This is an important tribunal case involving multiple PCNs for the same moving traffic contravention where the adjudicator referenced Civil Procedure rules.
There has been no reply whatsoever from the Authority, which I now deem to be in breach of its obligations to assist the Tribunal in pursuing the overriding objective of achieving justice fairly, expeditiously and at proportionate cost.
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Case reference 2250108586
Appellant xxxxxxx
Authority London Borough of Hounslow
VRM GG04MUN
PCN Details
PCN NJ41276082
Contravention date 16 Nov 2024
Contravention time 12:24:00
Contravention location Burford Road
Penalty amount N/A
Contravention Fail comply prohibition on certain types vehicle
Referral date -
Decision Date 18 Nov 2025
Adjudicator Carl Teper
Appeal decision Appeal allowed
Direction
cancel the Penalty Charge Notice.
Reasons
The Appellant attended for her appeals by video link, the Authority was not represented.
The Authority's case is that on twenty occasions the Appellant's vehicle failed to comply with a prohibition on certain types of vehicle (motor vehicles) when in either Green Dragon Lane or Burford Road in late 2024 and early 2025.
I first issued an adjournment notice on 24 June 2025 seeking assistance from the Authority to resolve a number of issues, by 14 October 2025 there had been no reply so I issued a further adjournment notice which gave the following direction:
"In Butt, R. (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Indemnity costs) [2022] UKUT 69 the Upper Tribunal held at 38 that (bold emphasis added):
Section 29(2) of the 2007 Act provides that this Tribunal has full power to determine the extent costs are to be paid. The 2008 Rules are silent as to the bases upon which the Tribunal may assess the amount of costs recoverable in judicial review proceedings. The CPR offers a valuable source of assistance in respect of costs and their assessment. CPR 44.3(1) provides that where a court is to assess the amount of costs (whether by summary or detailed assessment) it will assess those costs (a) on the standard basis; or (b) on the indemnity basis, explaining what is meant by each. Whilst no mention of these (or any other) bases of assessment is made in the 2007 Act or the 2008 Rules, the distinction drawn by the CPR between the standard and indemnity bases can properly inform the exercise of discretion by this Chamber when exercising its power under section 29 of the 2007 Act. The distinction is well-known and well-understood across the civil justice system and applied in judicial review proceedings that take place in the High Court and beyond. There is no reason not to employ it in this Chamber of the Upper Tribunal. Albeit in the context of sanctions and not costs, Lord Neuberger confirmed in BPP Holdings Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 55, [2017] 1 WLR 2945, at [25]-[26] that it is legitimate for tribunals to follow a well-established approach established under the CPR.
This Tribunal has previously adopted the guidance provided by the Civil Procedure Rules in contexts where the Tribunal's own rules of procedure are silent, see for instance the costs decision of Adjudicator Stanton-Dunne in Lmd Skip & Grab Hire Ltd v London Councils (2240280286, 11 February 2025).
The Civil Procedure rules provide under CPR 1.1 that:
(1) These Rules are a procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.
(2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable –
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence;
(b) saving expense;
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate –
(i) to the amount of money involved;
(ii) to the importance of the case;
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and
(iv) to the financial position of each party;
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases;
f) promoting or using alternative dispute resolution; and
(g) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.
CPR 1.3 then provides that:
The parties are required to help the court to further the overriding objective.
While these rules cannot be imported verbatim into this Tribunal, I find that the principle that the parties are under a duty to assist the Tribunal is of general application and it applies in particular to the Local Authority: any public Authority conducting legal proceedings before any court or Tribunal would generally be expected to assist that court or Tribunal to the extent that it is reasonably able to do so. I am not sure that the Authority has discharged its duties to assist the Tribunal in this case, so I offer it a further opportunity to do so.
On 24 June 2025 I caused correspondence to be issued to the Enforcement Authority where I raised the issue of whether Parliament's intent could truly be that in the circumstances of this case, a penalty of £2,470 should be imposed. I consider it unlikely that under the previous criminal enforcement regime, the Magistrates would have imposed such a penalty for the exact same conduct. The Authority has not responded and I renew my invitation for submissions on this point, which would be of significant assistance to me.
Having further considered the case, I also note the following passage in the case summary:
"With regard to the multiple PCNs issued to the appellant, the Council contends that number of PCNs issued is not a ground for cancellation."
The obvious question that arises in my mind is: why not ? It seems to me that the number of PCNs issued may well be a ground for cancellation and indeed many Authorities will cancel some or all of the penalty charges on the basis that to enforce all of them would be oppressive. While I readily accept that the number of penalty charge notices is not a statutory ground of appeal on which an Adjudicator may allow an appeal, I am mindful of the Authority's duty to consider the question of whether the penalty should be cancelled, obviously the Authority is not constrained in this regard by the statutory grounds of appeal.
The submission made in the case summary suggests the Authority has not taken an open-minded approach to the question of whether some or all of the penalties should be cancelled in light of their large number, indeed the case summary suggests the exact opposite. I require the Authority's assistance on this point and I, therefore, invite submissions on the following questions:
1) At the representations stage, did the Authority consider the question of whether the number of PCNs should lead to some of those PCNs being cancelled?
2) Was the Authority required to consider that question?
3) If not, why not? For the avoidance of doubt, if the Authority's position is that it was not required to answer the question posted at point 1, I am inviting a legal justification for that position.
4)If the Authority's position is that it was required to consider the issue but, having done so, it concluded that the answer was "no", I invite the Authority to provide me with its reasons for reaching such a conclusion, such reasons should be provided by the decision maker who rejected the representations at the time and not by the officer who now has conduct of the case at the Tribunal stage (unless the two officers are one and the same). If no documentary records exist documenting the decision, evidence may be provided by witness statement.
There is no reason why I should make a decision in the absence of relevant submissions from the Authority that is pursuing the proceedings. I draw the Authority's attention to the fact that its evidence would not be admissible in a court of law because it does not comply with the requirements of CPR Part 32, and regulation 9 of The Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (London) Regulations 1993 provides that:
2) Subject to the provisions of this regulation, the adjudicator shall conduct the hearing of an appeal in such manner as he considers most suitable to the clarification of the issues before him and generally to the just handling of the proceedings; he shall so far as appears to him appropriate seek to avoid formality in the proceedings.
[….]
(8) At the hearing of an appeal-
(a) the parties shall be entitled to give evidence, to call witnesses, to question any witnesses and to address the adjudicator both on the evidence and generally on the subject matter of the appeal; and
(b) the adjudicator may receive evidence of any fact which appears to him to be relevant notwithstanding that such evidence would be inadmissible in proceedings before a court of law.
The word "may" indicates a discretion, I am not required to admit the Authority's evidence. If this adjournment notice is met once more with silence from the Authority I may decide that, in the absence of any assistance from the Authority, the just handling of the proceedings can be achieved by exercising that discretion against the Authority, this would inevitably lead to findings of fact that are adverse to the Authority. I very much hope I will not have to go down that route and I look forward to receiving a detailed reply to the issues raised above.
The case is adjourned to the 18 November 2025."
There has been no reply whatsoever from the Authority, which I now deem to be in breach of its obligations to assist the Tribunal in pursuing the overriding objective of achieving justice fairly, expeditiously and at proportionate cost. The Appellant is not represented and would not be equipped to make submissions on the issues in this case without the assistance of professional representation. I could hazard a guess as to what the Authority could have said in response to the questions I posed above, but it would be quite wrong for me to do that.
Adjudicator Kumar remarked in Stanmore Quality Services Ltd v London Borough of Islington (2250176349, 14 July 2025) that:
'I can hazard a guess however, in the absence of representations, it is not for the Adjudicator to step into the litigation arena and provide answers to those questions.'
I agree entirely with that approach, if the Authority will not assist itself in the pursuit of its case, it would be quite wrong for an independent Adjudicator to engage in speculation or conjecture to try and resolve the issues. It follows that, as interesting as this case could have been, the issue presented cannot be dealt with fairly and justly because the Authority has simply failed to participate in the proceedings in any meaningful way (or indeed at all) for over five months, despite being repeatedly asked to do so.
I have now reached the conclusion that the Authority has had long enough to deal with the issues, provide a response, or indicate that further time was required for them to formulate a response, and time has now come to draw a line under this matter. The Authority has had fair notice that the absence of participation on its part could result in the exclusion of its evidence.
In the rather extraordinary circumstances of this case I have decided it is right to exercise my power under regulation 9(8)(b) of The Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (London) Regulations 1993, which provides that I have a discretion to admit evidence or not: whether I chose to admit the Authority's evidence is entirely a case management decision for me, I am not bound to accept the Authority's evidence. For the reasons stated above, I have decided to exercise that discretion against the Authority and it follows that, before making any findings of fact, I direct that the Authority's evidence is not admitted.
I now proceed to determine the merits of the case and, in the absence of any admissible evidence from the Authority, I find as a fact that none of the contraventions alleged in these cases occurred.
It follows that I direct the Authority to cancel all the Penalty Charge Notices.
Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.
