IAS Appeal: Smart Parking Ltd – PCN [insert number]
I appeal this Parking Charge on the ground that no contract was capable of being formed and therefore no breach of contract could have occurred.
1. No operative contractual terms at the material time
The signage specifies:“This applies Sunday–Thursday: 10:30 am – 00:30 am and Friday & Saturday: 10:30 am – 1:30 am. NO OVERNIGHT PARKING.”
By plain-English interpretation consistent with Clause 18.6 of the BPA Code of Practice, those hours define the period when parking regulations and the 90-minute stay restriction are operative. The vehicle was recorded between 09:25 and 09:45 am, a time outside the stated hours.
At that time, the sign did not communicate any restriction, prohibition, or contractual offer. It merely indicated that conditions apply from 10:30 am onwards, with “No overnight parking” referring to the late-night closure period after 00:30 am (01:30 am at weekends). Nothing on the signage states that parking is prohibited before 10:30 am, nor that the site is closed to motorists before that time.
In contract law, no liability can arise where no contractual terms are offered or capable of acceptance. The operator’s allegation of “unauthorised parking” before 10:30 am is therefore baseless, because no contractual terms were in effect at that time.
2. The signage fails to create certainty of offer or consideration
To establish a binding contract, there must be:• A clear offer,
• Communication of that offer,
• Acceptance, and
• Consideration.
The signage makes no “offer” to park outside the specified hours, and therefore no driver could accept any terms at 09:25 am. It follows that no consideration flowed between the parties, and thus no contract was formed.
This position is consistent with the principle that any ambiguity in a purported contractual term must be construed contra proferentem—against the drafter. If Smart Parking intended to forbid or charge for parking before 10:30 am, the sign should have said so explicitly. Its silence on this point must be interpreted in favour of the motorist.
3. The operator’s reliance on ANPR data is irrelevant
The Notice to Keeper alleges that the vehicle was “parked without the correct authorisation.” However, there is no mention of any authorisation requirement in the signage. The only restriction visible concerns maximum stay during stated hours. Consequently, the operator’s assertion is unsupported by any visible term and cannot form the basis of contractual liability.
4. Non-compliance with the IPC Code of Practice – signage clarity
Smart Parking is now bound by the IPC Code of Practice. The Code’s section on signage requires that:• signs are clear, conspicuous and legible;
• terms and conditions are clearly set out so that drivers can easily understand what is permitted and what is not; and
• any charges and restrictions must be accurately and prominently conveyed.
If Smart Parking’s position is that parking is prohibited before 10:30 and that a charge is payable for any vehicle on site at 09:25, this is not stated anywhere on the signs. The only time-related condition communicated is the 90-minute maximum stay “appl[ying]” between 10:30 and the stated evening cut-off times, plus a prohibition on “overnight parking” after those times.
The signage therefore fails to make any pre-10:30 prohibition clear or intelligible to a driver and does not accurately set out the alleged term the operator is trying to enforce. This is contrary to the IPC Code of Practice requirements on signage transparency and clarity and is insufficient to form a legally binding contract.
5. No genuine contractual or pre-contractual breach
Since no contractual terms applied between 09:25 and 09:45 am, there was no breach to trigger any liability. Even if the operator seeks to construe “unauthorised parking” as a trespass, only the landowner (not a parking agent) can claim nominal damages for trespass, not a contractual sum of £100. Smart Parking, as a third-party agent, has no standing to claim damages for trespass.
Conclusion
The operator has not demonstrated that a valid contract existed at 09:25–09:45 am or that any clear restriction applied. The signage expressly limits the application of terms to hours beginning 10:30 am. As no contract could have been formed, the alleged charge is unenforceable.
The appeal should therefore be upheld, and the Parking Charge cancelled.
What is the specific contravention alleged? Show us the Notice to Keeper (NtK). Your argument is irrelevant if the alleged contravention is something completely unrelated to signs.
Any arguments about the signs would be useful in court but this would never reach a hearing stage before being discontinued.
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The parking operator bears the burden of proof. It must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that it has lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in its own name. I therefore require the operator to provide the following:1. Strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage that was in place on the date in question, at the exact location of the alleged contravention. This must include a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the signs in situ. The operator must demonstrate that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the IPC Code of Practice that was valid at the time of the alleged contravention, including requirements relating to font size, positioning, and the communication of key terms.
2. Strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the IAS assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
3. Strict proof that the enforcement mechanism (e.g. ANPR or manual patrol) is reliable, synchronised, maintained, and calibrated regularly. The operator must prove the vehicle was present for the full duration alleged and not simply momentarily on site, potentially within a permitted consideration or grace period as defined by the PPSCoP.
4. Strict proof that the Notice to Keeper complies with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), if the operator is attempting to rely on keeper liability. Any failure to comply with the mandatory wording or timelines in Schedule 4 of PoFA renders keeper liability unenforceable.
5. Strict proof that the NtK was posted in time for it to have been given within the relevant period. The PPSCoP section 8.1.2(d) Note 2 requires that the operator must retain a record of the date of posting of a notice, not simply of that notice having been generated (e.g. the date that any third-party Mail Consolidator actually put it in the postal system.)
6. The IAS claims that its assessors are “qualified solicitors or barristers”. Yet there is no way to verify this. Decisions are unsigned, anonymised, and unpublished. There is no transparency, no register of assessors, and no way for a motorist to assess the legal credibility of the individual supposedly adjudicating their appeal. If the person reading this really is legally qualified, they will know that without strict proof of landowner authority (VCS v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 186), no claim can succeed. They will also know that clear and prominent signage is a prerequisite for contract formation (ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67), and that keeper liability under PoFA is only available where strict statutory conditions are met.
If the assessor chooses to overlook these legal requirements and accept vague assertions or redacted documents from the operator, that will speak for itself—and lend further weight to the growing concern that this appeals service is neither independent nor genuinely legally qualified.
In short, I dispute this charge in its entirety and require full evidence of compliance with the law, industry codes of practice, and basic contractual principles.