Typical of an incompetent solicitor employed by an incompetent firm of supposed legals. I have had a read of the WS and it is all hearsay, advocacy and with basic errors, all signed under a Statement of Truth. I have adjusted the WS I have prepared for you accordingly.
You can sign the WS by simply typing your full name for the signature. However, only do so if you agree with everything in it and you believe it to be true. You will attach it as a PDF to an email which will be sent to the court and CC'd to QDR and yourself. On the day, you take two extra copies with you to the hearing as it is not unknown for the claimant to plead that they never received it. You have extra copies for them and the judge if necessary.
Email it just before 4pm on the deadline date.
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT WATFORD
Claim No: [Claim Number]
BETWEEN:
UK Parking Control Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
WITNESS STATEMENT
1. I am the defendant in this claim. I am making this witness statement in support of my defence. The claim was originally issued in December 2022 but was never validly served.
2. The claimant’s witness statement has not been written by anyone with direct knowledge of the facts. It is signed by a solicitor acting for the claimant, who had no involvement in the events and is simply repeating what they have been told or what is in the claimant’s file. Much of the content is not even evidence but argument, and some parts are clearly wrong — for example, it wrongly states the claim was issued on 17 December 2025, a date that hasn’t even happened yet. Given that this is a hearsay statement made by someone without first-hand knowledge, I respectfully submit that it should be given little or no weight by the court.
3. I want to make it clear to the court that I genuinely have no idea who was driving that car on the day in question back in 2017, an inconspicuous day, over 8 years ago. The Claimant has included a photograph of a sign, but it shows no context whatsoever — there is no indication of where it is located or whether it was even near where the car was supposedly parked. Since 2017, I’ve moved house, had a child, lost both my parents, suffered a breakdown, and owned eight different cars. I honestly have no recollection of who parked the vehicle there on that day.
4. None of the supposed correspondence ever reached me at the time. I only saw the claim details for the first time very recently when I applied to have the original, defective CCJ set aside. The area in question is a wide, unmarked multi-bay zone that I remember has always been casually used by residents and locals for short-term parking, such as popping into the shop. I don’t understand how the sign — which appears to relate to a different part of the site with marked bays — is supposed to apply to that area. It is not clear what terms, if any, were even visible or enforceable in that specific spot.
5. On 8 May 2025, the judgment was set aside because the court found the claim had been sent to my old address where I no longer resided, over 5 years after the original PCN had been issued. The claimant did not offer any evidence of when or how they tried to confirm my address and made no attempt to check if it was correct. This was a breach of CPR 6.9.
6. The court order from that hearing required the claimant to file and serve a fully particularised claim in line with CPR 16 by 21 May 2025. The order said clearly that if they failed to do this, the claim would be struck out automatically.
7. The claimant has not complied with that order. They did not issue a new claim or properly serve the original claim. Instead, they just submitted more particulars based on the original claim form, which was never validly served. That claim form was issued on 7 December 2022 and became void after four months because it was not served. The claimant did not apply for extra time under CPR 7.6. The courts have made it clear in cases like Vinos, Boxwood, Croke and Piepenbrock that a claim form not served in time is dead and cannot be revived.
8. The further particulars and the accompanying letter were both signed and submitted to the court by Jordan Warwick-Tearne, a paralegal. These actions constitute the conduct of litigation, a reserved legal activity. However, Mr Warwick-Tearne does not appear on the Roll of Solicitors or hold rights of audience or litigation as required by law.
9. The High Court judgment in Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) confirmed that unauthorised individuals may not engage in reserved legal activities, including correspondence with the court or signing statements of case. These documents are therefore of no legal standing and should be disregarded by the court.
10. The claimant’s reference to ParkingEye v Beavis is not relevant to this case. That judgment was based on specific facts involving a retail car park with a free parking period, clear and prominent signs, and a legitimate need to manage space turnover. None of that applies here. This is a private residential site. The signs are not prominent, and the £100 charge is buried in small text. The added £60 is not clearly presented as a contractual term. There is no evidence this sum was incurred or paid, or that any contract was formed on those terms. Relying on Beavis in this very different context is not appropriate.
11. The Notice to Driver that was left on the vehicle only shows an “issue time”. It doesn’t say how long the vehicle was parked or give any actual “period of parking”. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Schedule 4, Paragraph 7(2)(a), says the notice MUST “specify the period of parking to which the notice relates”. Just giving a timestamp doesn’t meet that requirement. In the persuasive appellate case of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions Ltd (Plymouth County Court, 21 August 2023), the judge said in paragraph 27 that even a short stated period like “12:40 to 12:51” would have been enough. In paragraph 28, the judge also explained that a single recorded moment in time does not show that the car was parked — it could have just been briefly present. Because this notice doesn’t specify any period of parking, it doesn’t meet the rules and the keeper can’t be held liable under PoFA.
12. Also, even if PoFA didn’t apply, there’s no evidence that a contract was ever formed with the driver. The Private Parking Code of Practice (version 1.1, 17 February 2025) says there must be a minimum 5 minute consideration period so that drivers can read the signs and decide whether they want to stay. If a vehicle leaves within that time, then no contract has been accepted. In this case, there is no observation period and no evidence that the car stayed long enough for the driver to accept any terms. That’s only assuming the signs were even clear enough to form a contract in the first place, which I don’t accept.
13. The claimant’s solicitor has also made a serious error in paragraph 33 of their statement by claiming that the Notice to Keeper was sent “within the 56-day window required” under paragraphs 8 and 9 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. This is plainly incorrect. Paragraph 8 applies where a Notice to Driver has been issued, not paragraph 9, and the 56 days run from “the day after the period of parking ended”.
14. The Notice to Keeper was dated 12 January 2018, but that does not mean it was “given” on that day. Under Schedule 4 Paragraph 8(6) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, a notice sent by post is considered delivered on the second working day after it is sent, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Since 12 January 2018 was a Friday, the second working day after that would have been Tuesday 16 January 2018. This would be the earliest date the notice could be considered “given”. That is outside the 56-day limit that applies when a Notice to Driver was already given under PoFA para 7, as in this case. The alleged incident took place on 19 November 2017, so the deadline for delivery of a Notice to Keeper was 14 January 2018. Because the notice was not delivered (given) in time, it is not compliant with PoFA and I cannot be held liable as the registered keeper. I have no idea who was driving, and the claimant has not proven who was. They are not allowed to pursue me as the keeper.
15. I have looked at the contractual documents included by the claimant and I do not believe they demonstrate that UK Parking Control Ltd had any right to issue parking charges at the site in 2017 or to pursue them in their own name. The alleged contravention occurred on 19 November 2017. However, the contract they rely on is signed in 2014 and again in 2019. There is no contract from 2017, nor anything confirming that the 2014 agreement was still in effect at that time.
16. The cover page contains a handwritten note saying "Ticketing to commence 28/04/08 in accordance with attached phasing appendix", but it is just an annotation with no signature, no explanation, and no evidence of legal effect. I cannot tell who wrote it or when. The "phasing appendix" referred to has not been included. Without that, it’s unclear what areas the agreement was meant to cover or when enforcement was actually allowed to start.
17. The contract is signed by someone called Louisa Jeffcoate for the “Client,” but there is no explanation of what company she represented or whether that company even owned the land in 2017. There is no document showing that the company signing the contract in 2014 (or 2019) still had any rights over the land in 2017, or had the legal authority to give enforcement rights to UKPC. The Particulars of Claim mention Barratt as the developer, which suggests they may have been the original landowner, but there’s nothing showing how or when ownership changed or who was responsible in 2017.
18. There is also nothing in the contract that shows UKPC were authorised to issue PCNs and take court action in their own name. From what I can see, there is no clear evidence that they had any valid rights at all during the period in question.
19. The claimant now relies on two additional documents, exhibits MY3 and MY4, both dated 2015 and issued by Ian Gibbs Estate Management. They are not contracts but letters asserting that UK Parking Control Ltd had authority to operate at Parkhouse Court. Neither document is signed by a landowner or any identified legal entity holding title to the site. “Parkhouse Court” is an address, not a company or person. These letters are hearsay statements by a managing agent and provide no proof that UKPC was granted rights by the true landowner.
20. Both MY3 and MY4 refer to an “agreement dated 28 April 2008 running in perpetuity until terminated,” yet that alleged contract has not been produced. There is no evidence that any such agreement exists, was executed by a landowner, or remained in force in 2017. Without the underlying document, the court cannot verify its terms, scope, or validity.
21. Even if the 2015 letters were genuine, they are not contemporaneous with the date of the alleged parking event and do not show continuity of authority through to 2017. They also fail to establish that Ian Gibbs Estate Management held any proprietary interest in the land or any legal power to delegate enforcement rights. Assertions of “sufficient contractual authority” are not evidence of ownership or of any chain of title.
22. None of the claimant’s exhibits, including MY3 and MY4, demonstrate that UK Parking Control Ltd had a valid agreement giving them the right to issue parking charge notices or to bring proceedings in their own name at the relevant time. From what I can see, there remains no credible evidence of landowner authority or standing.
23. I believe this claim is both procedurally defective and without merit. The claimant failed to serve the original claim within the required time, did not comply with the court’s order to file and serve a fully particularised claim, and has not shown any legal right to pursue a parking charge against me. The notices issued do not comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and the driver has not been identified. The claimant has also failed to produce any valid evidence of landowner authority or legal standing to issue parking charges or bring proceedings in their own name for the date in question. As the registered keeper, I cannot be held liable. I ask the court to strike out the claim and consider an appropriate costs order due to the claimant’s unreasonable conduct in pursuing a claim that has no proper foundation.
Statement of truth
I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
