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Thanks for all the replies and suggestions, I did as you suggested. I received the attached today. They seem to have ignored all my previous responses and still want me to name the driver.
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Just respond with this:Quote
Subject: Re: Parking Charge 13927702 – Your Ongoing Failure to Address Statutory Non-Compliance
Dear Britannia Parking Appeals Team,
Thank you for your latest non-response dated 25 March 2025.
Once again, you have entirely failed to address the specific and serious legal deficiencies I raised. Instead of engaging with the substance of my appeal, you continue to parrot irrelevant excerpts from Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, as though simply quoting it somehow validates your position.
Let me help you understand, since this seems to be a recurring problem for you.
PoFA is not a “best efforts” checklist. It is an all-or-nothing statute. You cannot be “mostly PoFA compliant” any more than someone can be “mostly pregnant.” It’s binary: you either fully comply, or you don’t. And since I’ve already itemised your multiple and fatal failures—including your omission of the mandatory invitation wording under 9(2)(e)(i), the misrepresentation of the statutory deadline under 9(2)(f), your failure to identify the creditor under 9(2)(h), and the absence of proof of actual posting in line with PPSCoP 8.1.2(e)—your NtK is, quite simply, not compliant. Therefore, no right to pursue the registered keeper arises under PoFA.
Now, as for your persistent attempts to pressure me into naming the driver:
Please get it into your intellectually malnourished minds that I am under no legal obligation whatsoever to identify the driver to an unregulated private company. PoFA confers the right to pursue the keeper only if all statutory conditions are met. Since you have failed to meet those conditions, I owe you nothing—not money, not information, and certainly not the driver’s details.
You can repeat your misguided assertions about keeper liability until the cows come home. It won’t make them true. Burying your heads in the sand and hoping I’ll eventually capitulate is not a strategy; it’s a delusion.
If you insist on continuing to demand the driver’s identity despite your glaring lack of entitlement, I can only refer you to the answer famously given in Arkell v Pressdram (1971).
Your options remain unchanged:• Cancel this unenforceable charge and cease the unlawful processing of my data.
• Issue a formal rejection along with a POPLA code, so I can highlight your repeated breaches and PoFA non-compliance in full detail to an independent assessor.
I expect a substantive reply that responds to each specific point already raised, not another irrelevant boilerplate paragraph. Do not insult my intelligence with a third non-answer.
Yours insincerely,
[Your Name]
Registered Keeper -
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Ha! I like the tone of that. I have replied exactly as you suggest. Many thanks again for your input. I will let you know what response I receive :-)
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Of all the operators, Britannia has to be one of the most haphazard in their responses to appeals - it's a lucky dip which logo they'll put on their letterhead, let alone what bizarre response they'll churn out. I really can't figure them out.
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Well it seems our friends at Britannia have not given up and are digging their heels in. I've just received another reply and got my POPLA code along with another fake "proof of posting" Please see attached. Any further advice gratefully received.
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Here is a draft POPLA appeal you could use:Quote
POPLA Verification Code: 6010905045
Vehicle Registration: P777 AJN
Parking Charge Number: 13927702
Location: Botley – The Dolphin
Date of Alleged Contravention: 07/02/2025
Date of NtK Issue: 13/02/2025
Grounds of Appeal:1. The NtK fails to comply with PoFA Schedule 4 – Keeper liability cannot apply.
2. Inadequate evidence that a legally binding contract was capable of being formed.
3. Failure to clearly communicate key contractual terms, including the 10-minute validation requirement.
4. The operator is put to strict proof of a valid and contemporaneous contract with the landowner.
1. The NtK fails to comply with PoFA Schedule 4 – Keeper liability cannot apply.
Britannia Parking cannot rely on keeper liability under PoFA 2012 due to multiple breaches of Schedule 4, including but not limited to:• Failure to include the statutory invitation to the keeper to pay or name the driver (PoFA 9(2)(e)(i)).
The Notice to Keeper entirely omits the mandatory wording required by paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. This provision obliges the operator to explicitly invite the keeper to either pay the parking charge or provide the name and address of the driver. This is not optional wording, nor can its meaning be inferred from context or from the fact that the notice is addressed to the keeper. The legislation requires a clear and unambiguous invitation to be present on the face of the notice.
Britannia’s NtK fails to include this statutory invitation at all. There is no mention of any choice being offered to the keeper to name the driver or pay the charge. The courts have been clear that PoFA is not a matter of assumed or implied compliance: if any required paragraph is not followed to the letter, keeper liability cannot arise. The operator’s repeated references to paragraph 9(2)(b) — which simply states that the NtK must describe the circumstances — do not and cannot substitute for compliance with 9(2)(e)(i). Their failure to include this key provision is a fatal defect that voids any attempt to transfer liability to the registered keeper.
• Misrepresentation of the statutory payment period (PoFA 9(2)(f)).
Paragraph 9(2)(f) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires that a Notice to Keeper must inform the keeper that after the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the notice is given, the creditor will have the right to recover the unpaid parking charge from the keeper (if all other conditions are met and the driver has not been named). The legislation is precise: the 28-day period must begin the day after the notice is deemed to have been 'given', not the date the notice was issued or the date it was received.
The NtK issued by Britannia Parking fundamentally misrepresents this statutory requirement. It states:“You are advised that if, after 28 days from the date given, (which is presumed to be the second working day after the date Issued), the Parking Charge has not been paid in full… we have the right to recover the charge from the registered keeper.”
This is legally incorrect and misleading on multiple fronts:
PoFA defines the start of the 28-day period as the day after the notice is 'given'. Britannia defines the 28 days as running from the ‘date given’. This unlawfully shortens the statutory grace period by one full day.
Britannia relies on the presumption of service (two working days after posting) to calculate the ‘date given’, but instead of commencing the 28-day period the day after this date (as required by law), they treat the ‘date given’ itself as Day 1. This is a clear and deliberate misstatement of the legislation.
The compounded effect of this error is that the recipient is misled into believing enforcement may lawfully commence a day earlier than is permitted by statute — a breach of the transparency obligations under both PoFA and the Private Parking Single Code of Practice.
Furthermore, the notice gives the impression that keeper liability automatically arises if the charge is not paid within the shortened period, regardless of whether the conditions of PoFA have been met. This is not only false but arguably an act of misleading or aggressive commercial practice under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
To summarise: PoFA 9(2)(f) requires 28 full days to elapse starting the day after the notice is 'given'. Britannia unlawfully counts the ‘date given’ itself as Day 1, thereby shortening the keeper’s statutory period to respond. This is not a minor technicality — it is a direct and material misstatement of the law which renders the NtK non-compliant and invalidates any claim to keeper liability.
• Failure to clearly identify the creditor to whom the charge is owed (PoFA 9(2)(h)).
Paragraph 9(2)(h) of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires that a Notice to Keeper must “identify the creditor”—meaning it must clearly and unambiguously state the legal entity to whom the unpaid parking charge is owed. This is a mandatory statutory requirement and is critical to establishing any enforceable liability under PoFA.
The NtK issued by Britannia Parking fails this requirement. It refers throughout to “Britannia Parking” without any indication of the specific legal entity issuing the charge or to whom payment is owed. “Britannia Parking” is not itself a legal entity and does not appear as such on the Companies House register. Instead, there are multiple similarly-named companies listed, including but not limited to:• Britannia Parking Group Limited
• Britannia Parking Services Limited
• Britannia Parking Management Limited
• Britannia Parking Limited
The NtK fails to specify which of these corporate entities is acting as the creditor. There is no registered company number given on the face of the NtK, no reference to which Britannia company is party to the alleged parking contract, and no corporate identifier that would enable a reasonable recipient to determine who is legally owed the charge.
This omission is not trivial. The obligation under PoFA 9(2)(h) is to identify the creditor—not simply to imply or assume it, or to rely on generic branding. It is not enough to use a trading style or group brand name where there are multiple companies with the same brand but different legal personalities. The requirement exists precisely to ensure transparency and certainty regarding who the alleged debt is owed to, in the same way a contractual counterparty must be properly identified for a contract to be enforceable.
The failure to identify the creditor means the NtK does not meet the conditions for keeper liability under PoFA. No such liability can arise unless all mandatory elements are present and correct. By omitting this essential information, Britannia Parking has rendered the notice invalid for the purposes of Schedule 4 and cannot lawfully pursue the registered keeper.
• Failure to prove the Notice to Keeper was actually posted (PoFA 9(4), PPSCoP 8.1.2(e), and the Interpretation Act 1978).
Britannia has failed to demonstrate that the Notice to Keeper was actually posted, as required by PoFA 9(4), which states that the notice must be given (delivered) to the keeper within 14 days, or presumed delivered in accordance with the postal provisions under the Interpretation Act 1978.
Britannia relies on what they call a “certificate of posting,” but this is in fact not a "proof of posting certificate" at all. It is merely a system-generated confirmation from a third-party mail consolidator, showing only that Britannia transferred the notice to that consolidator for processing. This does not prove that the notice was physically posted — i.e., handed to Royal Mail or entered the postal system on the same day. It simply proves that it was generated and sent electronically to a bulk print/mail provider. That is not the same thing as posting, and it does not satisfy PoFA.
This precise failure is anticipated and directly addressed in the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), Clause 8.1.2(e), Note 2, which states:“Operators must retain a record of the date of posting of a notice, not simply of that notice having been generated (e.g. the date that any third-party Mail Consolidator actually put it in the postal system).”
Britannia has provided no evidence that the notice was actually entered into the Royal Mail system on the stated issue date, or even within the required period to be able show presumption of delivery within the 14 day period. They have not shown a Royal Mail receipt, dispatch log, or any other physical evidence that confirms the notice was posted.
Worse still, Britannia have confirmed that their delivery class is “2–3 day delivery.” This is clearly second-class post, not first class. Under the Interpretation Act 1978, only first class post triggers a statutory presumption of delivery two working days after posting. Second class post has no such two-day presumption, and may be presumed delivered not less than 3 working days after posting. Therefore, Britannia’s own admission about the postal class destroys their ability to rely on the PoFA 14-day service rule via presumption.
In summary:• The “certificate of posting” proves nothing about actual posting.
• No evidence has been provided to confirm that Royal Mail accepted or handled the notice.
• The delivery method was second class, which does not support a two-working-day presumption of delivery.
Therefore, Britannia has not complied with PoFA 9(4), the PPSCoP, or the Interpretation Act.
Without actual proof of posting via first class mail, Britannia cannot rely on any presumption of service, and the notice must be considered delivered outside the 14-day window. Keeper liability under PoFA therefore does not apply.
Because Britannia has failed to comply with multiple mandatory conditions, keeper liability does not apply. POPLA has no alternative but to uphold this appeal on this point alone.
2. Inadequate evidence that a legally binding contract was capable of being formed.
The alleged contravention is based on a failure to validate the stay by entering the vehicle registration into a kiosk within 10 minutes of arrival. For such a contractual obligation to be enforceable, Britannia Parking must prove that:• There was sufficient signage on site,
• Displayed in prominent and visible locations,
• Containing clear and legible wording,
• Communicating the material terms of the alleged contract, including the requirement to validate within 10 minutes, and the consequences of not doing so.
They are not required to prove that the driver actually read the signs, but they are required to demonstrate that the signage was such that a reasonable driver would have been aware of the terms before being deemed to have accepted them. This is the minimum threshold for contract formation under the principle of incorporation of terms by notice, as affirmed in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67.
To date, Britannia has not supplied any evidence of the signage at the site, including:• A site map showing the location of signs relative to the vehicle’s route and the kiosk,
• Photographs of the signage as seen from a driver’s perspective, particularly on entry and at the kiosk,
• A readable image of the sign displaying the 10-minute validation requirement and warning of the £100 charge.
Without such evidence, POPLA cannot be satisfied that the signage met the standard required to convey binding contractual terms to a reasonable motorist. Furthermore, if the validation requirement was buried in small print, not visible from a moving vehicle, or not immediately apparent upon parking, then no contract can be said to have been formed.
It is not open to Britannia to assert that a contract existed unless they provide compelling proof that their signage was capable of creating one. In the absence of such proof, no contractual liability can arise, and the Parking Charge Notice must be cancelled.
3. Failure to clearly communicate key contractual terms, including the 10-minute validation requirement.
Britannia asserts that motorists must enter their vehicle registration into a kiosk within 10 minutes of arrival or face a £100 charge. This is not a minor procedural detail — it is a core contractual condition, the breach of which allegedly triggers the charge. It therefore must be given particular prominence on the signage, in accordance with the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) Clause 7.2.3, which states:“Terms that may result in charges or other liabilities must be made clear and prominently displayed at the locations where they apply. These terms must be clearly identifiable as the key terms and distinguishable from less important information.”
Britannia has failed to provide any evidence that this 10-minute validation requirement is:• Displayed in large, prominent font;
• Unambiguous and clearly stated as a condition precedent to avoiding a charge;
• Highlighted in any way (e.g., bold, contrasting colour) to differentiate it from general terms;
• Located at key decision points, such as the car park entrance or payment kiosk.
Without this evidence, POPLA cannot possibly conclude that any contract was capable of being formed on these terms. The Supreme Court in ParkingEye v Beavis upheld the enforceability of a parking charge specifically because the £85 charge was prominently displayed in large text and the key terms were clear. That case cannot be used as a blanket justification for signage that hides its most critical term in small print or makes it discoverable only after a breach has occurred.
If the 10-minute condition is not sufficiently visible and distinguishable from surrounding text, then the operator cannot reasonably assert that any motorist — let alone one arriving in a moving vehicle — would be aware of it in time to comply. It is not enough to bury the requirement somewhere in dense text or expect that the motorist will seek it out unaided. The burden lies squarely with the operator to prove that the signage communicated this term clearly and prominently.
In the absence of any such evidence, Britannia has not met the evidential threshold required to demonstrate that a contract was properly offered or that its terms were fairly and prominently communicated. Accordingly, the Parking Charge Notice cannot be enforced.
4. The operator is put to strict proof of a valid and contemporaneous contract with the landowner.
The burden lies with Britannia Parking to demonstrate that they have the necessary legal standing to issue Parking Charge Notices and to offer contracts to motorists at the site in question. POPLA has consistently held that operators must provide evidence of their authority to operate on the land, not merely generic or assumed authority.
Britannia is put to strict proof that:• They have a current, valid contract with the landowner of the site known as "Botley – The Dolphin";
• That this contract grants them the right to issue Parking Charge Notices and to take legal action in their own name;
• That the contract is held by the specific Britannia entity pursuing the charge, not merely “Britannia Parking” as a group or brand;
• That the contract covers the relevant period, including the date of the alleged contravention.
As previously stated, “Britannia Parking” is not a legal entity. There are multiple companies registered at Companies House using the “Britannia Parking” brand or variants thereof. POPLA must be satisfied that the exact corporate entity issuing this charge has the contractual right to do so. An operator cannot rely on presumed or umbrella authority. There must be a clear and direct chain of authority between the landowner and the specific party enforcing the terms.
If the operator fails to produce a suitably redacted copy of this contract, or otherwise fails to meet the evidential burden of proving landowner authority, the appeal must be allowed.
Conclusion:
The Notice to Keeper is fundamentally non-compliant with multiple mandatory provisions of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Britannia Parking has failed to:• Include the statutory invitation required by PoFA 9(2)(e)(i);
• Accurately convey the 28-day period under PoFA 9(2)(f);
• Identify the correct legal creditor under PoFA 9(2)(h);
• Prove the notice was posted in accordance with PoFA 9(4), the Interpretation Act, and PPSCoP 8.1.2(e).
In addition, Britannia has failed to demonstrate that a legally binding contract could have been formed due to the absence of evidence of adequate signage clearly communicating the 10-minute validation condition. They have also not provided proof of landowner authority for the specific corporate entity pursuing the charge.
All of these are fatal defects. Britannia's template-style responses demonstrate a refusal to engage with the specific legal points raised and a complete disregard for statutory and code compliance.
For all the above reasons, I request that POPLA allow this appeal and require Britannia Parking to cancel this unenforceable Parking Charge Notice. -
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Amazing! Thank you so much! The appeal was submitted this morning, so lets see what happens. I owe you a beer :-)
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This is the evidence they've sent to POPLA, quite a big document!
Do I need to comment on this? I have the option to.
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Please host the redacted evidence pack on DropBox or Google Drive.
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Please host the redacted evidence pack on DropBox or Google Drive.
Should be attached to the previous post as as PDF. Can try a different link if you can't download it. -
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I refuse to download large PDF files when you could simply host it as suggested and then I don't have to clutter up my HD with other people data. It's not difficult.
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I refuse to download large PDF files when you could simply host it as suggested and then I don't have to clutter up my HD with other people data. It's not difficult.
That's fair enough. No problem. here is the link https://drive.google.com/file/d/14xYdUOt-hivUcN7Ti_CxdqmM80iIvhVl/view?usp=drive_link
Appreciate your help. -
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You need to provide public access. Just make sure that all your personal data is redacted. Do not redact any dates or times.
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You need to provide public access. Just make sure that all your personal data is redacted. Do not redact any dates or times.
Apologies. We'll get there in the end. Please try now. Have removed all personal details. -
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Where does the prominent sign in evidence refer to '10 minutes' with the same clarity as the other major terms?
If 10 minutes applies, then the breach occurred at 18.14, not at any other time. I'm still baffled at to when the breach occurred.
..nearly as baffled as to why the OP didn't provide a receipt. If we're talking of evidence then there is none that any person in the vehicle actually patronised the pub.
And on a point of accuracy, PoFA does not specify that a NTK must include details of by when payment of the charge is to be paid, in fact it's quite vague:
b)inform the keeper that the driver is required to pay parking charges in respect of the specified period of parking and that the parking charges have not been paid in full;
(c)describe the parking charges due from the driver as at the end of that period, the circumstances in which the requirement to pay them arose (including the means by which the requirement was brought to the attention of drivers) and the other facts that made them payable;
(d)specify the total amount of those parking charges that are unpaid, as at a time which is—
(i)specified in the notice; and
(ii)no later than the end of the day before the day on which the notice is either sent by post or, as the case may be, handed to or left at a current address for service for the keeper (see sub-paragraph (4));
The only reference to a period in this context is the warning regarding at what point the creditor may hold the keeper liable. Just because this states 28 days does not mean that payment of the charge has to be made within the same period. The latter has been drawn from the former, but it's not stipulated. Imputing a meaning is one thing, but it doesn't make it mandatory or directory.
IMO, there's too much enphasis placed on this in the appeal.
Similarly, trying to draw a distinction between the effects of '28 days from the date given' and '28 days beginning on the date after that on which the notice is given'. IMO, these are the same. 'From' excludes the trigger event IMO. There's case law on this. 'From' and 'within' and their variants exclude the trigger event which is why the form of words 'beginning on the date of' are used when this is intended to be conveyed.
And 'must state' does not mean must carry the words verbatim, this is established in case law, but it does mean that whatever is written must convey the correct meaning and not mislead.
IMO.
OP, I suggest you shift your focus.
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