No need to CC in District Enforcement but no harm done. Probably that is what forced Gladstones to respond do quickly as they most likely got a panicky phone call from DE. They never attend a hearing but they will likely send a pay by the hour advocate on their behalf. If they don't, even better.
Who has signed their WS? Is it a paralegal from Gladstones or an employee from DE? Interesting that they have offered their own draft order for the set aside (not for the claim). They are on the back foot.
Assuming you have paid for the application (N244) they are not offering anything in their order except to agree to the set aside and that you submit a defence to the original claim. Do not accept that. You want your costs back and the claim thrown out or at least force them to comply with the draft order to your defence.
Regarding the points you noted about their WS... You could send a supplementary WS.
Just so you understand, here are some explanations to counter their points:
34. The Defendant alleges that they were unable to respond to the claim as they did not receive the Court papers. Notices were served at the address provided by the DVLA. It is the Defendant’s obligation to ensure their details are correct and up to date with the DVLA and the Claimant cannot be prejudiced for their failure to do so. Further, the Claim Form was served on the Defendant at their last known place of residence pursuant to CPR 6.9.
DVLA data is provided for a single, very limited reason: to allow a parking operator to invite the registered keeper to either name the driver or pay the invoice, or to inform the registered keeper that they will be liable if they do not, as well as to notify them of their rights to appeal.
The system, known as 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date Of Event), provides a snapshot in time of the address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only permitted to request this information from the DVLA once. Therefore, the operators CoP requires that reasonable steps be taken to ensure the address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates their V5C logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common), a parking operator will not be aware of this and cannot find out.
There is no safe assumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address for serving a Defendant. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it only indicates where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper resides; it is simply where the car was 'kept').
37. The Defendant alleges that their Tenancy Agreement makes no reference to a third party being able to issue parking charges or a requirement to display a permit. The Defendant provided a copy of the Tenancy Agreement for 9 Stratford House Road in support of their application. The Claimant submits that the Defendant’s Tenancy Agreement has no impact on their liability for the PCNs.
They would say that, wouldn't they. Use the following as your counter to that:
Supremacy of Contract:
You should argue that your Tenancy Agreement, which predates any alleged contract between the managing agent and the parking operator, has supremacy of contract. Since the Tenancy Agreement does not mention any requirement to display a permit or authorise a third party to issue parking charges, the terms of the agreement take precedence over any subsequent parking rules imposed by the managing agent or parking operator. In the absence of any such terms in the Tenancy Agreement, you should claim that you did not consent to these rules and, therefore, cannot be held liable for breaching them.
Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, Section 37 Compliance:
You can argue that, under Section 37 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, any variation of the Tenancy Agreement that affects the tenant's rights must meet specific requirements. Section 37(5)(a) or (b) stipulates that, for a variation to be enforceable, it must either be agreed upon by at least 75% of the leaseholders or tenants, with no more than 10% dissenting, and be authorised by the court. If the managing agent did not follow those requirements as required by the Act when imposing the parking rules, you can argue that the purported contract with the parking operator is invalid and the original terms of the Tenancy Agreement remain in force.
No Evidence of Agreement to New Terms:
You should assert that there is no evidence that you agreed to any new terms that would allow a third party to issue parking charges or require a permit. If you did at any point show a permit, it was purely out of courtesy, not obligation. If the parking operator or managing agent did not inform you of these new terms or obtain you explicit consent, then you should argue that you are not bound by them. Without clear evidence of agreement to these new terms, you argue that the terms of the Tenancy Agreement prevail.
Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation:
You could invoke the principle of estoppel, arguing that you had a legitimate expectation based on the terms of the Tenancy Agreement that you would not be subject to additional parking rules or charges. Since you relied on this understanding when signing the Tenancy Agreement, it would be unfair to enforce new terms retrospectively without proper notice or agreement.
Challenging the Credibility of the Claimant’s Witness Statement:
Since the witness statement is signed only by a paralegal from the claimant's solicitor (if that is indeed the case), you should challenge its credibility, arguing that it lacks first-hand knowledge of the facts. You argue that the statement does not constitute substantive evidence to override the Tenancy Agreement, especially if it does not provide a clear basis for the claim that the Tenancy Agreement has no impact on liability for the PCNs.
39. The Defendant avers the Claimant’s Particulars of Claim are deficient, however despite this the Claimant notes the Defendant has been able to produce a substantive application. In this regard, the Claimant believes the Defendant has not suffered any prejudice.
Non-Compliance with CPR 16.4(1)(a): You must emphasise that the claimant’s PoC did not comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a), which requires that the particulars must include "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies." If the PoC did not provide a clear and concise account of the facts that formed the basis of the claim, then it is deficient. The fact that you managed to produce a substantive application based on your own knowledge does not absolve the claimant of their responsibility to comply with this rule.
Lack of Sufficient Information:
You have already argued in your draft defence that the PoC were so inadequate that they failed to provide sufficient information for you to fully understand the case against you or to prepare a proper defence. This lack of detail forced you to rely on your own recollection and limited information, rather than being able to address specific claims made by the claimant. Therefore, you were prejudiced by not having the opportunity to respond to a properly articulated claim.
Prejudice to the Defendant:
You argue that you have suffered prejudice as a result of the inadequate PoC because you were not given fair notice of the claim against you. This is a fundamental principle of justice, as it ensures that a defendant has a fair opportunity to know the case they must meet and to prepare a defence. The fact that you managed to infer some details from the limited information provided does not negate the prejudice caused by the claimant’s failure to comply with the Civil Procedure Rules.
Requirement for Proper Pleading:
You must stress that the rules of court exist to ensure fairness and clarity in legal proceedings. Compliance with CPR 16.4(1)(a) is not optional; it is a mandatory requirement designed to provide a clear framework within which both parties can understand the case. The claimant's failure to meet this requirement should not be excused simply because you managed to put together a response based on your own knowledge and assumptions. Proper legal procedure requires that each party is given a fair and equal opportunity to present their case based on a clear and complete statement of facts.
Emphasise Legal Precedents and Principles:
You have already cite relevant legal precedents and principles that reinforce the importance of providing adequate particulars of claim with the CPMS v Akande and CEL v Chan transcripts. Courts have consistently held that providing clear and detailed particulars is essential for fairness in legal proceedings. By not adhering to these principles, the claimant undermines the integrity of the process and prejudices your ability to defend yourself.
40. Notwithstanding the above, the Claim is issued via the County Court Business Centre which is a procedure specifically provided for in the Civil Procedure Rules. This only allows the Claimant to insert brief details of the Claim. In any event, the Claimant confirms that the Particulars of Claim contained sufficient information for the Defendant to be aware of what the claim relates to; namely:-
6
i. The date of the charge;
ii. The amount outstanding;
iii. That it relates to a parking charge; and
iv. That it is a debt.
Requirement for Sufficient Particulars of Claim Under CPR 16.4(1)(a):
You must emphasise that, regardless of the method used to issue the claim (including through the CNBC via MCOL), the claimant is still required to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(a). This rule mandates that the PoC must include "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies." The brief details allowed in the initial MCOL form do not exempt the claimant from their obligation to provide sufficient particulars to give the Defendant a clear understanding of the case against them. The claimant could have filed additional particulars after issuing the claim to comply with this requirement.
Ability to Provide Further Particulars After Issuing the Claim:
You argue that the claimant had the opportunity to provide further particulars of claim after issuing the claim via MCOL but chose not to do so. The Civil Procedure Rules allow claimants to serve more detailed particulars of claim within 14 days of the claim form. The claimant’s reliance on the MCOL’s limitations is not a valid excuse for failing to provide the necessary details. The claimant should have served a more detailed document to ensure the Defendant was fully informed of the case against them.
Insufficient Information Provided:
You assert that the information listed by the claimant as being provided in the PoC — such as the date of the charge, the amount outstanding, the fact that it relates to a parking charge and that it is a debt — is inadequate for understanding the full nature of the claim. For a claim to be properly articulated, the PoC should also include the specific facts and legal basis for the claim, such as:
The specific location of the alleged parking violation.
The terms and conditions that were allegedly breached.
How the Defendant is alleged to have breached those terms.
The basis on which the claimant asserts their right to impose and collect the parking charge.
You have already argued that without these crucial details, you were not in a position to understand the full nature of the claim or prepare an informed defence. Hence the draft order for the defence.
Impact of Insufficient Particulars on Your Ability to Defend:
You have already highlighted that the lack of detailed particulars prejudiced your ability to mount a proper defence. By only providing minimal details, the claimant has not given you a fair opportunity to understand the claim or gather evidence in your defence. This omission is significant, as it undermines the fundamental principle of fairness in legal proceedings, which requires both parties to have a fair opportunity to present their case.
Precedent for Adequate Particulars of Claim:
You have already referred to legal precedents where courts have held that even claims issued through MCOL must comply with the requirement for adequate particulars. Courts have made it clear that the use of MCOL does not relieve a claimant of their duty to provide sufficient information. The transcripts provided are persuasive appeal cases where claims struck out due to inadequate particulars, reinforcing the point that the method of issuing the claim does not excuse the claimant from meeting their procedural obligations.
Based on the above, you should file a Supplementary Witness Statement which makes it clear your objection to their draft order and highlights the failing in their WS. If you feel you can improve or expand on any of the points based on the information provided above, feel free to do so. I tis your SWS. If any regulars would care to add anything, they should mention in this thread.
IN THE [NAME OF COURT]
CLAIM NUMBER: [Claim Number]
BETWEEN
[Claimant's Name] (Claimant)
AND
[Defendant's Name] (Defendant)
SUPPLEMENTARY WITNESS STATEMENT OF [DEFENDANT’S NAME]
1. I, [Defendant’s Name], am the Defendant in this matter and make this supplementary witness statement in support of my application to set aside the default judgment entered against me. I strongly object to the Claimant’s proposed draft order for the reasons outlined below and provide further clarification to counter the arguments made in the Claimant's witness statement dated [date].
Objection to the Claimant’s Draft Order
2. I unequivocally object to the Claimant’s proposed draft order and do not consent to it. The Claimant’s draft order is a blatant attempt to undermine my application for a set aside and avoid liability for the costs I have incurred due to their failure to serve the claim at my correct address. The Claimant did not respond to my request for an order by consent, which forced me to incur a higher application fee (£303) for a hearing without consent. The Claimant's draft order seeks to unfairly prejudice my position by imposing unreasonable conditions and attempting to absolve themselves of responsibility for the procedural errors they have made.
Response to Paragraph 34 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement
3. In paragraph 34, the Claimant suggests that I did not receive the Court papers because I failed to update my address with the DVLA, implying that I am to blame for the misservice. However, it is the Claimant’s responsibility to ensure that the court documents are properly served. The Claimant relied solely on an outdated address obtained from the DVLA, which does not reflect my actual address at the time the claim was issued.
4. DVLA data is provided for a single, very limited reason: to allow a parking operator to invite the registered keeper to either name the driver or pay the invoice, or to inform the registered keeper that they will be liable if they do not, as well as to notify them of their rights to appeal.
5. The system, known as 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date Of Event), provides a snapshot in time of the address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only permitted to request this information from the DVLA once. Therefore, the operators Approved Operator Scheme (AOS) Code of Practice (CoP) requires that reasonable steps be taken to ensure the address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates their V5C logbook with a new address (or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common), a parking operator will not be aware of this and cannot find out.
6. There is no safe assumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address for serving a Defendant. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it only indicates where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper resides; it is simply where the car was 'kept').
7. Further, the Claimant’s assertion that they cannot be prejudiced for my alleged failure to update the DVLA is misplaced. The default judgment was entered automatically via the MCOL system without any human intervention by the defendant or the court, due to improper service of the claim. I was not given a fair opportunity to defend myself because I did not receive the claim form, which was sent to an incorrect address. The Claimant’s reliance on CPR 6.9 is also disingenuous, as they did not take reasonable steps to ascertain my current address before serving the claim.
Response to Paragraph 37 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement
8. In paragraph 37, the Claimant dismisses the significance of my Tenancy Agreement, stating that it has no impact on my liability for the Parking Charge Notices (PCNs). This is incorrect. My Tenancy Agreement forms the basis of my rights to use the parking space and makes no mention of any third-party parking management scheme, nor does it impose any requirement to display a permit. My Tenancy Agreement has supremacy of contract.
9. Since the Tenancy Agreement does not mention any requirement to display a permit or authorise a third party to issue parking charges, the terms of the agreement take precedence over any subsequent parking rules imposed by the managing agent or parking operator. In the absence of any such terms in the Tenancy Agreement, I did not consent to these rules and, therefore, cannot be held liable for breaching them.
10. The Claimant has not demonstrated that they have any contractual authority over the land or that their terms override my existing rights under the Tenancy Agreement. The Claimant’s assertion that the Tenancy Agreement has no relevance is a flawed interpretation of the supremacy of contract principle, which should protect my pre-existing rights against the imposition of new terms by a third party without my consent.
Response to Paragraph 39 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement
11. In paragraph 39, the Claimant argues that despite their inadequate Particulars of Claim (PoC), I have been able to produce a substantive application, suggesting that I have not suffered any prejudice. This argument is wholly unfounded. The fact that I was able to file a set aside application based on my knowledge of the events does not absolve the Claimant from the requirement to comply fully with CPR 16.4(1)(a). If the PoC did not provide a clear and concise account of the facts that formed the basis of the claim, then it is deficient. The Claimant also failed to provide a copy of the original PoC following the allocation judges order dated [date].
12. The PoC that I managed to obtain from the CNBC were woefully deficient and did not contain a "concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies." This inadequacy prejudiced my ability to understand the nature of the claim against me and to formulate a full defence. The court should not accept the Claimant’s attempt to shift the burden onto me when it is clear that they failed to meet the basic requirements for issuing a claim.
13. The rules of court exist to ensure fairness and clarity in legal proceedings. Compliance with CPR 16.4(1)(a) is not optional; it is a mandatory requirement designed to provide a clear framework within which both parties can understand the case. The claimant's failure to meet this requirement should not be excused simply because I managed to put together a response based on my own knowledge and assumptions. Proper legal procedure requires that each party is given a fair and equal opportunity to present their case based on a clear and complete statement of facts.
14. I have already cited relevant legal precedents and principles in my original witness statement that reinforce the importance of providing adequate particulars of claim with the CPMS v Akande and CEL v Chan transcripts. Courts have consistently held that providing clear and detailed particulars is essential for fairness in legal proceedings. By not adhering to these principles, the claimant undermines the integrity of the process and prejudices my ability to defend myself.
Response to Paragraph 40 of the Claimant’s Witness Statement
15. In paragraph 40, the Claimant contends that the limitations of the Money Claim Online (MCOL) service justify their minimalistic PoC and that these particulars were sufficient for me to understand the claim. This is misleading. While MCOL may have certain character limitations, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) do not absolve the Claimant of their duty to provide sufficient particulars to allow a Defendant to understand the case against them.
16. Regardless of the method used to issue the claim (including through the CNBC via MCOL), the claimant is still required to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(a). This rule mandates that the PoC must include "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies." The brief details allowed in the initial MCOL form do not exempt the claimant from their obligation to provide sufficient particulars to give the Defendant a clear understanding of the case against them. The claimant could have filed additional particulars after issuing the claim to comply with this requirement. They failed to do so.
17. The claimant had the opportunity to provide further particulars of claim after issuing the claim via MCOL but chose not to do so. The Civil Procedure Rules allow claimants to serve more detailed particulars of claim within 14 days of the claim form. The claimant’s reliance on the MCOL’s limitations is not a valid excuse for failing to provide the necessary details. The claimant should have served a more detailed document to ensure that I was fully informed of the case against me.
18. The information listed by the claimant as being provided in the PoC — such as (a) the date of the charge, (b) the amount outstanding, (c ) the fact that it relates to a parking charge and (d) that it is a debt — is inadequate for understanding the full nature of the claim. For a claim to be properly articulated, the PoC should also include the specific facts and legal basis for the claim, such as:
The specific location of the alleged parking violation.
The terms and conditions that were allegedly breached.
How I am alleged to have breached those terms.
The basis on which the claimant asserts their right to impose and collect the parking charge.
19. Without these crucial details, I am not in a position to understand the full nature of the claim or prepare an informed defence. Hence the draft order for the defence.
20. I have already highlighted that the lack of detailed particulars prejudice my ability to mount a proper defence. By only providing minimal details, the claimant has not given me a fair opportunity to understand the claim or gather evidence in my defence. This omission is significant, as it undermines the fundamental principle of fairness in legal proceedings, which requires both parties to have a fair opportunity to present their case.
21. I have already referred to legal precedents where courts have held that even claims issued through MCOL must comply with the requirement for adequate particulars. Courts have made it clear that the use of MCOL does not relieve a claimant of their duty to provide sufficient information. The transcripts provided are persuasive appeal cases where claims struck out due to inadequate particulars, reinforcing the point that the method of issuing the claim does not excuse the claimant from meeting their procedural obligations.
22. CPR 16.4(1)(a) requires a "concise statement of the facts" on which the Claimant relies, which the Claimant failed to provide. The details given in their PoC were minimal and did not give me adequate information to understand the legal basis of the claim, the alleged breaches, or the specific circumstances relating to the PCNs. The Claimant had the option to serve further particulars after issuing the claim but chose not to, demonstrating a lack of diligence and procedural fairness.
Conclusion
23. For the reasons stated above, I respectfully request that the court dismiss the Claimant’s draft order and instead grant my original application for a set aside and for the original claim to be dismissed. Alternatively, should the court not dismiss the original claim, this will ensure that I have a fair opportunity to defend myself and that the Claimant is held accountable for the procedural deficiencies and errors they have made, including the improper service of the claim and the inadequate PoC.
Statement of Truth
I believe that the facts stated in this supplementary witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed: [Defendant’s Signature]
Date: [Date]
Again, send as a PDF attachment by email to the hearing court and the claimants solicitor (no need to also send to the claimant) and CC in yourself, making sure that the claim number and claimant v defendant names are in the subject of the email.
This is the proposed draft order:
Draft Order:
CLAIM No: XXXXXXX
BETWEEN:
DISTRICT ENFORCEMENT LIMITED (Claimant)
-- and --
XXXXXXX (Defendant)
______________________________________________
DRAFT ORDER
______________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
UPON considering the application of the Defendant to set aside the Judgment by default entered on [date];
AND UPON reading the evidence in support of the application;
AND UPON the court taking note that the Claimant was not entitled to default judgment, having failed to serve on Defendant's usual residential address (CPR 13.2);
AND UPON more than 4 months having passed from issue of proceedings [date] (CPR 7.5);
AND UPON the Particulars of Claim fail to state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action (CPR 16.4(1)(e));
AND UPON the Claimants attempt to claim an unlawful amount constitutes an abuse of process (PoFA 4(5), CPR 1.1, CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b) and CPR 27.14;
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Judgment by default entered against the Defendant on [date] is hereby set aside.
2. The claim be struck out as more than 4 months has passed from issue of proceedings [date].
3. The claim be struck out for failing to state a coherent cause of action.
4. The claim be struck out for abuse of process.
5. Costs of the application be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant in the sum of £303.
I have put together a draft WS for the order. Have a look at it and add the necessary details such as addresses and dates where necessary. Once done, every paragraph must be numbered sequentially.
This is not all you need. There is also a draft order which I will provide for review before anything is sent.
District Enforcement Limited
V
XXXXXXX
Claim number XXXXXXX
WITNESS STATEMENT
I, [full name], of [current address], will say as follows:
1. I am the Defendant in this matter and I make this witness statement in support of my application to set aside the County Court Judgment (CCJ) entered against me on DD/MM/YYYY, in default due to a defective service of Claim.
2. I was not aware of the claim made against me until I recently checked my credit report and noticed that my credit score was in decline. Upon further research, I became aware that a CCJ had been issued against me in default for the sum of £685 relating to alleged parking events in March and April 2022.
BACKGROUND TO THE ALLEGED DEBT
3. In 2022, I lived in rented accommodation [old address] [exhibit #]. After residing there and parking in my designated parking space for approximately 6 months, I received a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) from the Claimant. I assumed a mistake had been made and contacted the the Claimant to ask them to cancel the charge. The Claimant replied that no error had been made and that I would have to pay, because I had not displayed a permit in my car. At the time, I was not aware that a permit was required. I did not have a permit. When I moved in, I had been shown where to park but told nothing about parking permits. I had received no other communications about parking permits up to the point that I receive the PCN.
4. In the time it took me to query the Claimant about the initial PCN, receive the Claimants response and chase up my landlady for a permit, I received two more PCNs for the same reason; no permit displayed. This was in the space of two weeks and the charges now totalled £300. I approached the site manager for the property and explained what had happened. He was surprised and told me that he would follow up. He came back to me to say that the charges had been dealt with and that the contract with the Claimant had been terminated, as it turned out that other residents had had similar experiences and the site management were not happy about it. I took that as good news, and I heard nothing more about the PCNs. I moved house approximately 3 or 4 months later.
IPC CODE OF PRACTICE AND CPR FAILURES
5. The Claimant has an old address at which I no longer reside on file and I believe that this is where the Claimant served the claim which is a clear breach of both the CPRs and the industry Code of Practice. These facts and issues are explained further, below.
6. The Claimant had a duty to take reasonable steps to check for the correct address, in accordance with the IPC Code of Practice v8 at 22.1 and CPR 6.9, as more than 12 months have passed since the Parking Charge Notices (PCN) on 29/03/2022, 12/04/2022 & 15/04/2022 and the CCJ on DD/MM/YYYY.
7. I have not received any claim form or detailed particulars of the claim regarding this matter until I became aware as per paragraph 2 above.
8. Whilst I am unsure exactly which date the claim was issued, it has been more than four months since the CCJ was issued, during which time I have not been aware of the claim or the CCJ. As per CPR 7.5, the claim should now be dismissed.
9. I believe that I have a strong defence to the claim and that it is without merit as I have evidence, in the form of my Tenancy Agreement at the time which makes no reference to any third party being able to issue parking charges nor any requirement to display a permit. [exhibit tenancy agreement or relevant section on parking]
10. Should it not be dismissed despite the wealth of case law below that supports the claim being dismissed at the set aside hearing, I should (at the very least) have the opportunity to defend it properly. My application relies upon the 'mandatory set aside' rule in CPR 13.2 (in the alternative, CPR 13.3).
11. I have set out the grounds for my application in the attached draft order.
THE CLAIM SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT
12. The Particulars of Claim (PoC) in the extant case are blatantly in breach of CPR 16.4, 16PD3 and 16PD7, and fail to "state all facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action". I am unable, on the basis of the PoC as provided by the Civil National Business Centre (CNBC), to understand with certainty what cause of action, liability basis, allegation(s) and what heads of cost are being pursued, making it difficult to respond to such an incoherently pleaded case had I received the claim. The particulars of the claim allege a breach of contract terms and conditions for parking at [old address] on 29/03/2022, 12/04/2022 & 15/04/2022. I am only aware that they relate to “failure to display a permit” as I queried the first PCN at the time.
13. There is now a persuasive Appeal judgment to support striking out the claim (in these exact circumstances of typically poorly pleaded private parking claims, and the extant PoC seen here are far worse than the one seen on Appeal). I believe that dismissing this meritless claim is the correct course, with the Overriding Objective in mind. Bulk litigators (legal firms) should know better than to make little or no attempt to comply with the Practice Direction. By continuing to plead cases with generic auto-fill unspecific wording, private parking firms should not be surprised when courts strike out their claims based in the following persuasive authority.
14. A recent persuasive appeal judgment in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) would indicate the PoC fails to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction Part 16.7.5. On the 15th August 2023, in the cited case, HHJ Murch held that 'the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract'. The same is true in this case and in view of the CEL v Chan judgment, the Court should strike out the claim, using its powers pursuant to CPR 3.4. [exhibit CEL v Chan judgment]
15. Additionally, the Claim should be struck out on the basis that it contravenes Schedule 4, Paragraph 4(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). PoFA clearly stipulates that a creditor may not make a claim against the keeper of a vehicle for more than the amount of the unpaid parking charges as they stood when the notice to the driver was issued. The original PCNs issued by the Claimant were for £100 each. The default judgment for this claim was for £685, which far exceeds the amount of the unpaid parking charges as stated in the original notices. The claimant’s attempt to claim an unlawful amount constitutes an abuse of process and should not be allowed to proceed. I respectfully request the court to dismiss the claim on the basis of the Claimant’s contravention of Schedule 4, Paragraph 4(5) of PoFA and thereby CPR 1.1, CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b) and CPR 27.14 and to award costs to for having to defend against this improper claim.
16. In any case, the original PCNs should not have been issued and the claim is invalid.
THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO SERVE THE CLAIM
17. I understand that the Claimant obtained a Default Judgment against me as the Defendant on DD/MM/YYYY. I am aware that the Claimant is District Enforcement Limited and that the assumed claim is in respect of unpaid Parking Charge Notices.
18. CPR 6.9 stipulates that an "Individual" should be served at their "Usual or last known residence." As I have not had any correspondence in relation to this matter, other than the brief case details emailed to me on DD/MM/YYYY from the courts, I am unsure of the specific dates that the claim was made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Claimant, having obtained a previous address from the DVLA and having received no response since my initial enquiry, did not perform the requisite “reasonable diligence" required to find my correct address to serve the claim form in. Had reasonable diligence been taken, my personal details are found in multiple public sources, such as DVLA, HMRC and credit reference agencies. The claimant did not have any contact with the defendant for over 12 months and thus should have considered they had incorrect details. It appears that the claimant continued to issue correspondence to the incorrect address intentionally, in line with the concerns raised by the government regarding this abhorrent industry (Relevant case law cited below in paragraphs 29 - 34).
19. The claim form was not served at my current address, thus I was not aware of the Default Judgment until I checked my credit report as mentioned in paragraph 2 on DD/MM/YYYY. This is a breach of CPR 13.2(a) as the claim form was never served to my current address. Due to this, the judgement was wrongly entered as I was unable to submit an acknowledgement of service in the absence of notification of the case (CPR 13.3).
20. The address that the Claimant has on file is [old address]. I moved from this address to my current address at [current address] in MMM YYYY. In support of this, I can provide a copy of my [mortgage agreement/AST] showing my updated address.
21. According to publicly available information, my circumstances are far from unique. The industry’s persistent failure to use correct and current addresses results in an unnecessary burden for individuals and the justice system across the country.
THE INTERNATIONAL PARKING COMMUNITY CODE WAS NOT FOLLOWED
22. International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice which requires a soft trace to be undertaken was not followed. The IPC Code of Practice - Version 8, 1st July 2021, clause 22.1 states;
23. Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings”
DVLA ADDRESS DATA MAY NOT BE RELIABLE
24. DVLA data is provided for a single (very limited) reason, so a parking operator can invite the registered keeper to name the driver or pay the invoice or inform the registered keeper they will be liable if not, and notify of appeal rights.
25. The system, called 'KADOE' (Keeper On Date Of Event), is a brief 'snapshot in time' address to enable a parking firm to send a Notice to the registered keeper. Operators are only allowed to ask the DVLA once, hence the code of practice requires reasonable steps are taken to check address details are current before litigation. Even if a motorist later updates a VC5 logbook with a new address (as in this case or if the DVLA fails to process a change in a timely manner, which is reportedly common) a parking operator will not know, nor be able to find that out.
26. There is no safe presumption that a DVLA vehicle address is a valid address where a Defendant can be served. The KADOE address is not provided as a 'court claim service address' and should not be relied upon, as it is only an address where the vehicle was kept at a historical point in time (which may not be where the keeper lives; it is where the car was ‘kept').
27. Considering the above, I was unable to defend this claim. I believe that the Default Judgment against me was issued incorrectly and thus should be set aside, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful.
28. There is a wealth of case law making reference to the failures of parking companies to correctly ascertain the addresses of defendants. Of note:
29. In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945 (CA) LJ Dyson said;
30. "What state of mind in the server is connoted by the words "last known"? …As we have said, there is an important distinction between belief and knowledge. It is a distinction particularly well understood in the criminal law, but elsewhere too. The draftsman of the rules deliberately chose the word "known". In our view, knowledge in this context refers to the serving party's actual knowledge or what might be called his constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which he could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. We arrive at this conclusion on the basis of what we understand the words to mean. We do not believe that there are any policy reasons which require us to give the words a strained or unusual meaning. The risk of satellite litigation is inherent in whatever interpretation is adopted. It is true that a defendant who has not in fact received the claim form should have no difficulty in setting aside a default judgment. But it is not desirable that defendants should be put to the trouble and expense of making applications to set aside default judgments."
31. The same sentiment was echoed by;
32. HHJ Hacon in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)
33. HHJ Behrens in Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012)
34. In Broadside Colours And Chemicals Ltd, Re (No 2) [2012] EWHC 195 (Ch) (20 February 2012) it would appear that obtaining the information from a source that an individual is required by law to keep updated is adequate knowledge. However, I would submit that it is incumbent to have recent knowledge and not outdated knowledge as HHJ Hacon put it in MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Mark Burton Construction Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC) (28 February 2014)
35. As it was put in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016) by LJ McCombe;
36. “If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgment. He is simply not in default at all.”
THE CLAIM HAS EXPIRED UNSERVED
37. I HEREBY CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR IT NOW (EFFECTIVELY THAT WOULD MEAN DISPENSING WITH SERVICE). THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT THE VERY LIMITED COURT DISCRETION TO RETROSPECTIVELY VALIDATE DEFECTIVE SERVICE BY RESURRECTING AN EXPIRED AND UNSERVED (AND HOPELESS) CLAIM.
38. Service of the claim form on an old address constitutes defective service and the claim has expired unserved. The Claimant currently has no claim because it was not properly served within 4 months and is time barred.
39. Continuing an expired unserved claim more than 4 months after it was raised (but never properly served) is impossible under any rule of law or practice (CPR 7.5).
40. The Claimant is wholly responsible for failing to serve the claim correctly within the 4 months (as required by CPR 7.5) and as a result this claim has expired unserved.
41. The Claimant should not be given extra opportunities to waste the Court’s time after failing to follow pre-action protocols for debt claims, breaching the IPC code of practice and the CPRs about taking 'reasonable steps' (CPR 6.9) to check a Defendant's address.
42. If the Claimant believes they still have a claim then filing afresh is the only way forward. The Claimant may send a ‘Letter Before Claim’ to the right address, this time following the pre-action protocol for debt claims. The court is reminded that I have received nothing to build any defence on. No claim form and no detailed particulars of the claim have ever been received at my current address.
43. This claim should be struck out as more than 4 months have passed (CPR 7.5 refers) from issue of proceedings [date] and service of the claim was defective (i.e. it was never served).
44. A Court's discretionary power to validate a defectively served claim is very limited, and only applies where there is ‘good reason’ for the court to exercise the power so conferred. There is no ‘good reason’ to retrospectively validate the claimants’ service under Rule 6.15. Further, whilst Rule 6.16 does create a power for a court to dispense with service of the claim form, this only applies in 'exceptional circumstances' and this does not apply in my case.
45. Tests were established by Lord Sumption’s analysis in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 and I have answered those questions in respect of my own case below:
46. Did the claimant take reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules?
47. In my case, no. An old DVLA address obtained months or years earlier is not a reliable address for service. Indeed the DVLA do not sell 'keeper data' with any warranty that it can be used or relied upon for service of court papers to a motorist; it is merely a snapshot in time of where a vehicle was once registered.
48. Addresses change frequently and the parking industry and DVLA know this; hence the International Parking Community's Code of Practice requires steps to be taken to ascertain any new address prior to litigation. Parking operators are not allowed to rely upon DVLA data for litigation purposes and must undertake a Credit Reference Agency 'soft trace' before issuing a claim.
49. Were the defendants aware of the contents of the claim form at the time when the time for service expired?
50. In my case, no. I have only just received the particulars from the CNBC (requested in May 2024 – [exhibit PoC here] and I knew nothing about any outstanding parking charge.
51. What, if any, prejudice would I suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what I knew about its contents?
52. The above answer is repeated. It would cause huge detriment for me to have to spend time and money to defend a meritless parking charge when I was under no obligation to display a permit or answer to a third party, unregulated private parking company when parking in my own demised parking space as evidenced by the terms of parking in my tenancy agreement. [exhibit clause from tenancy agreement]
FURTHER RELEVANT CASE LAW ON EXPIRED UNSERVED CLAIMS
53. There are several authorities, including the judgment in Boxwood [2021] EWHC 947 (TCC), which are reminders of the strictness of the requirements of CPR 7.6 and how difficult it is to use other parts of the Civil Procedure Rules to rectify a failure to serve the claim form within the requisite period: “A claimant is not entitled to rely on the wide, general powers under CPR 3.10 or CPR 3.9 to circumvent the specific conditions set out in CPR 7.6 (3) for extending the period for service of a claim form.”
54. In the judgment of Deputy Master Marsh in Croke & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc & Ors [2022] EWHC 1367 (Ch), the claimant was one day late in properly serving the Particulars of Claim to the Defendant and the claimant’s application for relief from sanctions was refused. In section 65 of the transcript of the trial, Deputy Master Marsh stated, “The defendants were entitled to know within the four month period specified in the CPR whether a claim had been made against them and to be able to understand that claim. [...] Unless an extension of time is granted, the claim will cease to have any validity and will be struck out."
55. In Piepenbrock-v-Associated News Limited [2020] EWHC 1708 (QB), the High Court refused the Claimant’s application for a retrospective extension of time to serve a Claim Form after the Claimant failed to demonstrate they took all reasonable steps to serve the Claim form in the period of its validity.
56. “Ultimately, the problem was that the Claimant had made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. [...] Although I sympathise with the Claimant that the consequences for him of the error of not validly serving the Claim Form will be serious, there is nothing that really separates his case from many others who have made similar mistakes when attempting to serve a Claim Form. [...] I am afraid, in this case, the responsibility for the failure validly to serve the Claim Form rests solely with the Claimant’s side [...]
57. In light of my conclusions above, having refused the applications made under CPR 7.6, 6.15 and 6.16, there is not a residual self-standing power available under CPR 3.9 to relieve the claimant of the “sanction” that, as a result of his failure to validly to serve the Claim Form during its period of validity, it has now lapsed. The term “sanction” is inapt because it would, in theory, be possible for the Claimant to issue and validly serve a fresh Claim Form. The obstacle standing in the way of a claim is not any sanction imposed by the Court but the fact that the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood has expired. [...]
58. Finally, the Claimant seeks an order under CPR 3.10 remedying his error in not validly serving the Claim Form. The Defendants submit that CPR 3.10 cannot rescue the Claimant. This general provision does not enable the Court to do what CPR 7.6(3) forbids: Vinos -v- Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784; [2001] CP Rep 12 [20]. [...]
59. The Claim Form was not served during its period of validity. In consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s claim. It follows that I should also formally dismiss the Claimant’s application for summary judgment.”
60. In Vinos v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, the Court of Appeal considered whether any extension of time should be granted under CPR 7.6 in circumstances where the defendant had been notified of the issue of a claim form but the claim form had not been served within four months as required by CPR 7.5 and the application was made after expiry of that period. The court refused to grant relief on the basis that it did not have the power to do so.
61. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim); and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired. In this case, the claim form was not validly served in [month/year] due to failure to check for a current address (CPR 6.9 (3)), therefore the time limit for acknowledging service has not begun. As the time limit has not begun it cannot have expired. As the time limit has not expired the condition in CPR 12.3(1)(b) has not been satisfied. This results in a mandatory set aside (CPR 13.2). It follows that if a claim is set aside for failure to be served, then the claim cannot be resurrected and served again after 4 months has passed from the date of filing pursuant to CPR 7.5(1). This is on point with the court of appeal in Dubai Financial Group Llc v National Private Air Transport Services Company (National Air Services) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 71 (09 February 2016):
62. “Moreover, I do not consider that the CPR presents an obstacle in the circumstances of this case to setting aside judgment. CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default judgment where any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied. The latter provision does not apply, but the former is relevant. CPR 12.3(1) states that a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service only if (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service or a defence and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired (my italics). I accept Mr McLaren's argument that when an order for retrospective validation of an alternative method of service has been made pursuant to CPR 6.15(2) the relevant time for filing an acknowledgement of service is the period which the court must specify under CPR 6.15(4)(c). Where, as in this case, the court did not specify any such time there can be no relevant time which has expired for the purposes of CPR 12.3(1). If this analysis is correct the requirements of CPR 12.3(1)(b) have not been satisfied and so the court is obliged to set aside the default judgment pursuant to CPR 13.2(a).
63. I do not see it as a draconian consequence that a judgment, obtained after deemed service has been effected without specifying a time for that service to be acknowledged, should be set aside as of right in such a case. I agree that CPR 13.2 specifies the circumstances in which a default judgment must be set aside and in my judgment one of those circumstances is when judgment is entered in default of an acknowledgement of service when "any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) …was not satisfied". Here one such condition was not satisfied, namely the time for acknowledgement of service had not expired, because none had ever become applicable.
64. This, to my mind, is not "playing technical games" (c.f. the passage from the Abela case, cited at paragraph 11 in the judgment of Longmore LJ). It is merely applying the principle that due process should be followed. If a defendant has never become under a valid obligation to acknowledge service, either as specified under the rules or by order of the court, I do not see how it can be that a judgment can be entered against him in default of such acknowledgement. He is simply not in default at all.”
SET ASIDE APPLICATION WAS MADE PROMPTLY
65. I have responded to this matter promptly. I discovered a CCJ had been obtained against me checking my credit reference at the beginning of May. On the DD MMMM 2024 I contacted the Civil National Business Centre to obtain relevant information relating to this default judgement. On the DD MMMM 2024 I wrote to District Enforcement Limited offering to jointly apply to set aside the judgment. Despite allowing them a reasonable amount of time to seek instructions, no response was received. So on the DD MMMM 2024, I have submitted my case in order to set-aside this judgement and fairly present my case.
66. Considering all of the above, I was unable to defend myself against this claim. I believe that the claim against me is without merit and the Default Judgement against me was issued incorrectly. Thus, the judgement should be set aside, the claim struck out, and I ask the Court to kindly consider the reimbursement of the fee of £303 from the claimant should this request be successful.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH:
I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed: XXXXXXXX
Date: DD MMM YYYY
Don't worry. This is going to go away if you follow the advice.
For information, Those PoC are woefully inadequate and there is a very good chance e that the claim will be fully dismissed at the set aside hearing. This is because there is no mention in the PoC of what terms, if any the defendant is supposed to have breached.
This was shown in an appeal court ruling a year or so ago, CEL v Chan, that because the PoC fail to comply with Civil Procedure Rule 16.4 (https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part16#16.4) and Practice Directions Part 16 (https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part16/pd_part16). The claim (and many others since) have been thrown out because of this breach of the rules.
Additionally, Gladstones have mendaciously claimed interest at 10.25% which is a violation of Section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/28/section/69#:~:text=69%20Power%20to%20award%20interest%20on%20debts%20and%20damages.&text=the%20defendant%20shall%20be%20liable,the%20date%20of%20the%20payment.). Section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984 permits interest to be added to most non-commercial debts at the rate of 8% per year. This is a statutory interest rate and can usually be claimed from the date the debt was due up to the date the claim is issued.
At the point of issuing court proceedings, other court fees and costs can also be added to the amount that is being claimed. However, that as with any other element of a claim, interest can only be claimed at 8% and is awarded at the discretion of the court. Gladstones should be reported to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (https://www.sra.org.uk/consumers/problems/report-solicitor/) for this embarrassing breach of the County Courts Act 1984.
From what you have told us about the AST and the little that it mentioned about parking, it does not appear that DE never had any right to impose parking charges and there was no requirement to display a permit. These things will be part of your draft defence and also mentioned in your Witness Statement for the set aside order.
It may be worthwhile trying to get a copy of the Head Lease for the property from the landlord, just in case there are any items in there about parking that could supersede your rights in our AST.
The first thing you should do now is email Gladstones with the following information. They need to be informed that you intend to have the CCJ set aside and give them an opportunity to do so at their expense. The nest steps will depend on their response to this letter. I suggest it is written and saved in a PDF format and the emailed to Gladstones as an attachment to the email. This will serve as proof of delivery.
Dear Sirs,
DISTRICT ENFORCEMENT LIMITED (THE 'CLAIMANT')
V
[ ] (THE 'DEFENDANT')
CLAIM REFERENCE [ ]
In April 2024, I noticed that my credit score was in decline and had no idea why, so I requested a statutory credit report. On it, I saw a CCJ and a £685 charge. This came as a tremendous shock as it is the first and only communication I have received from the Claimant or any organisation representing the Claimant in relation to this claim.
I made immediate enquiries of the CNBC from which I was able to establish that:
1. the claim relates to alleged parking events in March and April 2022;
2. the claim form was sent to an old address at which I no longer reside; and
3. if I had been given the opportunity to do so, I would have successfully defended the claim.
I did not receive any pre-claim correspondence, not even a letter of claim as required by the PAP. Nor did I receive the claim form or any particulars of claim and was thus deprived of the ability to defend the claim. The Claimant is well aware that people move home from time to time. They also know that I did not respond to any communications sent to me at my old address.
This situation is explicitly dealt with in the Civil Procedure Rules which provide at CPR 6.9(3):
(3) Where a claimant has reason to believe that the address of the defendant … is an address at which the defendant no longer resides or carries on business, the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence or place of business (‘current address’).
The Claimant is a member of the International Parking Community (the ‘IPC’) and is bound by the IPC’s Code of Practice which states the following terms:
22.1 Operators must take reasonable steps to ensure that the Motorist’s details are still correct if 12 months have passed from the Parking Event before issuing court proceedings.
Also:
25.1 The Code complements the relevant legislation and related guidance, which will define the overall standard of conduct for all Operators. Operators must be aware of their legal obligations and implement the relevant legislation and guidance when operating their businesses.
Civil Procedure Rule 6.9(3) is relevant legislation and has not been implemented as required by the IPC Code of Practice.
If the Claimant had taken the actions required by the Civil Procedure Rules and the Code of Practice, my current address would have been found easily. If those actions had been performed at the correct time, I would not have been deprived of the ability to defend the claim.
By reason of the Claimant’s breach of the Civil Procedure Rules, which amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, the claim form was never properly served and the judgment must be set aside at the Claimant’s expense and the claim dismissed.
In view of the foregoing, I invite the Claimant to join with me in an application to set aside the judgment and dismiss the claim, with the Claimant paying the court fee and no order as to costs.
Please respond to the above offer as soon as possible so that, if the offer is acceptable to the Claimant, we can work together to right the wrong that the Claimant has done to me.
To give the Claimant a reasonable time to take instructions and for us to agree a suite of documents for the Court, I am willing to defer making a unilateral application to set aside the judgment until 4 pm on Wednesday 22nd May 2024. If a joint application has not been made by that time, I intend to apply to the Court unilaterally for an order setting the judgment aside, striking out the particulars of claim, dismissing the claim and awarding costs against the Claimant on a full indemnity basis.
Pease respond by immediate return.
Yours faithfully,
Can you please find out the date the claim was issued as there could be other points to have the claim dismissed if more than 4 months have passed since the issue date of the claim.