The POPLA complaint response remains legally defective in several important respects. First, the “period of parking” is still not properly specified on the Notice to Keeper. The wording “the period of parking immediately prior to 16:57” combined with a single photograph timestamped 16:52 does not amount to a specified period. At best, it refers to two isolated points in time, with no stated duration and no defined start and end. Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a) of PoFA requires the Notice itself to specify the period of parking. Vague narrative wording plus a timestamp is not the same thing as an actual period being clearly set out on the NtK.
Secondly, POPLA tries to rely on the “option to review further photographic evidence” and additional images in the operator’s pack to justify PoFA compliance. That approach misunderstands how Schedule 4 operates. Compliance is judged on the face of the Notice to Keeper as served on the keeper, not by sending the motorist off to a website or by adding more material later and treating that as if it were part of the NtK. Post-hoc evidence cannot cure a statutory defect in the original notice.
Thirdly, POPLA mis-states the law on keeper liability and reverses the burden. They assert that by not naming the driver, the keeper effectively accepts that they can be held liable. That is wrong. Keeper liability only arises if the operator has already served a fully compliant NtK that meets every mandatory requirement of Schedule 4. Silence or refusal to name the driver does not itself create liability; the precondition is full PoFA compliance, without which there is no lawful route to hold the keeper liable.
Fourth, POPLA misuses the concept of the consideration period. They claim the five-minute consideration period “ended” because photographs show the car straddling bay markings over roughly five minutes and a sign somewhere nearby. The consideration period, however, is about the time allowed before any contract is formed, to enable the driver to locate, read, and assess the terms and then decide whether to stay or leave. The mere fact that photos show the car’s position over a few minutes does not demonstrate that the driver had, or used, a fair opportunity to read the terms, nor does it prove any parking duration beyond the minimum consideration period required.
Fifth, POPLA sidesteps relevant persuasive authority. They dismiss Brennan and VCS v Edward because they are county court cases, while ignoring that these were appellate decisions that are directly on point in relation to the meaning of “period of parking” and the inference (or lack of it) that can be drawn about the driver from the keeper’s identity. Even if not formally binding, they are clearly persuasive and ought to have been engaged with. POPLA is free to disagree with them, but it is not acceptable simply to brush them aside without addressing the reasoning they contain.
Finally, POPLA repeatedly conflates evidence of alleged breach with the statutory route to liability. Photos showing a vehicle parked out of a bay may be relevant to whether the operator can assert a breach of terms, but they do not establish that the Notice to Keeper specified a PoFA-compliant period of parking, nor do they prove that a valid contract was formed after a proper consideration period. POPLA jumps straight from “there are photos of a breach” to “the keeper is liable”, without first satisfying the statutory gateway under Schedule 4 that must be passed before the keeper can be pursued at all.
I suggest you respond to POPLA with the following, for the record:
Dear POPLA Complaints,
Thank you for your reply.
For the record, your response simply reinforces the core legal defects I had already identified. It also confirms a worrying lack of understanding of PoFA Schedule 4, the purpose of a consideration period, and the status of persuasive appellate authority. These are not matters of opinion; they are basic points of law and reasoning that any competent adjudicator ought to grasp.
First, your attempt to turn the wording “the period of parking immediately prior to 16:57” plus a photo timestamped 16:52 into a “specified period of parking” is hopeless. At best, this is two isolated instants with no stated duration and no clearly specified start and end. PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the Notice to Keeper itself to specify the period of parking. That means an actual period, not vague narrative wording and a single image. You cannot avoid that requirement by enlarging the photo or pointing to an option to go online and view “further evidence”. Statutory compliance is judged on the face of the NtK as served. Post-hoc evidence and web portals cannot retrospectively cure a defective statutory notice.
Second, your statement that by not naming the driver I “accept” that I can be held liable as keeper is legally wrong. There is no such mechanism in PoFA. Keeper liability arises, and only arises, if the operator has strictly complied with every mandatory element of Schedule 4 in the NtK. Silence from the keeper does not create liability where the statutory gateway has not been passed. Your position reverses the burden and misstates the scheme of the Act in a way that is frankly astonishing for a body that claims its assessors are trained on “relevant law”.
Third, your treatment of the five minute consideration period shows the same level of confusion. You assert that the consideration period had ended and the contract was accepted because the operator provided several images of the vehicle across two bays over about five minutes and a photo of a nearby sign. That is not what a consideration period is about. The consideration period concerns the pre-contract window during which a driver must be allowed to find, read and decide whether to accept the terms or leave. A sequence of photos showing the vehicle’s position proves nothing about whether a fair opportunity was actually afforded, nor does it establish any parking duration beyond the minimum period, nor does it prove when or whether a contract was accepted. You have simply assumed contract formation from the fact that the vehicle was present, which is precisely the kind of lazy reasoning the consideration period is intended to prevent.
Fourth, you continue to brush aside Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions and VCS v Edward on the basis that they are “county court” cases, without engaging at all with their reasoning. These are appellate decisions, directly on point as to what constitutes a “period of parking” and why it is not permissible simply to infer that the keeper was the driver. Nobody has suggested they are binding like Court of Appeal authority, but they are clearly persuasive and relevant. A credible adjudicator would either follow the reasoning or explain, with reasons, why they do not. POPLA has done neither.
Finally, you conflate alleged breach evidence with the statutory route to keeper liability. Photos of a vehicle across bay markings may be relevant to the operator’s allegation of breach, but they do not and cannot substitute for a PoFA compliant period of parking on the NtK, nor do they prove proper consideration, contract formation, or a lawful route to transfer liability to the keeper. You repeatedly jump from “there are photos” to “the keeper is liable” without ever showing that the statutory preconditions have been satisfied.
I understand fully that POPLA operates a one stage process and that you will not overturn this decision, no matter how clear the legal errors are. That in itself will form part of my evidence. For the avoidance of doubt, if MET Parking are unwise enough to progress this to litigation, I will rely on all points raised in my appeal and in my subsequent correspondence, together with the content of POPLA’s decision and your complaint response, to demonstrate both the defects in the NtK and the lack of any lawful keeper liability.
In addition, POPLA is not some neutral public body. It is operated as a cog within Trust Alliance Group Limited (company number 04351294).
In light of that, I will be raising a complaint with the Competition and Markets Authority under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act in respect of POPLA’s conduct.
In plain terms, the DMCC angles I will be advancing are as follows.
First, misleading commercial practice in the way POPLA and Trust Alliance Group market the service as independent, impartial and offering effective redress, when in reality decisions are one-shot, not capable of being corrected even where clear legal errors are identified, and function to the commercial advantage of the parking industry.
Second, misleading omission in failing to make it clear that POPLA is a trade-association scheme operated within Trust Alliance Group, with no statutory basis and no ministerial or regulatory status, and that its decisions are only binding on operators under industry rules and do not bind any court.
Third, lack of professional diligence in repeatedly misapplying PoFA, ignoring or side-stepping directly relevant persuasive appellate county court authority, and treating post hoc evidence as curing statutory defects in Notices to Keeper, thereby creating a real risk that consumers will be induced to accept and pay liabilities that they do not in law owe.
Your decision and this complaint response will be submitted in full to the CMA as part of that DMCC complaint, together with a copy to my Member of Parliament.
This email is therefore to ensure that your position, and the legal errors within it, are clearly recorded and attributable.
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
[POPLA reference]
