Here is the request for review that I have put together. I'd appreciate feedback on this please.
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1. I am requesting a review of this case on the grounds of the "interests of justice require a review".
2. I believe that the case ruling which was used in the judgement by the adjudicator has been misinterpreted and incorrectly used in deciding my case. I therefore contend that the adjudicator has erred in law and their decision should be reviewed.
3. It should be noted that the ruling quoted (
https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/media/uikbqxn4/2025csih2-appeal-to-the-court-of-session-by-glasgow-city-council-against-a-decision-of-the-upper-tribunal-for-scotland-dated-14-may-2024.pdf) has only very recently been made, was only binding in Scotland, and did not relate to parking in England which comes under separate legislation (The Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (Approved Devices, Charging Guidelines and General Provisions) (England) Regulations 2022). All references in the ruling are made with regards to traffic offences in Scotland - specifically the contraventions relating to contraventions of a LEZ.
4. The ruling in Scotland was about whether a PCN was valid if it was not sent by recorded or registered mail. The reason for the ruling was to establish whether this technicality proved that the PCN had not been delivered to the motorist within the statutory time limits set in legislation. The case looked to determine whether service of the PCN by a means other than by recorded delivery was a "bright-line" rule - one that is clearly defined and leaves little or no room for varying interpretation. It did not discuss statutory time limits as being a "technicality".
5. The reasoning behind the ruling in Scotland was that it was considered that Parliament had not intended that the PCN should be invalidated by the failure to comply with a technicality in the legislation (i.e. the method of service not being by registered mail). The ruling also discusses how the Council had 'largely' complied with the process, including “timeous” service. It also states that previous cases where the authority had made this same mistake previously could not be looked at again because the statutory time limits had been exceeded (see paragraph 3 of the ruling). This indicates that timeous service within the statutory time limits is key to the enforceability of a PCN.
6. However, I believe that misinterpretation of this ruling has been used to decide my case, as its meaning appears to have been arbitrarily extended by the adjudicator to also cover statutory time limits as well as other technicalities (such as the method of posting of the PCN). The requirements set out in the parking legislation have clearly defined "bright-line" rules for time of service of the NtO, which must be within 6 months of the service of the PCN: "(2) A notice to owner may not be served after the expiry of the period of 6 months beginning with the relevant date". This is not open to interpretation. Indeed they are backed up by the clear and unambiguous wording in the Statutory Guidance "The ultimate time limit, in exceptional circumstances, is 6 months from the ‘relevant date’. There should be a very good reason for waiting that long to serve an NtO". The wording "ultimate time limit" is very clear as to its intentions here. If the ruling in Scotland is used to effectively overrule this clear and unambiguous legislation it risks attempting to completely circumvent the law, both in terms of time limits for service but also in terms of the statutory rights of appeal.
7. If this ruling is used by the tribunal to justify that the time limits in legislation are not binding on authorities, this risks undermining the entire purpose of having time limits set in legislation. It raises the question: at what point does the authority failing to comply with a legally mandated time limit become relevant? 1 day late? 2 days late? 1 week late? 1 month late? 1 year late? The legal time limits are clearly intended as "bright-line" requirements with no room for interpretation. I do not believe that the adjudicator has the authority to determine where failing to comply with legislation is acceptable and not acceptable where that involves ignoring a statutory time limit. If Parliament had not intended that time limits were absolute requirements for legal compliance, why would they be so clearly laid out in legislation? Ignoring the time limits set in legislation makes a clear and unambiguous legal requirement subject to inconsistency and unfairness.
8. The statutory guidance for parking enforcement clearly states that the expectation is that the authority serves an NtO within 56 days, and that 6 months for issuing a NtO is the “ultimate time limit”, and that the authority should have a “very good reason” for waiting this long to serve a NtO. The authority has not provided any reason whatsoever for exceeding the time limit for service of the NtO. The tribunal did not appear to consider this point in their decision.
9. If we look at the other time limits, such as the 56 days limit for a council to respond to representations, then what would happen if the council responded a day late. Or two? Or three? At what point does a time limit set out in legislation actually become relevant for the purposes of law? There are multiple time limits laid out in the regulations, on both the authority and the motorist. Are all of these to be considered as null and void? How can there be any possible fairness and consistency if time limits are considered flexible?
10. In my case, the time limit for service of a notice to owner are very clearly written in law. This is an absolute time limit for legal compliance and not a technicality such as sending the PCN by normal mail in the case ruling in Scotland. It is both written clearly in the Statutory Instrument and also backed up by the Statutory Guidance. There is no room for interpretation here, or flexibility for the authority to miss these deadlines without consequence. The use of the Scottish ruling to justify any and all non-compliance with legislation on the authority’s part is a dangerous precedent which harms motorists and effectively denies one of the statutory grounds of appeal (Procedural impropriety by the authority).
11. If time limits clearly written in legislation are unenforceable, as this tribunal decision suggests, then effectively all time limits stated in legislation are null and void, including those which apply to the motorist.
12. The prejudice against me in this case is that allowing the authority to miss legal deadlines denies me the right to be treated consistently and fairly according to legislation, and in a timeous manner, and effectively denies my right to appeal under one of the statutory grounds.
13. I would like to request a video hearing as part of this review.
