Free Traffic Legal Advice

The VWFS letter of 7 July 2025 is fatal to the council’s position because it discloses that the authority purported to act on a representation that did not fall within any of the permissible statutory grounds under the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003. Section 6 of that Act permits the transfer of liability only in narrowly defined circumstances, one of which is where the recipient of the PCN is a vehicle hire firm and the vehicle was subject to a vehicle hiring agreement of not more than six months. Section 92 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, which is imported into the 2003 Act, defines a vehicle hiring agreement in strict terms. It must be a written agreement, signed by the hirer, for a fixed term not exceeding six months, and it must be accompanied by a signed statement of liability from the hirer. None of these statutory prerequisites were satisfied.

VWFS’ letter referred to a one-day lease commencing and terminating on 22 June 2025. Such an agreement is inconsistent with your evidence, which demonstrates that your lease expired on 20 June 2025 and that you had acquired title to the vehicle under a sales contract by that date. Even if VWFS had still owned the vehicle on 22 June, their assertion of a one-day lease is unsustainable in law, because it was not evidenced by the production of the written agreement required by statute, nor by a signed statement of liability from you as hirer. The authority, in accepting this representation and cancelling the PCN of 26 June issued to VWFS, acted outside their powers. The issue is not whether you were in fact the owner of the vehicle, but whether the statutory machinery was properly engaged to make you liable. It was not.

The concern that some adjudicators may adopt a pragmatic approach and focus on your ownership status is understandable, but legally misconceived. Liability in civil enforcement proceedings of this nature arises not by virtue of beneficial ownership but by operation of statute. The starting point is the registered keeper, subject to specific statutory exceptions. Unless the council can demonstrate that VWFS made representations on a permitted ground, supported by the requisite documentation, and that the PCN was lawfully cancelled on that basis, any subsequent PCN issued to you is a nullity. This is not a matter of discretion but of jurisdiction. The tribunal’s own decisions recognise that procedural impropriety or ultra vires conduct renders enforcement void: see for example Camden LBC v The Parking Adjudicator [2011] EWHC 295 (Admin), where it was emphasised that an authority must act strictly within the statutory framework.

The appropriate ground of representation is therefore that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case. The circumstances are that VWFS were not a hire firm within the meaning of the 2003 Act at the material time, the letter of 7 July 2025 does not satisfy the statutory requirements for transfer of liability, and the council had no power to issue a new PCN in your name. To reinforce this point, you may invite the authority to produce the signed hire agreement and statement of liability that section 66(4) requires. If they cannot, the only proper course is cancellation of the PCN.

Tactically, it is unnecessary and potentially distracting to argue about your status as owner. The strongest position is to deny liability as a matter of statutory procedure, supported by the documentary inconsistency in VWFS’ letter. If pressed, you may rely on your sales invoice and correspondence showing purchase on 20 June, but only to demonstrate that VWFS’ account is false, not to prove ownership as a ground of liability. If the council reject your representation and the matter proceeds to the tribunal, your case will rest on clear statutory footing: the authority had no jurisdiction to transfer liability to you and the PCN is void.

The most effective remedy is therefore to pursue cancellation on the procedural ground alone. This maximises your prospects because it compels the council to justify its decision within the strict confines of the statutory scheme, where its case is plainly defective.

The starting point is to recognise that liability for a penalty charge notice issued under the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003 arises once the enforcement authority serves a penalty charge notice by post to the name and address of the registered keeper as provided by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency pursuant to section 7 of that Act and paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. Service is deemed to occur two working days after posting unless the contrary is proved. The process thereafter is prescribed in statute and the Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (General Provisions) Regulations 2022, namely the issue of a charge certificate increasing the penalty by fifty per cent, the making of an order for recovery under regulation 23, and the subsequent authorisation of a warrant of control through the Traffic Enforcement Centre at Northampton County Court under regulation 28.

On the facts as presented, the contravention occurred on 3 May 2024, and the V5C registration document was updated by the DVLA on 9 May 2024. The key question is when the notification to the DVLA was actually made and whether it preceded the date of contravention. If it did, documentary proof such as the DVLA confirmation email or contemporaneous evidence of posting will be central to any application to set aside the warrant and revert the matter to the original penalty stage. The correct procedural route is to file a statutory declaration out of time under Part 75 of the Civil Procedure Rules and regulation 23 of the 2022 Regulations, using forms PE2 and PE3. The PE3 sets out the statutory ground that the penalty charge notice was not received. The PE2 explains why the application is made after the expiry of the prescribed time. The Traffic Enforcement Centre exercises discretion on whether to allow the application, and if refused there is a right of review before a District Judge upon payment of a fee.

It is essential to note that the enforcement authority is entitled to rely on the address provided by the DVLA at the date of contravention and is under no duty to recheck the address unless the warrant is to be reissued under CPR 75.7(7) following a return of "gone away" or similar. In this case, the fact that Marston's agents sent notices to the former address as late as November 2024 suggests either that the warrant had not been re-sealed or that the enforcement address had not been updated. This does not, however, invalidate the underlying penalty if the initial service was deemed effective under the statute. The correct approach is to challenge the enforcement on the basis of non-receipt caused by the address change and DVLA processing delay, not to attack the bailiff for behaviour that, whilst perhaps discourteous, is largely irrelevant to the court's determination of the underlying liability.

Pending determination of the out of time application, there is a real risk that enforcement will proceed under Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Under paragraph 18 of that Schedule, the enforcement agent may take control of goods on a public highway by immobilisation or removal. This power exists even if the warrant address is incorrect, provided the vehicle is identified as belonging to the judgment debtor. Accordingly, there are two immediate tactical options. First, to file the PE2 and PE3 without delay, accompanied by any proof of the date DVLA was notified, proof of moving dates, and a concise chronology explaining the lack of receipt. Secondly, to request the enforcement authority or its agents to place enforcement on hold for at least 14 days pending the TEC's decision. Such a request should be made in writing to Hackney Council's parking services, not merely to the bailiffs, as only the council can instruct its agents to suspend action.

The suggestion from some quarters that payment now will cap the liability is correct in the sense that paying the compliance stage sum of £280 would prevent the addition of the £235 enforcement stage fee under the Taking Control of Goods (Fees) Regulations 2014. If the out of time application then succeeds, that sum would be refunded. However, there is a countervailing tactical risk that payment will be treated administratively as acceptance of liability, and unless the application is properly framed it may prejudice the equitable exercise of discretion by the court. This risk is mitigated if payment is expressly made "without prejudice" to the right to recover upon successful application.

In practical terms, the most effective strategy is to prepare and submit the PE2 and PE3 immediately, supported by a sworn witness statement setting out the dates of the address change, the method and date of notification to DVLA, the absence of any mail forwarding, and the chronology of first knowledge of the penalty. Attach documentary evidence including the V5C showing the 9 May 2024 issue date, proof of house moves, and any correspondence with DVLA. Send a parallel request to Hackney Council to suspend enforcement. Retain copies of all communications. If the application is refused, apply promptly to the County Court for a review under CPR 75.5(2), where the District Judge may take a more generous view if satisfied that non-receipt was caused by DVLA processing delays outside your control. This combined approach maximises the prospect of having the case reverted to the £130 penalty stage and of recovering any enforcement fees paid, whilst protecting against the immediate threat of seizure of the vehicle.

Your case discloses a compelling basis for restitutionary relief grounded in statutory irregularity and procedural abuse under the civil enforcement framework. While you have discharged the underlying balance of £560 following enforcement by CDER Group, that payment was extracted in circumstances which, on your account, render the process invalid under both Schedule 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013.

Let me set out the legal position with clarity. The Notice of Enforcement issued to you by CDER Group bears the date 2 June 2025, with a demand for payment by 6:00am on 9 June 2025. This fails, on its face, to satisfy the mandatory requirement of Regulation 7(1) of the 2013 Regulations, which provides that a notice of enforcement must afford the debtor not less than seven clear days before enforcement action may be taken. Clear days exclude the day of service and the day of compliance, and further disregard Sundays and bank holidays. Even under a generous construction, the notice period in your case was non-compliant, thereby vitiating the enforcement process from the outset.

Moreover, you have reported that CDER’s enforcement agent, during a visit to your property, displayed on a mobile device an extended account history purporting to show a series of letters, emails, and possibly a prior visit, none of which you ever received. This log, crucial to justifying the escalation of fees, has not been disclosed to you despite multiple requests. Instead, CDER have provided what appear to be truncated or redacted records omitting the very entries shown to you at the door. The failure to furnish a complete and accurate record of enforcement activity engages both Regulation 24 of the 2013 Regulations and the common law principles of good faith and transparency in enforcement.

A further difficulty arises in relation to service of notices and address verification. You have evidence that both the Traffic Enforcement Centre and Transport for London were corresponding with you at your correct address as early as February 2025, yet CDER did not update their records until May 2025. This raises significant questions as to whether key statutory notices—including the Notice of Enforcement—were lawfully served or otherwise came to your attention within the prescribed timeframes. These defects are not academic. The enforcement fees levied—£75 at compliance stage and £235 at enforcement visit—are strictly contingent upon procedural compliance. Where there is material non-compliance, those fees cannot lawfully be charged.

Having now paid the sum in full, your remedy lies not in resisting enforcement but in challenging the lawfulness of the process and seeking restitution of fees unlawfully demanded. The legal basis for recovery would be a claim in restitution for money had and received, supported by the principle that money paid under compulsion or mistake of law is recoverable where no legal obligation to pay existed. This is well established in authority, including Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70 and, more recently in the enforcement context, Burton v Ministry of Justice [2024] EWCA Civ 681.

Transport for London, as the principal, remains vicariously liable for the acts of its agents. It cannot disown responsibility merely by referring 'complaints' to CDER Group. The standard response you received from TfL, dated 14 July 2025, fails entirely to engage with the statutory breach you have identified and reflects either a lack of understanding or an abdication of legal oversight.

In these circumstances, I would advise you to pursue the following course:

First, submit a formal pre-action disclosure request under CPR 31.17 to CDER Group. This is procedurally superior to a subject access request. A request under CPR 31.17 entitles you to obtain, prior to litigation, specific documents held by a third party (in this case, CDER Group) where it is likely those documents are relevant to anticipated proceedings and where disclosure is necessary to fairly dispose of the claim or save costs. Unlike a subject access request under the UK GDPR, which provides only for personal data (often in redacted or summarised form), CPR 31.17 enables you to demand unredacted original records, including audit logs, email dispatch reports, correspondence files, and internal system entries used to justify enforcement action. These documents will be central to the merits of any future claim for restitution.

Secondly, send a renewed formal complaint to Transport for London, expressly relying on the defective notice period and the absence of proper service. That complaint should be addressed to the legal or enforcement oversight department and demand repayment of the compliance and enforcement fees (£310). Your letter must make clear that the PCN itself is not in dispute; rather, it is the subsequent enforcement which is impugned. You may, if appropriate, enclose a draft Particulars of Claim to demonstrate the seriousness of your intention to litigate.

Thirdly, if neither CDER nor TfL respond adequately within 14 days, you may issue a Part 7 claim in the County Court for restitution of the £310. Your cause of action would be for money had and received on the grounds that the enforcement was unlawful, the fees were improperly levied, and the payment was made under compulsion. The claim would be suitable for the small claims track and should be supported by a concise witness statement and copy documents including the Notice of Enforcement, correspondence, and your CPR 31.17 request.

You may, in the alternative, consider an application under CPR 84.16 for detailed assessment of the enforcement fees, although this is more commonly deployed at an earlier stage and may involve technical argument as to timing.

In conclusion, your legal position is strong. The enforcement action taken against you was arguably void for failure to comply with mandatory notice provisions. You have a clear statutory and equitable basis to seek repayment of fees improperly extracted. I would be pleased to assist in the preparation of your CPR 31.17 request, and, if necessary, TFL particulars of claim.

Should you proceed promptly and with precision, I am confident the matter can be resolved without the need for protracted litigation.

I understand where you are coming from in trying to resolve a traffic contravention, but Freedom was clear from the outset that neither the contravention nor the associated debt is in dispute.

Submitting an out-of-time application using forms PE2 and PE3 would not succeed, as form PE3 specifically asks whether the motorist failed to receive key statutory notices or a response after making timely representations or an appeal. Since Freedom does not dispute the contravention, PE3 is not the appropriate form. Form PE2, which asks why the application is being made out of time, is also unsuitable, as Freedom already paid the debt directly to Newlyn and evidenced the flow of money.

This is to bring you up to date. The matter is now in hand. I am grateful to those who assisted Freedom by requesting the PCN number, vehicle registration, and supporting documents so the original contravention could be accessed via Barnet's website and the images shared here. That said, Freedom's case is not a motoring issue in the usual sense.

The core issue is that Freedom paid the traffic contravention debt in full and can clearly evidence the flow of funds, thereby bringing the enforcement power to an end under paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Despite this, the enforcement company, acting unilaterally, chose to refund the payment and then sought to treat that refund as reviving the enforcement power. That position is legally untenable, as no statutory provision permits enforcement to recommence simply because an enforcement agent, for reasons of its own, has elected to return funds after lawful payment has been made.

Freedom was therefore left with two lawful options. The first was to submit forms PE2 and PE3, which would activate paragraph 8.1 of Practice Direction 75 and thereby suspend enforcement, allowing time to apply for interim injunctive relief to restrain the auction and recover the vehicle, with a further hearing to be listed for costs and damages.

The second option was to pay the amount again, expressly without prejudice, in order to recover the vehicle, while preserving the right to bring a claim against Barnet for unlawful interference with goods and for any damage or loss arising from the enforcement. That claim would rely on paragraphs 35 and 66 of Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, together with section 3 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. That course has now been adopted.

Barnet will be invited to settle Freedom's claim, or otherwise resolve it judicially if not agreed.