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I wish to comment on the operator’s evidence as follows.

1. Keeper liability and late service of the NtK

UKPC rely on the “deemed service” provision in Schedule 4 PoFA and simply state that the notice was “issued and sent accordingly.” They have provided no proof of posting (for example, a certificate of posting or any individual track-and-trace record) showing that this specific NtK entered the postal system on the date they claim. A generic assertion that they sent it is not proof of the date on which it was actually posted.

By contrast, I have positively stated the actual date of receipt. PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(6) creates only a rebuttable presumption that a notice is delivered on the second working day after posting. That presumption is expressly subject to “unless the contrary is proved.” My evidence of the actual date of receipt, together with the absence of any proper proof of posting from UKPC, is sufficient to displace that presumption.

In any event, even if POPLA prefers to treat the NtK as “deemed” delivered, I remind the Assessor that I have not admitted to being the driver. UKPC must prove strict compliance with PoFA to hold the keeper liable. Any doubt about service or timing falls against the operator. If PoFA is not fully complied with, the keeper cannot be held liable and the appeal must be allowed on that basis alone.

2. “Parking”, “waiting” and loading – mis-statement of the law

UKPC state that for parking enforcement the terms “parking” and “waiting” are treated as synonymous and that any motorist “waits” for their own purposes is deemed to have parked. That is not an accurate statement of the law.

The county court appeal decision in Jopson v Homeguard Services [2016] B9GF0A9E makes it clear that “parking” is conceptually different from a brief stop for loading/unloading or for a short unavoidable interruption. The Judge expressly held that the concept of parking does not include the time “needed for getting in or out [of the vehicle], loading or unloading it” and that merely stopping for a few moments to carry items is not parking at all. My case is entirely analogous: the vehicle was stationary for just over one minute solely in order to load pre-ordered heavy goods and then immediately left.

UKPC’s own evidence shows a total duration on site of around 1 minute 5 seconds. This is textbook “loading” in the Jopson sense, not “parking”. No contract to pay a parking charge could have arisen from such a fleeting loading stop on a roadway in a retail park.

3. Equality Act 2010 and reasonable adjustments

UKPC accept that a Blue Badge was displayed but say that a Blue Badge does not give an unconditional right to park and refer to the Blue Badge handbook. That misses the point. I am not claiming that the Blue Badge itself overrides their terms. The relevant law here is the Equality Act 2010 and the operator’s duty as a service provider to make reasonable adjustments for disabled customers.

On the day in question:

- The driver is disabled and a Blue Badge holder.
- All disabled bays were occupied, including by vehicles not displaying a Blue Badge.
- The short stop was solely to load heavy goods as close as possible to the collection point, then leave.

Expecting a disabled driver to park further away (even if a bay were available) and manually carry heavy items over distance is not a reasonable expectation and is precisely the type of disadvantage the Equality Act is designed to prevent. A brief stop of around a minute in a roadway, for no other purpose than loading, is an obvious and proportionate “reasonable adjustment” to any general “no parking” policy in that area.

UKPC have produced no evidence that they considered, let alone made, any reasonable adjustment for a disabled customer, nor that they have any written policy dealing with such situations. Instead they seek to apply a rigid “no parking” rule to disabled and non-disabled motorists alike. That is the very definition of a policy which places disabled motorists at a substantial disadvantage.

POPLA may say it cannot adjudicate the Equality Act directly, but it is at least relevant to the overall fairness of the charge and whether UKPC’s rigid reliance on a “no parking” term is reasonable when applied to a disabled motorist engaged in a legitimate loading activity for just over a minute.

4. De minimis and the Single Code of Practice

UKPC rely on Clause 5.1 and Annex B of the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice and assert that “unauthorised motorists will not be entitled to the minimum time period of 5 minutes” in areas where parking is not allowed. That is a selective and misleading use of the Code.

Annex B and Clause 5.1 explain that a consideration period exists so that drivers can find a space (or decide not to park) and read and understand the terms and conditions, or the consequences of entering an area where public parking is not invited. The Code also makes clear that operators must take into account factors such as layout, traffic flow, and the time required to identify and read signage. It is not intended to legitimise an instantaneous £100 charge for a 65-second stop where the driver is simply loading goods and/or trying to understand the restrictions.

The new Single Code also recognises that disabled motorists may require longer periods than others, both for consideration and for grace. It cannot be correct that an able-bodied motorist in a “normal” bay is effectively afforded 5 minutes’ “consideration” in some contexts, while a disabled driver engaged in an essential loading activity in a roadway of a retail park is given zero tolerance for a one-minute stop.

On any sensible view the duration here is de minimis. In 1 minute and 5 seconds it is not realistically possible to: enter, spot and interpret signage, understand the unusual and onerous “no roadway parking” term, identify that all disabled bays are full (some abused by non-Blue-Badge vehicles), and then somehow find and use an alternative method of loading heavy goods. The time is so trivial that it should fall within a reasonable consideration/grace period even before one takes account of disability.

5. Signage and the nature of the “contract”

UKPC have produced photographs of their entrance sign, main signs and a signage plan. However, the issue here is not whether there are generic UKPC signs on the site, but whether the signage at the precise location of the stop is clear, prominent and capable of forming a contract for this particular alleged contravention.

Their own case summary accepts that the sign in question states “No roadway parking.” That is forbidding wording. It does not offer parking on certain terms for a price; it appears to be a prohibition: “you may not park here.” A sign that simply prohibits parking does not create a contractual licence to park in return for paying a charge. If anything, it suggests that any vehicle remaining there in defiance of the prohibition would be a trespasser. Only the landowner, not UKPC, could seek damages for trespass, and no actual loss has been evidenced.

Furthermore, the operator has not shown that, from the driver’s position on the roadway, these “No roadway parking” signs were obvious, at eye level, and readable in the few seconds available. A small sign high up on a post, with terms in small print, is not “clear and prominent” for a driver momentarily stopping to load. In such circumstances it is unreasonable to assert that the driver entered into a clear and binding contract to pay £100 for a stop lasting around one minute.

UKPC’s blanket assertion that its signage “complies fully” with the Code and that they are audited by the BPA is not evidence of clear contractual terms at this particular location. POPLA must assess what the driver could realistically see and understand within 65 seconds in a busy retail roadway, not rely on generalities.

6. Landowner authority

UKPC have not produced the actual contract with the landowner, only a brief witness statement with the signatory’s details redacted. That document is not a contract; it is merely an assertion that a contract exists. It does not allow any verification of its scope, duration, signatory capacity, or whether it actually covers “no roadway parking” enforcement at this specific location on the material date.

The operator’s promise that they “will provide a copy of the contract to the court if they require it” does nothing to assist POPLA, whose task is to assess the evidence actually produced now. A redacted witness statement from an unidentified person is not “strict proof” of authority in circumstances where the operator seeks to impose £100 charges for a non-parking loading stop on a roadway.

7. Blue Badge and private land

Finally, UKPC’s reference to the Blue Badge handbook is misplaced. I fully accept that the statutory Blue Badge scheme does not of itself grant rights on private land. However, the presence of a clearly displayed Blue Badge in the operator’s own photographs is clear evidence that the driver is disabled. That engages the Equality Act duty to make reasonable adjustments and supports the proposition that an extra minute for loading heavy goods near the entrance is not only fair but required.

The operator’s approach here – ignoring disability, ignoring the trivial duration, and strictly enforcing a “no roadway parking” rule against a disabled customer loading goods for just over a minute – is unreasonable and discriminatory. The charge should not be upheld in those circumstances.

Conclusion

In summary:

- PoFA keeper liability is not properly established, and I have not admitted to being the driver.
- Jopson v Homeguard makes clear that brief loading is not “parking,” directly contradicting UKPC’s attempt to treat “waiting” and “parking” as synonymous.
- The driver is disabled; a Blue Badge was displayed; all disabled bays were full; a one-minute loading stop near the collection point is a reasonable adjustment under the Equality Act.
- The duration of 1 minute 5 seconds is plainly de minimis and falls within any fair consideration/grace period, particularly for a disabled motorist.
- The signage is forbidding (“No roadway parking”) and incapable of forming a contract for a £100 charge, and its prominence at the exact location is not proved.
- Landowner authority has not been strictly proved; a short redacted witness statement is not equivalent to a contract.
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully request that POPLA upholds my appeal and instructs UKPC to cancel this Parking Charge Notice.