as there is no invitation for the Keeper to pay the charge, irrespective of whether they were the driver or not.

Usual non-PoFA appeal followed by POPLA and if unsuccessful, litigation through DCB Legal and defended with our non-CPR 16.4 compliance defence followed by eventual discontinuation.

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A search of the forum will bring up many recent POPLA appeals you can use to compile your own. Just show us before you send it so we can advise on any edits that may be necessary. You have 33 days for the appeal rejection date to actually submit your POPLA appeal, so no rush.

Ive let this slip a bit due to having an operation but its close to deadline now. appreciate a look over this Popla appeal and advise. think it's one of yours @b789
had to do this on my mobile so apologies if it's lost some formatting.

FAO Poplar Assessor
Polpla Code ................
Parking Operator: Euro Car Parks
Parking charge No. .....
Date of Charge....

Appellant........
Address......
Vehicle registration......

I am the registered keeper of the above vehicle.
I am appealing this parking charge issued by ECP on the grounds that they have failed to fully comply with Pofa. Accordingly they cannot hold me the keeper, liable for this Charge.

Failure to comply.

Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2) is binary (“MUST” means all or nothing) and this NtK omits the mandatory invitation to the keeper to pay under 9(2)(e)(i)

Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2) does not say the notice should include certain things. It says: “The notice must — (a)… (b)… (c)… (d)… (e)… (f)… (g)… (h)… (i)…”. “Must” is compulsory. PoFA 9(2) is a statutory gateway to keeper liability: either every required element is present or the gateway never opens. There is no such thing as “partial” or even “substantial compliance” with 9(2).
a notice is either PoFA-compliant or it is not. If one required limb is missing, the operator cannot use PoFA to pursue the keeper. End of.

Here the missing limb is 9(2)(e)(i).
That sub-paragraph requires the NtK to invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges. The law is explicit that the invitation must be directed to “the keeper”. It is not enough to tell “the driver” to pay; it must invite “the keeper” to pay if the creditor wants keeper liability.

What this NtK actually does, is talk only to “the driver” when demanding payment, and nowhere invites “the keeper” to pay. The demand section of the NtK is framed in driver terms (e.g. language such as “the driver is required to pay within 28 days” / “payment is due from the driver”), and there is no sentence that invites “the keeper” to pay the unpaid parking charges. The word “keeper” (if used at all) appears only in neutral data/disclosure paragraphs or generic definitions, not in any invitation to pay. That omission is precisely what 9(2)(e)(i) forbids.

For the avoidance of doubt, 9(2)(e) contains two limbs:
(i) an invitation to the keeper to pay, and (ii) an invitation to either identify and serve the driver and to pass the notice to the driver.
Even setting aside 9(2)(e)(ii), the absence of the 9(2)(e)(i) keeper-payment invitation alone is fatal to PoFA compliance. The statute makes keeper liability contingent on strict satisfaction of every “must” in 9(2). Where a notice invites only “the driver” to pay, it fails 9(2)(e)(i), so it is not a PoFA notice.
The operator therefore cannot transfer liability from an unidentified driver to the registered keeper. Only the driver could ever be liable; the driver is not identified. The keeper is not liable in law.

This charge must therefore be cancelled.

@DWMB2 yes i think youre right.
This case is for a family member so might get them to join thread. I seem to have trouble with the search and get random results.

It is highly unlikely that a POPLA appeal will succeed. However, you will not be paying penny to ECP because if you follow the advice, you will defend the eventual claim which will be issued by DCB Legal and eventually it will either be struck out and if not it will certainly be discontinued before the £27 trial fee has to be paid by them. It just means that this is drawn out over a much longer period (9-12+ months).

If you are adamant you want to make a POPLA appeal, then you can simply use the following:

I am the registered keeper of the above vehicle. I appeal this parking charge issued by Euro Car Parks Limited (“ECP”) on the following grounds:

1. The Notice to Keeper (“NtK”) does not comply with the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“PoFA”), in particular paragraph 9(2)(e)(i), so no keeper liability can arise.

2. The operator’s own ANPR timestamps and description of the alleged contravention do not establish any period of parking in breach of contract and are inconsistent with the mandatory consideration and grace periods required by industry regulation.

3. ECP has not proved that it has the necessary legal standing on the land to offer parking contracts and pursue charges in its own name, as required by the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (“PPSCoP”).

For context only, the NtK states that the vehicle was at “M&B – The Yeoman – West Byfleet” for “0 hour(s) 14 minute(s)”, with ANPR entry at 21/09/2025 13:05:08 and exit at 21/09/2025 13:19:14. The alleged contravention is described as: “The vehicle was parked without a valid Pay by Phone transaction.”

The driver had stopped as soon as reasonably practicable to attend to a four-month-old baby who was a passenger in the vehicle, believing it would be a very short stop. Nothing in this appeal is to be taken as an admission as to the identity of the driver.

Ground 1 – Non-compliance with PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(e)(i): no keeper liability

ECP seeks to rely on PoFA Schedule 4 to transfer liability from an unidentified driver to me as registered keeper. PoFA is a tightly drafted statutory scheme. Where an operator chooses to invoke keeper liability, it must comply in full with every condition in Schedule 4. For a notice issued by post following ANPR capture, that includes the wording requirements in paragraph 9(2).

Paragraph 9(2) does not provide a discretionary or “substantial compliance” test. It states that the notice “must” include each of the sub-paragraphs (a) to (i). “Must” is compulsory. Paragraph 9(2) therefore operates as a statutory gateway: unless every mandatory element is present, the creditor cannot recover the parking charge from the keeper under PoFA. There is no concept within the statute that “almost compliant” wording is sufficient. Either the NtK is fully compliant, or the gateway to keeper liability never opens.

Paragraph 9(2)(e) requires the NtK to:

(a) state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver; and

(b) invite the keeper:

(i) to pay the unpaid parking charges; or

(ii) if the keeper was not the driver, to notify the creditor of the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice to the driver.

There are therefore two distinct limbs: (i) an invitation to the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges, and (ii) an invitation to identify and serve the driver and to pass on the notice.

In this case, the NtK omits the mandatory invitation required by 9(2)(e)(i). The demand and payment sections are framed entirely in terms of “the driver” being liable and being required to pay within a stated period. Nowhere does the NtK invite “the keeper” to pay the unpaid parking charges. Any reference to “keeper” appears only in neutral definitional or data-handling paragraphs; it does not appear in a sentence that can properly be described as an invitation to the keeper to pay.

That is exactly the situation that paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) is designed to address. The statute recognises that the keeper may not have been the driver and expressly requires that the invitation to pay be directed to the keeper if the creditor wishes to rely on keeper liability. Where, as here, the NtK demands payment only from “the driver”, it fails to satisfy paragraph 9(2)(e)(i). Once that limb is missing, the notice is not a PoFA-compliant NtK and cannot give rise to keeper liability.

Even leaving aside paragraph 9(2)(e)(ii), the absence of the 9(2)(e)(i) keeper-payment invitation alone is fatal to PoFA compliance. The statute makes keeper liability contingent on strict satisfaction of every “must” in paragraph 9(2). Since this NtK is not drafted in accordance with paragraph 9(2)(e)(i), ECP cannot use PoFA to transfer liability from an unidentified driver to the registered keeper.

The driver has not been identified to ECP. As a matter of law, only the driver could be liable. I, as registered keeper, cannot be held liable for this parking charge.

Ground 2 – ANPR timestamps, alleged contravention and consideration / grace periods

The NtK states:

Time in car park: 0 hour(s) 14 minute(s)
Entry time: 21/09/2025 13:05:08
Exit time: 21/09/2025 13:19:14
Contravention: “The vehicle was parked without a valid Pay by Phone transaction.”

These times are simply the moments when the vehicle passed the ANPR cameras at the site entrance and exit. ANPR records perimeter movements; it does not record how long the vehicle was actually stationary in a bay. “Time in car park” is therefore an upper limit and necessarily includes time spent driving in, finding a safe place to stop, manoeuvring, attending to the baby passenger and then driving out again. It is not proof of a continuous period of parking in breach of contract.

Under the prevailing industry rules, including the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, operators must allow an initial “consideration period” on arrival, during which a motorist can drive in, locate a space, read the terms and conditions and decide whether to stay and, if so, how to pay. Separately, they must allow a “grace period” at the end of any permitted or paid-for parking period, to allow reasonable time to leave the site. These are distinct obligations, both of which must be respected.

ECP has produced no evidence of what specific consideration period and grace period apply at this location, nor how those periods were applied to the facts of this case. With only 14 minutes between ANPR entry and exit, it is clear that any actual stationary time in a bay would have been significantly less than 14 minutes once driving in and out is taken into account. In the context of a site where a reasonable consideration period must be allowed on arrival, and where the driver evidently chose not to remain for a substantive visit, this short interval is entirely consistent with a motorist who has not yet committed to a chargeable period of parking.

ECP has adduced no evidence that the driver exceeded any free or paid period of parking, nor that the driver was reasonably made aware that a Pay by Phone transaction was required before the end of the consideration period. Their case rests only on two perimeter timestamps and a bare assertion that “the vehicle was parked without a valid Pay by Phone transaction”. That is insufficient to discharge the burden of proving a contractual breach.

On this ground also, the charge should not stand.

Ground 3 – ECP’s standing to offer contracts and pursue charges (PPSCoP Section 14)

ECP is not the landowner at The Yeoman, West Byfleet and has no proprietary interest in the land. It can only have standing to offer contracts to motorists and enforce parking charges if it holds a written agreement with the landowner that meets the requirements of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (“PPSCoP”).

Section 14 of the PPSCoP (“Relationship with landowner”) provides that, where controlled land is being managed on behalf of a landowner, a parking operator must obtain written confirmation from the landowner before any parking charges are issued. That written confirmation must, as a minimum, cover the matters listed at 14.1(a)–(j), including:

a) the identity of the landowner;
b) a boundary map of the land to be managed;
c) any byelaws applying to the land which relate to the management of parking;
d) the permission granted to the operator by the landowner and the duration of that permission;
e) the parking terms and conditions to be applied by the operator, including the duration of any free parking permitted, parking tariffs, and any specific permissions and exemptions (for example staff, residents or those stopping for short periods such as taxi and minicab drivers, delivery drivers and couriers);
f) the means by which parking charges will be issued (for example to the windscreen or through the post);
g) responsibility for obtaining relevant consents such as planning or advertising consents relating to signs;
h) the obligations under which the operator is working, in compliance with the PPSCoP and as a member of an ATA;
i) notification of the documentation that the operator may be required to supply on request to authorised bodies detailing the relationship with the landowner; and
j) the operator’s approach to the handling of appeals against parking charges.

Section 14 makes clear that, without such a contract covering these core points, a parking operator should not be issuing parking charges at all.

ECP is therefore put to strict proof, by way of production of the full, contemporaneous contract with the true landowner (or properly authorised agent) for this particular site, with only genuinely commercially sensitive material redacted and with all information necessary to evidence compliance with PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j) left fully visible; POPLA is invited to require that:

1. The document produced clearly evidences all of the mandatory elements in PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j), not merely a subset.

2. The document is disclosed in full to me as appellant, not just to POPLA, so that I have a fair opportunity to inspect it and, if necessary, comment upon it in rebuttal.

3. Any document that is generic, heavily redacted, unsigned, out of date, refers to a different site, or fails to address the PPSCoP 14.1 points above is afforded no evidential weight.

If ECP fails to produce such a contract, or if the document produced does not clearly satisfy the requirements of PPSCoP Section 14, then ECP has not established standing to issue or enforce parking charges at this location. In those circumstances, POPLA is invited to allow the appeal on that basis alone.

Conclusion

In summary:

1. The NtK does not comply with PoFA Schedule 4, in particular paragraph 9(2)(e)(i), because it fails to include the mandatory invitation to the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges. Without full compliance, no keeper liability can arise.

2. The driver has not been identified, so liability cannot be transferred from the driver to the keeper in any event.

3. The operator’s own ANPR timestamps show a very short interval between entry and exit which is entirely consistent with a brief stop to attend to a four-month-old baby during the initial consideration period, and ECP has not proved any actual overstay of a permitted parking period or any breach of contract.

4. ECP has not demonstrated, by way of a full unredacted landowner contract disclosed to both POPLA and the appellant and satisfying PPSCoP Section 14.1(a)–(j), that it has the necessary legal standing on the land to offer parking contracts and pursue parking charges in its own name.

For all of the above reasons, I respectfully invite POPLA to allow this appeal and to direct that this parking charge be cancelled.