Author Topic: Basingstoke & Deane - code 83 Parked in car park without displaying valid ticket - Paid for wrong location on RingGo  (Read 1053 times)

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IMO, your application is too long and seeks to evaluate the reasoning behind the Scottish decision. I wouldn't bother.

This is a case (in the adjudicator's mind) of the distinction between 'mandatory' and 'directory' in law - look them up, there are useful online links especially the Lord Hailsham judgment.

But IMO 'a NTO may not..' is clearly a strict condition, mandatory and failure to comply with such a condition is procedurally fatal.

@H C Andersen

Thanks for the information. I will try and rewrite to use this info and include the mandatory and directory parts.

I felt that I needed to explain the Scottish decision because it added substance to the case (and also showed that I had read the ruling in detail!). However, I will consider cutting the content out of the Scottish case without reducing the message behind it.

Thanks

I have tried to shorten and reword my request for review - here it is:

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1.   I am requesting a review of this case on the grounds of the "interests of justice require a review".
2.   I believe that the case ruling which was used in the judgement by the adjudicator has been misinterpreted and incorrectly used in deciding my case. I therefore contend that the adjudicator has erred in law and their decision should be reviewed.
3.   The ruling Glasgow City Council v  Decision of Upper Tribunal Scotland (https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/media/uikbqxn4/2025csih2-appeal-to-the-court-of-session-by-glasgow-city-council-against-a-decision-of-the-upper-tribunal-for-scotland-dated-14-may-2024.pdf) sought to establish whether a PCN was valid if it was not sent by recorded or registered mail. It found that this ‘technicality’ was a directory rule (i.e. good practice) and not one that was intended to be mandatory (i.e. must be adhered to), and therefore failure to comply would not necessarily be fatal to the enforcement of the penalty charge.
4.   The ruling in Scotland also states that previous cases where the authority had made this same mistake previously could not be looked at again because the statutory time limits had been exceeded (see paragraph 3 of the ruling). This indicates that timely service within the statutory time limits is key to the enforceability of a PCN.
5.   I believe that the adjudicator has misinterpreted this ruling in deciding my case, as its meaning appears to have been arbitrarily extended by the adjudicator to determine that any and all procedural requirements in the English legislation are merely directory rules that can be ignored without consequence. However, it is very clear that the statutory time limits are mandatory requirements in the legislation. The requirement for prejudice to be demonstrated is only valid where directory rules are not adhered to, it does not need to be demonstrated for mandatory rules.
6.   The requirements set out in the English parking legislation have clearly defined mandatory rules for time of service of the NtO, which must be within 6 months of the service of the PCN: "(2) A notice to owner may not be served after the expiry of the period of 6 months beginning with the relevant date". This not only gives a time limit but also a consequence to this time limit not being adhered to – the time limit is 6 months from the date of service of the PCN, the consequence of failing to adhere to this time limit is that the notice to owner may not be served. This is clearly intended to be fatal to the enforcement of the penalty charge. This is not open to interpretation. Indeed, it is backed up by the clear and unambiguous wording in the Statutory Guidance: "The ultimate time limit, in exceptional circumstances, is 6 months from the ‘relevant date’.  There should be a very good reason for waiting that long to serve an NtO". The wording "ultimate time limit" is very clear as to its intentions here. The authority has not provided any reason whatsoever for exceeding the statutory time limit for service of the NtO, in fact they did not even attempt to reference it in their evidence. The tribunal did not appear to consider this point in their decision.
7.   If this ruling is used by the tribunal to determine that the statutory time limits in legislation are not mandatory rules that are not binding on authorities, this risks undermining the entire purpose of having statutory time limits set in legislation. It raises the question: at what point does the authority failing to comply with a legally mandated time limit become relevant? 1 day late? 2 days late? 1 week late? 1 month late? 1 year late? At what point does a statutory time limit set out in legislation actually become relevant for the purposes of law? The legal time limits laid out in legislation for the service of a PCN and the service of a NtO are clearly intended as mandatory, "bright-line" requirements with no room for interpretation. If they are not met it is clearly intended that this is fatal to the penalty charge procedure. I do not believe that the adjudicator has the authority to determine where failing to comply with mandatory statutory time limits in the legislation is acceptable or not acceptable. If Parliament had not intended that time limits were absolute requirements for legal compliance, why would they be so clearly laid out in legislation and given clear consequences for failing to meet them? Ignoring the statutory time limits set in legislation and determining them as mere ‘technicalities’ makes a clear and unambiguous legal requirement subject to inconsistency and unfairness.
8.   There are multiple time limits laid out in the regulations, on both the authority and the motorist. Are all of these to be considered as null and void? This is clearly not the intention of the legislation. How can there be any possible fairness and consistency if statutory time limits are considered flexible?
9.   In my case, the time limit for service of a notice to owner is very clearly written as a mandatory rule in law. This is an absolute time limit for legal compliance and not a technicality such as sending the PCN by normal mail in the case ruling in Scotland. It is both written clearly in the Statutory Instrument and also backed up by the Statutory Guidance. There is no room for interpretation here, or flexibility for the authority to miss these deadlines without consequence. The use of the Scottish ruling as a broad brush to justify any and all non-compliance with legislation on the authority’s part, whether directory or mandatory, is a dangerous precedent which harms motorists and effectively denies one of the statutory grounds of appeal (Procedural impropriety by the authority).
10.   I would therefore request that the original adjudicator’s decision be reviewed and overturned, and that the NtO be cancelled for failing to be served within the mandatory statutory time limits.
11.   I would like to request a telephone or video hearing as part of this review.

IMO, you can shorten further, perhaps as follows:

I note from the adjudicator's decision that they drew upon a Scottish ** Tribunal decision(give the citation). However, I believe that this has been misapplied.

That decision concerned whether the procedural timeframe was mandatory or directory and, if the latter, whether despite a prima facie breach, the purpose of the provision was affected and the defendant's position jeopardised. This was in the context of a wholly civil law case. As you will be aware, the distinction between 'mandatory' and 'directory' provisions is well established in English law and no doubt has been considered regularly by the Tribunal.

In this case, as in every other Tribunal case I have been able to research, when Regulations state that a particular action may not be taken after or before a specified time period, in this case serving a NTO under the Traffic Management Act 2004 beyond 6 months from the 'relevant date', but it would also apply to a response to formal representations( 56 days) or service of a postal PCN(28 days), then failure by the authority to comply is procedurally fatal.

I respectfully submit that this applies in this case and it did not lie with the adjudicator to determine otherwise.

Some thoughts.

@H C Andersen

Thank you for the suggestion on the wording - I appreciate the time that you’ve taken to put this together. It certainly makes the point more succinct and I will definitely base my request for review on it. 

I may add a little bit onto it just to request a hearing so I can further explain the other points if necessary, but I think you’ve made the point very clearly and objectively. Thanks

@H C Andersen
Please can I ask for clarification on this sentence:
“ That decision concerned whether the procedural timeframe was mandatory or directory and, if the latter, whether despite a prima facie breach, the purpose of the provision was affected and the defendant's position jeopardised.”

The Scottish court of session decision didn’t appear to consider the ‘timeframe’ directly, but rather the method of service - therefore is ‘timeframe’ the correct term to use here?

I think we might be missing an important angle or two here. The Scottish ruling says "Mr Hamilton has lost nothing of significance so far as the statutory regime is concerned" - ie that he was not disadvantaged because the letter was delivered by a different method (or as we would say round here, the issue was de-minimis). This is not the case with statutory time limits on enforcement, the principle of there being statutory limitations on enforcement is not a trivial matter like a choice of postal service, it's one of the pillars on which our justice system is founded.

Secondly, the appellant was blindsided by the adjudicator's novel reasoning. The idea that statutory deadlines might be dismissed in this manner is highly surprising. The tribunal has indicated through the size of it's costs awards what it considers to be a reasonable amount of preparation for an appellant to undertake, and this would clearly not extend to being both cognisant of the Scottish case and sufficiently prepared to present compelling arguments that they were actually disadvantaged in this case. At the very least the interests of justice require appellant should be given time to prepare a rebuttal to a legal argument that they could not have reasonably expected.
« Last Edit: April 27, 2025, 02:11:20 pm by Grant Urismo »

I’m officially at the end of the road. My request for review has been rejected. I don’t actually believe that they read my request properly because once again they’ve made no attempt to discuss statutory time limits. I think this group should take note of this decision and warn people that statutory time limits basically don’t protect anyone any more.

——————-

Here is the rejection:

1.        Mr Thompson applies for the review of the appeal decision, dated 24 April 2025, in the interests of justice.
2.        The appeal adjudicator’s costs decision will be final unless one of the limited grounds for review set out in paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (Representations and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2022 (the Appeals Regulations) applies. A review application does not entail a fresh reconsideration of the appeal; only a decision whether there is sufficient reason within terms of paragraph 12 for the appeal to be reconsidered.
3.        The review application concerns the adjudicator’s decision that the alleged procedural impropriety in the late service of the Notice to Owner identified by Mr Thompson does not invalidate the enforcement process because no real prejudice arose.
4.        Mr Thompson does not dispute the appeal adjudicator’s finding of fact that no real prejudice arose from late service of the Notice to Owner by one day.
5.        He applies for review on the basis that the adjudicator erred in law in following the decision of the Scottish Court of Session in Glasgow City Council v The Upper Tribunal for Scotland (2025)CIH2 in taking into account whether any procedural unfairness arose as a result of a failure to comply with a requirement of the statutory enforcement scheme in determining whether there had been a procedural impropriety in this case.
6.        Mr Thompson distinguishes the Glasgow City Case on the basis that it concerns a Scottish statutory civil enforcement scheme, not the English civil enforcement scheme; and concerns the method of service of the PCN.
7.        That the Glasgow case concerns the Scottish statutory civil enforcement scheme and a different procedural issue is acknowledged. Nevertheless, there is recent authority in English case law that there is no procedural impropriety, which is the relevant statutory ground for appeal in this case, where a failure to comply with a requirement of the English statutory civil enforcement scheme causes no prejudice or unfairness  -  R(Bedi) v Traffic Adjudicator [2022] EWHC 1795 (Admin).
8.        I do not, therefore, find any obvious error of law in the appeal adjudicator taking into account the absence of prejudice in this case in relation to service of the Notice to Owner.
9.        In any event, even if the appeal adjudicator erred in law in taking into account the absence of prejudice and procedural unfairness in this case, the High Court has held that errors of law do not fall within the scope of the ground for review that “the interests of justice require such a review” ; and that if a party wishes to challenge a decision on the basis that it is wrong in law the correct route is by application for judicial review to the High Court (see R(Transport for London) v London Tribunals (Environment and Traffic Adjudicators) and others [2023] EWHC 2889 (Admin)).
10.        For these reasons I find that the ground for review that the interests of justice require such a review is not made out in this case.
11.        I refuse this review application and the decision remains refused for the reasons given to the parties on 24 April 2025.

I am more and more convinced that the TPT is heavily biased in favour of the councils, and this decision further confirms my view. Just look at their Key Cases; virtually all of them failed appeals.

They say one can go to Judicial Review, knowing this costs thousands for a private citizen.

I initially appealed this PCN because I thought that, through explanation of the facts, the council would see sense and see that we’d paid in good faith.

Everything else since then, including the process with the adjudicators, has left me with a strong feeling of injustice. I’m not allowed to make a mistake when paying but the council are allowed to make mistakes in their process, even when it’s written in law.

Sadly I just have to put this behind me now. Thanks everyone for the advice.

Hard to believe they are saying the law set out by parliament is optional because it had no prejudicial impact and in any case an error in law even if so doesn't matter. This is surely a binary yes/no in a date established by legislation.

The case referred to is nothing like this:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MPD7J_bXc-wxUUyfvdoUaaBc67LH-JD1/view

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I would complain to the council CEO and council leader about their unreasonable refusal to use discretion on the car park names and copy it to the local newspaper(s).

I've written to the TPT to ask them to add my case to the Traff-iCase website and to change their own website where it talks about statutory time limits.

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Hi

My case BG00005-2504 has now been decided by the TPT and, while I don't agree with the outcome, I abide by the rulings and have paid the PCN.

Please can I request that my case be uploaded to the Traff-iCase website as a key case, as I think it is really important that the public are aware of the implications of my case - i.e. that the Statutory Time Limits for service of a PCN or a Notice to Owner are not mandatory and that an authority failing to meet these time limits won't lead to the cancellation of a PCN. All of the information I was able to find suggested that this wasn't the case, so it would be really helpful for this ruling to be publicised so that future visitors to the website are made aware of this.

Also, please can I request that the wording on the Traff-iCase website be updated to remove the time limits for service of a NtO, saying it "may not be served" after 6 months (https://www.keycases.info/legislation-and-regulations/).

It was this information on the Traff-iCase website that led me to feel that I had grounds to submit an appeal to the PCN, and also request a review, but this information is incorrect - a NtO can be served after this date as my ruling states. So I think it would be really helpful if this information is either removed or updated to let the public know that these time limits are just general guidelines and that not meeting them won't actually lead to the PCN or NtO being cancelled. If I had known this beforehand I would not have taken several hours preparing an appeal!

I think publication of my case and updating the information on the Traff-iCase website is really important to clarify the law on parking and also to help the public make a decision on whether to submit an appeal or not.

Many thanks

Good idea. But I think this may be about the tribunal and not traffic law.

I saw this case where the review was requested by a council and was refused. I've bolded the key sentence.

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Case reference 2250028421
Appellant Michael Tanner
Authority London Borough of Wandsworth
VRM WX59LZR

PCN Details
PCN WA91117341
Contravention date 03 Oct 2024
Contravention time 14:22:00
Contravention location Pulborough Road
Penalty amount N/A
Contravention Parked resident/shared use without a valid permit

Referral date -

Decision Date 10 Mar 2025
Adjudicator Carl Teper
Appeal decision Appeal allowed
Direction cancel the Penalty Charge Notice and the Notice to Owner.
Reasons The Appellant has attended for his appeal via video link, the Authority did not attend.
The Authority's case is that the Appellant's vehicle was parked in a residents' or shared use parking place or zone without a valid virtual permit or clearly displaying a valid physical permit or voucher or pay and display ticket issued for that place where required, or without payment of the parking charge when in Pulborough Road on 3 October 2024 at 14:22.
The Appellant's case is that the bay markings were too worn and degraded to be enforceable and that the Traffic Management Order does not support a Penalty Charge Notice at the location where his vehicle was parked.
I have considered the evidence in this case and, whilst I find the bay markings are just about sufficient, I find that the second point advanced by the Appellant to be well founded.
I find that the Authority has not proved that the Traffic Management Order, The Wandsworth (Southfields) (Parking Places) (No. 1) Order 2002, supports a restriction at the location where the Appellant's vehicle was parked in Pulborough Road.
The appeal is allowed.

Decision Date 02 May 2025
Adjudicator Gerald Styles
Previous decision Appeal allowed
Appeal decision Appeal allowed
Direction cancel the Penalty Charge Notice and the Notice to Owner.
Reasons
A video hearing was arranged for the review application by the Council on 2 May. The appellant attended the hearing. No Council representative attended it.
There is a limited and discretionary power for the adjudicator to re-open an appeal that has been decided in this tribunal.
The application received is in these terms:
"The Council request a review for this appeal.
The adjudicator has allowed the appeal on the basis that the The Wandsworth (Southfields) (Parking Places) (No. 1) Order 2002 does not support a restriction at the location. The adjudicator found that the bay markings were sufficient.
The Wandsworth (Southfields) (Parking Places) (No. 1) Order 2002 is the original parent order which did not specify this location as it had not yet been implemented. The original parent order was included with the evidence because this Council have previously lost an appeal for not providing the original parent order for reference.
The Council included under Evidence Type B (within parts 3 and 4) the subsequent TMO (2004 No.18 Item 280) introducing this location and the London Tribunals Forms Version 8 amendment TMO (2007 No.57 Item 249) under Evidence Type B (within part 5).
The Council believe that the TMO’s that we supplied support this restriction
and that the contravention occurred."
This was in response to a passage in the decision of the original adjudicator's decision that reads:
"I find that the Authority has not proved that the Traffic Management Order, The Wandsworth (Southfields) (Parking Places) (No. 1) Order 2002, supports a restriction at the location where the Appellant's vehicle was parked in Pulborough Road. The appeal is allowed."
The application today can only qualify for a review if I am persuaded this is in the interests of justice.
These include regard to the character of the allegation and the interests of judicial finality.
Assuming as I am for present purposes the original adjudicator may have made an error of law by misreading or incompletely reading a document before him, that does not in itself provide sufficient ground for re-opening a decided case in this tribunal.
The adjudicator's ruling in this case has no wide general application. It relates to the legal status of a bay in residential street and having regard to the interests of finality and the character and limited scale of the issues I have seen in dispute, I am refusing this application.
The result in short is that the appeal remains allowed and no penalty charge is payable.
« Last Edit: May 07, 2025, 02:10:18 pm by stamfordman »

Needless to say, this is a decision of London Tribunals adjudicator.

It seems ridiculous. It seems that they won’t reverse a decision even if they acknowledge that the previous decision was probably wrong.