Step by step guide for bypassing a webform that blocks pasting
1. First try the keyboard shortcut. On Windows or Linux press Ctrl+V. On a Mac press Command+V. Many sites only block right‑click paste but not the shortcut.
2. If that fails, paste your text into another box on the page or into a notes app, then copy it again and try pasting inside the form. Sometimes this works because the block only applies to the first attempt.
3. If the site still refuses, use your browser’s developer tools. On the page press F12. On Windows or Linux you can also press Ctrl+Shift+I. On a Mac press Command+Option+I.
4. Right‑click the box where you want to paste and choose Inspect. This shows the code for that box.
5. Look for anything that says onpaste or return false. If you see it, delete that part of the code. Close the tools and try pasting again.
6. If you do not want to touch code, install a browser extension. Search for Allow Copy or Enable Copy Paste in your browser’s extension store. Add it to your browser. These extensions automatically remove the block and let you paste normally.
7. Remember this block is only a nuisance. It does not make the form safer. Using shortcuts, developer tools, or an extension simply restores normal browser behaviour.
This is my response to the operator’s prima facie case. I rely on the following submissions to show that the parking charge is not recoverable and should be cancelled.
1. Failure to establish keeper liability under PoFA
The operator’s NtK purports to rely on PoFA by reproducing the warning in paragraph 9(2)(f). Having chosen to invoke statutory keeper liability, the operator must comply strictly with all mandatory conditions in paragraph 9. Any material defect is fatal.
The NtK fails to comply with paragraph 9(2)(e). That paragraph requires the creditor to state that it does not know the driver’s name and address for service, and to invite the keeper either to pay the charge or, if not the driver, to provide the driver’s details and pass on the notice.
The NtK does not contain the required statement that the creditor does not know the driver’s name and address, nor a compliant invitation in the terms envisaged by PoFA. Instead, it is framed mainly as a demand that the keeper pay, with a separate instruction that, if the keeper was not the driver, they “should notify” CPM of the driver’s details and pass the notice on. That is not the statutory wording and does not satisfy paragraph 9(2)(e). PoFA is a narrow derogation from the ordinary rule that only the driver is liable, so strict compliance is required.
Without full compliance with paragraph 9, the operator cannot transfer liability from the unidentified driver to the keeper. Any assertion of keeper liability in reliance on PoFA is misconceived. The only person who could, in principle, be liable is the driver, who has not been identified and whose liability has not been proved.
2. The driver was an authorised visitor engaged in deliveries, not an “unauthorised” parker
According to the NtK and signage, only vehicles “registered” with CPM and holding a valid e-permit may park, and others are treated as unauthorised. That framework does not fit these facts.
The evidence includes the driver’s delivery manifest from the material date and time. It shows three deliveries to addresses at Eagling Close within the 13-minute period relied on by the operator. The vehicle was present solely to perform those deliveries.
A delivery driver attending at the request of three occupiers is an authorised visitor, present under the implied licence and invitation of those occupiers, not on the land for personal convenience. Any suggestion that the vehicle was “not authorised” or “not permitted” to attend is therefore untenable.
3. Loading and unloading do not amount to “parking” on these facts
The signs regulate “parking” in marked bays and purport to prohibit parking on roadways, yellow lines and similar areas. They do not expressly address the temporary stopping of a commercial vehicle to load and unload parcels to residents.
Jopson v Homeguard [2016] distinguishes “parking” from temporary stopping for loading/unloading at residential premises and holds that brief stops to unload goods are a normal and necessary adjunct to the use of premises, not “parking” in the ordinary sense.
Those principles apply here. A 13-minute period to locate three properties, obtain access and deliver three parcels is normal loading/unloading activity. It is qualitatively different from static parking of the kind considered in ParkingEye v Beavis. There is no evidence that the vehicle was left for a substantial period, or that it occupied a marked bay contrary to any clear prohibition.
Any ambiguity as to whether the operator’s “parking conditions” extend to short delivery stops must be construed contra proferentem against the drafter. On a proper construction, the driver was not in breach of the signage. There was therefore no contractual breach.
4. Inconsistency between a permit-only scheme and the alleged contractual charge
The operator’s documentation adopts two inconsistent positions. On the one hand, CPM asserts that only vehicles pre-registered in its e-permit system are authorised to park, implying that other vehicles have no permission to be there. On the other, CPM asserts that every driver who stops is deemed to have accepted a contract to pay £100 for “breach of any term or condition”.
If a vehicle truly has no permission to park, at most there might be a trespass. Any cause of action in trespass belongs to the landowner, not CPM, and would sound in nominal damages only. Conversely, if CPM says that all motorists, including non-permit holders, are offered a contractual licence to stop on terms, then it cannot, in the same breath, describe the driver as “unauthorised”. The operator’s own characterisation of the vehicle as “not registered” and therefore unauthorised is inconsistent with the contention that a binding contract to pay £100 was nonetheless formed.
5. Unfairness and disproportionality of the charge
Even if, contrary to the submissions above, a contractual term were engaged, imposing a £100 charge on a delivery driver lawfully attending at the request of residents, for a brief period of loading/unloading, is penal and unfair.
The site is not a retail car park where there is a commercial justification akin to that identified in Beavis. There is no legitimate interest in imposing a large charge on delivery vehicles performing essential services to residents. The operator has adduced no evidence of any commercial or operational justification. The charge is out of all proportion to any legitimate interest and functions as a penalty, which is unenforceable at common law and unfair under the CRA 2015.
For all of these reasons, the charge is not lawful or recoverable in contract or statute. The appeal should be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.
I wish to lodge a formal complaint against United Trade and Industry Limited, trading as the Independent Appeals Service (IAS). The IAS presents itself as an independent adjudicator of consumer disputes in the private parking sector. In reality, its processes are deliberately engineered to frustrate consumers and deny them a fair hearing.
The most egregious example is the restriction imposed on appellants when responding to an operator’s prima facie case. Consumers are limited to 1,000 words and are blocked from pasting text into the IAS webform. This restriction does not apply to the initial appeal, only to the rebuttal stage, where it matters most. Operators are free to submit extensive evidence and argument, yet consumers are deliberately prevented from responding in kind. This is not a neutral design choice; it is a calculated obstruction that suppresses consumer input and tilts the process in favour of operators.
These practices breach core principles of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024:
1. Fairness and transparency in consumer contracts (Part 4, Chapter 1): Consumers must be given a fair opportunity to present their case. Arbitrary word limits and technical barriers are unfair terms in practice, as they materially disadvantage one party.
2. Prohibition of misleading and aggressive practices (Part 3, Chapter 2): By presenting itself as an independent adjudicator while deliberately restricting consumer participation, the IAS engages in a misleading practice. It creates the false impression of impartiality while structurally favouring operators.
3. Duty not to frustrate consumer rights (general consumer protection principles): The IAS’s deliberate blocking of text pasting is a direct frustration of consumers’ ability to exercise their right to challenge evidence.
4. Conflict of interest undermining independence: United Trade and Industry Ltd owns the International Parking Community (IPC), the trade association representing the very operators whose cases the IAS adjudicates. This dual role creates a structural conflict of interest. The IAS cannot credibly claim independence while being owned by the same entity that represents one side of the dispute.
Taken together, these practices amount to a breach of the DMCC’s requirement that consumer redress mechanisms be fair, transparent, and free from conflicts of interest. The IAS is not a genuine independent appeals service; it is a mechanism designed to give the appearance of fairness while systematically disadvantaging consumers.
I therefore request that regulators investigate United Trade and Industry Ltd’s operation of the IAS. The 1,000‑word limit and the deliberate blocking of text pasting should be condemned as unfair practices under the DMCC. The ownership link between United Trade and Industry Ltd and the IPC should be recognised as a structural conflict of interest that disqualifies the IAS from being treated as an independent adjudicator. Consumers deserve a process that enables them to present their case fully and fairly, not one that deliberately frustrates them for no legitimate reason.
This is my response to the operator’s prima facie case. I rely on the following submissions to show that the parking charge is not recoverable in law and should be cancelled.
1. Failure to establish keeper liability under Schedule 4 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012
The operator’s Notice to Keeper (“NtK”) purports to rely upon Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“PoFA”) by reproducing the warning required by paragraph 9(2)(f). Having chosen to invoke statutory keeper liability, the operator must comply strictly with all of the mandatory conditions in paragraph 9. Any material defect is fatal to keeper liability.
The NtK fails to comply with paragraph 9(2)(e). That paragraph requires the creditor to (a) state that it does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver; and (b) invite the keeper either to pay the unpaid parking charges, or, if not the driver, to notify the creditor of the driver’s name and service address and to pass the notice to the driver.
The NtK does not contain the required statement that the creditor does not know the driver’s name and address. Nor does it contain a compliant invitation in the terms envisaged by PoFA. Instead, it is framed primarily as a demand that the keeper pay the charge, with a separate instruction that, if the keeper was not the driver, they “should notify” CPM of the driver’s details and pass the notice on. That is not the statutory wording and does not satisfy paragraph 9(2)(e). The omission is significant because PoFA represents a statutory derogation from the ordinary rule that only the driver is liable.
In the absence of full compliance with paragraph 9, the operator cannot transfer liability from the unidentified driver to the keeper. Any assertion of keeper liability in reliance on PoFA is misconceived as a matter of law. The only person who could, in principle, be liable is the driver, who has not been identified and whose liability has not been proved.
2. The driver was an authorised visitor engaged in deliveries, not an “unauthorised” parker
The operator’s case theory, as expressed in the NtK and signage, is that only vehicles “registered” with CPM and holding a valid e-permit may park, and that others are in some sense unauthorised. That framework is wholly inapt to the facts of this case.
The evidence includes the driver’s delivery manifest from the material date and time. It shows three separate deliveries to addresses at Eagling Close within the 13-minute period relied upon by the operator. The vehicle was present solely to perform those deliveries.
In law and in common sense, a delivery driver attending at the request of three occupiers is an authorised visitor, present pursuant to the implied licence and invitation of those occupiers. The driver was not on the land gratuitously or for their own convenience. Any suggestion that the vehicle was “not authorised” or “not permitted” to attend is untenable on these facts.
3. Loading and unloading do not amount to “parking” on these facts
The operator’s signs regulate “parking” in marked bays and purport to prohibit parking on roadways, yellow lines and similar areas. They do not expressly address or forbid the temporary stopping of a commercial vehicle for the purposes of loading and unloading parcels to residents.
The Court of Appeal authority in Jopson v Homeguard [2016] (Oxford County Court, HHJ Harris QC, appeal) distinguishes “parking” from the temporary stopping for loading/unloading at residential premises. The learned judge held that brief stopping in order to unload goods is a normal and necessary adjunct to the use of premises and does not fall within the ordinary meaning of “parking” in such contexts.
Those principles are directly analogous here. A 13-minute period to locate three separate properties, obtain access and deliver three parcels is entirely consistent with normal loading/unloading activity. It is qualitatively different from the kind of static parking with which consumer parking charges such as in ParkingEye v Beavis are concerned. There is no evidence that the vehicle was ever left for a substantial period, or that it occupied a marked bay contrary to a clearly expressed prohibition.
Any ambiguity as to whether the operator’s “parking conditions” extend to short operational delivery stops must be construed contra proferentem against the drafter. On a proper construction, the driver was not in breach of the signage at all. There was therefore no contractual breach.
4. Inconsistency between a permit-only scheme and the alleged contractual charge
The operator’s documentation attempts to occupy two mutually inconsistent positions. On the one hand, CPM asserts that only vehicles pre-registered in its e-permit system are authorised to park, implying that other vehicles have no permission to be there. On the other, CPM asserts that every driver who stops is deemed to have accepted a contract to pay £100 in the event of “breach of any term or condition”.
If a vehicle truly has no permission to park at all, the position in law is that at most there might be a trespass. Any cause of action in trespass belongs to the landowner, not to CPM, and would sound in nominal damages only. Conversely, if CPM says that all motorists, including non-permit holders, are offered a contractual licence to stop on terms, then they cannot, in the same breath, describe the driver as “unauthorised”. The operator’s own characterisation of the vehicle as “not registered” and therefore unauthorised sits uneasily with the contention that a binding contract to pay £100 was nonetheless formed.
This internal inconsistency further undermines the operator’s case. It is not open to CPM to convert what is in essence an alleged trespass by an “unauthorised” vehicle into a contractual penalty where no clear and lawful contractual offer was made to that class of road user.
5. Unfairness and disproportionality of the charge
Even if, contrary to the submissions above, a contractual term were engaged, the imposition of a £100 charge upon a delivery driver lawfully attending at the request of residents, for a brief period of loading/unloading, is penal and unfair.
The site is not a retail car park where there is a commercial justification akin to that identified in ParkingEye v Beavis. There is no legitimate interest in imposing a large charge on delivery vehicles performing essential services to residents. The operator has adduced no evidence of any commercial or operational justification for such a sanction in this context. The charge is therefore out of all proportion to any legitimate interest and functions as a penalty, which is unenforceable at common law and unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
Conclusion
In summary:
(a) The NtK fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of PoFA Schedule 4, paragraph 9(2)(e). CPM cannot rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable.
(b) The operator has not proved the identity or liability of the driver.
(c) On the evidence, the driver was an authorised visitor engaged in deliveries and not “parking” in the relevant sense; there was no breach of any properly construed term.
(d) The operator’s own materials are internally inconsistent as between a permit-only, “unauthorised” theory and a contractual charge theory.
(e) In any event, the £100 charge is penal and unfair when applied to a short delivery stop and is not saved by ParkingEye v Beavis.
For all of these reasons, the charge is not lawful or recoverable in contract or statute. The appeal should be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.
We need to see the evidence referred to.
The IAS appeal will not be successful. The only way to not have to pay these scammers is to wait for them to try and litigate without the county court small claims track. That is when you would win this.
It would help if you can show us an image of the terms sign in place. It is highly likely that no contract was formed with the driver if it says Parking only for authorised users or something similar.
You can submit the following genetic IAS appeal, if only to frustrate the scammers and for the record. They will likely provide images of their signs in their prima facie evidence. But don't hold your breath:QuoteI am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The parking operator bears the burden of proof. It must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that it has lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in its own name. I therefore require the operator to provide the following:1. Strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage that was in place on the date in question, at the exact location of the alleged contravention. This must include a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the signs in situ. The operator must demonstrate that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the IPC Code of Practice that was valid at the time of the alleged contravention, including requirements relating to font size, positioning, and the communication of key terms.
2. Strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the IAS assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
3. Strict proof that the enforcement mechanism (e.g. ANPR or manual patrol) is reliable, synchronised, maintained, and calibrated regularly. The operator must prove the vehicle was present for the full duration alleged and not simply momentarily on site, potentially within a permitted consideration or grace period as defined by the PPSCoP.
4. Strict proof that the Notice to Keeper complies with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), if the operator is attempting to rely on keeper liability. Any failure to comply with the mandatory wording or timelines in Schedule 4 of PoFA renders keeper liability unenforceable.
5. Strict proof that the NtK was posted in time for it to have been given within the relevant period. The PPSCoP section 8.1.2(d) Note 2 requires that the operator must retain a record of the date of posting of a notice, not simply of that notice having been generated (e.g. the date that any third-party Mail Consolidator actually put it in the postal system.)
6. The IAS claims that its assessors are “qualified solicitors or barristers”. Yet there is no way to verify this. Decisions are unsigned, anonymised, and unpublished. There is no transparency, no register of assessors, and no way for a motorist to assess the legal credibility of the individual supposedly adjudicating their appeal. If the person reading this really is legally qualified, they will know that without strict proof of landowner authority (VCS v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 186), no claim can succeed. They will also know that clear and prominent signage is a prerequisite for contract formation (ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67), and that keeper liability under PoFA is only available where strict statutory conditions are met.
If the assessor chooses to overlook these legal requirements and accept vague assertions or redacted documents from the operator, that will speak for itself—and lend further weight to the growing concern that this appeals service is neither independent nor genuinely legally qualified.
In short, I dispute this charge in its entirety and require full evidence of compliance with the law, industry codes of practice, and basic contractual principles.
Hello.
So, I have sent in your appeal and the IAS have responded:
https://ibb.co/rT8r5bQ
https://ibb.co/hFXWfVGq
How shall I respond?
Can you post up photos of the signage?I went back and took photos of the signage and location.
If deliveries were been made then Jobson v Homeguard could come into this.
Was the drivers ID given in the appeal?
Can you show us the exact wording of the appeal?This is a copy of the appeal: https://ibb.co/Xfcx7z75
I will have to return to the location to get a photo of their signage (if any), and no, the driver's ID was not given in the appeal, only mentioned as the RK in the appeal.
Can you post up photos of the signage?
If deliveries were been made then Jobson v Homeguard could come into this.
Was the drivers ID given in the appeal?
I will have to return to the location to get a photo of their signage (if any), and no, the driver's ID was not given in the appeal, only mentioned as the RK in the appeal.
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The parking operator bears the burden of proof. It must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that it has lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in its own name. I therefore require the operator to provide the following:1. Strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage that was in place on the date in question, at the exact location of the alleged contravention. This must include a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the signs in situ. The operator must demonstrate that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the IPC Code of Practice that was valid at the time of the alleged contravention, including requirements relating to font size, positioning, and the communication of key terms.
2. Strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the IAS assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
3. Strict proof that the enforcement mechanism (e.g. ANPR or manual patrol) is reliable, synchronised, maintained, and calibrated regularly. The operator must prove the vehicle was present for the full duration alleged and not simply momentarily on site, potentially within a permitted consideration or grace period as defined by the PPSCoP.
4. Strict proof that the Notice to Keeper complies with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), if the operator is attempting to rely on keeper liability. Any failure to comply with the mandatory wording or timelines in Schedule 4 of PoFA renders keeper liability unenforceable.
5. Strict proof that the NtK was posted in time for it to have been given within the relevant period. The PPSCoP section 8.1.2(d) Note 2 requires that the operator must retain a record of the date of posting of a notice, not simply of that notice having been generated (e.g. the date that any third-party Mail Consolidator actually put it in the postal system.)
6. The IAS claims that its assessors are “qualified solicitors or barristers”. Yet there is no way to verify this. Decisions are unsigned, anonymised, and unpublished. There is no transparency, no register of assessors, and no way for a motorist to assess the legal credibility of the individual supposedly adjudicating their appeal. If the person reading this really is legally qualified, they will know that without strict proof of landowner authority (VCS v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 186), no claim can succeed. They will also know that clear and prominent signage is a prerequisite for contract formation (ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67), and that keeper liability under PoFA is only available where strict statutory conditions are met.
If the assessor chooses to overlook these legal requirements and accept vague assertions or redacted documents from the operator, that will speak for itself—and lend further weight to the growing concern that this appeals service is neither independent nor genuinely legally qualified.
In short, I dispute this charge in its entirety and require full evidence of compliance with the law, industry codes of practice, and basic contractual principles.