How about this:
1. It is admitted that the Defendant is the registered keeper of vehicle registration N6LYY ("the Vehicle"). Save as expressly admitted herein, the Claimant is put to strict proof of each and every allegation in the Particulars of Claim.
2. With regard to the Particulars of Claim, two recent persuasive appeal judgments in Civil Enforcement Limited v Chan (Ref. E7GM9W44) and Car Park Management Services Ltd v Akande (Ref. K0DP5J30) indicate that the Particulars of Claim fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(e) and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5. On 15 August 2023, in Chan, HHJ Murch held: "the particulars of the claim as filed and served did not set out the conduct which amounted to the breach in reliance upon which the claimant would be able to bring a claim for breach of contract." The same is true in this case, and the Defendant invites the Court to strike out the claim pursuant to its case management powers under CPR 3.4. In the second persuasive appeal judgment, on 10 May 2024, in CPMS v Akande, HHJ Evans held: "Particulars of Claim have to set out the basic facts upon which a party relies in order to prove his or her claim." The Claimant has not specified which term of the alleged contract was breached, nor produced the signage said to constitute the contract terms, and is put to strict proof of the terms allegedly displayed and of the specific breach relied upon.
3. As to paragraph 3 of the Particulars of Claim, it is not admitted that the Defendant was the driver of the Vehicle at the material time. The Claimant's enforcement method was by Automatic Number Plate Recognition camera, which captures no image of any individual and provides no evidence as to the identity of the driver. The burden of proving the Defendant's identity as driver rests with the Claimant, who is put to strict proof of this allegation. The Defendant further notes that the events in question occurred more than three years ago, on 10 August 2023, and that the delay in bringing these proceedings lies entirely with the Claimant. This delay has made it significantly more difficult for the Defendant to gather or recall evidence relevant to these events, which is highly prejudicial to the Defendant.
4. In relation to paragraph 4 of the Particulars of Claim, pleaded in the alternative, the Defendant denies that she is liable as registered keeper pursuant to Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("POFA 2012"), for the following reasons:
a. Keeper liability under Schedule 4 POFA 2012 can only arise where both the "first condition" (paragraph 5) and the "second condition" (paragraph 6) are satisfied.
b. The second condition requires, among other things, that a compliant Notice to Keeper be given in accordance with paragraph 9, including that it be given "not later than the period of 14 days beginning with the day after that on which the specified period of parking ended" (paragraph 9(5)).
c. The parking period in this matter ended on 10 August 2023. The Claimant's own Parking Charge Notice, served as the Notice to Keeper, records a "Date Issued" of 7 November 2023 — 89 days after the parking period ended, and considerably outside the mandatory 14-day period.
d. In the premises, the second condition in paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 was not satisfied, and no liability for the parking charge was capable of transferring to the Defendant as registered keeper, regardless of the identity of the driver.
5. The Defendant notes that the Claimant's agents, DCB Legal Ltd, having been notified of this precise point by letter dated 29 January 2024 and by subsequent email correspondence dated 3 December 2024, 30 January 2025 and 22 April 2025, have at no stage disputed the date on which the Notice to Keeper was issued, nor otherwise provided any substantive answer to this point.
6. For the avoidance of doubt, the non-admission in paragraph 3 above does not give rise to any presumption or inference that the Defendant was the driver, nor does any failure to respond to a Notice to Keeper, or to nominate a driver, create any liability where the statutory conditions in Schedule 4 POFA 2012 have not been met. The burden of proving the Defendant's liability, whether as driver or as keeper, rests with the Claimant throughout.
7. Further and in the alternative, even if (which is denied) the conditions for keeper liability under Schedule 4 POFA 2012 were satisfied, liability would in any event be capped by paragraph 4(5) of Schedule 4, which provides that a creditor may not recover from the keeper more than the amount of the unpaid parking charge as it stood when the notice was issued to the driver. Accordingly, the sum of £50.00 described as "legal representative's costs", together with any other sum beyond the original parking charge, is not recoverable from the Defendant as keeper in any event.
8. As to the sum claimed generally, the Defendant denies that the Claimant is entitled to recover £50.00 described as "legal representative's costs", or any sum beyond the parking charge, court fee and permitted statutory interest. The Supreme Court in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 held that a parking charge of £85 already covered the full costs of operating a parking control scheme, including DVLA lookups and a standard letter chain; the same heads of cost cannot lawfully be recovered twice. In ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd [2011] EWHC 4023 (QB), the court held that inflating a parking charge from £75 to £135 to reflect alleged "costs" was disproportionate and penal. No order for the costs of legal representation is ordinarily appropriate on the small claims track pursuant to CPR 27.14, and no explanation or evidential basis has been provided by the Claimant for this charge; its inclusion is an attempt at double recovery and unreasonable conduct under CPR 27.14(2)(g).
9. The Claimant is a third-party agent and not the landowner of the site in question. The Defendant puts the Claimant to strict proof of its standing to issue parking charges and to bring these proceedings, including the existence, terms, scope and dates of any written authority granted to it by the landowner.
10. The Defendant further relies on the correspondence between the parties since January 2024 — including her letter dated 29 January 2024 and subsequent emails dated 3 December 2024, 30 January 2025 and 22 April 2025 — as evidence that the points raised in paragraphs 4 and 7 above were raised with the Claimant's agents at the earliest opportunity and have never been properly answered. The Defendant will invite the Court to take this into account in respect of costs and the conduct of these proceedings, pursuant to the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims.
11. In the premises, the Defendant denies that she is liable to the Claimant in the sum claimed, or at all, and invites the Court to dismiss the claim with costs.