Free Traffic Legal Advice

Hi,

Dealing with a "Penalty Notice", Notice to keeper from APCOA - See images below.
The driver mistakingly paid with a VRM of their previous vehicle.

From some cursory searching, I found that APCOA may not have the right to issue penalty notices as this is private land? Please correct me if I'm wrong.

Date of offence is 16/10/2025
Date of notice is 27/10/2025
Date received: 31/10/2025
Amount 100, discounted to 60 if paid within 14 days.

The driver nor keeper have not taken any action yet as the penalty notice was received today.

Can you please advise whether they have the driver bang to rights or if this can be successfully appealed.

Thank you.

No. That appeal is for a Parking Charge Notice (PCN). What you have received is a Penalty Notice (PN) issued as a criminal breach of railway bylaws. A PCN is only a speculative invoice for an alleged breach of contract by the driver.

Not that you have to pay it. Nothing will ever come of this, but you need to treat it for what it is. APCOA will mendaciously try and get you to appeal to POPLA. POPLA is not an authorised Independent Appeals Body (IAB) that is approved by the Train Operating Company (TOC). If you do appeal to POPLA, you do so under protest but you go through the motions as they are likely to tell APCOA to cancel anyway.

In reality, the only way to challenge a PN is to do so in the magistrates court. However, APCOA will NEVER take you to court over this because they can't.

A Railway Byelaw breach is a statutory offence. Only the TOC can authorise any prosecution. They would have to lay an information before a magistrate and then a demand would be made under the Single Justice Procedure where the case would be challenged. In the magistrates court, a criminal matter has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A high bar, very unlikely to be achieved.

As long as the driver is not identified, they would have to prove you are the "owner" of the vehicle if they ever wanted to recover any fine imposed by the court if you were the first ever person to charged like this in the magistrates court. They will try and say that the vehicles registered keeper is the owner. However, if you look at your V5C, note the big bold capitalised words on the front that clearly say tha the V5C is NOT proof of ownership.

APCOA wold eventually threaten a claim in the county court but that is simply impossible for an alleged breach of criminal law. The county court did only for civil cases, not statutory breaches.

I could go on, but this is never, EVER going to any court. APCOA just do not litigate. They hope you are low-hanging fruit on the gullible tree who can be intimidated into toying up out of ignorance and fear.

A PN must be prosecuted within 6 months of the date of the alleged breach. So, all responses should be made at the very last minute.

For now, appeal only as the Keeper with the following:

I am the Registered Keeper. My details are:

Full name: [ ]
Postal address: [ ]
Penalty Notice: [Ref]

This location is subject to Railway Byelaws and is not “relevant land” for PoFA 2012; you cannot transfer liability to the keeper. POPLA is not competent for Byelaws matters and is not a TOC approved Independent Appeals Body (IAB).

If you believe an offence occurred, lay an information before the magistrates under the Single Justice Procedure within six months. Otherwise, erase my data when no longer necessary for this purpose.

As to any further demands, I refer you to the response given in Arkell v Pressdram (1971).

FYI, ,the DVLA is going to ban all TOCs from contracting unregulated private parking firms from issuing any PNs for breaches of Railway Byelwas from Next month. All TOCs will be required to only contract these firms to issue PCNs in future for breach of contract, a civil matter.

As expected, they rejected the appeal (Redacted version below) and gave a POPLA code, so time to draft an appeal to them.

If I understand it, I need to appeal to POPLA under protest, as they are not an authorised appeals body by the railway TOC?

I am having trouble finding a post on here that has a POPLA appeal regarding "Penalty notices" related to TOC land. The closest I can find is this, but it seems to me that it's quite a lot of text for an appeal to an organisation that's essentially not authorised to act: https://www.ftla.uk/private-parking-tickets/amberley-railway-station-(apcoa)-failure-to-park-in-marked-bay-three-days-in-a-r/msg39422/#msg39422

I would be happy with some helpful pointers so I can draft an appeal, thank you!

Thank you, b789, POPLA appeal submitted verbatim. Under the first question about what kind of appeal, I selected "Other".

I received verification and a password to follow up on the appeal.

I'll report back when I receive anything.

Thanks!

Sorry, skipped over it straight to the appeal text. That's on me.

You can copy and paste this as your response. It is within the 20,000 character limit and puts POPLA firmly on notice that it is operating outside of its jurisdiction:

This rebuttal is a single, overarching point that arises directly from APCOA’s own operator evidence and from Southeastern’s description of that same contractual relationship. It goes to the heart of jurisdiction. Once this point is understood, POPLA has no lawful basis to adjudicate on this Penalty Notice at all, still less to uphold it against the registered keeper.

APCOA’s evidence pack includes a document headed “Contract for Parking Enforcement & Landowner Authority” between SE Trains Limited and APCOA Parking (UK) Ltd. This is the central document which APCOA rely on to show “landowner authority”. Nothing in this rebuttal introduces new factual material about the incident; it is analysis of APCOA’s own contract and of the legal framework they themselves say applies (Railway Byelaws).

The contractual document is drafted entirely as a British Parking Association Approved Operator Scheme parking agreement. It states that APCOA is authorised to carry out “parking enforcement” on SE Trains’ property “in accordance with sections 7.1 to 7.4 of the British Parking Association Code of Practice”. It then goes on to say (in substance) that this agreement extends authority “to carry out parking enforcement for breaches of the advertised terms and conditions, and pursuit of unpaid parking charges”. It later adds that “this contract gives the operator (APCOA Parking UK Ltd) the authority to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges”.

The financial term is set out in a table as a “Parking Charge Amount: £100.00 reduced to £80.00 if paid within 14 days of issue”. That is classic private Parking Charge Notice wording. Statutory penalties imposed under Railway Byelaws are court fines; they are not “parking charges”, cannot be discounted for early payment, and they are not payable to a private contractor. Any reduced-amount “charge” demanded by APCOA is, by definition, a CIVIL parking charge under contract, not a CRIMINAL penalty under Byelaws.

The only mention of Byelaws anywhere in the contract is a tick in a box in the “Enforcement Type” section labelled “Penalty – under Byelaws”. That label does not create any new legal power. There is no clause which says that APCOA may issue Penalty Notices under the Railway Byelaws in its own name, no clause that allows APCOA to demand statutory penalties for itself, and no clause that authorises APCOA to prosecute Byelaw offences in the magistrates’ court. On the contrary, the operative clauses repeatedly and exclusively talk about “parking charges” (not Penalty Notices), “breaches of the advertised terms and conditions”, and “legal action on any outstanding parking charges”, all by reference to the BPA AOS Code of Practice. In other words, APCOA’s authority is CONTRACTUAL and CIVIL, not STATUTORY and CRIMINAL.

Southeastern themselves, in response to a Freedom of Information request, have confirmed that APCOA “does not prosecute byelaw breaches in the magistrates’ courts” and that Southeastern “have not delegated prosecution of this power” and “retain prosecutorial responsibility”. This is not new factual evidence about the event; it is Southeastern’s own explanation of the contract APCOA have already placed in evidence and of how that relationship operates. It merely confirms what is already apparent on the face of the contract: APCOA is a parking contractor issuing private charges; it is not a prosecuting authority for Byelaw offences.

APCOA’s “Penalty Notice” and subsequent correspondence try to have it both ways. They describe an “offence” under the Railway Byelaws, threaten that a criminal record may result, assert that the registered keeper is “legally liable as the owner even if not the driver”, and yet simultaneously demand a discounted sum payable to APCOA’s own PO Box, refer to the BPA Code of Practice, and rely on a contract that only authorises pursuit of civil parking charges. They expressly state in their evidence that they are “not issuing under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012” but then import keeper/owner presumptions that appear in civil contexts, not in the Railway Byelaws themselves. The Byelaws contain no deeming provision that the DVLA registered keeper is the “owner”; DVLA data is administrative and the V5C is not proof of ownership. Ownership for a Byelaw 14(4) prosecution would have to be proved, beyond reasonable doubt, in a magistrates’ court. APCOA cannot convert that criminal standard into a civil presumption in front of POPLA.

POPLA exists as an independent appeals service for BPA members’ private parking charges. It is not a court and has no statutory footing to determine criminal or quasi-criminal liability under Railway Byelaws, to decide who the “owner” is for the purposes of Byelaw 14(4), or to award statutory penalties to a private company. APCOA’s own contract shows they are authorised to issue parking charges and to pursue civil debts. Southeastern’s own explanation confirms that any Byelaw prosecution remains their responsibility and has not been delegated. In those circumstances, APCOA’s attempt to dress up a civil parking enforcement contract as a Byelaw “Penalty Notice” is ultra vires the contract and outside POPLA’s remit.

This leads to a single, unavoidable conclusion. Either:

1. POPLA treats this for what the contract actually authorises: a private Parking Charge Notice for breach of contract. In that case, the site is Railway land and not “relevant land” for Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, so no keeper liability can arise and APCOA’s case against the keeper must fail; or

2. POPLA accepts APCOA’s characterisation that this is a Penalty Notice “issued under Byelaw 14”. In that case, POPLA has no jurisdiction at all to determine a statutory criminal allegation or to endorse keeper/owner liability that the Byelaws themselves do not provide for. The only lawful route is for Southeastern, not APCOA, to lay information before the magistrates within six months, where ownership and liability would have to be proved to the criminal standard. POPLA cannot substitute itself for a criminal court.

Either way, APCOA’s Penalty Notice cannot lawfully be upheld against the registered keeper. On the basis of APCOA’s own contract and Southeastern’s own statements about that contract, this Penalty Notice falls outside POPLA’s competence and outside APCOA’s proper authority. The only fair and lawful outcome is for POPLA to allow the appeal and direct that the Penalty Notice is cancelled.

For the avoidance of doubt, I also put POPLA, which is not a separate legal person but a trading style of Trust Alliance Group Limited (Company No. 04351294), on notice that any decision which upholds APCOA’s characterisation of this demand as a lawful “Penalty Notice under Railway Byelaws” and purports to impose liability on the keeper risks amounting to an unfair commercial practice under Part 4 Chapter 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC).

First, if POPLA endorses APCOA’s position that I am “legally liable” to pay a discounted “penalty” to a private contractor, and that POPLA can properly adjudicate criminal or quasi-criminal liability under the Railway Byelaws, that would be capable of being a misleading action under section 226 DMCC. It would amount to a false representation about my legal obligations and about POPLA’s own competence and status, and it is clearly material to a consumer’s transactional decision whether to pay or not.

Second, if POPLA involves itself in what APCOA describe as an “offence” under Byelaw 14, despite POPLA’s own published remit being limited to Parking Charge Notices on private land, that is at least a failure to exercise the standard of special skill and care that a consumer is entitled to expect from a professional ADR body. That is capable of breaching the requirement of professional diligence in section 229 DMCC.

Third, by using and applying a private-sector code (the BPA AOS Code of Practice) in a way which promotes the dressing-up of civil parking charges as statutory criminal penalties, POPLA and Trust Alliance Group Limited risk engaging section 225 and Schedule 20, which deal with the promotion of unfair practices in or through a code of conduct.

These provisions are now directly enforceable by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which can impose significant administrative fines on traders who engage in unfair commercial practices. If POPLA, as a trading name of Trust Alliance Group Limited, chooses to step outside its published scope and to endorse APCOA’s misrepresentation of this Penalty Notice, I will reserve my position to refer Trust Alliance Group Limited’s conduct to the CMA for investigation under the DMCC.

In light of the potential consequences for Trust Alliance Group Limited, the assessor is invited to think very carefully before endorsing APCOA’s position. If there is any doubt about POPLA’s jurisdiction or about the DMCC implications, this decision should be escalated to an appropriately senior person within Trust Alliance Group Limited who has proper legal understanding of what a breach of the DMCC could mean for the company.

Just send it now. APCOA cannot and will not prosecute this. I have a Southeastern Trains FoI statement from an earlier APCOA Penalty notice issue I have been dealing with that explicitly states:

APCOA does not prosecute byelaw breaches in the magistrates’ courts, we have not delegated prosecution of this power. Southeastern retains prosecutorial responsibility.

I have also just sent the following email to Trust Alliance Group Ltd. POPLA is a trading style/brand of Trust Alliance Group Ltd, which is the legal entity responsible for its operation:

Subject: POPLA involvement in APCOA “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws” – potential breaches of DMCC 2024

Dear Sir or Madam,

I write as a private individual and advisor to motorists who receive demands from unregulated private parking operators, including APCOA Parking (UK) Ltd. This email is not sent in my capacity as a recipient of any APCOA Penalty Notice, but in my personal capacity as someone who regularly reviews POPLA decisions and operator practices.

POPLA is presented publicly as an independent appeals service for Parking Charge Notices issued on private land, administered by Trust Alliance Group Limited. However, APCOA are using POPLA in relation to documents that are explicitly described to consumers as “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws” and framed as “offences” that may lead to a criminal record.

These APCOA Penalty Notices are not conventional civil Parking Charge Notices. They purport to be statutory penalties for alleged Byelaw 14 offences but demand discounted “penalties” payable to a private contractor, rely on DVLA registered keeper data on non-relevant land, and are issued where there is no clear delegation of prosecutorial powers from the Train Operating Company. Motorists are then directed to POPLA as if POPLA were a legitimate appellate body for those alleged offences.

In my view, POPLA’s involvement in these Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices places Trust Alliance Group Limited at risk of breaching Part 4 Chapter 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC), for which TAGL is the relevant “trader”, POPLA being only a trading style.

In particular:

1. Misleading actions (s.226 DMCC)
Where POPLA considers appeals against APCOA “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws” and issues decisions that endorse APCOA’s position that a registered keeper is “legally liable” to pay a discounted penalty to APCOA, POPLA risks making or reinforcing false or misleading representations about:

(a) the nature and legal status of the demand (civil parking charge versus statutory criminal penalty),
(b) the legal obligations of the consumer (for example, keeper liability on land that is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 PoFA 2012), and
(c) POPLA’s own competence and status (implying it has power to adjudicate criminal or quasi-criminal liability under Railway Byelaws).

These representations are clearly likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision they would not otherwise take, namely to pay a demand believing that an independent and authoritative body has confirmed legal liability for a Byelaw “offence”. That is exactly the scenario contemplated by section 226 DMCC.

2. Lack of professional diligence (s.229 DMCC)
POPLA’s own published remit is confined to Parking Charge Notices issued on private land in accordance with the BPA Approved Operator Scheme. Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices relate to land under statutory control, engage criminal procedure in the magistrates’ courts, and any genuine penalty would be imposed by a court and paid to the public purse, not to a private company.

By nevertheless accepting “appeals” in these Penalty Notice cases and purporting to decide whether Byelaw “offences” have occurred or whether a registered keeper is liable as “owner”, POPLA appears to be operating outside its own competence and applying a private-sector code in an area where only a magistrates’ court has jurisdiction. That is, at the very least, capable of falling below the standard of special skill and care expected of a professional ADR body and therefore of breaching the requirement of professional diligence under section 229 DMCC.

3. Promotion of unfair practices via a code of conduct (s.225 and Schedule 20 DMCC)
Trust Alliance Group operates POPLA within the BPA AOS Code of Practice framework. Where POPLA uses that code to support or endorse APCOA’s practice of presenting what are, in reality, private parking charges as “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws”, with all the associated suggestions of criminality and keeper liability, there is a real risk that Trust Alliance Group is promoting or supporting unfair commercial practices through a code of conduct within the meaning of section 225 and Schedule 20 DMCC.

The net result is that motorists are being told that POPLA has “rejected” their appeal in relation to a supposed Railway Byelaw “offence”, that they remain “legally liable” to pay a penalty to APCOA, and that this reflects the correct legal position, when in fact:

• POPLA has no statutory jurisdiction over Byelaw offences;
• ownership and any Byelaw 14 liability can only be determined by a magistrates’ court to the criminal standard; and
• the only lawful route for a genuine Byelaw prosecution is for the Train Operating Company to lay information before a Magistrate within six months.

In those circumstances, I believe that POPLA’s ongoing involvement in APCOA Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices presents a serious consumer-protection risk and exposes Trust Alliance Group Limited to possible regulatory action by the Competition and Markets Authority under the DMCC.

I therefore request that Trust Alliance Group Limited:

1. Undertakes an urgent internal review of POPLA’s remit and policies in relation to any APCOA (or other operator) documents described as “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws”;

2. Pauses or withdraws POPLA from handling such cases unless and until Trust Alliance Group Limited is satisfied that POPLA has a clear and lawful basis to adjudicate them and that consumers are not being misled about the nature of the charge or POPLA’s powers; and

3. Confirms what steps will be taken to ensure that POPLA’s published materials and decision letters do not state or imply that POPLA has confirmed criminal or quasi-criminal liability, or that a keeper is legally obliged to pay a Byelaw “penalty” to a private operator.

This email is intended to give Trust Alliance Group Limited a fair opportunity to address these concerns internally. If I do not see evidence that POPLA is being brought back within its published remit and that Byelaw Penalty Notices are being excluded from its scope, I reserve my position to share case examples and refer these issues to the Competition and Markets Authority for investigation as potential breaches of Part 4 Chapter 1 DMCC.

Given the nature of these concerns, I would ask that this correspondence is brought to the attention of your legal and compliance teams, and to the senior executive responsible for the POPLA business unit.

Yours faithfully,

Give me a break. I haven't even got round to reporting APCOA or TAGL (POPLA) to the CMA yet. I have simply outlined to POPLA why their remit does not extend to adjudicating on fake Penalty Notices and the consequences for TAGL (POPLA is just a trading style for them) of breaching the DMCC.

Anyone can report APCOA, TAGL, United Trade and Industry Ltd (the IPC/IAS), the BPA and every single unregulated private parking firm to the CMA for breaches of the DMCC. I just don't understand why more people don't just do it.

The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC) gives the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) new powers to investigate and penalise unfair trading practices, consumer harm, and anti‑competitive conduct. Unregulated private parking firms and their trade associations (BPA/IPC) routinely engage in behaviours that fall squarely within those powers.

They issue misleading notices, misrepresent legal liability, and exploit consumers with opaque terms and excessive charges. Trade bodies like the BPA and IPC act as gatekeepers, presenting themselves as regulators while in reality operating as industry clubs that protect their members from scrutiny. POPLA (Trust Alliance Group Ltd) and the IAS (United Trade and Industry Ltd) profit from appeal systems that lack independence and have obvious conflicts of interest.

These practices amount to breaches of the DMCC because they involve:


Reporting them to the CMA forces scrutiny under the DMCC framework. The CMA can investigate, impose penalties of up tp 10% of each companies worldwide turnover, and mandate reforms. Every report builds pressure and evidence, showing that these are not isolated incidents but systemic misconduct.

In short: the DMCC was designed to stop exactly this kind of exploitation. If consumers, advocates, and professionals all report these firms and their trade bodies, the CMA cannot ignore the scale of the problem.