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Fair point, thanks both.   

Just copy and paste this rebuttal from a previous POPLA appeal over the exact same location and reasons:

This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.

1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA

The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.

MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.

MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.

Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

2. The location is under statutory control

MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land if the parking of a vehicle on that land is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The Stansted Airport byelaws contain a provision that regulates where vehicles may be parked within the airport boundary. Since the byelaws impose statutory control over parking, this means the location is not relevant land under PoFA.

The airport byelaws do contain a provision stating:

“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”

This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA

MET Parking Services has failed to acknowledge or rebut the official airport boundary map provided in this appeal, which confirms that Southgate Park is within the airport boundary and thus subject to these byelaws. They have also failed to explain why they believe that parking at this location is not subject to statutory control, despite the clear wording of the byelaws.

The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.

MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.

MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’

Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.

3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument

The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.

MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.

4. No Keeper liability under PoFA

MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.

MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.

5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice

MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This assumption has no basis in law and contradicts established legal precedent.

The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.

6. Inadequate signage evidence

MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.

The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:

- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance

MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.

7. No obligation to prove customer status

MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.

MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.

Conclusion

- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- hey have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- MET has ignored the case law referenced in the appeal, failing to address binding legal principles that refute their position.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.

Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.

IMO, it's not as simple as b789 suggests.

MET manage the site and were clearly nonplussed by the quoted POPLA decision. But they have a contract and IMO won't surrender all income easily.

Previously, the assessor stated that they had allowed the appeal in question because MET had failed to rebut the appellant's claim that the land was not relevant land.

But now they are and their evidence makes their argument clear in that there is NO statutory provision which 'imposes a liability (whether criminal or civil, and whether in the form of a fee or charge or a penalty of any kind) in respect of the parking on that land of vehicles generally or of vehicles of a description that includes the vehicle in question.' Therefore although subject to the byelaws, it is 'relevant land'.

I suggest the OP deals with this argument in detail rather than generalities.

The creditor claims and states that there were numerous and clear signs setting out the terms of parking.

The landowner is the 'Airport Company'.

Byelaw 3(28) states that 'no person shall..fail to comply with a ..sign exhibited by or on behalf of the Airport Company?

Byelaw 2 deals with Penalties and byelaw 2(3) states that the penalty for contravention..of any other byelaw shall not exceed level 3 on the standard scale.

It seems quite clear that the creditor's evidence is seeking to disapply the byelaws in favour of their contract with Starbucks, the lessee. (OP, I haven't seen the landowner authority. Is it Starbucks and are they a lessee? I'm assuming they are.)

That the land is not 'relevant land' cannot be disputed as the byelaws are clear, and this is a matter for the assessor.

MET's attempt to disapply the byelaws is a different matter which the appellant will address with the Airport Company direct.

My thoughts.

Juicymarbel - Thank you for a concise an informative thread. Likewise to all who assisted you.

I recently received a similar Notice to Keeper. I appealed immediately as the vehicle was only parked for 30 minutes and, like so many others, I was unaware of the nuances of the  carpark. I responded as  keeper,  refusing  to name the driver.

The NTK that I received makes no mention of PofA Schedule 4. It simply says that I am now invited to either pay the charge or, if I was not the driver, to notify MET of the name and address of the driver and pass the NTK on to  them.

In anticipation of the appeal rejection by MET, may I ask if:

 1. I am obliged under any other legislation to disclose the name of the driver.
 2. MET can pursue me as keeper for the parking charge without relying on PofA.

I understand the arguments relating to relevant land but did not mention them in my appeal to MET as I did not know about this issue at the time. Can I still rely on this argument when appealing to POPLA (which I certainly intend to do).

Thank you in anticipation and keep up the good work!!

Done. Thank you and apologies for my ignorance of the Forum Rules.

Ownership of the land is legally distinct from the applicability of airport bylaws. Southgate Park lies within the designated Stansted Airport bylaw boundary—typically defined under the Stansted Airport Bylaws 1991 or subsequent amendments—then those bylaws apply regardless of who holds the title.

This is a classic case of jurisdictional overlay: the bylaws regulate conduct within a geographic zone, not based on ownership but on location. Tabacon Stansted 2 Ltd owns the freehold at Southgate Park, and any activity on that land is still subject to airport-specific restrictions, enforcement powers, or operational controls—especially if the bylaws were enacted under statutory authority like the Civil Aviation Act 1982.

Stansted Airport Ltd is the legal entity that operates Stansted Airport. It’s a wholly owned subsidiary of Manchester Airports Holdings Ltd.

Freehold ownership means Tabacon Stansted 2 Ltd holds the title to the land at Southgate Park. They control its use, lease, and development—subject to planning law and other statutory constraints. Byelaw jurisdiction is a regulatory overlay. It applies to any land within a defined geographic boundary, regardless of who owns it.

MET's contract is with Tabacon Stansted 2 Ltd, the freeholder. Starbucks and McDonalds will be the lessees,