Free Traffic Legal Advice

Thank you for the timeline, which will need to be referenced from time to time.

For now, just send the letter (PDF) with the blanks filled in to Gladstone. You can CC in District Enforcement. Just give them 14 days from the date on the PDF.

When they respond, show us and we’ll advise on the next step.

I expect them to try and wriggle out of this by suggesting that they draft the order for the set aside themselves which fools some victims into agreeing. Any order drafted by them will not be good for you and is likely to leave you out of pocket.

We will provide a draft order as necessary, together with a warning to the court not to accept theirs. We first need to see their response to the initial letter.

You need to understand, what is being offered to them is the cheaper of two options. If they consent to the set aside and the fee for doing so, it will only cost them £119. If they are allowed to draft the order, they will try to get no order as to costs and for you to pay that fee. They will also try and have the claim re-issued. Later, when they know that they have little chance of winning the claim, they will discontinue.

If they don’t agree to the content of the letter, then you will have to go for a set aside without consent, which will cost £303. However, as you will be setting the terms of the order, you will be asking the court to set the CCJ aside, have the original claim dismissed and have all your costs paid by the Claimant.

It is therefore cheaper for them, ultimately, if they agree to your terms. However, as I have already mentioned, you are not dealing with some nice fluffy, customer service led organisations. These are intellectually malnourished people working for roboclaim, ex-clamper thugs who are only interested in squeezing as much money out of you as possible.

This first shot (the letter) across their bows, alerts them that they may not be dealing with a piece of low-hanging fruit on the gullible tree. Let’s see their response.

Yes. That will do. Make sure your letter is correctly formatted with your own name and address and email details.

Afternoon, all.


I sent the above email on 9 May with a 'deadline' of 23 May. Obviously, said date has now come and gone, and I've received no response from either Gladstones nor District Enforcement.

Any advice on my next steps would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks

Do I need to write any formal letters to any particular parties for this?

Or if I contact the court and inform them of that intention, will they give me the guidance I need to proceed?

I know when I called before coming to this forum, they directed me to a form to submit, which carried the £303 cost mentioned in an above post. Given that I am now going down the "without consent" route and requesting the dismissal and for the costs to be passed on to the claimant, will I need to approach it differently?

Or is all of that available through boxes on the form? (I am realising now I should probably look at the form before asking these questions, so I'll go and download it now, but I suspect some of these questions may still stand.)

What was the "issue" date of the claim? This was asked earlier on but I don't seem to be able to find it anywhere. If the claim was issued more than 4 months ago, then there are additional arguments that can be added to your order to get the claim thrown out.

So, what date was the original claim issued?

I have put together a draft WS for the order. Have a look at it and add the necessary details such as addresses and dates where necessary. Once done, every paragraph must be numbered sequentially.

This is not all you need. There is also a draft order which I will provide for review before anything is sent.

District Enforcement Limited

V

XXXXXXX
 
Claim number  XXXXXXX

WITNESS STATEMENT 

I, [full name], of [current address], will say as follows: 

1. I am the Defendant in this matter and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on DD/MM/YYYY, in default due to a defective service of Claim. 

2. I was not aware of the claim made against me until I recently checked my credit report and noticed that my credit score was in decline. Upon further research, I became aware that a CCJ had been issued against me in default for the sum of £685 relating to alleged parking events in March and April 2022.



BACKGROUND TO THE ALLEGED DEBT

3. In 2022, I lived in rented accommodation [old address] [exhibit #]. After residing there and parking in my designated parking space for approximately 6 months, I received a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) from the Claimant. I assumed a mistake had been made and contacted the the Claimant to ask them to cancel the charge. The Claimant replied that no error had been made and that I would have to pay, because I had not displayed a permit in my car. At the time, I was not aware that a permit was required. I did not have a permit. When I moved in, I had been shown where to park but told nothing about parking permits. I had received no other communications about parking permits up to the point that I receive the PCN.

4. In the time it took me to query the Claimant about the initial PCN, receive the Claimants response and chase up my landlady for a permit, I received two more PCNs for the same reason; no permit displayed. This was in the space of two weeks and the charges now totalled £300. I approached the site manager for the property and explained what had happened. He was surprised and told me that he would follow up. He came back to me to say that the charges had been dealt with and that the contract with the Claimant had been terminated, as it turned out that other residents had had similar experiences and the site management were not happy about it. I took that as good news, and I heard nothing more about the PCNs. I moved house approximately 3 or 4 months later.



IPC CODE OF PRACTICE AND CPR FAILURES

5. The Claimant has an old address at which I no longer reside on file and I believe that this is where the Claimant served the claim which is a clear breach of both the CPRs and the industry Code of Practice. These facts and issues are explained further, below.

6. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice v8 at 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the Parking Charge Notices (PCN) on 29/03/2022, 12/04/2022 & 15/04/2022 and the CCJ on DD/MM/YYYY.

7. I have not received any claim form or detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 2 above.

8. Whilst I am unsure exactly which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed. 

9. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim and that it is without merit as I have evidence, in the form of my Tenancy Agreement at the time which makes no reference to any third party being able to issue parking charges nor any requirement to display a permit. [exhibit tenancy agreement or relevant section on parking]

10. Should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly.  My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, CPR 13.3). 

11. I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order.

THE CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT


12. The Particulars of Claim (PoC) in the extant case are blatantly in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". I am unable, on the basis of the PoC as provided by the Civil National Business Centre (CNBC), to understand with certainty what cause of action, liability basis, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond to such an incoherently pleaded case had I received the claim. The particulars of the claim allege a breach of contract terms and conditions for parking at [old address] on 29/03/2022, 12/04/2022 & 15/04/2022. I am only aware that they relate to “failure to display a permit” as I queried the first PCN at the time. 


13. There is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal).  I believe that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind.  Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction.  By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.


14. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the PoC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the CEL v Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. [exhibit CEL v Chan judgment]


15. Additionally, the Claim should be struck out on the basis that it contravenes Schedule 4, Paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). PoFA clearly stipulates that a creditor may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued. The original PCNs issued by the Claimant were for £100 each. The default judgment for this claim was for £685, which far exceeds the amount of the unpaid parking charges as stated in the original notices. The claimant’s attempt to claim an unlawful amount constitutes an abuse of process and should not be allowed to proceed. I respectfully request the court to dismiss the claim on the basis of the Claimant’s contravention of Schedule 4, Paragraph 4(5) of PoFA and thereby CPR 1.1, CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b) and CPR 27.14 and to award costs to for having to defend against this improper claim.


16. In any case, the original PCNs should not have been issued and the claim is invalid.



THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM

17. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on DD/MM/YYYY. I am aware that the Claimant is District Enforcement Limited and that the assumed claim is in respect of unpaid Parking Charge Notices. 

18. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence."  As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter, other than the brief case details emailed to me on DD/MM/YYYY from the courts, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address from the DVLA and having received no response since my initial enquiry, did not perform the requisite “reasonable diligence"  required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as DVLA, HMRC and credit reference agencies. The claimant did not have any contact with the defendant for over 12 months and thus should have considered they had incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding  this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 29 - 34).

19. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I checked my credit report as mentioned in paragraph 2 on DD/MM/YYYY. This is a breach of CPR 13.2(a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).

20. The address that the Claimant has on file is [old address]. I moved from this address to my current address at [current address] in MMM YYYY. In support of this, I can provide a copy of my [mortgage agreement/AST] showing my updated address.

21. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses results in an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.



THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE  WAS NOT FOLLOWED

22. International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice - Version 8, 1st July 2021, clause 22.1 states; 

23. Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings”



DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE

24. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not, and notify of appeal rights.

25. The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date Of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (as in this case or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out. 

26. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was ‘kept').

27. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful. 

28. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note: 

29. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said; 

30. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? …As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments." 

31. The same sentiment was echoed by;

32. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014) 

33.  HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) 

34. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, I would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014) 

35. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe;

36. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all.”



THE CLAIM HAS EXPIRED UNSERVED

37. I HEREBY CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR IT NOW (EFFECTIVELY THAT WOULD MEAN DISPENSING WITH SERVICE). THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE VERY LIMITED COURT DISCRETION TO RETROSPECTIVELY VALIDATE DEFECTIVE SERVICE BY RESURRECTING AN EXPIRED AND UNSERVED (AND HOPELESS) CLAIM.

38. Service of the claim form on an old address constitutes defective service and the claim has expired unserved.  The Claimant currently has no claim because it was not properly served within 4 months and is time barred.


39. Continuing an expired unserved claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5).  


40. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim has expired unserved.


41. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address.
 

42. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that I have received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been received at my current address.  


43. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date] and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served).
  

44. A Court's discretionary power to validate a defectively served claim is very limited, and only applies where there is ‘good reason’ for the court to exercise the power so conferred.  There is no ‘good reason’ to retrospectively validate the claimants’ service under Rule 6.15.  Further, whilst Rule 6.16 does create a power for a court to dispense with service of the claim form, this only applies in 'exceptional circumstances' and this does not apply in my case.


45. Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and I have answered those questions in respect of my own case below:


46. Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?


47. In my case, no.  An old DVLA address obtained months or years earlier is not a reliable address for service.  Indeed the DVLA do not sell 'keeper data' with any warranty that it can be used or relied upon for service of court papers to a motorist; it is merely a snapshot in time of where a vehicle was once registered.


48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice requires steps to be taken to ascertain any new address prior to litigation. Parking operators are not allowed to rely upon DVLA data for litigation purposes and must undertake a Credit Reference Agency 'soft trace' before issuing a claim.


49. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?


50. In my case, no. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested in May 2024 – [exhibit PoC here] and I knew nothing about any outstanding parking charge.


51. What, if any, prejudice would I suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what I knew about its contents?


52. The above answer is repeated. It would cause huge detriment for me to have to spend time and money to defend a meritless parking charge when I was under no obligation to display a permit or answer to a third party, unregulated private parking company when parking in my own demised parking space as evidenced by the terms of parking in my tenancy agreement. [exhibit clause from tenancy agreement]



FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS


53. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.”  


54. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out."
 

55. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.  


56. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...] 
 

57. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...] 


58. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...]  


59. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”  


60. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.  


61. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):
 

62. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).  


63. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.
 

64. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.” 

SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY


65. I have responded to this matter promptly. I discovered a CCJ had been obtained against me checking my credit reference at the beginning of May. On the DD MMMM 2024 I contacted the Civil National Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement. On the DD MMMM 2024 I wrote to District Enforcement Limited offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment. Despite allowing them a reasonable amount of time to seek instructions, no response was received. So on the DD MMMM 2024, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case.

66. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the claim against me is without merit and the Default Judgement against me was issued incorrectly. Thus, the judgement should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH:  


I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
 

Signed:  XXXXXXXX
 
Date: DD MMM YYYY

Thank you for the above. I've just realised that my reply did not post, so I'm trying again.

First. I do not have any dates other than those included in the timeline I've posted earlier in this thread. When CNBC emailed me the PoC, that didn't even have a date in it. The only date I have related to the court is the date on my credit report, which lists the judgment with the date of 11 April 2023.

This is presumably the date the Judgment was issued by the court? So I don't know when District Enforcement / Gladstones would have initially submitted to the court.

Second. Unfortunately, I no longer have the original NtKs. After believing that the matter was handled and having moved house since, I have not kept those documents on file.


I have read the drafts above and believe I comprehend them enough to know what they intend to achieve and enough to confirm that the information/claims within them are correct and applicable.

The only thing that I'm not entirely clear on is the timeline and the responsibility on the claimant's end regarding knowledge of my address. It seems they may have begun the court proceedings before 12 months had passed from the initial parking event. Indeed it even seems they may have intentionally done so just before that 12-month period expired. Have they been clever there? Does this undermine that element of my claim?


I have the N244 form, sent to me by CNBC. I am going through that form now, but I will likely need some guidance on how best to fill in certain sections that will help or not harm my case. For example, do I request a hearing, an online hearing or no hearing? Would one answer be more in my favour than others?

Good day, FTLA people.

Thank you for all the advice and guidance offered above.

I submitted my claim a couple of months ago and have now received a letter informing me that the claim has been passed to my local court and I will soon receive a date and place for a hearing.

What do I need to be prepared for when I attend the hearing? I have no idea what the procedure will be... Will I have to testify in some way? Or is it just a case of attending to hear a judgment that has already been made on the strength of the submitted claim?

Any advice is appreciated! Thanks