OK. So you confirmed you were the Keeper but also admitted to being the driver. For future reference, you must never, EVER, admit to being the driver. There is no legal obligation on the Keeper to identify the driver to an unregulated private parking firm. Only the driver can liable.
However, in certain circumstances, as long as the operator has fully complied with all the requirements of PoFA 2012, they can transfer liability from the unidentified driver to the Keeper. In most cases, and in particular yours, the Notice to Keeper (NtK) is not fully compliant with PoFA as it fails to specify a period of parking as required by paragraph 9(2)(a).
If the Keeper refuses to identify the driver, simply by only referring to the driver in the third person, the operator cannot transfer liability from the unknown driver to the known Keeper. Unfortunately, your appeal handed them the liable party on a plate because you identified yourself as the driver when there was no legal obligation to do so.
So, we are where we are. What this means is that this will now take much longer to conclude but is still easily won, as long as you follow all the advice you receive here.
You now move on to the POPLA appeal. Whilst this supposed to be an independent ADR, it isn't really. POPLA are funded by the very firms they are supposedly adjudicating. The quality of POPLA decisions are also very variable, with some assessors being utter morons with clear lack of contract law knowledge. There is no proper consistency in their decisions.
Even if POPLA is not successful, it doesn't matter. Their decision is not binding on you and you certainly don't pay. It just means that the process then moves on through the useless debt recovery stage to the county court small claim. That is a good thing, because it is the only stage where you are likely to get a truly independent look at your case by a district judge.
However, I can tell you with greater than 99.9% certainty, that a claim from UKPC that is issued through DCB Legal, will never reach a hearing with a judge. As long as the advice given to you here and the template defence, the claim will either be struck out or discontinued. You just have to follow the advice.
For now, you have 33 days from the date of the initial appeal rejection to submit your POPLA appeal. So, 14 January is the deadline.
Use the following as your POPLA appeal:
I am the registered keeper of vehicle [VRM]. I appeal to POPLA against UK Parking Control Ltd (“the Operator”) in respect of Parking Charge Notice [PCN NUMBER], issued in relation to an alleged contravention on 19/11/2025 at Strood Retail Park, ME2 2AD. Liability is denied in full. This appeal concerns substantive issues of contract formation, evidential sufficiency, the meaning of “parking”, and the Operator’s compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (“PPSCoP”) and established principles of contract law.
The Operator bears the burden of proof and is put to strict proof of: (i) the precise location and factual circumstances of the alleged contravention; (ii) that a contract was capable of being formed and was in fact formed, including evidence that any mandatory consideration period had expired before enforcement; (iii) that the alleged conduct amounted to “parking” rather than a brief stop for unloading; (iv) that the sum demanded is recoverable as a contractual charge rather than an unenforceable penalty or damages dressed up as a contractual sum; and (v) that the Operator has proper standing and landowner authority to contract with motorists and to pursue charges in its own name. Mere assertion is not evidence.
1. STRICT PROOF: CONSIDERATION PERIOD – UKPC HAS NO EVIDENCE IT HAD ENDED (PPSCoP SECTION 5.1 AND ANNEX B)
UKPC is alleging a contractual parking charge for “not parked correctly within the markings of the bay or space”. However, the PPSCoP makes clear that before any contract can be treated as accepted, the driver must first be allowed a consideration period.
PPSCoP Section 5.1 requires operators to allow a consideration period for the driver to read the terms and conditions and decide whether to accept them or leave. PPSCoP Annex B further explains that the consideration period is fundamental because it is the point at which the driver is taken to have accepted the terms and conditions, and it explicitly states that a consideration period is not a free period of parking. Annex B also requires that, where there is evidence the consideration period has expired, the operator should retain evidence to show how the consideration period had ended.
In this case, the Operator has produced no evidence capable of demonstrating that the vehicle remained in situ beyond the mandatory consideration period, nor any evidence showing when or how the consideration period ended. Evidence that a vehicle was stationary at a particular moment does not establish that the consideration period elapsed, nor that the driver accepted the terms rather than leaving.
Therefore, even if the still image shows the vehicle slightly outside the bay markings, UKPC is put to strict proof of compliance with PPSCoP Section 5.1 and Annex B by producing retained evidence showing how the consideration period had ended before enforcement. If UKPC cannot evidence expiry of the consideration period, the charge was issued prematurely and in breach of the PPSCoP, and POPLA must allow the appeal.
2. STRICT PROOF: UNLOADING IS NOT “PARKING” – JOPSON v HOMEGUARD (2016) [B9GF0A9E] IS PERSUASIVE APPEAL AUTHORITY
The alleged “parking” event was, in fact, a brief stop for unloading. In Jopson v Homeguard (2016) [B9GF0A9E] (County Court appeal, HHJ Harris QC), the court drew a clear and principled distinction between “parking” and brief stopping for the purposes of loading or unloading. The judge explained that the ordinary meaning of “parking” does not extend to short-duration stops that are part of the normal and reasonable use of land, such as loading or unloading, as opposed to leaving a vehicle parked for a period of time.
Whilst Jopson is not binding on POPLA, it is persuasive authority. A legally trained assessor will understand that persuasive authority, especially a County Court appeal decision with reasoned analysis, is relevant and should be taken into account. POPLA is invited to apply that persuasive distinction here.
UKPC is therefore put to strict proof that the vehicle was “parked”, rather than briefly stopped for unloading. In any event, the Operator is also put to strict proof that any alleged breach occurred only after the PPSCoP consideration period had ended and a contract had been accepted. If the Operator cannot prove expiry of the consideration period prior to enforcement, the appeal must be allowed regardless of the vehicle’s position.
If the Operator’s evidence does not demonstrate when and how the consideration period ended, POPLA cannot properly conclude that a contract was accepted or that enforcement was permissible.
3. FAILURE TO PROVE ADEQUATE SIGNAGE – NO CONTRACT FORMED
In the alternative, and without prejudice to the primary grounds above, the Operator has failed to prove that any contract could have been formed due to inadequate signage.
A parking charge can only be recovered as a contractual term if the terms were clearly and prominently brought to the driver’s attention before any alleged acceptance. This requires signage that is legible, prominent, and positioned so that a driver can read and understand the terms in time to decide whether to enter, stop, or leave.
The Operator has produced no evidence showing:
• the location of the signs in relation to where the vehicle was observed;
• the orientation of the signs relative to a driver’s line of sight;
• the font size, prominence, or readability of the terms;
• what a driver would actually see on approach or at the stopping position.
A generic assertion that “signage is displayed on site” is not evidence of communication of contractual terms.
The Operator is put to strict proof that:
(a) a compliant entrance sign was in place at the material time, meeting the requirements of the BPA Code of Practice v9, such that a driver on approach is clearly alerted that the land is private, controlled, and subject to terms;
(b) there were a sufficient number of prominent, adequately positioned terms signs throughout the site, including in the area where the vehicle was observed, so that a driver would reasonably be expected to see them;
(c) those terms signs were oriented and positioned to be seen from a driver’s likely stopping/parking position and in the immediate vicinity on foot; and
(d) the core terms, and in particular the parking charge itself, were prominently displayed and legible (not concealed within dense or small-print text) at the material time.
The Supreme Court decision in ParkingEye v Beavis turned on unusually prominent and clear signage, coupled with a specific commercial justification. It does not permit operators to impose a £100 charge on the basis of unclear, obscure, or unreadable terms. Absent strict proof that the charge was prominently displayed and legible at the material time, no contract can be established and the appeal must be allowed.
4. FAILURE TO EVIDENCE LANDOWNER AUTHORITY AND STANDING (PPSCoP SECTION 14.1)
The Operator is put to strict proof that it had the necessary landowner authority and standing to issue PCNs and to pursue recovery in its own name at Strood Retail Park, ME2 2AD on 19/11/2025. This is a strict requirement, because an operator that lacks authority from the landholder has no standing to contract with motorists or to enforce parking charges.
The Operator must therefore produce a contemporaneous written agreement flowing from the landowner (or a party with properly evidenced landholder rights) which was in force on the material date. Whilst the Operator may redact genuinely commercially sensitive financial information, any redaction must not obscure the identity of the contracting parties, the land boundary, the scope of authority, the duration of the agreement, or the Operator’s authority to issue PCNs and pursue recovery in its own name.
A generic “authority statement”, witness template, or a single-page agreement bearing signatures alone is not evidence of standing and does not demonstrate compliance with the mandatory requirements of the PPSCoP.
In accordance with PPSCoP Section 14.1 (a–j), the Operator must evidence, as a minimum, written authorisation that clearly defines:
(i) the identity of the landowner and the contracting parties, and the basis on which the signatory has authority to bind the landowner;
(ii) the start date, end date, and any renewal provisions confirming the agreement was live on 19/11/2025;
(iii) the land boundary and the exact area of operation, supported by a site plan/boundary map;
(iv) the scope of the Operator’s authority, including whether it may issue PCNs, the circumstances in which it may do so, and any restrictions;
(v) any exemptions, permissions, or user classes and how these are administered;
(vi) the terms relating to signage responsibilities and standards at the site; and
(vii) explicit authority for the Operator to pursue charges to recovery, including in its own name (not merely as an agent), if that is what is claimed.
If the Operator cannot produce a compliant contemporaneous contract (and boundary map) meeting PPSCoP Section 14.1, POPLA must find that the Operator has failed to prove standing. In those circumstances, no contract can be enforced by the Operator and the appeal must be allowed.
Conclusion
The Operator has failed to discharge the burden of proof. It has not demonstrated that the mandatory PPSCoP consideration period had expired before enforcement, nor that a contract was accepted. The alleged conduct amounts, on the evidence, to unloading rather than “parking” within the ordinary meaning of that term, as explained in Jopson v Homeguard (2016), which POPLA is invited to treat as persuasive authority.
In the alternative, the Operator has failed to prove that any contract could have been formed due to inadequate signage, and has further failed to evidence the landowner authority and standing required by PPSCoP Section 14.1.
In the absence of strict proof on these fundamental matters, the charge is unenforceable. POPLA is therefore respectfully invited to allow the appeal.